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LATER GLEANINGS

W. E. GLADSTONE



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LATER GLEANINGS.

A NEW SERIES OF
GLEANINGS OF PAST YEARS.

BY THE RIGHT HON.
W. E. GLADSTONE.

THEOLOGICAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL.

SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1898.

NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THIS Edition is in all respects the same as the first, except that the article on *Ancient Beliefs in a Future State* has been substituted for the *General Introduction to Sheppard's Pictorial Bible*.



NOTICE.

The following title-page is included for those who desire to bind up this volume consecutively with those of the First Series of GLEANINGS OF PAST YEARS.



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GLEANINGS OF PAST YEARS,

1885-96.

BY THE RIGHT HON.

W. E. GLADSTONE.

VOL. VIII.

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


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I.

DAWN OF CREATION AND OF WORSHIP.*

1885.†

AMONG recent works on the origin and history of religions by distinguished authors, a somewhat conspicuous place may be awarded to the 'Prolégomènes de l'Histoire des Religions,' by Dr. Réville, Professor in the College of France, and Hibbert Lecturer in 1884. The volume has been translated into English by Mr. Squire, and the translation comes forth with all the advantage, and it is great, which can be conferred by an Introduction from the pen of Professor Max Müller; and it appears, if I may presume so to speak of it, to be characterized, among other merits, by marked ingenuity and acuteness, breadth of field, great felicity of phrase, evident candour of intention, and abundant courtesy.

Whether its contents are properly placed as *prolegomena* may at once be questioned; for surely the proper office of *prolegomena* is to present preliminaries, and not results. Such is not, however, the aim of this work. It starts from assuming the subjective origin of all

* Reprinted from the *Nineteenth Century*.

† See the 'Prolegomena to the History of Religions,' by Dr. Réville. My references throughout are to the translation by Mr. Squire (Williams & Norgate, 1884).

religions, which are viewed as so many answers to the call of a strong human appetite for that kind of food, and are examined as the several varieties of one and the same species. The conclusions of opposing inquirers, however, are not left to be confuted by a collection of facts and testimonies drawn from historical investigation, but are thrust out of the way beforehand in this preface; for, after all, *prolegomena* can be nothing but a less homely phrase for a preface. These inquirers are so many pretenders, who have obstructed the passage of the rightful heir to his throne, and they are to be put summarily out of the way, as disturbers of the public peace. The method pursued appears to be not to allow the facts and arguments to dispose of them, but to condemn them before the cause is heard. I do not know how to reconcile this method with Dr. Réville's declaration that he aims (p. vi.) at proceeding in a "strictly scientific spirit." It might be held that such a spirit required the regular presentation of the evidence before the delivery of the verdict upon it. In any case I venture to observe that these are not truly *prolegomena*, but *epilegomena* to a History of Religions not yet placed before us.

The first enemy whom Dr. Réville despatches is M. de Bonald, as the champion of the doctrine that "in the very beginning of the human race the creative power revealed to the first men by supernatural means the essential principles of religious truth," together with "language and even the art of writing" (pp. 35, 36).

In passing, Dr. Réville observes that "the religious schools, which maintain the truth of a primitive revelation, are guided by a very evident theological interest" (*ibid.*); the Protestant, to fortify the authority of the

Bible ; and the Roman Catholic, to prop the infallibility of the Church.

It is doubtless true that the doctrine of a primitive revelation tends to fortify the authority of religion. But is it not equally true, and equally obvious, that the denial of a primitive revelation tends to undermine it ? and, if so, might it not be retorted upon the school of Dr. Réville that the schools which deny a primitive revelation are guided by a very evident anti-theological interest ?

Against this antagonist Dr. Réville observes, *inter alia* (p. 37), that an appeal to the supernatural is *per se* inadmissible ; that a divine revelation, containing the sublime doctrines of the purest inspiration, given to man at an age indefinitely remote, and in a state of "absolute ignorance," is "infinitely hard" to imagine ; that it is not favoured by analogy ; and that it contradicts all that we know of prehistoric man (p. 40). Thus far it might perhaps be contended in reply, (1) that the preliminary objection to the supernatural is a pure *petitio principii*, and wholly repugnant to "scientific method ;" (2) that it is not inconceivable that revelation might be indefinitely graduated, as well as human knowledge and condition ; (3) that it is in no way repugnant to analogy, if the greatest master of analogy, Bishop Butler,* may be heard upon the subject ; and (4) that our earliest information about the races from which we are least remote, Aryan, Semitic, Accadian, or Egyptian, offers no contradiction and no obstacle to the idea of their having received, or inherited, portions of some knowledge divinely revealed. I will take upon me to

* 'Analogy,' P. II. ch. ii. § 7.

add, that they offer many topics of support to such a supposition.

But I do not now enter upon these topics, as I have a more immediate and defined concern with the work of Dr. Réville.

It only came within the last few months to my knowledge that, at a period when my cares and labours of a distinct order were much too absorbing to allow of any attention to archæological history, Dr. Réville had done me the honour to select me as the representative of those writers who find warrant for the assertion of a primitive revelation in the testimony of the Holy Scriptures.

This is a distinction which I do not at all deserve ; first, because Dr. Réville might have placed in the field champions much more competent and learned* than myself ; secondly, because I have never attempted to give the proof of such a warrant. I have never written *ex professo* on the subject of it ; but it is true that, in a work published nearly thirty years ago, when destructive criticism was less advanced than it now is, I assumed it as a thing generally received, at least in this country. Upon some of the points, which group themselves round that assumption, my views, like those of many other inquirers, have been stated more crudely at an early, and more maturely at more than one later period. I admit that variation or development imposes a hardship upon critics, notwithstanding all their desire to be just ; especially, may I say, upon such critics as, traversing ground of almost boundless extent, can hardly, except in the rarest cases, be minutely and closely acquainted with every portion of it.

* I will only name one of the most recent, Dr. Reusch, the author of 'Bibel und Natur' (Bonn, 1876).

I also admit to Dr. Réville, and indeed I contend by his side, that in an historical inquiry the mere authority of Scripture cannot be alleged in proof of the existence of a primitive revelation. So to allege it is a preliminary assumption of the supernatural, and is in my view a manifest departure from the laws of "scientific" procedure: as palpable a departure, may I venture to say? as that preliminary exclusion of the supernatural which I have already presumed to notice. My own offence, if it be one, was of another character; and was committed in the early days of Homeric study, when my eyes perhaps were dazzled with the amazing richness and variety of the results which reward all close investigation of the text of Homer, so that objects were blurred for a time in my view, which soon came to stand with greater clearness before me.

I had better perhaps state at once what my contention really is. It is, first, that many important pictures drawn, and indications given, in the Homeric poems supply such evidence as cannot be confuted not only of an ideal but of an historical relationship to the Hebrew traditions, (1) and mainly, as they are recorded in the Book of Genesis; (2) as less authentically to be gathered from the later Hebrew learning; and (3) as illustrated from extraneous sources. Secondly, any attempt to expound the Olympian mythology of Homer wholesale, and by simple reference to a solar theory, or even to Nature worship in a larger sense, is simply a plea for a verdict against the evidence. It is also true that I have an unshaken belief in a Divine Revelation, not resting on assumption, but made obligatory upon me by reason. But I hold the last of these convictions entirely apart from the others, and I derived the first and second not

from preconception, of which I had not a grain, but from the poems themselves, as purely as I derived my knowledge of the Peloponnesian War from Thucydides or his interpreters.

The great importance of this contention I do not deny. I have produced in its favour a great mass of evidence, which, as far as I have seen, there has been no serious endeavour, if indeed any endeavour, to repel. Dr. Réville observes that my views have been subjected to "very profound criticism" by Sir G. Cox in his learned work on Aryan mythology (p. 41). That is indeed a very able criticism; but it is addressed entirely to the statements of my earliest Homeric work.* Now, apart from the question whether those statements have been rightly understood (which I cannot admit), that which he attacks is beyond and outside of the proposition which I have given above. Sir G. Cox has not attempted to decide the question whether there was a primitive revelation, or whether it may be traced in Homer. And I may say that I am myself so little satisfied with the precise form, in which my general conclusions were originally clothed, that I have not reprinted and shall not reprint the work, which has become very rare, only appearing now and then in some catalogue, and at a high price. When there are representatives living and awake, why disturb the ashes of the dead? In later works, reaching from 1865 to 1875,† I have confessed to the modification of my results, and have stated the case in terms which appear to me, using

* 'Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age,' 3 vols. Oxford, 1858.

† 'Address to the University of Edinburgh' (Murray, 1865); 'Juventus Mundi' (Macmillan, 1868); 'Primer of Homer' (Macmillan, 1878); especially see Preface to 'Juventus Mundi,' p. 1.

the common phrase, to be those yielded by the legitimate study of comparative religion. But why should those, who think it a sound method of comparative religion to match together the Vedas, the Norse legends, and the Egyptian remains, think it to be no process of comparative religion to bring together, not vaguely and loosely, but in searching detail, certain traditions of the Book of Genesis and those recorded in the Homeric poems, and to argue that their resemblances may afford proof of a common origin, without any anticipatory assumption as to what that origin may ultimately prove to be?

It will hardly excite surprise, after what has now been written, when I say I am now unable to accept as mine any one of the propositions which Dr. Réville (pp. 41-2) affiliates to me. (1) I do not hold that there was a "systematic" or wilful corruption of a primitive religion. (2) I do not hold that all the mythologies are due to any such corruption systematic or otherwise. (3) I do not hold that no part of them sprang out of the deification of natural facts. (4) I do not hold that the ideas conveyed in the Book of Genesis, or in any Hebrew tradition, were developed in the form of dogma, as is said by Sir G. Cox,* or in "six great doctrines" as is conceived by Dr. Réville; and (5) I am so far from ever having held that there was "a primitive orthodoxy" revealed to the first men (p. 43) that I have carefully from the first referred not to developed doctrine, but to rudimentary indications of what are now developed and established truths. So that, although Dr. Réville asks me for proof, I decline to supply proofs

* 'Aryan Mythology,' vol. i. p. 15.

of what I disbelieve. What I have supplied proofs of is the appearance in the Poems of a number of traits, incongruous in various degrees with their immediate environment, but having such marked and characteristic resemblances to the Hebrew tradition as to require of us, in the character of rational inquirers, the admission of a common origin, just as the markings, which are sometimes noticed upon the coats of horses and donkeys, are held to require the admission of their relationship to the zebra.

It thus appears that Dr. Réville has discharged his pistol in the air, for my Homeric propositions involve no assumption as to a revelation contained in the Book of Genesis, while he has not *ex professo* contested my statements of an historical relationship between some traditions of that book and those of the Homeric poems. But I will now briefly examine (1) the manner in which Dr. Réville handles the Book of Genesis, and (2) the manner in which he undertakes, by way of specimen, to construe the mythology of Homer, and enlists it, by comparison, in the support of his system of interpretation. And first with the first-named of these two subjects.

Entering a protest against assigning to the Book "a dictatorial authority," that is, I presume, against its containing any Divine revelation to anybody, he passes on to examine its contents. It contains, he says, scientific errors, of which (p. 42, *n.*) he specifies three. His charges are that (1) it speaks of the heaven as a solid vault; (2) it places the creation of the stars after that of the earth, and so places them solely for its use; (3) it introduces the vegetable kingdom before that kingdom could be subjected to the action of solar light. All these condemnations are quietly enunciated in a

note, as if they were subject to no dispute. Let us see.

As to the first: if our scholars are right in their judgment, just made known to the world by the recent revision of the Old Testament, the "firmament" is, in the Hebrew original, * *not* a solid vault, but an expanse. As to the second (a) it is *not* said in the sacred text that the stars were made solely for the use of the earth; (b) it is true that no other use is mentioned. That is to say, in the case of the stars, no use or time is named. They give us light, but an ineffectual light; and the reference to them is little more than parenthetical, and is in keeping with that secondary character, which alone they hold in reference to the earth. For, all along, we must here inquire what was the purpose of the narrative? Not to rear cosmic philosophers, but to furnish ordinary, and especially primitive, men with some idea of what the Creator had done in the way of providing for them a home, and giving them a place in nature.

The assertion that the stars are stated to have been "created" after the earth is more serious. But here it becomes necessary first of all to notice the recital in this part of the indictment. In the language of Dr. Réville, the Book speaks of the creation of the stars after the formation of the earth. Now, curiously enough, the Book says nothing either of the "formation" of the earth, or of the "creation" of the stars. It says in its first line that "in the beginning God *created* the heaven and the earth." It says further on,† "He *made* the stars also." Can it be urged that this is a fanciful distinction between

* The *σπεῖωμα* of the Septuagint is construed in conformity with the Hebrew.

† Gen. i. 16.

creating on the one hand and making, forming, or fashioning on the other? Dante did not think so, for, speaking of the Divine Will, he says:—

“Ciò ch’ Ella cria, e che Natura face.” *

Luther did not think so, for he uses *schuf* in the first verse, and *machte* in the sixteenth. The English Translators and their Revisers did not think so, for they use the words “created” and “made” in the two passages respectively. The main question, however, is what did the author of the Book think, and what did he intend to convey? The LXX drew no distinction, probably for the simple reason that, as the idea of creation proper was not familiar to the Greeks, their language conveyed no word better than *poiein* to express it, which is also the proper word for fashioning or making. But the Hebrew, it seems, had the distinction, and by the writer of Genesis i. it has been strictly, to Dr. Réville I might almost say scientifically, followed. He uses the word “created” on the three grand occasions (1) of the beginning of the mighty work (v. 1); (2) of the beginning of animal life (v. 21) “And God created great whales,” and every living creature that peoples the waters; (3) of the yet more important beginning of rational and spiritual life; “so God created man in His own image” (v. 27). In every other instance, the simple command is recited, or a word implying less than creation is employed.

From this very marked mode of use, it is surely plain that a marked distinction of sense was intended by the sacred writer. I will not attempt a definition of the

* ‘Paradiso,’ iii. 87.

distinction further than this, that the one phrase points more to calling into a separate or individual existence, the other more to shaping and fashioning the conditions of that existence; the one to *quid*, the other to *quale*. Our Earth, created in v. 1, undergoes structural change, different arrangement of material, in v. 9. After this, and in the fourth day, comes not the original creation, but the location, or exhibition in the firmament, of the sun and the moon. Of their "creation" nothing particular has been said; for no use, palpable to man, was associated with it before their perfect, or at least sufficient, equipment. Does it not seem allowable to suppose that in the "heavens" * (v. 1), of which after the first outset we hear no more, were included the planetary bodies? In any case what is afterwards conveyed is not the calling into existence of the sun and moon, but the assignment to them of a certain place and orbit respectively, with a light-giving power. Is there the smallest inconsistency in a statement which places the emergence of our land, and its separation from the sea, and the commencement of vegetable life, before the more full and gathered concentration of light in the sun, and its reflection on the moon and the planets? In the gradual severance of other elements, would not the severance of the luminous body, or force, be gradual also? And why, let me ask of Dr. Réville, as there would plainly be light diffused before there was light concentrated, why may not that light diffused have been

* In our translation, and in the recent Revision, the singular is used. But we are assured that the Hebrew word is plural (Bishop of Winchester on Genesis i. 1 in the Speaker's Bible). If so taken, we have the creation, visible to us, treated conjointly in verses 1-5, distributively in verses 6-19; surely a most orderly arrangement.

sufficient for the purposes of vegetation? There was soil, there was atmosphere, there was moisture, there was light. What more could be required? Need we go beyond our constant experience to be aware that the process of vegetation, though it may be slackened or suspended, is not arrested, when, through the presence of cloud and vapour, the sun's globe becomes to us invisible? The same observations may apply to the light of the planets; while as to the other stars, such as were then perceptible to the human eye, we know nothing. The planets, being luminous bodies only through the action of the sun, could not be luminous until such a degree of light, or of light-force, was accumulated upon or in the sun, as to make them spherically luminous, instead of being either

"silent as the moon,
When she deserts the night
Hid in her vacant interlunar cave,"*

or at least unprovided with definite luminous figure. Is it not then the fact, thus far, that the impeachment of the Book has fallen to the ground? There remains to add only one remark, the propriety of which is, I think, indisputable. Easy comprehension and impressive force are the objects to be aimed at in a composition at once popular and summary; but these cannot always be had without some departure from accurate classification, and from the order of minute detail. It seems much more easy to justify the language of the opening verses of Genesis than, for example, the convenient usage by which we affirm that the sun rises, or mounts above the horizon, and sets, or descends below it, when we

* 'Samson Agonistes,'

know perfectly well that he does neither the one nor the other. As to the third charge of scientific error, that the vegetable kingdom appeared before it could be subjected to the action of solar light, it has already been in substance disposed of. If the light now appropriated to the sun alone was gradually gathering towards and round his centre, why may it not have performed its proper office in contributing to vegetation when once the necessary degree of severance between solid and fluid, between wet and dry, had been effected? And this is just what had been described in the formation of the firmament, and the separation of land from sea.

More singular still seems to be the next observation offered by Dr. Réville in his compound labour to satisfy his readers, first, that there is no revelation in Genesis, and secondly that, if there be, it is one which has no serious or relevant meaning. He comes to the remarkable expression, in v. 26, "Let *us* make man in our own image." There has, it appears, been much difference of opinion even among the Jews on the meaning of this verse. The Almighty addresses, as some think, His own powers; as others think, the angels; others, the earth; other writers, especially, as it appears, Germans, have understood this to be a plural of dignity, after the manner of kings. Others, of the rationalising school, conceive the word Elohim to be a relic of polytheism. The ancient Christian interpreters,* from the Apostle Barnabas onwards, find in these words an indication of a plurality in the Divine Unity. Dr. Réville (p. 43)

* On this expression, I refer again to the commentary of Bishop Harold Browne. Bishop Mant supplies an interesting list of testimonies.

holds that this is "simply the royal plural used in Hebrew as in many other languages," or else, "and more probably," that it is an appeal to the Bené Elohim or angels. But is not this latter meaning a direct assault upon the supreme truth of the Unity of God? If he chooses the former, from whence does he derive his knowledge that this "royal plural" was used in Hebrew? Will the royal plural account for (Gen. iii. 22), "when the man is become as one of us"? and would George the Second, if saying of Charles Edward, "the man is become as one of us," have intended to convey a singular or a plural meaning? Can we disprove the assertion of Bishop Harold Browne, that this plurality of dignity is unknown to the language of Scripture? And further, if we make the violent assumption that the Christian Church with its one voice is wrong and Dr. Réville right, and that the words were not meant to convey the idea of plurality, yet, if they have been such as to lead all Christendom to see in them this idea through 1800 years, how can he be sure that they did not convey a like signification to the earliest hearers or readers of the Book of Genesis?

The rest of Dr. Réville's criticism is directed rather to the significance or propriety, than to the truth, of the record. It is not necessary to follow his remarks in detail, but it will help the reader to judge how far even a perfectly upright member of the scientific and comparative school can indulge an unconscious bias, if notice be taken in a single instance of his method of comparing. He compares together the two parts of the prediction that the seed of the woman shall bruise the head of the serpent, and that the serpent shall bruise the heel of the seed of the woman (iii. 15); and he

conceives the head and the heel to be so much upon a par in their relation to the faculties and the vitality of a man that he can find here nothing to indicate which shall get the better, or, in his own words, "on which side shall be the final victory" (p. 45). St. Paul seems to have taken a different view when he wrote, "the God of peace shall bruise Satan under your feet shortly" (Rom. xvi. 20).

Moreover "our author" (in Dr. Réville's phrase) is censured because he "takes special care to point out" (p. 44) "that the first pair are as yet strangers to the most elementary notions of morality," inasmuch as they are unclothed, yet without shame; nay, even, as he feelingly says, "without the least shame." In what the morality of the first pair consisted, this is hardly the place to discuss. But let us suppose for a moment that their morality was simply the morality of a little child, the undeveloped morality of obedience, without distinctly formed conceptions of an ethical or abstract standard. Is it not plain that their feelings would have been exactly what the Book describes (Gen. ii. 25), and yet that in their loving obedience to their Father and Creator they would certainly have had a germ, let me say an opening bud, of morality? But this proposition, taken alone, by no means does justice to the case. Dr. Réville would probably put aside with indifference or contempt all that depends upon the dogma of the Fall. And yet there can be no more rational idea, no idea more palpably sustained, whether by philosophy or by experience. Namely this idea: that the commission of sin, that is the act of deliberately breaking a known law of duty, injures the nature and composition of the being who commits it. It injures that nature by

deranging it, by altering the proportion of its parts and powers, by introducing an inward disorder and rebellion of the lower against the higher, too mournfully corresponding with all the disorder and rebellion produced outwardly, as towards God, of which the first sin was the fountain head. Such is, I believe, the language of Christian theology, and in particular of St. Augustine, one of its prime masters. On this matter I apprehend that Dr. Réville, when judging the author of Genesis, judges him without regard to his fundamental ideas and aims, one of which was to convey that before sinning man was a being morally and physically balanced, and nobly pure in every faculty; and that, by and from his sinning, the sense of shame found a proper and necessary place in a nature which before was only open to the sense of duty and of reverence.

One further observation only. Dr. Réville seems to "score one" when he finds (Gen. iv. 26) that Seth had a son, and that "then began men to call on the name of the Lord;" "but not," he adds, "as the result of a recorded revelation." Here at last he has found, or seemed to find, the beginning of religion, and that beginning subjective, not revealed. So hastily, from the first aspect of the text, does he gather a verbal advantage, which, upon the slightest inquiry, would have disappeared, like dew in the morning sun. He assumes the rendering of a text which has been the subject of every kind of question and dispute, the only thing apparently agreed on by others being, that his interpretation is wholly excluded. Upon a disputed original, and a disputed interpretation of the disputed original, he founds a signification in flat contradiction to the whole of the former narrative, to Elohist and

Jehovist alike ; which narrative, if it represents anything, represents a continuity of active reciprocal relation between God and man both before and after the transgression. Not to mention differences of translation, which essentially change the meaning of the words, the text itself is given by the double authority of the Samaritan Pentateuch * and of the Septuagint in the singular number, which of itself wholly destroys the construction of Dr. Réville. I do not enter upon the difficult question of conflicting authorities : but I urge that it is unsafe to build an important conclusion upon a seriously controverted reading.†

In the criticisms, then, of Dr. Réville we find what rather tends to confirm than to impair the old-fashioned belief that there is a revelation in the Book of Genesis. With his argument outside this proposition I have not dealt. I make no assumption as to what is termed a verbal inspiration, and of course, in admitting the variety, I give up the absolute integrity of the text. Upon the presumable age of the book and its compilation I do not enter—not even to contest the opinion which brings it down below the age of Solomon—beyond observing that in every page it appears from internal evidence to belong to a remote antiquity. There is here no question of the chronology, or of the date of man, or of knowledge or ignorance in the primitive man ; or whether the element of parable enters into any portion

* See Bishop of Winchester's ' Commentary.'

† This perplexed question is discussed, in a sense adverse to the Septuagint, by the critic of the recent Revision, in the *Quarterly Review* for October, No. 322. The Revisers of the Old Testament state (Preface, p. vi.) that in a few cases of extreme difficulty they have set aside the Massoretic Text in favour of a reading from one of the Ancient Versions.

of the narrative ; or whether every statement of fact contained in the text of the Book, can now be made good. It is enough for my present purpose to point to the cosmogony, and the fourfold succession of the living organisms, as entirely harmonising, according to present knowledge, with belief in a revelation, and as presenting to the rejector of that belief a problem, which demands solution at his hands, and which he has not yet been able to solve. Whether this revelation was conveyed to the ancestors of the whole human race who have at the time or since existed, I do not know, and the Scripture does not appear to me to make the affirmation, even if they do not convey certain indications which favour a contrary opinion. Again, whether it contains the whole of the knowledge specially vouchsafed to the parents of the Noachian races, may be very doubtful ; though of course great caution must be exercised in regard to the particulars of any primæval tradition not derived from the text of the earliest among the sacred Books. I have thus far confined myself to rebutting objections. But I will now add some positive considerations which appear to me to sustain the ancient, and as I am persuaded impregnable, belief of Christians and of Jews concerning the inspiration of the Book. I offer them as one wholly destitute of that kind of knowledge which carries authority, and who speaks derivatively as best he can, after listening to teachers of repute and such as practise rational methods.

I understand the stages of the majestic process described in the Book of Genesis to be in general outline as follows :—

1. The point of departure is the formless mass, created by God, out of which the earth (and not the earth

alone) was shaped and constituted a thing of individual existence (vers. 1, 2).

2. The detachment and collection of light, leaving in darkness as it proceeded the still chaotic mass from which it was detached (vers. 3-5). The narrative assigning a space of time to each process appears to show that each was gradual, not instantaneous.

3. The detachment of light from darkness is followed by the detachment of wet from dry, and of solid from liquid, in the firmament, and on the face of the earth. Each of these operations occupies a "day;" and the conditions of vegetable life, as known to us by experience, being now provided, the order of the vegetable kingdom began (vers. 6-13).

4. Next comes the presentation to us of the heavenly bodies—sun, moon, and stars—in their definite forms, when the completion of the process of light-collection and concentration in the sun, and the due clearing of the intervening spaces, had enabled the central orb to illuminate us both with direct and with reflected light (vers. 14-19).

5. So far, we have been busy only with the adjustment of material agencies. We now arrive at the dawn of animated being; and a great transition seems to be marked as a kind of recommencement of the work, for the name of creation is again introduced. God created—

(a) The water-population;

(b) The air-population.

And they receive His benediction (vers. 20-23).

6. Pursuing this regular progression from the lower to the higher, from the simple to the complex, the text now gives us the work of the sixth "day," which supplies

the land-population — air and water having already been supplied. But in it there is a sub-division, and the transition from (c) animal to (d) man, like the transition from inanimate to animate, is again marked as a great occasion, a kind of recommencement. For this purpose the word “create” is a third time employed. “God created man in His own image,” and once more He gave benediction to this the final work of His hands, and endowed our race with its high dominion over what lived and what did not live (vers. 24–31).

I do not dwell on the cessation of the Almighty from the creating and (ii. 1) “finishing” work, which is the “rest” and marks the seventh “day,” because it introduces another order of considerations. But glancing back at the narrative which now forms the first Chapter, I offer perhaps a prejudiced, and in any case no more than a passing, remark. If we view it as popular narrative, it is singularly vivid, forcible, and effective ; if we take it as poem, it is indeed sublime. No wonder if it became classical and reappeared in the glorious devotions of the Hebrew people,* pursuing, in a great degree, the same order of topics as in the Book of Genesis.

But the question is not here of a lofty poem, or a skilfully constructed narrative: it is whether natural science, in the patient exercise of its high calling to examine facts, finds that the works of God cry out against what we have fondly believed to be His Word, and tell another tale ; or whether, in this nineteenth century of Christian progress, it substantially echoes

* Ps. civ. 2–20 ; cxxxvi. 5–9 ; and the Song of the Three Children in vers. 57–60.

back the majestic sound which, before physical science existed as a pursuit, went forth into all lands.

First, looking largely at the latter portion of the narrative, which describes the creation of living organisms, and waiving details, on some of which (as in ver. 24) the Septuagint seems to vary from the Hebrew; there is a grand fourfold division, set forth in an orderly succession of times as follows: on the fifth day—

1. The water-population ;

2. The air-population ;

and, on the sixth day,

3. The land-population of animals ;

4. The land-population consummated in man.

Now, this same fourfold order is understood to have been so affirmed in our time by natural science, that it may be taken as a demonstrated conclusion and established fact.* Then, I ask, how came Moses, or, not to cavil on the word, how came the author of the first Chapter of Genesis, to know that order, to possess knowledge which natural science has only within the present century for the first time dug out of the bowels of the earth? It is surely impossible to avoid the conclusion, first, that either this writer was gifted with faculties passing all human experience, or else his knowledge was divine. The first branch of the alternative is truly nominal and unreal. We know the sphere within which human inquiry toils. We know the heights to

* The proposition conveyed in this sentence requires some qualification. As regards the general sketch of the fourfold order, it is too succinct to convey anything material. But the candid reader will observe that while this order is stated generally, no attempt is made to assert the completeness of the outline, or to exclude the overlapping of periods, or the intermixture of processes, neither of which impair the force of the argument. See a following paper, 'Proem to Genesis.'

which the intuitions of genius may soar. We know that in certain cases genius anticipates science; as Homer, for example, in his account of the conflict of the four winds in sea-storms. But even in these anticipations, marvellous, and, so to speak, imperial as they are, genius cannot escape from one inexorable law. It must have materials of sense or experience to work with, and a *ποῦ στῶ* from whence to take its flight; and genius can no more tell, apart from some at least of the results attained by inquiry, what are the contents of the crust of the earth, than it could square the circle, or annihilate a fact.*

So stands this particular plea for a revelation of truth from God, a plea only to be met by questioning its possibility; that is, as Dr. Salmon† has observed with great force in a recent work, by suggesting that a Being, able to make man, is unable to communicate with the creature He has made. If, on the other hand, the objector confine himself to a merely negative position, and cast the burden of proof on those who believe in revelation, it is obvious to reply by a reference to the actual constitution of things. Had that constitution been normal or morally undisturbed, it might have been held that revelation as an *adminiculum*, an addition to our natural faculties, would itself have been a disturbance. But the disturbance has in truth been created in the other scale of the balance by departure from the Supreme Will, by the introduction of sin; and revelation,

* In conversation with Miss Burney ('Diary,' i. 576), Johnson, using language which sounds more disparaging than it really is, declares that 'Genius is nothing more than knowing the use of tools; but then there must be tools for it to use.'

† 'Introduction to the New Testament,' p. ix. Murray, 1885.

as a special remedy for a special evil, is a contribution towards symmetry, and towards restoration of the original equilibrium.

Thus far only the fourfold succession of living orders has been noticed. But among the persons of very high authority in natural science quoted by Dr. Reusch,* who held the general accordance of the Mosaic cosmogony with the results of modern inquiry, are Cuvier and Sir John Herschel. The words of Cuvier show he conceived that "every day" fresh confirmation from the purely human source accrued to the credit of Scripture. And since his day, for he cannot now be called a recent authority, this opinion appears to have received some remarkable illustrations.

Half a century ago, Dr. Whewell† discussed, under the name of the nebular hypothesis, that theory of rotation which had been indicated by Herschel, and more largely taught by La Place, as the probable method through which the solar system has taken its form. Carefully abstaining, at that early date, from a formal judgment on the hypothesis, he appears to discuss it with favour; and he shows that this hypothesis, which assumes "a beginning of the present state of things," ‡ is in no way adverse to the Mosaic cosmogony. The theory has received marked support from opposite quarters. In the 'Vestiges of Creation' it is frankly adopted; the very curious experiment of Professor

* 'Bibel und Natur,' pp. 2, 63. The words of Cuvier are: 'Moyses hat uns eine Kosmogonie hinterlassen, deren Genauigkeit mit jedem Tage in einer bewunderungswürdigern Weise bestätigt ist.' The declaration of Sir John Herschel was in 1864.

† Whewell's 'Astronomy and General Physics,' 1834, p. 181 *seqq.*

‡ Whewell, *op. cit.* p. 206.

Plateau is detailed at length on its behalf ;* and the author considers, with La Place, that the zodiacal light, on which Humboldt in his 'Kosmos' has dwelt at large, may be a remnant of the luminous atmosphere originally diffused around the sun. Dr. McCaul, in his very able argument on the Mosaic Record, quotes † Humboldt, Pfaff, and Mädler—a famous German astronomer—as adhering to it. It appears on the whole to be in possession of the field ; and McCaul observes ‡ that, “had it been devised for the express purpose of removing the supposed difficulties of the Mosaic record, it could hardly have been more to the purpose.” Even if we were, somewhat daringly, to conceive, with Dr. Réville, that the “creation,” the first gift of separate existence or configuration, to the planets is declared to have been subsequent to that of the earth, there seems to be no known law which excludes such a supposition, especially with respect to the larger and more distant of their number. These, it is to be noticed, are of great rarity as compared with the earth. Why should it be declared impossible that they should have taken a longer time in condensation, like in this point to the comets, which still continue in a state of excessive rarity ? Want of space forbids me to enter into further explanation ; but it requires much more serious efforts and objections than those of Dr. Réville to confute the statement that the extension of knowledge and of inquiry has confirmed the Mosaic record.

One word, however, upon the “days” of Genesis. We do not hear the authority of Scripture impeached

* ‘Vestiges,’ etc., pp. 11–15.

† ‘Aids to Faith,’ p. 210.

‡ *Ibid.*

on the ground that it assigns to the Almighty eyes and ears, hands, arms, and feet ; nay, even the emotions of the human being. This being so, I am unable to understand why any disparagement to the credit of the sacred books should ensue because, to describe the order and successive stages of the Divine working, these have been distributed into "days." What was the thing required in order to make this great procession of acts intelligible and impressive ? Surely it was to distribute the parts each into some integral division of time, having the character of something complete in itself, of a revolution, or an outset and return. There are but three such divisions familiarly known to man. Of these the day was the most familiar to human perceptions ; and probably on this account its figurative use is admitted to be found in prophetic texts, as, indeed, it largely pervades ancient and modern speech. Given the object in view, which indeed can hardly be questioned, does it not appear that the "day," more definitely separated than either month or year from what precedes and what follows, was appropriately chosen for the purpose of conveying the idea of development by gradation in the process which the Book sets forth ?

I now come to the last portion of my task, which is to follow Dr. Réville into his exposition of the Olympian mythology. Not, indeed, the Homeric or Greek religion alone, for he has considered the case of all religions, and disposes of them all with equal facility. Of any other system than the Olympian, it would be presumption in me to speak, as I have, beyond this limit, none but the most vague and superficial knowledge. But on the Olympian system in its earliest and least adulterated, namely its Homeric, development, whether with success

or not, I have freely employed a large share of such leisure as more than thirty years of my Parliamentary life, passed in freedom from the calls of office, have supplied. I hope that there is not in Dr. Réville's treatment of other systems that slightness of texture, and that facility and rapidity of conclusion, which seem to me to mark his performances in the Olympian field.

In the main he follows what is called the solar theory. In his widest view, he embraces no more than "the religion of nature" (pp. 94, 100), and he holds that all religion has sprung from the worship of objects visible and sensible.

His first essay is upon Heracles, whom I have found to be one of the most difficult and, so to speak, irreducible characters in the Olympian mythology. In the Tyrian system Heracles, as Melkart, says Dr. Réville in p. 95, is "a brazen god, the devourer of children, the terror of men;" but, without any loss of identity, he becomes in the Greek system "the great lawgiver, the tamer of monsters, the peacemaker, the liberator." I am deeply impressed with the danger that lurks in these summary and easy solutions; and I will offer a few words first on the Greek Heracles generally, next on the Homeric presentation of the character.

Dr. L. Schmidt has contributed to Smith's great Dictionary a large and careful article on Heracles; an article which may almost be called a treatise. Unlike Dr. Réville, to whom the matter is so clear, he finds himself out of his depth in attempting to deal with this highly incongruous character, which meets us at so many points, as a whole. But he perceives in the Heracles of Greece a mixture of fabulous and historic elements; and the mythical basis is not, according to

him, a transplanted Melkart, but is essentially Greek.* He refers to Buttmann's 'Mythologus' and Müller's 'Dorians' as the best treatises on the subject, "both of which regard the hero as a purely Greek character." Thus Dr. Réville appears to be in conflict with leading authorities, whom he does not confute, but simply ignores.

Homer himself may have felt the difficulty which Dr. Réville does not feel, for he presents to us, in one and the same passage, a divided Heracles. Whatever of him is not *eidolon* † dwells among the Olympian gods. This *eidolon*, however, is no mere shade, but something that sees and speaks, that mourns and threatens; no "lawgiver," or "peacemaker," or "liberator," but one from whom the other shades fly in terror, set in the place and company of sinners suffering for their sins, and presumably himself in the same predicament, as the sense of grief is assigned to him: it is in wailing that he addresses Odysseus.‡ Accordingly, while on earth, he is *thrasumemnon*, § *huperthumos*, ¶ a doer of *megala erga*, || which with Homer very commonly are crimes. He is profane, for he wounded Herè, the specially Achaian goddess; ** and he is treacherous, for he killed Iphitos, his host, in order to carry off his horses.†† A mixed character, no doubt, or he would not have had Hebè for a partner; but those which I have stated are some of the difficulties which Dr. Réville quietly rides over to describe him as lawgiver, peacemaker, and liberator. In Homer he is no lawgiver, and he never makes peace. But I proceed.

* Smith's 'Dict.' ii. 400.

† 'Od.' xi. 601-4.

‡ 'Od.' xi. 605-16.

§ 'Od.' xi. 267.

¶ 'Il.' xiv. 250.

|| 'Od.' xxi. 26.

** 'Il.' v. 392.

†† 'Od.' xxi. 26-30.

Nearly everything, with Dr. Réville, and, indeed, with his school, has to be pressed into the service of the solar theory; and if the evidence will not bear it, so much the worse for the evidence. Thus Ixion, tortured in the later Greek system on a wheel, which is sometimes represented as a burning wheel, is made (p. 105) to be the Sun; the luminary whose splendour and beneficence had rendered him, according to the theory, the centre of all Aryan worship. A sorry use to put him to; but let that pass. Now the occasion that supplies an Ixion and a burning wheel available for solarism—a system which prides itself above all things on its exhibiting the primitive state of things—is that Ixion had loved unlawfully the wife of Zeus. And first as to the wheel. We hear of it in Pindar;* but as a winged, not a burning wheel. This “solar” feature appears, I believe, nowhere but in the latest and most defaced and adulterated mythology. Next as to the punishment. It is of a more respectable antiquity. But some heed should surely be taken of the fact that the oldest authority upon Ixion is Homer; and that Homer affords no plea for a burning or any other wheel, for according to him,† instead of Ixion’s loving the wife of Zeus, it was Zeus who loved the wife of Ixion.

Errors, conveyed without testimony in a sentence, commonly require many sentences to confute them. I will not dwell on minor cases, or those purely fanciful; for mere fancies, which may be admired or the reverse, are impalpable to the clutch of argument, and thus are hardly subjects for confutation. *Paulò majora canamus.* I continue to tread the field of Greek mythology,

* ‘Pyth.’ ii. 39.

† ‘Il.’ xiv. 317.

because it is the favourite sporting-ground of the exclusivists of the solar theory.

We are told (p. 80) that because waves with rounded backs may have the appearance (but query?) of horses or sheep throwing themselves tumultuously upon one another, therefore "in maritime regions, the god of the liquid element, Poseidon or Neptune, is the breeder, protector, and trainer of horses." Then why is he not also the breeder, protector, and trainer of sheep? They have quite as good a maritime title; according to the fine line of Ariosto—

"Muggendo van per mare i gran montoni."

I am altogether sceptical about these rounded backs of horses, which, more, it seems, than other backs, become conspicuous like a wave. The resemblance, I believe, has commonly been drawn between the horse, as regards his mane, and the foam-tipped waves, which are still sometimes called white horses. But we have here, at best, a case of a great superstructure built upon a slight foundation; when it is attempted, on the groundwork of a mere simile, having reference to a state of sea which in the Mediterranean is not the rule but the rare exception, to frame an explanation of the close, pervading, and almost profound relation of the Homeric Poseidon to the horse. Long and careful investigation has shown me that this is an ethnical relation, and a key to important parts of the ethnography of Homer. But the proof of this proposition would require an essay of itself. I will, therefore, only refer to the reason which leads Dr. Réville to construct this (let me say) castle in the air. It is because he thinks he is accounting hereby for a fact, which would indeed, if established,

be a startling one, that the god of the liquid element should also be the god of the horse. We are dealing now especially with the Homeric Poseidon, for it is in Homer that the relation to the horse is developed; and the way to a true explanation is opened when we observe that the Homeric Poseidon is *not* the god of the liquid element, as such, at all.

The truth is that the Olympian and ruling gods of Homer are not elemental. Some few of them bear the marks of having been elemental in other systems; but, on admission into the Achaian heaven, they are divested of their elemental features. In the case of Poseidon, there is no sign that he ever had these elemental features. The signs are unequivocal that he had been worshipped as supreme, as the Zeus-Poseidon, by certain races and in certain, viz. in far southern, countries. Certainly he has a special relation to the sea. Once, and once only, do we hear of his having a habitation under water.* It is in 'Il.' xiii. where he fetches his horses from it, to repair to the Trojan plain. He seems to have been an habitual absentee; the prototype, he might be called, of that ill-starred, ill-favoured class. We hear of him in Samothrace, on the Solyman mountains, as visiting the Ethiopians† who worshipped him, and the reek of whose offerings he preferred at such times to the society of the Olympian gods debating on Hellenic affairs; though, when we are in the zone of the Outer Geography, we find him actually presiding in an Olympian assembly marked with foreign associations.‡ Now compare with this great mundane figure the true elemental gods of Homer: first, Okeanos, a

* 'Il.' xiii. 17-31.

† 'Od.' i. 25, 26.

‡ 'Od.' viii. 321-66.

venerable figure, who dwells appropriately by the furthest* bound of earth, the bank of the Ocean-river, and who is not summoned† even to the great Olympian assembly of the Twentieth Book; and secondly, the greybeard of the sea, whom only from the patronymic of his Nereid daughters we know to have been called Nereus, and who, when reference is made to him and to his train, is on each occasion‡ to be found in one and the same place, the deep recesses of the Mediterranean waters. If Dr. Réville still doubts who was for Homer the elemental god of water, let him note the fact that while *neros* is old Greek for *wet*, *nero* is, down to this very day, the people's word for water. But, conclusive as are these considerations, their force will be most fully appreciated only by those who have closely observed that Homer's entire theurgic system is resolutely exclusive of Nature-worship, except in its lowest and most colourless orders, and that where he has to deal with a Nature-power of serious pretensions, such as the Water-god would be, he is apt to pursue a method of quiet suppression, by local banishment or otherwise, that space may be left him to play out upon his board the gorgeous and imposing figures of his theanthropic system.

As a surgeon performs the most terrible operation in a few seconds, and with unbroken calm, so does the school of Dr. Réville, at least within the Homeric precinct, marshal, label, and transmute the personages that are found there. In touching on the "log," by which Dr. Réville says Hera was represented for ages, she is quietly described as the "Queen of the shining

* 'Il.' xiv. 201.

† 'Il.' xx. 7.

‡ 'Il.' i. 358; xviii. 36.

Heaven" (p. 79). For this assumption, so naïvely made, I am aware of no authority whatever among the Greeks; a somewhat formidable difficulty for others than solarists, as we are dealing with an eminently Greek conception. Euripides, a rather late authority, says,* she dwells among the stars, as all deities might be said, *ex officio*, to do; but gives no indication either of identity or of queenship. Etymology, stoutly disputed, may afford a refuge. Schmidt † refers the name to the Latin *hera*; Curtius ‡ and Preller § to the Sanscrit *svar*, meaning the heaven; and Welcker, ¶ with others, to what appears the more obvious form of *žpa*, the earth. Dr. Réville, I presume, makes choice of the Sanscrit *svar*. Such etymologies, however, are, though greatly in favour with the solarists, most uncertain guides to Greek interpretation. The effect of trusting to them is that, if a deity has in some foreign or anterior system had a certain place or office, and if this place or office has been altered to suit the exigencies of a composite mythology, the Greek idea comes to be totally misconceived. If we take the pre-name of the Homeric Apollo, we may with some plausibility say the *Phoibos* of the poet is the Sun; but we are landed at once in the absurd consequence that we have got a Sun already, || and that the two are joint actors in a scene of the eighth 'Odyssey.'** Strange, indeed, will be the effect of such a system if applied to our own case at some date in the far-off future; for it will be shown, *inter alia*, that there were

* Eurip. 'Helena,' 109.

† Smith's 'Dict.' art. "Hera."

‡ 'Griech. Etymol.' p. 119.

§ Preller, 'Griech. Mythol.' i. 121.

¶ 'Griech. Götterlehre,' i. 362-3.

|| See *infra*.

** 'Od.' viii. 302, 334.

no priests, but only presbyters, in any portion of Western Christendom; that our dukes were simply generals leading us in war; that we broke our fast at eight in the evening (for *dîner* is but a compression of *déjeuner*); and even, possibly, that the Howards, one of the noblest and most famous of English houses, pursued habitually the humble occupation of a pig-driver.

The character of Hera, or Heré, has received from Homer a full and elaborate development. There is in it absolutely no trace whatever of "the queen of the shining heaven." In the action of the 'Odyssey' she has no share at all—a fact absolutely unaccountable if her function was one for which the voyages of that poem give much more scope than is supplied by the 'Iliad.' The fact is, that there is no queen of heaven in the Achaian system; nor could there be without altering its whole genius. It is a curious incidental fact that, although Homer recognizes to some extent humanity in the stars (I refer to Orion and Leucotheë, both of them foreign personages of the Outer Geography), he never even approximates to a personification of the real queen of heaven, namely, the moon. There happens to be one marked incident of the action of Hera, which stands in rather ludicrous contrast with this lucent queenship. On one of the occasions when, in virtue of her birth and station, she exercises some supreme prerogative, she directs the Sun (surely not thus to her lord and master) to set, and he reluctantly obeys.* Her character has not any pronounced moral elements; it exhibits pride and passion; it is pervaded intensely with policy and nationalism; she is beyond all others

* 'Il,' xviii. 239, 240.

the Achaian goddess, and it is sarcastically imputed to her by Zeus that she would cut the Trojans if she could, and eat them without requiring in the first instance any culinary process.* I humbly protest against mauling and disfiguring this work; against what great Walter Scott would, I think, have called "mashackering and misgugling" it, after the manner of Nicol Muschat, when he put an end to his wife Ailie† at the spot afterwards marked by his name. Why blur the picture so charged alike with imaginative power and with historic meaning, by the violent obtrusion of ideas, which, whatever force they may have had among other peoples or in other systems, it was one of the main purposes of Homer, in his marvellous theurgic work, to expel from all high place in the order of ideas, and from every corner, every loft and every cellar, so to speak, of his Olympian palaces?

If the Hera of Homer is to own a relationship outside the Achaian system, like that of Apollo to the Sun, it is undoubtedly with Gaia, the Earth, that it can be most easily established. The all-producing function of Gaia in the Theogony of Hesiod‡ and her marriage with Ouranos, the heaven, who has a partial relation to Zeus, points to Hera as the majestic successor who in the Olympian scheme, as the great mother, and guardian of maternity, bore an analogical resemblance to the female head of one or more of the Pelasgian or archaic theogonies that it had deposed.

I have now done with the treatment of details, and I must not quit them without saying that there are some of the chapters, and many of the sentences, of

* 'Il.' iv. 35. † 'Heart of Midlothian.' ‡ 'Theog.' 116-136.

Dr. Réville which appear to me to deserve our thanks. And, much as I differ from him concerning an essential part of the historic basis of religion, I trust that nothing which I have said can appear to impute to him any hostility or indifference to the substance of religion itself.

I make, indeed, no question that the solar theory has a most important place in solving the problems presented by many or some of the Aryan religions; but whether it explains their first inception is a totally different matter. When it is ruthlessly applied, in the teeth of evidence, to them all, in the last resort it stifles facts, and reduces observation and reasoning to a mockery. Sir George Cox, its able advocate, fastens upon the admission that some one particular method is not available for all the phenomena, and asks, Why not adopt for the Greek system, for the Aryan systems at large, perhaps for a still wider range, "a clear and simple explanation," namely, the solar theory? * The plain answer to the question is, that this must not be done, because, if it is done, we do not follow the facts, nor are led by them; but, to use the remarkable phrase of Æschylus,† we ride them down, we trample them under foot. Mankind has long been too familiar with a race of practitioners, whom courtesy forbids to name, and whose single medicine is alike available to deal with every one of the thousand figures of disease. There are surely many sources to which the old religions are referable. We have solar worship, earth worship, astronomic worship, the worship of animals, the worship of evil powers, the worship of abstractions, the worship of the

* 'Mythology of Aryan Nations,' i. 18.

† *καθιπνάζεσθαι*: a remarkable word, as applied to moral subjects, found in the 'Eumenides' only.

dead, the foul and polluting worship of bodily organs, so widespread in the world, and especially in the East ; last, but not least, I will name terminal worship, the remarkable and most important scheme which grew up, perhaps first on the Nile, in connection with the stones used for marking boundaries, which finds its principal representative in the god Hermes, and which is very largely traced and exhibited in the first volume of the work of M. Dulaure * on ancient religions.

But none of these circumstances discredit or impair the proof that in the Book, of which Genesis is the opening section, there is conveyed special knowledge to meet the special need everywhere so palpable in the state and history of our race. Far indeed am I from asserting that this precious gift, or that any process known to me, disposes of all the problems, either insoluble or unsolved, by which we are surrounded ; of

“the burden and the mystery
Of all this unintelligible world.” †

But I own my surprise not only at the fact, but at the manner in which in this day, writers, whose name is Legion, unimpeached in character and abounding in talent, not only put away from them, but cast into shadow or into the very gulf of negation itself, the conception of a Deity, an acting and a ruling Deity. Of this belief, which has satisfied the doubts, and wiped away the tears, and found guidance for the footsteps of so many a weary wanderer on earth, which among the best and greatest of our race has been so cherished by those who had it, and so longed and sought for by those

* ‘Histoire abrégée de différens Cultes.’ Seconde édition. Paris, 1825.

† Wordsworth’s ‘Excursion.’

who had it not, we might suppose that if at length we had discovered that it was in the light of truth untenable, that the accumulated testimony of man was worthless, and that his wisdom was but folly, yet at least the decencies of mourning would be vouchsafed to this irreparable loss. Instead of this, it is with a joy and exultation that might almost recall the frantic orgies of the Commune, that this, at least at first sight terrific and overwhelming calamity is accepted, and recorded as a gain. One recent, and in many ways, respected writer—a woman long wont to unship creed as sailors discharge excess of cargo in a storm, and passing at length into formal atheism—rejoices to find herself on the open, free, and “breezy common of the universe.” Another, also woman, and dealing only with the workings and manifestations of God, finds* in the theory of a physical evolution as recently developed by Mr. Darwin, and received with extensive favour, both an emancipation from error and a novelty in kind. She rejoices to think that now at last Darwin “shows life as an harmonious whole, and makes the future stride possible by means of the past advance.” Evolution, that is physical evolution, which alone is in view, may be true (like the solar theory), may be delightful and wonderful, in its right place; but are we really to understand that varieties of animals brought about through domestication, the wasting of organs (for instance, the tails of men) by disuse, that natural selection and the survival of the fittest, all in the physical order, exhibit to us the great *arcanum* of creation, the sum and centre of life, so that

* I do not quote names, but I refer to a very recent article in one of our monthly periodicals.

mind and spirit are dethroned from their old supremacy are no longer sovereign by right, but may find somewhere by charity a place assigned them, as appendages, perhaps only as excrescences, of the material creation? I contend that Evolution in its highest form has not been a thing heretofore unknown to history, to philosophy, or to theology. I contend that it was before the mind of Saint Paul when he taught that in the fulness of time God sent forth His Son, and of Eusebius, when he wrote the 'Preparation for the Gospel,' and of Augustine when he composed the 'City of God;' and, beautiful and splendid as are the lessons taught by natural objects, they are, for Christendom at least, indefinitely beneath the sublime unfolding of the great drama of human action, in which, through long ages, Greece was making ready a language and an intellectual type, and Rome a framework of order and an idea of law, such that in them were to be shaped and fashioned the destinies of a regenerated world. For those who believe that the old foundations are unshaken still, and that the fabric built upon them will look down for ages on the floating wreck of many a modern and boastful theory, it is difficult to see anything but infatuation in the destructive temperament which leads to the notion that to substitute a blind mechanism for the hand of God in the affairs of life is to enlarge the scope of remedial agency; that to dismiss the highest of all inspirations is to elevate the strain of human thought and life; and that each of us is to rejoice that our several units are to be disintegrated at death into "countless millions of organisms;" for such, it seems, is the latest "revelation" delivered from the fragile tripod of a modern Delphi. Assuredly, either on the

minds of those who believe, or else on the minds of those who after this fashion disbelieve, there lies some deep judicial darkness, a fog of darkness that may be felt. While disbelief in the eyes of faith is a sore calamity, this kind of disbelief, which renounces and repudiates with more than satisfaction what is brightest and best in the inheritance of man, is astounding, and might be deemed incredible. Nay, some will say, rather than accept the flimsy and hollow consolations which it makes bold to offer, might we not go back to solar adoration, or, with Goethe, to the hollows of Olympus?

“ Wenn die Funke sprüht,
Wenn die Asche glüht,
Eilen wir den alten Göttern zu.” *

NOTE.

Hawarden Castle, Chester, -
July 11, 1886.

MR. GLADSTONE presents his compliments to the Editor of the *Nineteenth Century*, and requests, with reference to an observation by Professor Huxley on Mr. Gladstone's neglect duly to consult the works of Professor Dana, whom he had cited, that the Editor will have the kindness to print in his next number the accompanying letter, which has this morning been sent to him from America.

“REV. DR. SUTHERLAND,

“My dear Sir,—I do not know that in my letter of yesterday, in which I referred you to the ‘*Bibliotheca Sacra*,’ I answered directly your question, and hence I add a word to say that I agree in all essential points with Mr. Gladstone, and believe that the first chapters of Genesis and Science are in accord.

“Yours very truly,

“JAMES D. DANA.

“Newhayen, April 16, 1886.”

* ‘Braut von Corinth,’

II.

PROEM TO GENESIS: A PLEA FOR A FAIR TRIAL.*

1885.

Vous avez une manière si aimable d'annoncer les plus mauvaises nouvelles, qu'elles perdent par là de leurs désagréments. So wrote, *de haut en bas*, the Duchess of York to Beau Brummell, sixty or seventy years back; † and so write I, *de bas en haut*, to the two very eminent champions who have in the *Nineteenth Century* of December entered appearances on behalf of Dr. Réville's 'Prolégomènes,' with a decisiveness of tone, at all events, which admits of no mistake: Professor Huxley and Professor Max Müller. My first duty is to acknowledge in both cases the abundant courtesy and indulgence with which I am personally treated. And my first thought is that, where even disagreement is made in a manner pleasant, it will be a duty to search and see if there be any points of agreement or approximation, which will be more pleasant still. This indulgence and courtesy deserves in the case of Professor Huxley a special warmth of acknowledgment, because, while thus more than liberal to the individual, he has for the class

* Reprinted from the *Nineteenth Century*.

† 'Life,' by Jesse. Revised edition, i. 260.

of Reconcilers, in which he places me, an unconcealed and unmeasured scorn. These are they who impose upon man a burden of false science *in the name of religion*, who dictate as a Divine command "an implicit belief in the cosmogony of Genesis;" and who "stir un wisdom and fanaticism to their depths." * Judgments so severe should surely be supported by citation or other evidence, for which I look in vain. To some they might suggest the idea that Passion may sometimes unawares intrude even within the precincts of the temple of Science. But I admit that a great master of his art may well be provoked, when he finds his materials tumbled about by incapable hands, and may mistake for irreverence what is only want of skill.

While acknowledging the great courtesy with which Professor Huxley treats his antagonist individually, and while simply listening to his denunciations of the Reconcilers as one listens to distant thunders, with a sort of sense that after all they will do no great harm, I must presume to animadvert with considerable freedom upon his method; upon the sweeping character of his advocacy; upon his perceptible exaggeration of points in controversy; upon his mode of dealing with authorities; and upon the curious fallacy of substitution by which he enables himself to found the widest proscriptions of the claim of the Book of Genesis to contain a Divine record upon a reasoned impeachment of its scientific accuracy in, as I shall show, a single particular.

As to the first of these topics, nothing can be more equitable than Professor Huxley's intention to intervene as a "science proctor" in that part of the debate raised

* *Nineteenth Century*, Dec. 1885, pp. 859, 860.

by M. Réville, "to which he proposes to restrict his observations" (*N. C.* p. 849). This is the part on which he proposes in his first page to report as a student—and every reader will inwardly add, as one of the most eminent among all students—of natural science. Now this is not the cosmogonical part of the account in Genesis. On Gen. i. 1–19, containing the cosmogony, he does not report as an expert, but refers us (p. 859) to "those who are specially conversant with the sciences involved;" adding his opinion about their opinion. Yet in his second page, without making any reference to this broad distinction, he at once forgets the just limitation of his first, and our "proctor for science" pronounces on M. Réville's estimate, not of the fourfold succession in the stratification of the earth, but of "the account of the Creation given in the Book of Genesis," that its terms are as "respectful as in his judgment they are just" (*ibid.*). Thus the proctorship for science, justly assumed for matters within his province as a student, is rather hastily extended to matters which he himself declares to be beyond it. In truth it will appear, that as there are many roads to heaven with one ending, so, provided only a man arrives at the conclusion that the great Proem of Genesis lends no support to the argument for Revelation, it does not much matter how he gets there. For in this "just" account of the Creation I have shown that M. Réville supports his accusation of scientific error by three particulars (*N. C.* p. 639): that in the first he contradicts the judgment of scholars on the sense of the original; in the second he both misquotes (by inadvertence) the terms of the text, and overlooks the distinction made so palpable (if not earlier) half a century ago, by the work of Dr,

Buckland,* between *bara* and *asa*; while the third proceeds on the assumption that there could be no light to produce vegetation, except light derived from a visible sun. These three charges constitute the head and front of M. Réville's indictment against the cosmogony; and the fatal flaws in them, without any notice or defence, are now all taken under the mantle of our science proctor, who returns to the charge at the close of his article (p. 859), and again dismisses with comprehensive honour as "wise and moderate" what he had ushered in as reverent and just. So much for the sweeping, indiscriminating character of an advocacy which, in a scientific writer, we might perhaps have expected to be carefully limited and defined; and which does not seem to belong to science-proctorship.

I take next the exaggeration which appears to me to mark unhappily Professor Huxley's *method*. Under this head I include all needless multiplication of points of controversy, whether in the form of overstating differences, or understating agreements, with an adversary.

As I have lived for more than half a century in an atmosphere of contention, my stock of controversial fire has perhaps become abnormally low; while Professor Huxley, who has been inhabiting the Elysian regions of science, the *edita doctrinâ sapientium templa serena*,† may be enjoying all the freshness of an unjaded appetite. Certainly one of the lessons life has taught me is, that where there is known to be a common object, the pursuit of truth, there should also be a studious desire to interpret the adversary in the best sense his words will

* 'Bridgewater Treatise,' vol. i. pp. 19-28. Chap. i.: "Consistency of Geological Discoveries with Sacred History."

† Lucr. ii. 8.

fairly bear; to avoid whatever widens the breach; and to make the most of whatever tends to narrow it. These I hold to be part of the laws of knightly tournament.

I do not, therefore, fully understand why Professor Huxley makes it a matter of objection to me that, in rebuking a writer who had treated evolution wholesale as a novelty in the world, I cited a few old instances of moral and historical evolution only, and did not extend my front by examining Indian sages and the founders of Greek philosophy (*N. C.* p. 854). Nor why, when I have spoken of physical evolution as of a thing to me most acceptable, but not yet in its rigour (to my knowledge) proved (*N. C.* p. 705), we have only the rather niggardly acknowledgment that I have made "the most oblique admissions of a possible value" (*N. C.* p. 854). Thus it is when agreement is threatened, but far otherwise when differences are to be blazoned. When I have spoken of the succession of orders in the most general terms only, this is declared to be a sharply divided succession in which the last species of one cannot overlap the first species of another (p. 857). When I have pleaded on simple grounds of reasoning for the supposition of a substantial correspondence between Genesis i. and science (*N. C.* p. 696), have waived all question of a verbal inspiration, all question whether the whole of the statements can now be made good (*N. C.* p. 694), I am treated as one of those who impose "in the name of religion" as a divine requisition "an implicit belief in the accuracy of the cosmogony of Genesis," and who deserve to have their heads broken in consequence (*N. C.* p. 860).

I have urged nothing "in the name of religion." I

have sought to adduce probable evidence that a guidance more than human lies within the great Proem of the Book of Genesis (*N. C.* p. 694), just as I might adduce probable evidence to show that Francis did or did not write Junius, that William the Third was or was not responsible for the massacre of Glencoe. I have expressly excepted detail (p. 696), and have stated (*N. C.* p. 687) that in my inquiry "the authority of Scripture cannot be alleged in proof of a primitive revelation" (*N. C.* p. 687). I object to all these exaggerations of charge, as savouring of the spirit of the Inquisition, and as restraints on literary freedom.

My next observation as to the Professor's method refers to his treatment of authorities.

In one passage (*N. C.* p. 851) Mr. Huxley expresses his regret that I have not named my authority for the statement made concerning the fourfold succession, in order that he might have transferred his attentions from myself to a new delinquent. Now, published works are (as I may show) a fair subject for reference. But as to pointing out any person who might have favoured me with his views in private correspondence, I own that I should have some scruple in handing him over to be pilloried as a Reconciler, and to be pelted with charges of un wisdom and fanaticism, which I myself, from long use, am perfectly content to bear.

I did refer to three great and famous names: those of Cuvier, Sir John Herschel, and Whewell (*N. C.* p. 697). Mr. Huxley speaks of me as having quoted them in support of my case on the fourfold succession; and at the same time notices that I admitted Cuvier not to be a recent authority, which in geology proper is, I believe, nearly equivalent to saying he is, for

particulars, no authority at all. This recital is singularly inaccurate. I cited them (*N. C.* p. 697), not with reference to the fourfold succession, but generally for "the general accordance of the Mosaic cosmogony with the results of modern inquiry" (*ibid.*), and particularly in connection with the nebular hypothesis. It is the cosmogony (*Gen.* i. 1-19), not the fourfold succession, which was the sole object of Réville's attack, and the main object of my defence; and which is the largest portion of the whole subject. Will Mr. Huxley venture to say that Cuvier is an unavailable authority, or that Herschel and Whewell are other than great and venerable names, with reference to the cosmogony? Yet he has quietly set them aside without notice; and they with many more are inclusively bespattered with the charges, which he has launched against the pestilent tribe of Reconcilers.

My fourth and last observation on the "method" of Professor Huxley is that, after discussing a part, and that not the most considerable part, of the Proem of Genesis, he has broadly pronounced upon the whole. This is a mode of reasoning which logic rejects, and which I presume to savour more of licence than of science. The fourfold succession is condemned with argument; the cosmogony is thrown into the bargain. True, Mr. Huxley refers in a single sentence to three detached points of it partially touched in my observations (p. 853). But all my argument, the chief argument of my paper, leads up to the nebular or rotatory hypothesis (*N. C.* 689-694 and 697, 698). This hypothesis, with the authorities cited—of whom one is the author of 'Vestiges of the Creation'—is inclusively condemned, and without a word vouchsafed to it.

I shall presently express my gratitude for the scientific part of Mr. Huxley's paper. But there are two sides to the question. The whole matter at issue is, (1) a comparison between the probable meaning of the Proem to Genesis and the results of cosmological and geological science; (2) the question whether this comparison favours or does not favour the belief that an element of divine knowledge—knowledge which was not accessible to the simple action of the human faculties—is conveyed to us in this Proem. It is not enough to be accurate in one term of a comparison, unless we are accurate in both. A master of English may speak the vilest and most blundering French. I do not think Mr. Huxley has even endeavoured to understand what is the idea, what is the intention, which his opponent ascribes to the Mosaic writer: or what is the conception which his opponent forms of the weighty word Revelation. He holds the writer responsible for scientific precision: I look for nothing of the kind, but assign to him a statement general, which admits exceptions; popular, which aims mainly at producing moral impression; summary, which cannot but be open to more or less of criticism in detail. He thinks it is a lecture. I think it is nearer to a sermon. He describes living creatures by structure. The Mosaic writer describes them by *habitat*. Both I suppose are right. I suppose that description by *habitat* would be unavailing for the purposes of science. I feel sure that description by structure, such as the geologists supply, would have been unavailing for the purpose of summary teaching with religious aim. Of Revelation I will speak by-and-by.

In order to institute with profit the comparison, now

in view, the very first thing necessary is to determine, so far as the subject-matter allows, what it was that the Pentateuchal or Mosaic writer designed to convey to the minds of those for whom he wrote. The case is, in more ways than one, I conceive, the direct reverse of that which the Professor has alleged. It is not bringing Science to be tried at the bar of Religion. It is bringing Religion, so far as it is represented by this part of the Holy Scriptures, to be tried at the bar of Science. The indictment against the Pentateuchal writer is, that he has written what is scientifically untrue. We have to find, then, in the first place, what it is that he has written, according to the text, not an inerrable text, as it now stands before us.

First, I assume there is no dispute that in Gen. i. 20-27 he has represented a fourfold sequence or succession of living organisms. Aware of my own inability to define in any tolerable manner the classes of these organisms, I resorted to the general phrases—water-population, air-population, land-population. The immediate purpose of these phrases was not to correspond with the classifications of Science, but to bring together in brief and convenient form the larger and more varied modes of expression used in vers. 20, 21, 24, 25 of the Chapter.

I think, however, I have been to blame for having brought into a contact with science, which was not sufficiently defined, terms that have no scientific meaning: water-population, air-population, and (twofold) land-population. I shall now discard them, and shall substitute others, which have the double advantage of being used by geologists, and perhaps of expressing better than my phrases what was in the mind of the

Mosaic writer. These are the words—1, fishes ; 2, birds ; 3, mammals ; * 4, man. By all, I think, it will be felt that the first object is to know what the Penta-teuchal writer means. The relation of his meaning to science is essential, but, in orderly argumentation, subsequent. The matter now before us is a matter of reasonable and probable interpretation. What is the proper key to this hermeneutic work ? In my opinion it is to be found in a just estimate of the purpose with which the author wrote, and with which the Book of Genesis was, in this part of it, either composed or compiled.

If this be the true point of departure, it opens up a question of extreme interest, at which I have but faintly glanced in my paper, and which is nowhere touched in the reply to me. What proper place has such a composition as the first Chapter of Genesis in such a work as the Scriptures of the Old Testament ? They are indisputably written with a religious aim ; and their subject-matter is religious. We may describe this aim in various ways. For the present purpose, suffice it to say they are conversant with belief in God, with inculcation of duties founded on that belief, with history and prophecy obviously having it for their central point. But this chapter, at the least down to ver. 25, and perhaps throughout, stands on a different ground. In concise and rapid outline, it traverses a vast region of physics. It is easy to understand St. Paul when he speaks of the world as bearing witness to God.† What he said

* I wish to be understood as speaking here of the higher or ordinary mammals, which alone I assume to have been probably known to the Mosaic writer.

† Acts xiv. 17 ; Rom. i. 20.

was capable of being verified or tested by the common experimental knowledge of all who heard him. Of it, of our Saviour's mention of the lilies—and may it not be said generally of the references in Scripture to natural knowledge?—they are at once accounted for by the positions in which they stand. But this first Chapter of Genesis professes to set out in its own way a large and comprehensive scheme of physical facts : the transition from chaos to kosmos, from the inanimate to life, from life in its lower orders to man. Being knowledge of an order anterior to the creation of Adamic man, it was beyond verification, as being beyond experience. As a physical exposition in miniature, it stands alone in the Sacred Record. And, as this singular composition is solitary in the Bible, so it seems to be hardly less solitary in the sacred books of the world. “The only important resemblance of any ancient cosmogony to the Scriptural account, is to be found in the Persian or Zoroastrian :” this Bishop Browne * proceeds to account for on the following among other grounds : that Zoroaster was probably brought into contact with the Hebrews, and even perhaps with the prophet Daniel ; a supposition which supplies the groundwork of a recent and remarkable romance, not proceeding from a Christian school.† Again, the Proem does not carry any Egyptian marks. In the twenty-seven thousand lines of Homer, archaic as they are and ever turning to the past, there is, I think, only one ‡ which belongs to physiology. The beautiful sketch of a cosmogony by Ovid § seems in

* Note on Gen. i. 5.

† ‘Zoroaster.’ By F. M. Crawford. Macmillan, 1885.

‡ ‘Il.’ vii. 99. § Ovid, ‘Metam.’ i. 1–38.

considerable degree to follow the Mosaic outline ; but it was composed at a time when the treasure of the Hebrew records had been for two centuries imparted, through the Septuagint, to the Aryan nations.

Professor Huxley, if I understand him rightly (*N. C.* pp. 851, 852), considers the Mosaic writer, not perhaps as having intended to embrace the whole truth of science in the province of geology, but at least as liable to be convicted of scientific worthlessness if his language will not stand the test of a strict construction. Thus the "water-population" is to include "the innumerable hosts of marine invertebrated animals." It seems to me that these discoveries, taken as a whole, and also taken in all their parts and particulars, do not afford a proper, I mean a rational, standard for the interpretation of the Mosaic writer ; that the recent discovery of the Silurian scorpion, a highly organised animal (p. 858), is of little moment either way to the question now before us ; * that it is not an account of the extinct species which we should consider the Mosaic writer as intending to convey ; that while his words are capable of covering them, as the *oikoumenè* of the New Testament covers the red and yellow man, the rules of rational construction recommend and require our assigning to them a more limited meaning, which I will presently describe.

Another material point in Professor Huxley's interpretation appears to me to lie altogether beyond the natural force of the words, and to be of an arbitrary

* Because my argument in no way requires universal accordance, what bearing the scorpion may have on any current scientific hypothesis, it is not for me to say.

character. He includes in it the proposition that the production of the respective orders was effected (p. 857) during each of "three distinct and successive periods of time; and only during those periods of time;" or again, in one of these, "and not at any other of these;" as, in a series of games at chess, one is done before another begins; or as in a "march-past," one regiment goes before another comes. No doubt there may be a degree of literalism which will even suffice to show that, as "every winged fowl" was produced on the fourth day of the Hexaemeron, therefore the birth of new fowls continually is a contradiction to the text of Genesis. But does not the equity of common sense require us to understand simply that the order of "winged fowl," whatever that may mean, took its place in creation at a certain time, and that from that time its various component classes were in course of production? Is it not the fact that in synoptical statements of successive events, distributed in time for the sake of producing easy and clear impressions, general truth is aimed at, and periods are allowed to overlap? If, with such a view, we arrange the schools of Greek philosophy in numerical order, according to the dates of their inception, we do not mean that one expired before another was founded. If the archæologist describes to us as successive in time the ages of stone, bronze, and iron,* he certainly does not mean that no kinds of stone

* I use this enumeration to illustrate an argument, but I must, even in so using it, enter a *caveat* against its particulars. I do not conceive it to be either probable or historical that, as a general rule, mankind passed from the use of stone implements to the use of bronze, a composite metal, without passing through some intermediate (whether longer or shorter) period of copper.

implement were invented after bronze began, or no kinds of bronze after iron began. When Thucydides said that the ancient limited monarchies were succeeded by tyrannies, he did not mean that all the monarchs died at once, and a set of tyrants, like Deucalion's men, rose up and took their places. Woe be, I should say, to any one who tries summarily to present in series the phases of ancient facts, if they are to be judged under the rule of Professor Huxley.

Proceeding, on what I hold to be open ground, to state my own idea of the true key to the meaning of the Mosaic record, I suggest that it was intended to give moral, and not scientific, instruction to those for whom it was written. That for the Adamic race, recent on the earth, and young in faculties, the traditions here incorporated, which were probably far older than the Book, had a natural and a highly moral purpose in conveying to their minds a lively sense of the wise and loving care with which the Almighty Father, who demanded much at their hands, had beforehand given them much, in the provident adaptation of the world to be their dwelling-place, and of the created orders for their use and rule. It appears to me that, given the very nature of the Scriptures, this is clearly the rational point of view. If it is so, then, it follows, that just as the tradition described earth, air, and heaven in the manner in which they superficially presented themselves to the daily experience of man—not scientifically, but

“The common air, the sun, the skies”—

so he spoke of fishes, of birds, of beasts, of what man was most concerned with; and, last in the series, of man himself, largely and generally, as facts of his

experience; from which great moral lessons of wonder, gratitude, and obedience were to be deduced, to aid him in the great work of his life-training.*

If further proof be wanting, that what the Mosaic writer had in his mind were the creatures with which Adamic man was conversant, we have it in the direct form of ver. 28, which gives to man for meat the fruit of every seed-yielding tree, and every seed-yielding herb, and the dominion of every beast, fowl, and reptile living. There is here a marked absence of reference to any but the then living species.

This, then, is the key to the meaning of the Book, and of the tradition, if, as I suppose, it was before the Book, which seems to me to offer the most probable, and therefore the rational guide to its interpretation. The question we shall have to face is whether this statement so understood, this majestic and touching lesson of the childhood of Adamic man, stands in such a relation to scientific truth, in the forms in which it is now known, as to give warrant to the inference that the guidance under which it was composed was more than that of faculties merely human, at that stage of development, and likewise of information, which belonged to the childhood of humanity.

We have, then, before us one term of the desired comparison. Let us now turn to the other.

And here my first duty is to render my grateful thanks to Professor Huxley for having corrected my either erroneous or superannuated assumption as to the state of scientific opinion on the second and third terms

* See also my 'General Introduction to Sheppard's Pictorial Bible,' *infra*.

of the fourfold succession of life. As one probable doctor sufficed to make an opinion probable, so the dissent of this eminent man would of itself overthrow and pulverise my proposition that there was a scientific *consensus* as to a sequence like that of Genesis in the production of animal life, as between fishes, birds, mammals, and man. I shall compare the text of Genesis with geological statements; but shall make no attempt, unless this be an attempt, to profit by a *consensus* of geologists.*

I suppose it to be admitted on all hands that no perfectly comprehensive and complete correspondence can be established between the terms of the Mosaic text and modern discovery. No one, for instance, could conclude from it that which appears to be generally recognised, that a great reptile-age would be revealed by the mesozoic rocks.

Yet I think readers, who have been swept away by the torrent of Mr. Huxley's denunciations, will feel some surprise when on drawing summarily into line the main allegations, and especially this ruling order of the Proem, they see how small a part of them is brought into question by Mr. Huxley, and to how large an extent they are favoured by the tendencies, presumptions, and even conclusions of scientific inquiry.

First, as to the cosmogony, or the formation of the earth and the heavenly bodies—

1. The first operation recorded in Genesis, after the creative act, appears to be the formation of light. It

* With regard, however, to the counter-statement of Mr. Huxley, see the letter of Mr. Dana (appended *supra*) to the 'Dawn of Creation.'

is detached, apparently, from the waste or formless elemental mass (vers. 2-5), which, as it proceeds, is left relatively dark by its withdrawal.

2. Next we hear of the existence of vapour, and of its condensation into water on the surface of the earth (vers. 6-10). Vegetation subsequently begins: but this belongs rather to geology than to cosmogony (vers. 11, 12).

3. In a new period, the heavenly bodies are declared to be fully formed and visible, dividing the day from the night (vers. 14-18).

Under the guidance particularly of Dr. Whewell, I have referred to the nebular hypothesis as confirmatory of this account.

Mr. Huxley has not either denied the hypothesis, or argued against it. But I turn to Phillips's 'Manual of Geology,' edited and adapted by Mr. Seeley and Mr. Etheridge (1885). It has a section in vol. i. (pp. 15-19) on "Modern Speculations concerning the Origin of the Earth."

The first agent here noticed as contributing to the work of production is the "gas hydrogen in a burning state," which now forms the enveloping portion of the sun's atmosphere; whence we are told the inference arises that the earth also was once "incandescent at its surface," and that its rocks may have been "products of combustion." Is not this representation of light with heat for its ally, as the first element in this Speculation, remarkably accordant with the opening of the Proem to Genesis?

Next it appears (*ibid.*) that "the product of this combustion is vapour," which with diminished heat condenses into water, and eventually accumulates "in

depressions on the sun's surface so as to form oceans and seas." "It is at least probable that the earth has passed through a phase of this kind" (*ibid.*). "The other planets are apparently more or less like the earth in possessing atmospheres and seas." Is there not here a remarkable concurrence with the second great act of the cosmogony?

Plainly, as I conceive, it is agreeable to these suppositions that, as vapour gradually passes into water, and the atmosphere is cleared, the full adaptation of sun and moon by visibility for their functions should come in due sequence, as it comes in Gen. i. 14-18.

Pursuing its subject, the 'Manual' proceeds (p. 17): "This consideration leads up to what has been called the nebular hypothesis," which "supposes that, before the stars existed, the materials of which they consist were diffused in the heavens in a state of vapour" (*ibid.*). The text then proceeds to describe how local centres of condensation might throw off rings, these rings break into planets, and the planets, under conditions of sufficient force, repeat the process, and thus produce satellites like those of Saturn, or like the Moon.

I therefore think that, so far as cosmogony is concerned, the effect of Mr. Huxley's paper is not by any means to leave it as it was, but to leave it materially fortified by the 'Manual of Geology,' which I understand to be a standard of authority at the present time.

Turning now to the region of that science, I understand the main statements of Genesis, in successive order of time, but without any measurement of its divisions, to be as follows:—

1. A period of land, anterior to all life (vers. 9, 10).

2. A period of vegetable life, anterior to animal life (vers. 11, 12).

3. A period of animal life, in the order of fishes (ver. 20).

4. Another stage of animal life, in the order of birds.*

5. Another, in the order of beasts (vers. 24, 25).

6. Last of all, man (vers. 26, 27).

Here is a chain of six links, attached to a previous chain of three. And I think it not a little remarkable that of this entire succession, the only step directly challenged is that of numbers four and five, which (p. 858) Mr. Huxley is inclined rather to reverse. He admits distinctly the seniority of fishes. How came that seniority to be set down here? He admits as probable upon present knowledge, in the person of *Homo sapiens*, the juniority of man (p. 856). How came this juniority to be set down here? He proceeds indeed to describe an opposite opinion concerning man as holding exactly the same rank as the one to which he had given an apparent sanction (*ibid.*). As I do not precisely understand the bearing of the terms he uses, I pass them by, and I shall take the liberty of referring presently to the latest authorities, which he has himself suggested that I should consult. But I add to the questions I have just put this other inquiry: How came the Mosaic writer to place the fishes and the men in their true relative positions not only to one another, and not only to the rest of the animal succession, but in a definite and that a true relation of time to the origin of the first plant-life, and to the colossal operations

* Only several from No. 3 by the order of succession in the narrative, not by any fresh grammatical recommencement.—W. E. G., 1897.

by which the earth was fitted for them all? Mr. Huxley knows very well that it would be in the highest degree irrational to ascribe this correct distribution to the doctrine of chances; nor will the stone of Sisypheus of itself constitute a sufficient answer to inquiries which are founded, not upon a fanciful attempt to equate every word of the Proem with every *dictum* of science, but upon those principles of probable reasoning by which all rational lives are and must be guided.

I find the latest published authority on geology in the Second or Mr. Etheridge's volume of the 'Manual'* of Professor Phillips, and by this I will now proceed to test the sixfold series which I have ventured upon presenting.

First, however, looking back for a moment to a work, obviously of the highest authority,† on the geology of its day, I find in it a table of the order of appearance of animal life upon the earth, which, beginning with the oldest, gives us—

- | | |
|-------------------|-------------|
| 1. Invertebrates. | 4. Birds. |
| 2. Fishes. | 5. Mammals. |
| 3. Reptiles. | 6. Man. |

I omit all reference to specifications, and speak only of the principal lines of division.

In the Phillips-Etheridge 'Manual,' beginning as before with the oldest, I find the following arrangement, given partly by statement, and partly by diagram.

1. "The Azoic or Archæan time of Dana;" called Pre-Cambrian by other physicists (pp. 3, 5).

* Phillips's 'Manual of Geology' (vol. ii.), part ii., by R. Etheridge, F.R.S. New edition, 1885.

† 'Palæontology,' by Richard Owen (now Sir Richard Owen, K.C.B.). Second edition, p. 5, 1861.

2. A commencement of plant-life indicated by Dana as anterior to invertebrate animal life; long anterior to the vertebrate forms, which alone are mentioned in Genesis (pp. 4, 5).

3. Three periods of invertebrate life.

4. Age of fishes.

5. Age of reptiles.

6. Age of mammals, much less remote.

7. Age of man, much less remote than mammals.

As to birds, though they have not a distinct and separate age assigned them, the 'Manual' (vol. i. ch. xxv. pp. 511-520) supplies us very clearly with their place in "the succession of animal life." We are here furnished with the following series, after the fishes: 1. Fossil reptiles (p. 512). 2. Ornithosauria (p. 517); they were "flying animals, which combined the characters of reptiles with those of birds." 3. The first birds of the secondary rocks with "feathers in all respects similar to those of existing birds" (p. 518). 4. Mammals (p. 520).

I have been permitted to see in proof another statement from an authority still more recent, Professor Prestwich, which is now passing through the press. In it (pp. 80, 81) I find the following seniority assigned to the orders which I here name:—

- | | |
|---------------------------|-------------|
| 1. Plants (cryptogamous). | 4. Mammals. |
| 2. Fishes. | 5. Man. |
| 3. Birds. | |

It will now, I hope, be observed that, according to the probable intention of the Mosaic writer, these five orders enumerated by him correspond with the state of geological knowledge, presented to us by the most recent

authorities, in this sense ; that the origins of these orders respectively have the same succession as is assigned in Genesis to those representatives of the orders, which alone were probably known to the experience of Adamic man. My fourfold succession thus, without suffering any shock, grows into a fivefold one. By placing before the first plant-life the azoic period, it becomes sixfold. And again by placing before this the principal stages of the cosmogony, it becomes, according as they are stated, nine or tenfold ; every portion holding the place most agreeable to modern hypothesis and modern science respectively.

I now notice the points in which, so far as I understand, the text of the Proem, as it stands, is either incomplete or at variance with the representations of science.

1. It does not notice the great periods of invertebrate life standing between (1) and (2) of my last enumeration.

2. It also passes by the great age of Reptiles, with their antecessors the *Amphibia*, which come between (2) and (3). The secondary or Mesozoic period, says the 'Manual' (i. 511), "has often been termed the age of Reptiles."

3. It mentions plants in terms which, as I understand from Professor Huxley and otherwise, correspond with the later, not the earlier, forms of plant-life.

4. It mentions reptiles in the same category with its mammals.

Now, as regards the first two heads, these omissions, enormous with reference to the scientific record, are completely in harmony with the probable aim of the Mosaic writer, as embracing only the formation of the objects and creatures with which early man was

conversant. The introduction of these orders, invisible and unknown, would have been not agreeable, but injurious, to his purpose.

As respects the third, it will strike the reader of the Proem that plant-life (vers. 11, 12) is mentioned with a particularity which is not found in the accounts of the living orders; nor in the second notice of the Creation, which appears, indeed, pretty distinctly to refer to recent plant-life (Gen. ii. 5, 8, 9). Questions have been raised as to the translation of these passages, which I am not able to solve. But I bear in mind the difficulties which attend both oral traditions and the conservation of ancient MSS., and I am not in any way troubled by the discrepancy before us, if it be a discrepancy, as it is the general structure and effect of the Mosaic statement on which I take my stand.

With regard to reptiles, while I should also hold by my last remark, the case is different. They appear to be mentioned as contemporary with mammals, whereas they are of prior origin. But the relative significance of the several orders evidently affected the method of the Mosaic writer. Agreeably to this idea, insects are not named at all. So reptiles were a family fallen from greatness; instead of stamping on a great period of life its leading character, they merely skulked upon the earth. They are introduced, as will appear better from the LXX than from the A.V. or R.V., as a sort of appendage to mammals. Lying outside both the use and the dominion of man, and far less within his probable notice, they are not wholly omitted like insects, but treated apparently in a loose manner as not one of the main features of the picture which the writer meant to draw. In the Song of the Three Children, where the

four principal orders are recited after the series in Genesis, reptiles are dropped altogether, which suggests either that the present text is unsound, or, perhaps more probably, that they were deemed a secondary and insignificant part of it. But, however this case may be regarded, of course I cannot draw from it any support to my general contention.

I distinguish, then, in the broadest manner, between Professor Huxley's exposition of certain facts of science, and his treatment of the Book of Genesis. I accept the first, with the reverence due to a great teacher from the meanest of his hearers, as a needed correction to myself, and a valuable instruction for the world. But, subject to that correction, I adhere to my proposition respecting the fourfold succession in the Proem; which further I extend to a fivefold succession respecting life, and to the great stages of the cosmogony to boot. The five origins, or first appearances of plants, fishes, birds, mammals and man, are given to us in Genesis in the order of succession, in which they are also given by the latest geological authorities.

It is, therefore, by attaching to words a sense they were never meant to bear, and by this only, that Mr. Huxley establishes the parallels (so to speak) from which he works his heavy artillery. Land-population is a phrase meant by me to describe the idea of the Mosaic writer, which I conceive to be that of the animals familiarly known to early man. But, by treating this as a scientific phrase, it is made to include extinct reptiles, which I understand Mr. Huxley (*N. C.* p. 853) to treat as being land-animals; as, by taking birds of a very high formation, it may be held that mammal forms existed before such birds were produced. These are

artificial contradictions, set up by altering in its essence one of the two things which it is sought to compare.

If I am asked whether I contend for the absolute accordance of the Mosaic writer, as interpreted by me, with the facts and presumptions of science, as I have endeavoured to extract them from the best authorities, I answer that I have not endeavoured to show either that any accordance has been demonstrated, or that more than a substantial accordance—an accordance in principal relevant particulars—is to be accepted as shown by probable evidence.

In the cosmogony of the Proem, which stands on a distinct footing as lying wholly beyond the experience of primitive man, I am not aware that any appreciable flaw is alleged; but the nebular hypothesis with which it is compared appears to be, perhaps from the necessity of the case, no more than a theory; a theory, however, long discussed, much favoured, and widely accepted in the scientific world.

In the geological part, we are liable to those modifications or displacements of testimony which the future progress of the science may produce. In this view, its testimony does not in strictness pass, I suppose, out of the category of probable into that of demonstrative evidence. Yet it can hardly be supposed that careful researches, and reasonings strictly adjusted to method, both continued through some generations, have not in a large measure produced what has the character of real knowledge. With that real knowledge the reader will now have seen how far I claim for the Proem to Genesis, fairly tried, to be in real and most striking accordance.

And this brings me to the point at which I have to observe that Mr. Huxley, I think, has not mastered

and probably has not tried to master, the idea of his opponent as to what it is that is essentially embraced in the idea of a Divine revelation to man.

So far as I am aware, there is no definition, properly so called, of revelation either contained in Scripture or established by the general and permanent consent of Christians. In a word polemically used, of indeterminate or variable sense, Professor Huxley has no title to impute to his opponent, without inquiry, anything more than it must of necessity convey.

But he seems to assume that revelation is to be conceived of as if it were a lawyer's parchment, or a sum in arithmetic; wherein a flaw discovered at a particular point is *ipso facto* fatal to the whole. Very little reflection would show Professor Huxley that there may be those who find evidences of the communication of Divine knowledge in the Proem to Genesis as they read it in their Bibles, without approaching to any such conception. There is the uncertainty of translation; translators are not inspired. There is the difficulty of transcription; transcribers are not inspired, and an element of error is inseparable from the work of a series of copyists. How this works in the long courses of time, we see in the varying texts of the Old Testament, with rival claims not easy to adjust. Thus the authors of the recent Revision * have had to choose in the Massoretic text itself between different readings, and "in exceptional cases" have given a preference to the Ancient Versions. Thus, upon practical grounds quite apart from the higher questions concerning the original composition, we seem at once to find a human element in the sacred

* Preface to the Revised Old Testament, p. vi.

text. That there is a further and larger question, not shut out from the view even of the most convinced and sincere believers, Mr. Huxley may perceive by reading, for example, Coleridge's 'Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit.' The question whether this Proem bears witness to a Divine communication, to a working beyond that of merely human faculties in the composition of the Scriptures, is essentially one for the disciples of Bishop Butler; a question, not of demonstrative, but of probable evidence. I am not prepared to abandon, but rather to defend, the following proposition. It is perfectly conceivable that a document penned by the human hand, and transmitted by human means, may contain matter questionable, uncertain, or even mistaken, and yet may by its contents as a whole present such *πίστεις*, such moral proofs of truth Divinely imparted, as ought irrefragably *pro tanto* to command assent and govern practice. A man may possibly admit something not reconciled, and yet may be what Mr. Huxley denounces as a Reconciler.

I do not suppose it would be feasible, even for Professor Huxley, taking the nebular hypothesis and geological discovery for his guides, to give, in the compass of the first twenty-seven verses of Genesis, an account of the cosmogony, and of the succession of life in the stratification of the earth, which would combine scientific precision of statement with the majesty, the simplicity, the intelligibility, and the impressiveness of the record before us. Let me modestly call it, for argument's sake, an approximation to the present presumptions and conclusions of science. Let me assume that the statement in the text as to plants, and the statement of vers. 24, 25 as to reptiles, cannot in all points be sustained; and yet still there remain great

unshaken facts to be weighed. First, the fact that such a record should have been made at all. Secondly, the fact that, instead of dwelling in generalities, it has placed itself under the severe conditions of a chronological order, reaching from the first *nisus* of chaotic matter to the consummated production of a fair and goodly, a furnished and a peopled world. Thirdly, the fact that its cosmogony seems, in the light of the nineteenth century, to draw more and more of countenance from the best natural philosophy; and fourthly, that it has described the successive origins of the five great categories of present life, with which human experience was and is conversant, in that order which geological authority confirms. How came these things to be? How came they to be, not among Accadians, or Assyrians, or Egyptians, who monopolised the stores of human knowledge when this wonderful tradition was born; but among the obscure records of a people who, dwelling in Palestine for twelve hundred years from their sojourn in the valley of the Nile, hardly had force to stamp even so much as their name upon the history of the world at large, and only then began to be admitted to the general communion of mankind when their Scriptures assumed the dress which a Gentile tongue was needed to supply? It is more rational, I contend, to say that these astonishing anticipations were a God-given supply, than to suppose that a race, who fell uniformly and entirely short of the great intellectual development* of antiquity, should here not only have

* I write thus bearing fully in mind the unsurpassed sublimity of much that is to be found in the Old Testament. The consideration of this subject would open a wholly new line of argument, which the present article does not allow me to attempt.

equalled and outstripped it, but have entirely transcended, in kind even more than in degree, all known exercise of human faculties.

Whether this was knowledge conveyed to the mind of the Mosaic author, I do not presume to determine. There has been, in the belief of Christians, a profound providential purpose, little and not uniformly visible to us, which presided, from Genesis to the Apocalypse, over the formation of the marvellous compound, which we term the Holy Scriptures. This we wonderingly embrace without being much perplexed by the questions which are raised on them; for instance, by the question, In what exact relation the books of the Apocrypha, sometimes termed deuterocanonical, stand to the books of the Hebrew Canon. Difficulties of detail, such as may (or ultimately may not) be found to exist in the Proem to Genesis, have much the same relation to the evidence of revealed knowledge in this record, as the spots in the sun to his all-unfolding and sufficing light. But as to the Mosaic writer himself, all I presume to accept is the fact that he put upon undying record, in this portion of his work, a series of particulars which, interpreted in the growing light of modern knowledge, require from us, on the whole, as reasonable men, the admission that we do not see how he could have written them, and that in all likelihood he did not write them, without aid from the guidance of a more than human power. It is in this guidance, and not necessarily or uniformly in the consciousness of the writer, that, according to my poor conception, the idea of Revelation mainly lies.

And now one word on the subject of Evolution. I cannot follow Mr. Huxley in his minute acquaintance

with Indian sages, and I am not aware that Evolution has a place in the greater number of the schools of Greek philosophy. Nor can I comprehend the rapidity with which persons of authority have come to treat the Darwinian hypothesis as having reached the final stage of demonstration. To the eye of a looker-on their pace and method seem rather too much like a steeplechase. But this may very well be due to their want of appropriate knowledge and habits of thought. For myself, in my loose and uninformed way of looking at Evolution, I feel only too much biassed in its favour, by what I conceive to be its relation to the great argument of design.*

Not that I share the horror with which some men of science appear to contemplate a multitude of what they term "sudden" acts of creation. All things considered, a singular expression: but one, I suppose, meaning the act which produces, in the region of nature, something not related, by an unbroken succession of measured and equable stages, to what has gone before it. But what has equality or brevity of stage to do with the question how far the act is creative? I fail to see, or indeed am somewhat disposed to deny, that the short stage is less creative than the long, the single than the manifold, the equable than the jointed or graduated stage. Evolution is, to me, series with development. And like series in mathematics, whether arithmetical or geometrical, it

* "Views like these, when formulated by religious instead of scientific thought, make more of Divine Providence and fore-ordination, than of Divine intervention; but perhaps they are not the less theistical on that account." (From the very remarkable Lectures of Professor Asa Gray on 'Natural Science and Religion,' p. 77. Scribner, New York, 1880.)

establishes in things an unbroken progression ; it places each thing (if only it stand the test of ability to live) in a distinct relation to every other thing, and makes each a witness to all that have preceded it, a prophecy of all that are to follow it. It gives to the argument of design, now called the teleological argument, at once a wider expansion, and an augmented tenacity and solidity of tissue. But I must proceed.

I find Mr. Huxley asserting that the things of science, with which he is so splendidly conversant, are " susceptible of clear intellectual comprehension " (*N. C.* p. 859). Is this rhetoric, or is it a formula of philosophy? If the latter, will it bear examination? He pre-eminently understands the relations between those things which Nature offers to his view ; but does he understand each thing in itself, or *how* the last term but one in an evolutionary series passes into and becomes the last? The seed may produce the tree, the tree the branch, the branch the twig, the twig the leaf or flower ; but can we understand the slightest mutation or growth of Nature in itself? can we tell *how* the twig passes into leaf or flower, one jot more than if the flower or leaf, instead of coming from the twig, came directly from the tree or from the seed?

I cannot but trace some signs of haste in Professor Huxley's assertion that, outside the province of science (*ibid.*), we have only imagination, hope, and ignorance. Not, as we shall presently see, that he is one of those who rob mankind of the best and highest of their inheritance, by denying the reality of all but material objects. But the statement is surely open to objection, as omitting or seeming to omit from view the vast fields of knowledge only probable, which are not of mere hope,

nor of mere imagination, nor of mere ignorance ; which include alike the inward and the outward life of man ; within which lie the real instruments of his training, and where he is to learn how to think, to act, to be.

I will now proceed to notice briefly the last page of Professor Huxley's paper, in which he drops the scientist and becomes simply the man. I read it with deep interest, and with no small sympathy. In touching upon it, I shall make no reference (let him forgive me the expression) to his "damnatory clauses," or to his harmless menace, so deftly conveyed through the Prophet Micah, to the public peace.

The exaltation of Religion as against Theology is at the present day not only so fashionable, but usually so domineering and contemptuous, that I am grateful to Professor Huxley for his frank statement (p. 859) that Theology is a branch of science ; nor do I in the smallest degree quarrel with his contention that Religion and Theology ought not to be confounded. We may have a great deal of Religion with very little Theology ; and a great deal of Theology with very little Religion. I feel sure that Professor Huxley must observe with pleasure how strongly practical, ethical, and social is the general tenor (especially) of the three synoptic Gospels ; and how the appearance in the world of the great doctrinal Gospel was reserved to a later stage, as if to meet a later need, when men had been toned anew by the morality and, above all, by the life of our Lord.

I am not, therefore, writing against him, when I remark upon the habit of treating Theology with an affectation of contempt. It is nothing better, I believe, than a mere fashion ; having no more reference to permanent principle, than the mass of ephemeral fashions,

that come from Paris, have with the immovable types of Beauty. Those who take for the burden of their song, "Respect Religion, but despise Theology," seem to me just as rational as if a person were to say, "Admire the trees, the plants, the flowers, the sun, moon, or stars, but despise Botany, and despise Astronomy." Theology is ordered knowledge; representing in the region of the intellect what religion represents in the heart and life of man. And this religion, Mr. Huxley says a little further on, is summed up in the terms of the Prophet Micah (vi. 8): "Do justly, and love mercy, and walk humbly with thy God." I forbear to inquire whether every addition to this—such, for instance, as the Beatitudes—is (*N. C.* p. 860) to be proscribed. But I will not dispute that in these words is conveyed the true ideal of religious discipline and attainment. They really import that identification of the will which is set out with such wonderful force in the very simple words of the 'Paradiso:'

"In la sua voluntade è nostra pace,"

and which no one has more beautifully described than (I think) Charles Lamb: "He gave his heart to the Purifier, his will to the Will that governs the universe." It may be we shall find that Christianity itself is in some sort a scaffolding, and that the final building is a pure and perfect theism: when * the kingdom shall be "delivered up to God," "that God may be all in all." †

* 1 Cor. xv. 24, 28.

† On the publication of this paper I received from two quarters prompt remonstrances against the passages ending with these words, as one disparaging to the honour of our Lord's humanity. My intention in it was simply to conform to the declaration of St. Paul: whatever may go beyond that, I disavow and retract. But in those concurrent remonstrances there was one extremely interesting feature,

Still, I cannot help being struck with an impression that Mr. Huxley appears to cite these terms of Micah, as if they reduced the work of religion from a difficult to a very easy performance. But look at them again. Examine them well. They are, in truth, in Cowper's words—

“Higher than the heights above,
Deeper than the depths beneath.”

Do justly, that is to say, extinguish self; love mercy, cut utterly away all the pride and wrath, and all the cupidity, that make this fair world a wilderness; walk humbly with thy God, take His will and set it in the place where thine own was used to rule. “Ring out the old, ring in the new.” Pluck down the tyrant from his place; set up the true Master on His lawful throne.

There are certainly human beings, of happy composition, who mount these airy heights with elastic step, and with unbated breath.

“Sponte sua, sine lege, fidem rectumque colebat.” *

This comparative refinement of nature in some may even lead them to undervalue the stores of that rich armoury, which Christianity has provided to equip us for our great life-battle. The text of the Prophet Micah, developed into all the breadth of St. Paul and St. Augustine, is not too much—is it not often all too little?—for the needs of ordinary men.

I must now turn, by way of epilogue, to Professor

namely, the wide apparent severance of the quarters from which they proceeded. One was from Cardinal Manning; the other from Dr. Hutton, a leading minister of the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland.

* Ovid, ‘Metam.’ i. 90.

Max Müller ; and I hope to show him that on the questions which he raises we are not very far apart. One grievous wrong, indeed, he does me in (apparently) ascribing to me the execrable word "theanthromorphic" (*N. C.* p. 920), of which I wholly disclaim the paternity, and deny the use. Then he says, I warn him not to trust too much to etymology (p. 921). Not so. But only not to trust to it for the wrong purpose, in the wrong place : just as I should not preach on the virtue and value of liberty to a man requiring handcuffs. I happen to bear a name known, in its genuine form, to mean stones or rocks frequented by the glee ; and probably taken from the *habitat* of its first bearer. Now, if any human being should ever hereafter make any inquiry about me, trace the current form of my name to its origin, and therefore describe the susceptibility of stones to gladness, he would not use etymology too much, but would use it ill. What I protest against is a practice, not without example, of taking the etymology of mythologic names in Homer, and thereupon supposing that in all cases we have thus obtained a guide to their Homeric sense. The place of Nereus in the mind of the poet is indisputable ; and here etymology helps us. But when a light-etymology is found for Hera, and it is therefore asserted that in Homer she is a light-goddess, or when, because no one denies that *Phoibos* is a light-name, therefore the Apollo of Homer was the Sun, then indeed, not etymology, but the misuse of etymology, hinders and misleads us. In a question of etymology, however, I shall no more measure swords with Mr. Max Müller than with Mr. Huxley in a matter of natural science, and this for the simple reason that my sword is but a lath. I therefore surrender to the mercy of this

great philologist the conjectural derivation of *dine* and *dîner* from *déjeuner*; which may have been suggested by the use of the word *dine* in our Bible (as John xxi. 12) for breakfasting; a sense expressed by La Bruyère (xi.) in the words, *Cliton n'a jamais eu, toute sa vie, que deux affaires, qui sont de dîner le matin, et de souper le soir.*

But, Mr. Max Müller says, I have offended against the fundamental principles of comparative mythology (*N. C.* p. 919). How, where, and why, have I thus tumbled into mortal sin? By attacking solarism. But what have I attacked, and what has he defended? I have attacked nothing, but the exclusive use of the solar theory to solve all the problems of the Aryan religions; and it is to this monopolising pretension that I seek to apply the name of solarism, while admitting that "the solar theory has a most important place" in solving such problems (*N. C.* p. 704). But my *vis-à-vis*, whom I really cannot call my opponent, declares (*N. C.* p. 919) that the solarism I denounce is not his solarism at all; and he only seeks to prove that "certain portions of ancient mythology have a directly solar origin." So it proves that I attack only what he repudiates, and I seem even to defend what he defends. That is, I humbly subscribe to a doctrine, which he has made famous throughout the civilised world.

It is only when a yoke is put upon Homer's neck, that I presume to cry "hands off." The Olympian system, of which Homer is the great architect, is a marvellous and splendid structure. Following the guidance of ethnological affinities and memories, it incorporates in itself the most diversified traditions, and binds them into an unity by the plastic power of an unsurpassed creative imagination. Its dominating spirit is intensely

human. It is therefore of necessity thoroughly anti-elemental. Yet, when the stones of this magnificent fabric are eyed singly by the observer, they bear obvious marks of having been appropriated from elsewhere by the sovereign prerogative of genius; of having had an anterior place in other systems; of having largely belonged to Nature-worship, and in some cases to Sun-worship; of having been drawn from many quarters, and among them from those which Mr. Max Müller excludes (p. 921): from Egypt, and either from Palestine, or from the same traditional source, to which Palestine itself was indebted. But this is not the present question. As to the solar theory, I hope I have shown either that our positions are now identical, or that, if there be a rift between them, it is so narrow that we may conveniently shake hands across it.

III.

‘ROBERT ELSMERE:’ THE BATTLE OF BELIEF.*

1888. †

HUMAN nature, when aggrieved, is apt and quick in devising compensations. The increasing seriousness and strain of our present life may have had the effect of bringing about the large preference, which I understand to be exhibited in local public libraries, for works of fiction. This is the first expedient of revenge. But it is only a link in a chain. The next step is, that the writers of what might be grave books, *in esse* or *in posse*, have endeavoured with some success to circumvent the multitude. Those who have systems or hypotheses to recommend in philosophy, conduct, or religion induct them into the costume of romance. Such was the second expedient of nature, the counterstroke of her revenge. When this was done in ‘Télémaque,’ ‘Rasselas,’ or ‘Cœlebs,’ it was not without literary effect. Even the last of these three appears to have been successful with its own generation. It would now be deemed intolerably dull. But a dull book is easily renounced. The more didactic

* ‘Robert Elsmere.’ By Mrs. Humphry Ward, author of ‘Miss Bretherton.’ In 3 vols. London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1888.

† Reprinted from the *Nineteenth Century*.

fictions of the present day, so far as I know them, are not dull. We take them up, however, and we find that, when we meant to go to play, we have gone to school. The romance is a gospel of some philosophy, or of some religion; and requires sustained thought on many or some of the deepest subjects, as the only rational alternative to placing ourselves at the mercy of our author. We find that he has put upon us what is not indeed a treatise, but more formidable than if it were. For a treatise must nowhere beg the question it seeks to decide, but must carry its reader onwards by reasoning patiently from step to step. But the writer of the romance, under the convenient necessity which his form imposes, skips in thought, over undefined distances, from stage to stage, as a bee from flower to flower. A creed may (as here) be accepted in a sentence, and then abandoned in a page. But we the common herd of readers, if we are to deal with the consequences, to accept or repel the influence of the book, must, as in a problem of mathematics, supply the missing steps. Thus, in perusing as we ought a propagandist romance, we must terribly increase the pace; and it is the pace that kills.

Among the works to which the preceding remarks might apply, the most remarkable within my knowledge is 'Robert Elsmere.' It is indeed remarkable in many respects. It is a novel of nearly twice the length, and much more than twice the matter, of ordinary novels. It dispenses almost entirely, in the construction of what must still be called its plot, with the aid of incident in the ordinary sense. We have indeed near the close a solitary individual crushed by a waggon, but this catastrophe has no relation to the plot, and its only purpose

is to exhibit a good death-bed in illustration of the great missionary idea of the piece. The *nexus* of the structure is to be found wholly in the workings of character. The assumption and the surrender of a Rectory are the most salient events, and they are simple results of what the actor has thought right. And yet the great, nay, paramount function of character-drawing, the projection upon the canvas of human beings endowed with the true forces of nature and vitality, does not appear to be by any means the master-gift of the authoress. In the mass of matter which she has prodigally expended there might obviously be retrenchment; for there are certain laws of dimension which apply to a novel, and which separate it from an epic. In the extraordinary number of personages brought upon the stage in one portion or other of the book, there are some which are elaborated with greater pains and more detail, than their relative importance seems to warrant. 'Robert Elsmere' is hard reading, and requires toil and effort. Yet, if it be difficult to persist, it is impossible to stop. The prisoner on the treadmill must work severely to perform his task: but if he stops he at once receives a blow which brings him to his senses. Here, as there, it is human infirmity which shrinks; but here, as not there, the propelling motive is within. Deliberate judgment and deep interest alike rebuke a fainting reader. The strength of the book, overbearing every obstacle, seems to lie in an extraordinary wealth of diction, never separated from thought; in a close and searching faculty of social observation; in generous appreciation of what is morally good, impartially* exhibited in all directions: above

* Mrs. Ward has given evidence of this impartiality in her Dedication to the memory of two friends, of whom one, Mrs. Alfred

all in the sense of mission with which the writer is evidently possessed, and in the earnestness and persistency of purpose with which through every page and line it is pursued. The book is eminently an offspring of the time, and will probably make a deep or at least a very sensible impression; not, however, among mere novel-readers, but among those who share, in whatever sense, the deeper thought of the period.

The action begins in a Westmoreland valley, where the three young daughters of a pious clergyman are grouped around a mother infirm in health and without force of mind. All responsibility devolves accordingly upon Catherine, the eldest of the three; a noble character, living only for duty and affection. When the ear heard her, then it blessed her; and when the eye saw her, it gave witness to her.* Here comes upon the scene Robert Elsmere, the eponymist and hero of the book, and the ideal, almost the idol, of the authoress.

He had been brought up at Oxford, in years when the wholesale discomfiture of the great religious movement in the University, which followed upon the secession of Cardinal Newman, had been in its turn succeeded by a new religious reaction. The youth had been open to the personal influences of a tutor, who is in the highest degree beautiful, classical, and indifferentist; and of a noble-minded rationalising teacher, whose name, Mr. Grey, is the thin disguise of another name, and whose lofty character, together with his gifts, and with the tendencies of the time, had made him a power in Oxford.

Lyttelton, lived and died unshaken in belief. The other is more or less made known in the pages of the work.

* See Job xxix. 11.

But, in its action on a nature of devout susceptibilities as well as active talents, the place is stronger than the man, and Robert casts in his lot with the ministry of the Church. Let us stop at this point to notice the terms used. At St. Mary's "the sight and the experience touched his inmost feeling, and satisfied all the poetical and dramatic instincts of a passionate nature." * He "carried his religious passion . . . into the service of the great positive tradition around him." This great, and commonly life-governing decision, is taken under the influence of forces wholly emotional. It is first after the step taken that we have an inkling of any reason for it.† This is not an isolated phenomenon. It is a key to the entire action. The work may be summed up in this way : it represents a battle between intellect and emotion. Of right, intellect wins ; and, having won, enlists emotion in its service.

Elsmere breaks upon us in Westmoreland, prepared to make the great commission the business of his life, and to spend and be spent in it to the uttermost. He is at once attracted by Catherine ; attention forthwith ripens into love ; and love finds expression in a proposal. But, with a less educated intelligence, the girl has a purpose of life not less determined than the youth. She believes herself to have an outdoor vocation in the glen, and above all an indoor vocation in her family, of which she is the single prop. A long battle of love ensues, fought out with not less ability, and with even greater tenacity, than the remarkable conflict of intellects, carried on by correspondence, which ended in the marriage between Mr. and Mrs. Carlyle. The resolute

* i. 121, 123.

† i. 128.

tension of the two minds has many phases ; and a double crisis, first of refusal, secondly of acceptance. This part of the narrative, wrought out in detail with singular skill, will probably be deemed the most successful, the most normal, of the whole. It is thoroughly noble on both sides. The final surrender of Catherine is in truth an opening of the eyes to a wider view of the evolution of the individual, and of the great vocation of life ; and it involves no disparagement. The garrison evacuates the citadel, but its arms have not been laid down, and its colours are flying still.

So the pair settle themselves in a family living, full of the enthusiasm of humanity, which is developed with high energy in every practical detail, and based upon the following of the Incarnate Saviour. Equipped thus far with all that renders life desirable, their union is blessed by the birth of a daughter, and everything thrives around them for the formation of an ideal parish.

But the parish is adorned by a noble old English mansion, and the mansion inhabited by a wealthy Squire, who knows little of duty, but is devoted to incessant study. As an impersonated intellect, he is abreast of all modern inquiry, and, a "Tractarian" in his youth, he has long abandoned all belief. At the outset, he resents profoundly the Rector's obtrusive concern for his neglected tenantry. But the courage of the clergyman is not to be damped by isolation, and in the case of a scandalously insanitary hamlet, after an adequate number of deaths, Mr. Wendover puts aside the screen called his agent, and rebuilds with an ample generosity. This sudden and complete surrender seems to be introduced to glorify the hero of the work, for it does not

indicate any permanent change in the social ideas of Mr. Wendover, but only in his relations to his clergyman.

There is, however, made ready for him a superlative revenge. Robert has enjoyed the use of his rich library, and the two hold literary communications, but with a compact of silence on matters of belief. This treaty is honourably observed by the Squire. But the clergyman invites his fate.* Mr. Wendover makes known to him a great design for a "History of Testimony,"† worked out through many centuries. The book speaks indeed of "the long wrestle" of the two men, and the like.‡ But of Elsmere's wrestling there is no other trace or sign. What weapons the Rector wielded for his faith, what strokes he struck, has not even in a single line been recorded. The discourse of the Squire points out that theologians are men who decline to examine evidence, that miracles are the invention of credulous ages, that the preconceptions sufficiently explain the results. He wins in a canter. There cannot surely be a more curious contrast than that between the real battle, fought in a hundred rounds, between Elsmere and Catherine on marriage, and the fictitious battle between Elsmere and the Squire on the subject of religion, where the one side is a pæan, and the other a blank. A great creed, with the testimony of eighteen centuries at its back, cannot find an articulate word to say in its defence, and the downfall of the scheme of belief shatters also, and of right, the highly ordered scheme of life that had nestled in the Rectory of Murewell, as it still does in thousands of other English parsonages.

* ii. 243.

† ii. 240.

‡ ii. 244, 245.

It is notable that Elsmere seeks, in this conflict with the Squire, no aid or counsel whatever. He encounters indeed by chance Mr. Newcome, a Ritualistic clergyman, whom the generous sympathies of the authoress place upon the roll of his friends. But the language of Mr. Newcome offers no help to his understanding. It is this :—

"Trample on yourself. Pray down the demon, fast, scourge, kill the body, that the soul may live. What are we miserable worms, that we should defy the Most High, that we should set our wretched faculties against His Omnipotence?" *

Mr. Newcome appears everywhere as not only a respectable but a remarkable character. But as to what he says here, how much does it amount to? Considered as a medicine for a mind diseased, for an unsettled, dislocated soul, is it less or more than pure nonsense? In the work of an insidious non-believer, it would be set down as part of his fraud. Mrs. Ward evidently gives it in absolute good faith. It is one in a series of indications, by which this gifted authoress conveys to us what appears to be her thoroughly genuine belief that historical Christianity has, indeed, broad grounds and deep roots in emotion, but in reason none whatever.

The revelation to the wife is terrible; but Catherine clings to her religion on a basis essentially akin to that of Newcome; and the faith of these eighteen centuries, and of the prime countries of the world,

"Bella, immortal, benefica
Fede, ai trionfi avvezza," †

is dismissed without a hearing.

* ii. 270.

† Manzoni's 'Cinque Maggio.'

For my own part, I humbly retort on Robert Elsmere. Considered intellectually, his proceedings in regard to belief appear to me, from the beginning as well as in the downward process, to present dismal gaps. But the emotional part of his character is complete—nay, redundant. There is no moral weakness or hesitation. There rises up before him the noble maxim, assigned to the so-called Mr. Grey (with whom he has a consultation of foregone conclusions), "Conviction is the conscience of the mind."

He renounces his parish and his orders. He still believes in God, and accepts the historical Christ as a wonderful man, good among the good, but a *primus inter pares*. Passing through a variety of stages, he devotes himself to the religion of humanity; reconciles to the new gospel, by shoals, skilled artisans of London who had been totally inaccessible to the old one; and nobly kills himself with overwork, passing away in a final flood of light. He founds and leaves behind him the "New Christian Brotherhood" of Elgood Street; and we are at the close apprised, with enthusiastic sincerity, that this is the true effort of the race,* and

"Others I doubt not, if not we,
The issue of our toils shall see."

Who can grudge to this absolutely pure-minded and very distinguished writer the comfort of having at last found the true specific for the evils and miseries of the world? None surely who bear in mind that the Salvation Army has been known to proclaim itself the Church of the future, or who happen to know that Bunsen,

* iii. 411; comp. 276.

when in 1841 he had procured the foundation of the bishopric of Jerusalem, suggested in private correspondence his hope that this might be the Church which would meet the glorified Redeemer at His coming.

It is necessary here to revert to the Squire. Himself the *μοῖρα πεπρωμένη*, the supreme arbiter of destinies in the book, he is somewhat unkindly treated; his mind at length gives way, and a darkling veil is drawn over the close. Here seems to be a little literary intolerance, something even savouring of a religious test. Robert Elsmere stopped in the downward slide at theism, and it calms and glorifies his death-bed. But the Squire had not stopped there. He had said to Elsmere,* "You are playing into the hands of the Blacks. All this theistic philosophy of yours only means so much grist to their mill in the end." But the great guide is dismissed from his guiding office as summarily as all other processes are conducted, which are required by the purpose of the writer. Art everywhere gives way to purpose. Elsmere no more shows cause for his theism than he had shown it against his Christianity. Why was not Mr. Wendover allowed at least the consolations which gave a satisfaction to David Hume?

Not yet, however, may I wholly part from this sketch of the work. It is so large that much must be omitted. But there is one limb of the plan which is peculiar. Of the two sisters not yet named, one, Agnes by name, appears only as quasi-chaperon or as "dummie." But Rose, the third, has beauty, the gift of a musical artist, and quick and plastic social faculties. Long and elaborate love relations are developed between her and

* iii. 226.

the *poco-curante* tutor and friend, Mr. Langham. Twice she is fairly embarked in passion for him, and twice he jilts her. Still she is not discouraged, and she finally marries a certain Flaxman, an amiable but somewhat manufactured character. From the standing point of art, can this portion of the book fail to stir much mis-giving? We know from Shakespeare how the loves of two sisters can be comprised within a single play. But while the drama requires only one connected action, the novel, and eminently this novel, aims rather at the exhibition of a life: and the reader of these volumes may be apt to say that in working two such lives, as those of Catherine and Rose, through so many stages, the authoress has departed from previous example, and has loaded her ship, though a gallant one, with more cargo than it will bear.

It may indeed be that Mrs. Ward has been led to charge her tale with such a weight of matter from a desire to give philosophical completeness to her representation of the main springs of action which mark the life of the period. For in Robert Elsmere we have the tempered but aggressive action of the sceptical intellect; in Catherine the strong reaction against it; in Rose the art-life; and in Langham the literary and cultivated indifference of the time. The comprehensiveness of such a picture may be admitted, without withdrawing the objection that, as a practical result, the cargo is too heavy for the vessel.

Apart from this question, is it possible to pass without a protest the double jilt? Was Rose, with her quick and self-centred life, a well-chosen *corpus vile* upon whom to pass this experiment? More broadly, though credible perhaps for a man, is such a process in any case possible

by the laws of art for a woman? Does she not violate the first conditions of her nature in exposing herself to so piercing an insult? An enhancement of delicate self-respect is one among the compensations, which Providence has supplied in woman, to make up for a deficiency in some ruder kinds of strength.

Again, I appeal to the laws of art against the final disposal of Catherine. Having much less of ability than her husband, she is really drawn with greater force and truth; and possesses so firm a fibre that when, having been bred in a school of some intolerance, she begins to blunt the edge of her resistance, and to tolerate in divers ways, without adopting, the denuded system of her husband, we begin to feel that the key-note of her character is being tampered with. After his death, the discords become egregious. She remains, as she supposes, orthodox and tenaciously Evangelical. But every knee must be made to bow to Elsmere. So she does not return to the northern valley and her mother's declining age, but in London devotes her week-days to carrying on the institutions of charity he had founded on behalf of his new religion. He had himself indignantly remonstrated with some supposed clergyman, who, in the guise of a Broad Churchman, at once held Elsmere's creed and discharged externally the office of an Anglican priest. He therefore certainly is not responsible for having taught her to believe the chasm between them was a narrow one. Yet she leaps or steps across it every Sunday, attending her church in the forenoon, and looming as regularly every afternoon in the temple of the New Brotherhood. Here surely the claims of system have marred the work of art. Characters might have been devised whom this see-saw

would have suited well enough ; but for the Catherine of the first volume it is an unmitigated solecism ; a dismal, if not even a degrading compromise.

It has been observed that the women of the book are generally drawn with more felicity than the men. As a work of art, Rose is in my view the most successful of the women, and among the men the Squire. With the Squire Mrs. Ward is not in sympathy, for he destroys too much, and he does nothing but destroy. She cannot be in sympathy with Rose ; for Rose, who is selfishly and heartlessly used, is herself selfish and heartless ; with this aggravation, that she has grown up in immediate contact with a noble elder sister, and yet has not caught a particle of nobleness, as well as in view of an infirm mother to whom she scarcely gives a care. On the other hand, in her Robert, who has all Mrs. Ward's affection and almost her worship, and who is clothed with a perfect panoply of high qualities, she appears to be less successful and more artificial. In the recently published correspondence* of Sir Henry Taylor, who was by no means given to paradox, we are told that great earnestness of purpose and strong adhesive sympathies in an author are adverse to the freedom and independence of treatment, the disembarrassed movement of the creative hand, which are required in the supreme poetic office of projecting character on the canvas. If there be truth in this novel and interesting suggestion, we cannot wonder at finding the result exhibited in 'Robert Elsmere,' for never was a book written with greater persistency and intensity of purpose. Every page of its principal narrative is adapted and addressed

* Page 17.

by Mrs. Ward to the final aim which is bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh. This aim is to expel the preternatural element from Christianity, to destroy its dogmatic structure, yet to keep intact the moral and spiritual results. The Brotherhood presented to us with such sanguine hopefulness is a "Christian" brotherhood, but with a Christianity emptied of that which Christians believe to be the soul and springhead of its life. For Christianity, in the established Christian sense, is the presentation to us not of abstract dogmas for acceptance, but of a living and a Divine Person, to whom they are to be united by a vital incorporation. It is the reunion to God of a nature severed from God by sin, and the process is one, not of teaching lessons, but of imparting a new life, with its ordained equipment of gifts and powers.

It is, I apprehend, a complete mistake to suppose, as appears to be the supposition of this remarkable book, that all which has to be done with Scripture, in order to effect the desired transformation of religion, is to eliminate from it the miraculous element. Tremendous as is the sweeping process which extrudes the Resurrection, there is much else, which is in no sense miraculous, to extrude along with it. The Procession of Palms, for example, is indeed profoundly significant, but it is in no way miraculous. Yet, in any consistent history of a Robert Elsmere's Christ, there could be no Procession of Palms. Unless it be the healing of the ear of Malchus, there is not a miraculous event between the commencement of the Passion and the Crucifixion itself. Yet the notes of a superhuman majesty overspread the whole. We talk of all religions as essentially one; but what religion presents to its votaries such a tale as this?

Bishop Temple, in his sermons at Rugby, has been among the later teachers who have shown how the whole behaviour of our Lord, in this extremity of His abasement, seems more than ever to transcend all human limits, and to exhibit without arguing His Divinity. The parables, again, are not less refractory than the miracles, and must disappear along with them : for what parables are there which are not built upon the idea of His unique and transcendent office ? The Gospel of St. John has much less of miracle than the Synoptics ; but it must of course descend from its pedestal, in all that is most its own. And what is gained by all this condemnation, until we get rid of the Baptismal formula ? It is a question not of excision from the Gospels, but of tearing them into shreds. Far be it from me to deny that the parts which remain, or which remain legible, are vital parts ; but this is no more than to say that there may remain vital organs of a man, after the man himself has been cut in pieces.

I have neither space nor capacity at command for the adequate discussion of the questions, which shattered the faith of Robert Elsmere : whether miracles can happen, and whether "an universal preconception" in their favour at the birth of Christianity "governing the work of all men of all schools," * adequately accounts for the place which has been given to them in the New Testament, as available proofs of the Divine Mission of our Lord. But I demur on all the points to the authority of the Squire, and even of Mr. Grey.

The impossibility of miracle is a doctrine which appears to claim for its basis the results of physical

* ii. 246, 247.

inquiry. They point to unbroken sequences in material nature, and refer every phenomenon to its immediate antecedent as adequate to its orderly production. But the appeal to these great achievements of our time is itself disorderly, for it calls upon natural science to decide a question which lies beyond its precinct. There is an extraneous force of will which acts upon matter in derogation of laws purely physical, or alters the balance of those laws among themselves. It can be neither philosophical nor scientific to proclaim the impossibility of miracle, until philosophy or science shall have determined a limit, beyond which this extraneous force of will, so familiar to our experience, cannot act upon or deflect the natural order.

Next, as to that avidity for miracle, which is supposed by the omniscient Squire to account for the invention of it. Let it be granted, for argument's sake, that if the Gospel had been intended only for the Jews, they at least were open to the imputation of a biassing and blinding appetite for signs and wonders. But scarcely had the Christian scheme been established among the Jews, when it began to take root among the Gentiles. It will hardly be contended that these Gentiles, who detested and despised the Jewish race, had any predisposition to receive a religion at their hands or upon their authority. Were they then, during the century which succeeded our Lord's birth, so swayed by a devouring thirst for the supernatural as to account for the early reception, and the steady if not rapid growth, of the Christian creed among them? The statement of the Squire, which carries Robert Elsmere, is that the preconception in favour of miracles at the period "governed the work of all men of all

schools." * A most gross and palpable exaggeration. In philosophy the Epicurean school was atheistic, the Stoic school was ambiguously theistic, and doubt nestled in the Academy. Christianity had little direct contact with these schools, but they acted on the tone of thought, in a manner not favourable but adverse to the pre-conception.

Meantime the power of religion was in decay. The springs of it in the general mind and heart were weakened. A deluge of profligacy had gone far to destroy, at Rome, even the external habit of public worship; and Horace, himself an indifferentist,† denounces the neglect and squalor of the temples; while further on we have the stern and emphatic testimony of Juvenal—

"Esse aliquid Manes, et subterranea regna,
Et contum, et Stygio ranas in gurgite nigras,
Nec pueri credunt, nisi qui nondum ære lavantur." ‡

The age was not an age of faith, among thinking and ruling classes, either in natural or in supernatural religion. There had been indeed a wonderful "evangelical preparation" in the sway of the Greek language, in the unifying power of the Roman State and Empire, and in the utter moral failure of the grand and dominant civilisations; but not in any virgin soil, yearning for the sun, the rain, or the seed of truth.

But the Squire, treading in the footprints of Gibbon's fifteenth Chapter, leaves it to be understood that, in the appeal to the supernatural, the new religion enjoyed an exclusive as well as an overpowering advantage;

* ii. 247. † Hor. 'Od.' i. 34; iii. 6. ‡ 'Sat.' ii. 150.

that it had a patent for miracle, which none could infringe. Surely this is an error even more gross than the statement already cited about all men of all schools. The supernatural was interwoven with the entire fabric of the religion of the Roman State, which, if weak and effete as a religious discipline, was of extraordinary power as a social institution. It stood, if not on faith, yet on nationality, on tradition, on rich endowments, on the deeply interested attachment of a powerful aristocracy, and on that policy of wide conciliation, which gave to so many creeds, less exclusive than the Christian, a cause common with its own.

Looking for a comprehensive description of miracles, we might say that they constitute a language of heaven embodied in material signs, by which communication is established between the Deity and man, outside the daily course of nature and experience. Distinctions may be taken between one kind of miracle and another. But none of these are distinctions in principle. Sometimes they are alleged to be the offspring of a divine power committed to the hands of particular men ; sometimes they are simple manifestations unconnected with human agency, and carrying with them their own meaning, such as the healings in Bethesda ; sometimes they are a system of events and of phenomena subject to authoritative and privileged interpretation. Miracle, portent, prodigy and sign are all various forms of one and the same thing, namely, an invasion of the known and common natural order from the side of the supernatural. In the last-named case, there is an expression of the authorised human judgment upon it, while in the earlier ones there is only a special appeal to it. They rest upon one and the same basis. We may assign to

miracle a body and a soul. It has for its body something accepted as being either in itself or in its incidents outside the known processes of ordinary nature, and for its soul the alleged message which in one shape or another it helps to convey from the Deity to man. This supernatural element, as such, was at least as familiar to the Roman heathenism, as to the Christian scheme. It was indeed more highly organised. It was embodied in the regular and normal practice of the ministers of religion, and especially, under the jurisdiction of the pontifical college, it was the regular and standing business of the augurs to observe, report, and interpret the supernatural signs, by which the gods gave reputed instructions to men outside the course of nature. Sometimes it was by strange atmospheric phenomena ; sometimes by physical prodigies, as when a woman produced a snake,* or a calf was born with its head in its thigh ; † whereupon, says Tacitus, *secuta haruspicum interpretatio*. Sometimes through events only preternatural from the want of assignable cause, as when the statue of Julius Cæsar, on an island in the Tiber, turned itself round from west to east. ‡ Sometimes with an approximation to the Christian signs and wonders, as when Vespasian removed with spittle the *tabes oculorum*, and restored the impotent hand.§ It does not readily appear why in principle the Romans, who had the supernatural for their daily food in a shape sustained by the unbroken tradition of their country, should be violently attracted by the mere exhibition of it from a despised source, and in a manner less formal,

* Tac. 'Ann.' xiv. 12.

† Tac. 'Hist.' i. 86.

‡ *Ibid.* xv. 47.

§ *Ibid.* iv. 81.

less organised, and less known. In one important way we know the accepted supernatural of the Romans operated with direct and telling power against the Gospel. *Si cælum stetit, si terra movit, Christianos ad leones.** Or, in the unsuspected language of Tacitus, *dum latius metuitur, trepidatione vulgi, invalidus quisque obtriti.* When the portents were unfavourable, and there was fear of their extension, the weak had to suffer for the popular alarms.†

The upshot of the matter then appears to be something like this.

The lowly and despised preachers of Christian portent were confronted everywhere by the highborn and accomplished caste sworn to the service of the gods, familiar from centuries of tradition with the supernatural, and supported at every point with the whole force and influence of civil authority. Nor has there ever probably been a case of a contest so unequal, as far as the powers of this world are concerned. Tainted in its origin by its connection with the detested Judaism, odious to the prevailing tone by its exclusiveness, it rested originally upon the testimony of men few, poor and ignorant, and for a length of time no human genius was enlisted in its service, with the single exception of St. Paul. All that we of this nineteenth century know, and know so well, under the name of vested interests, is insignificant compared with the embattled fortress that these humble Christians had to storm. And the Squire, if he is to win the day with minds less ripe for conversion than Robert Elsmere, must produce some other suit of weapons from his armoury.

* Tertull, 'Apol. 40.

† Tac, 'Ann.' xii. 43.

With him I now part company, as his thoroughgoing negation parts company with the hybrid scheme of Mrs. Ward. It is of that scheme that I now desire to take a view immediately practical.

In a concise but striking notice in the *Times** it is placed in the category of "clever attacks upon revealed religion." It certainly offers us a substitute for revealed religion; and possibly the thought of the book might be indicated in these words: "The Christianity accepted in England is a good thing; but come with me, and I will show you a better."

It may, I think, be fairly described as a devout attempt, made in good faith, to simplify the difficult mission of religion in the world by discarding the supposed lumber of the Christian theology, while retaining and applying, in their undiminished breadth of scope, the whole personal, social, and spiritual morality which has now, as matter of fact, entered into the patrimony of Christendom; and, since Christendom is the dominant power of the world, into the patrimony of our race. It is impossible indeed to conceive a more religious life than the later life of Robert Elsmere, in his sense of the word religion. And that sense is far above the sense in which religion is held, or practically applied, by great multitudes of Christians. It is, however, a new form of religion. The question is, can it be actually and beneficially substituted for the old one? It abolishes, of course, the whole authority of Scripture. It abolishes also Church, priesthood or ministry, sacraments, and the whole established machinery which trains the Christian as a member of a

* *Times*, April 7, 1888.

religious society. These have been regarded by fifty generations of men as wings of the soul. It is still required of us by Mrs. Ward to fly, and to fly as high as ever; but it is to fly without wings. For baptism, we have a badge of silver, and inscription in a book.* For the Eucharist there is at an ordinary meal a recital of the fragment, "This do in remembrance of Me." The children respond, "Jesus, we remember Thee always." It is hard to say that prayer is retained. In the Elgood Street service "it is rather an act of adoration and faith, than a prayer properly so called,"† and it appears that memory and trust are the instruments on which the individual is to depend, for maintaining his communion with God. It would be curious to know how the New Brotherhood is to deal with the great mystery of marriage, perhaps the truest touchstone of religious revolution.

It must be obvious to every reader that in the great duel between the old faith and the new, as it is fought in 'Robert Elsmere,' there is a great inequality in the distribution of the arms. Reasoning is the weapon of the new scheme; emotion the sole resource of the old. Neither Catherine nor Newcome have a word to say beyond the expression of feeling; and it is when he has adopted the negative side that the hero himself is fully introduced to the faculty of argument. This is a singular arrangement, especially in the case of a writer who takes a generous view of the Christianity that she only desires to supplant by an improved device. The explanation may be simple. There are abundant signs in the book that the negative speculatists have been

* iii. 358.

† iii. 360.

consulted if not ransacked ; but there is nowhere a sign that the authoress has made herself acquainted with the Christian apologists, old or recent ; or has weighed the evidences derivable from the Christian history ; or has taken measure of the relation in which the doctrines of grace have historically stood to the production of the noblest, purest, and greatest characters of the Christian ages. If such be the case, she has skipped lightly (to put it no higher) over vast mental spaces of literature and learning relevant to the case, and has given sentence in the cause without hearing the evidence.

It might perhaps be not unjust to make a retort upon the authoress, and say that while she believes herself simply to be yielding obedience to reason, her movement is in reality impelled by bias. We have been born into an age when, in the circles of literature and science, there is a strong anti-dogmatic leaning, a prejudice which may largely intercept the action of judgment. Partly because belief has its superstitions, and the detection of these superstitions opens the fabric to attack, like a breach in the wall of a fortress when at a given point it has been stuffed with unsound material. Partly because the rapidity of the movement of the time predisposes the mind to novelty. Partly because the multiplication of enjoyments, through the progress of commerce and invention, enhances the materialism of life, strengthens by the forces of habit the hold of the seen world upon us, and leaves less both of brain power and of heart power available for the unseen. Enormous accretion of wealth is no more deprived of its sting now, than it was when Saint Paul penned his profoundly penetrating admonition to Timothy.* And when, under the present

* 1 Tim. iv. 9.

conditions, it happens that the environment of personal association represents either concentrated hostility or hopeless diversity in religion, there may be hardly a chance for firm and measured belief. What we find to be troublesome, yet from some inward protest are not prepared wholly to reject, we like to simplify and reduce ; and the instances of good and devoted men who are averse to dogma, more frequent than usual in this age, are powerful to persuade us that in lightening the cargo we are really securing the safe voyage of the ship. "About dogma we hear dispute, but the laws of high social morality no speculation is disposed to question. Why not get rid of the disputable, and concentrate all our strength on grasping the undisputed?" We may by a little wresting quote high authority for this recommendation. "Whereto we have already attained . . . let us mind the same thing. . . . And if in anything ye be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you."* It is not difficult to conceive how, under the action of causes with which the time abounds, pure and lofty minds, wholly guiltless of the intention to impair or lower the motive forces of Christianity, may be led into the snare, and may even conceive a process in itself destructive to be, on the contrary, conservative and reparatory.

But it is a snare none the less. And first let us recollect, when we speak of renouncing Christian dogma, what it is that we mean. The germ of it as a system lies in the formula, "Baptising them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."† This was speedily developed into the substance of the Apostles'

* Phil. iii. 15, 16.

† St. Matt. xxviii. 19.

Creed: the Creed which forms our confession of individual faith, in baptism and on the bed of death. Now belief in God, which forms (so to speak) the first great limb of the Creed, is strictly a dogma, and is on no account, according to Mrs. Ward, to be surrendered. But the second and greatest portion of the Creed contains twelve propositions, of which nine are matters of fact, and the whole twelve have for their office the setting forth to us of a Personage, to whom a great dispensation has been committed. The third division of the Creed is more dogmatic, but it is bound down like the second to earth and fact by the article of the Church, a visible and palpable institution. The principal purely dogmatic part of this great document is the part which is to be retained. And we, who accept the Christian story, are entitled to say, that to extrude from a history, tied to strictly human facts, that by which they become a standing channel of organic connection between Deity and humanity, is not presumptively a very hopeful mode of strengthening our belief in God, thus deprived of its props and accessories. The chasm between deity and the human soul, over which the scheme of Redemption has thrown a bridge, again yawns beneath our feet, in all its breadth and depth.

Although the Divinity of Christ is not put prominently forward in this book, but rather the broader objection to supernatural manifestations, yet it will be found to be the real hinge of the entire question. For, if Christ be truly God, few will deny that the exceptional incidents, which follow in the train of His appearance upon earth, raise, in substance, no new difficulty. Is it true, then, that Christians have been so divided on this

subject as to promise us a return of peace and progress by its elimination?

To answer this question rightly, we must not take the humour of this or that particular time or country, but must regard the Christian system in its whole extension, and its whole duration. So regarding it, we shall find that the assertion, far from being true, is glaringly untrue. The truth in rude outline is surely this. That when the Gospel went out into the world, the greatest of all the groups of controversies, which progressively arose within its borders, was that which concerned the true nature of the Object of worship. That these controversies ran through the most important shapes, which have been known to the professing Church of later years, and through many more. That they rose, especially in the fourth century, to such a height, amidst the conflict of councils, popes, and theologians, that the private Christian was too often like the dove wandering over the waters, and seeking in vain a resting-place for the sole of his foot. That the whole mind and heart of the Church were given, in their whole strength and through a lengthened period, to find some solution of these controversies. That many generations passed before Arianism wholly ceased to be the basis of Christian profession in spots or sections of Christendom, but not so long before the central thought of the body as a whole had come to be fixed in the form of what has ever since, and now for over fourteen hundred years, been known as the orthodox belief. The authority of this tradition, based upon the Scriptures, has through all that period been upheld at the highest point to which a marvellous continuity and universality could raise it. It was not impeached by the questioning mind

of the thirteenth century. The scientific revolution, which opened to us the antipodes and the solar system, did not shake it. The more subtle dangers of the Renaissance were dangers to Christianity as a whole, but not to this great element of Christianity as a part. And when the terrible struggles of the Reformation stirred every coarse human passion as well as every fond religious interest into fury, even then the Nicene belief, as Möhler in his 'Symbolik' has so well observed, sat undisturbed in a region elevated above the controversies of the time ; which only touched it at points so exceptional, and comparatively so obscure, as not appreciably to qualify its majestic authority. A Christianity without Christ is no Christianity ; and a Christ not divine is one other than the Christ on whom the souls of Christians have habitually fed. What virtue, what piety, have existed outside of Christianity, is a question totally distinct. But to hold that, since the great controversy of the early time was wound up at Chalcedon, the question of our Lord's Divinity (which draws after it all that Robert Elsmere would excide), has generated the storms of the Christian atmosphere, would be simply an historical untruth. How then is the work of peace to be promoted by the excision from our creed of that central truth on which we are generally agreed ?

The onward movement of negation in the present day has presented perhaps no more instructive feature than this, that the Unitarian persuasion has, in this country at least, by no means thriven upon it. It might have been thought that, in the process of dilapidation, here would have been a point at which the receding tide of belief would have rested at any rate for a while. But instead of this, we are informed that the numbers of

professed Unitarians have increased less than those of other communions, and less than the natural growth of the population. And we find Mrs. Ward herself describing the old Unitarian scheme * as one wholly destitute of logic ; but in what respect she improves upon it I have not yet perceived.

In order to invest any particular propagandism with a show of presumptive title to our acceptance, its author should be able to refer it to some standard of appeal which will show that it has foundations otherwise than in mere private judgment or active imagination. The books of the New Testament I understand to be, for Mrs. Ward, of no value except for the moral precepts they contain. Still less may we invoke the authority of the Old Testament, where the ethical picture is more chequered. She finds no spell in the great moral miracle (so to phrase it) of the Psalms ; nor in the marvellous *propaideia* of the Jewish history, so strikingly confirmed by recent research ; in the Levitical law, the prophetic teaching, the entire dispensation of temporal promise and of religious worship and instruction, by which the Hebrew race was kept in social isolation through fifteen centuries, as a cradle for the Redeemer that was to come. She is not awakened by the Christian more than by the Jewish history. No way to her assent is opened by the great victory of the world's babes and striplings over its philosophers and scholars, and the serried array of emperors, aristocracies, and statesmen, with their elaborate apparatus of organised institutions. All this cogent mass of human testimony is rendered, I admit, on behalf not of a vague and arbitrary severance

* iii. 55.

of Christian morals from the roots which have produced them, but of what we term the Christian dogma, that is to say, of belief in God supplemented and brought home by the great fact of Redemption, and of the provision made through the Church of Christ for the perpetual conservation and application of its living powers.

And it must be observed that, in adducing this evidence from consent, I make no assumption and beg no question as between reformed and unreformed Christianity. By any such preferential treatment of a part, I should weaken the authority and betray the sacred cause of the whole. All that can be said or shown of the corruptions that have gathered round the central scheme, of the failure rightly to divide the word of truth, of the sin and shame that in a hundred forms have belied its profession, affords only new proof of the imperishable vitality that has borne so much disease, of the buoyancy of the ark on whose hull has grown so much of excrescence without arresting its course through the waters. And again, the concord of Christians ever since the great adjudication of the fifth century on the central truth has acquired an addition of weight almost incalculable, from the fact that they have differed so sharply upon many of the propositions that are grouped around it.

Without doubt human testimony is to be duly and strictly sifted, and every defect in its quantity or quality is to be recorded in the shape of a deduction from its weight. But as there is no proceeding more irreverent, so there is none more strictly irrational, than its wholesale depreciation. Such depreciation is an infallible note of shallow and careless thinking, for it very generally implies an exaggerated and almost ludicrous estimate of the capacity and performances of the present

generation, as compared with those which have preceded it. Judges in our own cause, pleaders with nobody to reply, we take ample note of every comparative advantage we possess, but forget to register deteriorating and disqualifying influences. Not less commonly is our offence avenged by our own inconsistency. The solemn voice of the ages, the *securus judicat orbis terrarum*, amounts simply to zero for Robert Elsmere. Yet he can absolutely surrender to his own selected pope the guidance of his understanding; and when he asks himself, at the funeral in the third volume, whether the more modest, that is, the emasculated, form of human hope in the presence of the Eternal, may not be "as real, as sustaining," as the old one, his reply to this great question is—"Let Grey's trust answer for me."*

This great buttress of the old religion, whatever its value, is then withdrawn from the new one, which starts like

"a painted ship
Upon a painted ocean,"

accredited by a successful venture among the London artisans, who differ (so we are told) not only from the classes above and beneath them in the metropolis, as to their disposition to accept the Christian doctrines, but from their own brethren in the north.† It is not, therefore, on testimony that the Elsmere gospel takes its stand. Does it, then, stand upon philosophy, upon inherent beauty and fitness, as compared with the scheme which it dismembers and then professes to replace? Again, be it borne in mind that the essence of the proposal is to banish the supernatural idea and

* iii. 284.

† iii. 159.

character of our Lord, but to imbibe and assimilate His moral teachings.

From my antiquated point of view, this is simply to bark the tree, and then, as the death which ensues is not immediate, to point out with satisfaction on the instant that it still waves living branches in the wind. We have before us a huge larcenous appropriation, by the modern schemes, of goods which do not belong to them. They carry peacocks’ feathers, which adorn them for a time, and which they cannot reproduce. Let us endeavour to learn whether these broad assumptions, which flow out of the historic testimony of the Christian ages, are also prompted and sustained by the reason of the case.

It is sometimes possible to trace peculiar and marked types of human character with considerable precision to their causes. Take, for instance, the Spartan type of character, in its relation to the legislation attributed to Lycurgus. Or take, again, the Jewish type, such as it is presented to us both by the ancient and the later history, in its relation to the Mosaic law and institutions. It would surely have been a violent paradox, in either of these cases, to propose the abolition of the law, and to assert at the same time that the character would continue to be exhibited, not only sporadically and for a time, but normally and in permanence.

These were restricted, almost tribal, systems. Christianity, though by no means less peculiar, was diffusive. It both produced a type of character wholly new to the Roman world, and it fundamentally altered the laws and institutions, the tone, temper, and tradition of that world. For example, it changed profoundly the relation of the poor to the rich, and the almost forgotten

obligations of the rich to the poor. It abolished slavery, abolished human sacrifice, abolished gladiatorial shows, and a multitude of other horrors. It restored the position of woman in society. It proscribed polygamy; and put down divorce, absolutely in the West, though not absolutely in the East. It made peace, instead of war, the normal and presumed relation between human societies. It exhibited life as a discipline everywhere and in all its parts, and changed essentially the place and function of suffering in human experience. Accepting the ancient morality as far as it went, it not only enlarged but transfigured its teaching, by the laws of humility and of forgiveness, and by a law of purity perhaps even more new and strange than these. Let it be understood that I speak throughout not of such older religion as may have subsisted in the lowly and unobserved places of human life, but of what stamped the character of its strongholds; of the elements which made up the main and central currents of thought, action, and influence, in those places, and in those classes, which drew the rest of the world in their train. All this was not the work of a day, but it was the work of powers and principles which persistently asserted themselves in despite of controversy, of infirmity, and of corruption in every form; which reconstituted in life and vigour a society found in decadence; which by degrees came to pervade the very air we breathe; and which eventually have beyond all dispute made Christendom the dominant portion, and Christianity the ruling power, of the world. And all this has been done, not by eclectic and arbitrary fancies, but by the creed of the Homocousion, in which the philosophy of modern times sometimes appears to find a favourite theme of ridicule.

But it is not less material to observe that the whole fabric, social as well as personal, rests on the new type of individual character which the Gospel brought into life and action : enriched and completed without doubt from collateral sources which made part of the " Evangelical preparation," but in its central essence due entirely to the dispensation, which had been founded and wrought out in the land of Judæa, and in the history of the Hebrew race. What right have we to detach, or to suppose we can detach, this type of personal character from the causes out of which as matter of history it has grown, and to assume that without its roots it will thrive as well as with them ?

For Mrs. Ward is so firmly convinced, and so affectionately sensible, of the exquisite excellence of the Christian type that she will permit no abatement from it, though she thinks it can be cast in a mould which is human as well as, nay, better than, in one which is divine. Nor is she the first person who, in renouncing the Christian tradition, has reserved her allegiance to Christian morals and even sought to raise their standard. We have, for instance, in America, not a person only, but a society, which, while trampling on the Divinity and Incarnation of Christ, not only accepts His rule of life, but pushes evangelical counsels into absolute precepts, and insists upon them as the rule of life for all who seek, instead of abiding in the " lower floor churches," to be Christians indeed. " The fundamental principles of Shakerism " are " virgin purity, non-resistance, peace, equality of inheritance, and unspottedness from the world." * The evidence of travellers appears to show

* The quotation is from a preface to ' Shaker Sermons,' by H. L. Eads, Bishop of South Union, Kentucky. Fourth edition, 1887.

that the ideal of these projectors has to a certain degree been realised; nor can we know for how many years an eccentric movement of this kind will endure the test of time without palpably giving way. The power of environment, and the range of idiosyncrasy, suffice to generate, especially in dislocating times, all sorts of abnormal combinations, which subsist, in a large degree, upon forces not their own, and so impose themselves, with a show of authority, upon the world.

Let us return to the point. The Christian type is the product and the property of the Christian scheme. No, says the objector, the improvements which we witness are the offspring of civilisation. It might be a sufficient answer to point out that the civilisation before and around us is a Christian civilisation. What civilisation could do without Christianity for the greatest races of mankind, we know already. Philosophy and art, creative genius and practical energy, had their turn before the Advent; and we can register the results. I do not say that the great Greek and Roman ages lost—perhaps even they improved—the ethics of *meum* and *tuum*, in the interests of the leisured and favoured classes of society, as compared with what those ethics had been in archaic times. But they lost the hold which some earlier races within their sphere had had of the future life. They degraded, and that immeasurably, the position of woman. They effaced from the world the law of purity. They even carried indulgence to a worse than bestial type; and they gloried in the achievement.* Duty and religion, in the governing classes and the governing places, were absolutely torn asunder; and self-

* See, for instance, the *Epwtres* of Lucian.

will and self-worship were established as the unquestioned rule of life. It is yet more important to observe that the very qualities which are commended in the Beatitudes, and elsewhere in the Sermon on the Mount, and which form the base of the character specifically Christian, were for the Greek and the Roman mind the objects of contempt. From the history of all that has lain within the reach of the great Mediterranean basin, not a tittle of encouragement can be drawn for the ideas of those, who would surrender the doctrines of Christianity and yet retain its moral and spiritual fruits.

Does then that severance, unsustained by authority or by experience, commend itself at any single point by an improved conformity with purely abstract principles of philosophy? and is the new system better adapted to the condition and the needs of human nature, than the old? Does it better correspond with what an enlightened reason would dictate as the best provision for those needs? Does it mitigate, or does it enhance, the undoubted difficulties of belief? And if the answer must be given in the negative to both these inquiries, how are we to account for the strange phenomenon which exhibits to us persons sincerely, nay painfully, desirous of seeing Divine government more and more accepted in the world, yet enthusiastically busied in cutting away the best among the props, by which that government has been heretofore sustained?

As regards the first of these three questions, it is to be observed that, while the older religions made free use of prodigy and portent, they employed these instruments for political rather than moral purposes; and it may be doubted whether the sum total of such action tended to raise the standard of life and thought. The

general upshot was that the individual soul felt itself very far from God. Our bedimmed eye could not perceive His purity; and our puny reach could not find touch of His vastness. By the scheme of Redemption, this sense of distance was removed. The divine perfections were reflected through the medium of a perfect humanity, and were thus made near, familiar, and liable to love. The great all-pervading law of human sympathy became directly available for religion, and in linking us to the Divine Humanity, linked us by the same act to God. And this not for rare and exceptional souls alone, but for the common order of mankind. The direct contact, the interior personal communion of the individual with God was re-established: for human faculties, in their normal action, could now appreciate, and approach to, what had previously been inappreciable and unapproachable. Surely the system I have thus rudely exhibited was ideally a great philosophy, as well as practically an immeasurable boon. To strike out the redemptive clauses from the scheme is to erase the very feature by which it essentially differed from all other schemes; and to substitute a didactic exhibition of superior morality, with the rays of an example in the preterite tense, set by a dead man in Judæa, for that scheme of living forces, by which the powers of a living Saviour's humanity are daily and hourly given to man, under a charter which expires only with the world itself. Is it possible here to discern, either from an ideal or from a practical point of view, anything but depletion and impoverishment, and the substitution of a spectral for a living form?

If we proceed to the second question, the spectacle, as it presents itself to me, is stranger still. Although

we know that James Mill, arrested by the strong hand of Bishop Butler, halted rather than rested for a while in theism on his progress towards general negation, yet his case does not supply, nor can we draw from other sources, any reason to regard such a position as one which can be largely and permanently held against that relentless force of logic, which is ever silently at work to assert and to avenge itself. The theist is confronted, with no breakwater between, by the awful problem of moral evil, by the mystery of pain, by the apparent anomalies of waste and of caprice on the face of creation; and not least of all by the fact that, while the moral government of the world is founded on the free agency of man, there are in multitudes of cases environing circumstances independent of his will which seem to deprive that agency, called free, of any operative power adequate to contend against them. In this bewildered state of things, in this great enigma of the world, "Who is this that cometh from Edom, with dyed garments from Bozrah? . . . Wherefore art thou red in thine apparel, and thy garments like him that treadeth in the winefat?"* There has come upon the scene the figure of a Redeemer, human and divine. Let it be granted that the Incarnation is a marvel wholly beyond our reach, and that the miracle of the Resurrection to-day gives serious trouble to some fastidious intellects. But the difficulties of a baffled understanding, lying everywhere around us in daily experience, are to be expected from its limitations; not so the shocks encountered by the moral sense. Even if the Christian scheme slightly lengthened the immeasurable catalogue of the first, this

* Isa. lxiii. 1, 2.

is dust in the balance compared with the relief it furnishes to the second ; in supplying the most powerful remedial agency ever known, in teaching how pain may be made a helper, and evil transmuted into good ; and in opening clearly the vision of another world, in which we are taught to look for yet larger counsels of the Almighty wisdom. To take away, then, the agency so beneficent, which has so softened and reduced the moral problems that lie thickly spread around us, and to leave us face to face with them in all their original rigour, is to enhance and not to mitigate the difficulties of belief.

Lastly, it is not difficult to understand why those who prefer the Pagan ideal, or who cannot lay hold on the future world, or who labour under still greater disadvantages, should put aside as a whole the gospel of God manifest in the flesh. But Mrs. Ward is none of these ; and it is far harder to comprehend the mental attitude, or the mental consistency at least, of those who like her desire to retain what was manifested, but to thrust aside the manifesting Person, and all that His living personality entails : or, if I may borrow an Aristotelian figure, to keep the accidents and discard the substance. I cannot pretend to offer a solution of this hard riddle. But there is one feature which almost uniformly marks writers whose mind as in this case is of a religious tone, or who do not absolutely exclude religion, while they reject the Christian dogma and the authority of Scripture. They appear to have a very low estimate both of the quantity and the quality of sin : of its amount, spread like a deluge over the world, and of the subtlety, intensity, and virulence of its nature. I mean a low estimate as compared with the mournful denunciations of the sacred writings, or with

the language especially of the later Christian Confessions. Now let it be granted that, in interpreting those Confessions, we do not sufficiently allow for the enormous differences among human beings—differences both of original disposition, and of ripened character. We do not sufficiently take account of the fact that, while disturbance and degradation have so heavily affected the mass, there are a happy few on whom nature's degeneracy has but lightly laid its hand. In the biography of the late Dr. Marsh we have an illustration apt for my purpose. His family was straitly Evangelical. He underwent what he deemed to be conversion. A like-minded friend congratulated his mother on the work of Divine grace in her son. But, in the concrete, she mildly resented the remark, and replied that in truth "Divine grace would find very little to do in her son William."

In the novel of 'The Unclassed' by the author of 'Thyrza,' which like 'Robert Elsmere' is of the didactic and speculative class, the leading man-character, when detailing his mental history, says that "sin" has never been for him a word of weighty import. So ingenuous a confession is not common. I remember but one exception to the rule that the negative writers of our own day have formed, or at least have exhibited, a very feeble estimate of the enormous weight of sin, as a factor in the condition of man and of the world. That exception is Amiel. Mrs. Ward has prefixed to her translation of his remarkable and touching work an Introduction from which I make the following extract :—

"His Calvinistic training lingers long in him ; and what detaches him from the Hegelian school, with which he has much in common, is his own stronger sense of personal need, his preoccupation

with the idea of sin. He speaks (says M. Renan contemptuously) of sin, of salvation, of redemption and conversion, as if these things were realities. He asks me, 'What does M. Renan make of sin?' 'Eh bien, je crois que je le supprime.'"

The closing expression is a happy one : sin is for the most part suppressed.

We are bound to believe, and I for one do believe, that in many cases the reason why the doctrines of grace, so profoundly embedded in the Gospel, are dispensed with by the negative writers of the day, is in many cases because they have not fully had to feel the need of them : because they have not travelled with St. Paul through the dark valley of agonising conflict, or with Dante along the circles downward and the hill upward ; because, having to bear a smaller share than others of the common curse and burden, they stagger and falter less beneath its weight.

But ought they not to know that they are physicians, who have not learned the principal peril of the patient's case, and whose prescription accordingly omits the main requisite for a cure? For surely in this matter there should be no mistake. As the entire Levitical institutions seem to have been constructed to impress upon the Hebrew mind a deep and definite idea of sin, we find in the New Testament that that portion of our Lord's work was so to speak ready-made. But He placed it at the foundation of His great design for the future. "When the Comforter is come, He will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment." * Mrs. Ward seeks, and even with enthusiasm, to "make for righteousness ;" but the three terms compose an

* John xvi. 8.

organic whole, and if a part be torn away the residue will bleed to death. For the present, however, we have only to rest in the real though but partial consolation that, if the ancient and continuous creed of Christendom has slipped away from its place in Mrs. Ward's brilliant and subtle understanding, it has nevertheless by no means lost a true, if unacknowledged, hold upon the inner sanctuary of her heart.

IV.

INGERSOLL ON CHRISTIANITY.*

1888.

As a listener, from across the broad Atlantic, to the clash of arms in the combat between Colonel Ingersoll and Dr. Field on the most momentous of all subjects, I have not the personal knowledge which assisted these doughty champions in making reciprocal acknowledgments, as broad as could be desired, with reference to personal character and motive. Such acknowledgments are of high value in keeping the issue clear, if not always of all adventitious, yet of all venomous matter.

* [A controversy on Christianity has now been carried on for some months in the pages of *The North American Review* between Dr. Field and Colonel Ingersoll, the most eloquent representative of the school of unbelief (in the United States). In the course of the discussion Mr. Gladstone contributed the following paper, which, if we are to judge by the circulation of the number of the Review in which it appears, has excited very considerable interest in America. We believe that some sixty-three editions have been published. By the kind permission of the distinguished author, we are enabled to present it to our readers. If it be possible for party feeling to be suppressed for a time, all Christian men must rejoice that an illustrious statesman should have found time, amid the varied and exciting engagements of his active and honoured old age, to produce this able exposition and defence of his faith in the gospel. Colonel Ingersoll's reply has been published in this country in pamphlet form.—EDITOR of *The Congregational Review*.]

Destitute as I am of the experience on which to found them as original testimonies, still, in attempting partially to criticise the remarkable Reply of Colonel Ingersoll, I can both accept in good faith what has been said by Dr. Field, and add that it seems to me consonant with the strain of the pages I have set before me. Having said this, I shall allow myself the utmost freedom in remarks, which will be addressed exclusively to the matter, not the man.

Let me begin by making several acknowledgments of another kind, but which I feel to be serious. The Christian Church has lived long enough in external triumph and prosperity to expose those of whom it is composed to all such perils of error and misfeasance, as triumph and prosperity bring with them. Belief in Divine guidance is not of necessity belief that such guidance will never be frustrated by the laxity, the infirmity, the perversity of man, alike in the domain of action and in the domain of thought. Believers in the perpetuity of the life of the Church are not tied to believing in the perpetual health of the Church. Even the great Latin Communion, and that Communion even since the Council of the Vatican in 1870, theoretically admits, or does not exclude, the possibility of a wide range of local and partial error in opinion as well as conduct. Elsewhere the admission would be yet more unequivocal. Of such errors in tenet, or in temper and feeling more or less hardened into tenet, there has been a crop alike abundant and multifarious. Each Christian party is sufficiently apt to recognize this fact with regard to every other Christian party; and the more impartial and reflective minds are aware that no party is exempt from mischiefs, which lie at the root of the

human constitution in its warped, impaired, and dislocated condition. Naturally enough, these deformities help to indispose men towards belief; and when this indisposition has been developed into a system of negative warfare, all the faults of all the Christian bodies, and sub-divisions of bodies, are, as it was natural to expect they would be, carefully raked together, and become part and parcel of the indictment against the Divine scheme of redemption. I notice these things in the mass, without particularity, which might be invidious, for two important purposes. First, that we all, who hold by the gospel and the Christian Church, may learn humility and modesty, as well as charity and indulgence, in the treatment of opponents, from our consciousness that we all, alike by our exaggerations and our shortcomings in belief, no less than by faults of conduct, have contributed to bring about this condition of fashionable hostility to religious faith: and, secondly, that we may resolutely decline to be held bound to tenets, or to consequences of tenets, which represent not the great Christendom of the past and present, but only some hole and corner of its vast organization; and not the heavenly treasure, but the rust or the canker to which that treasure has been exposed through the incidents of its custody in earthen vessels.

I do not remember ever to have read a composition in which the merely local colouring of particular, and even very limited sections of Christianity, was more systematically used as if it had been available and legitimate argument against the whole, than in the Reply before us. Colonel Ingersoll writes with a rare and enviable brilliancy, but also with an impetus which he seems unable to control. Denunciation, sarcasm, and invective,

may in consequence be said to constitute the staple of his work ; and, if argument, or some favourable admission here and there, peeps out for a moment, the writer soon leaves the dry and barren heights of careful thought for his favourite and more luxurious galloping-grounds beneath. Thus, when the Reply has consecrated a line * to the pleasing contemplation of his opponent as "manly, candid, and generous," it immediately devotes more than twelve to a declamatory denunciation of a practice (as if it were his) altogether contrary to generosity and to candour, and reproaches those who expect † "to receive as alms an eternity of joy." I take this as a specimen of the mode of statement which permeates the whole Reply. It is not the statement of an untruth. The Christian receives as alms all whatsoever he receives at all. *Qui salvandos salvas gratis* is his song of thankful praise. But it is the statement of one-half of a truth, which lives only in its entirety, and of which the Reply gives us only a mangled and bleeding *frustum*. For the gospel teaches that the faith which saves is a living and energizing faith, and that the most precious part of the alms which we receive lies in an ethical and spiritual process, which partly qualifies for, but also and emphatically composes, this conferred eternity of joy. Restore this ethical element to the doctrine from which the Reply has rudely displaced it, and the whole force of the assault is gone, for there is now a total absence of point in the accusation ; it comes only to this, that "mercy and judgment are met together," and that "righteousness and peace have kissed each other." ‡

Perhaps, as we proceed, there will be supplied ampler

* N. A. R., No. 372, p. 473.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Ps. lxxxv. 10,

means of judging whether I am warranted in saying that the instance I have here given is a normal instance of a practice so largely followed as to divest the Reply entirely of that calmness and sobriety of movement which are essential to the just exercise of the reasoning power in subject matter not only grave, but solemn. Pascal has supplied us, in the 'Provincial Letters,' with an unique example of easy, brilliant, and fascinating treatment, on sarcastic lines, of a theme both profound and complex. But where shall we find another Pascal? And, if we had found him, he would be entitled to point out to us that the famous work was not less close and logical than it was witty. In this case, all attempt at continuous argument appears to be deliberately abjured, not only as to pages, but, as may almost be said, even as to lines. The paper, noteworthy as it is, leaves on my mind the impression of a battle-field where every man strikes at every man, and all is noise, hurry, and confusion. Better surely had it been, and worthier of the great weight and elevation of the subject, if the controversy had been waged after the pattern of those engagements where a chosen champion on either side, in a space carefully limited and reserved, does battle on behalf of each silent and expectant host. The promiscuous crowds represent all the lower elements which enter into human conflicts: the chosen champions, and the order of their proceeding, signify the dominion of reason over force, and its just place as the sovereign arbiter of the great questions that involve the main destiny of man.

I will give another instance of the tumultuous method in which the Reply conducts, not, indeed, its argument, but its case. Dr. Field had exhibited an

example of what he thought superstition, and had drawn a distinction between superstition and religion. But to the author of the Reply all religion is superstition, and, accordingly, he writes as follows:—

—“You are shocked at the Hindoo mother, when she gives her child to death at the supposed command of her God. What do you think of Abraham? of Jephthah? What is your opinion of Jehovah Himself?” *

Taking these three appeals in the reverse order to that in which they are written, I will briefly ask, as to the closing challenge, “What do you think of Jehovah Himself?” whether this is the tone in which controversy ought to be carried on? Not only is the name of Jehovah encircled in the heart of every believer with the profoundest reverence and love, but the Christian religion teaches, through the Incarnation, a doctrine of personal union with God so lofty that it can only be approached in a deep, reverential calm. I do not deny that a person who deems a given religion to be wicked may be led onward by logical consistency to impugn in strong terms the character of the Author and Object of that religion. But he is surely bound by the laws of social morality and decency to consider well the terms and the manner of his indictment. If he finds it upon allegations of fact, these allegations should be carefully stated, so as to give his antagonists reasonable evidence that it is truth and not temper which wrings from him a sentence of condemnation, delivered in sobriety and sadness, and not without a due commiseration for those, whom he is attempting to undeceive, who think he is himself both deceived and a deceiver, but

who surely are entitled, while this question is in process of decision, to require that He whom they adore should at least be treated with those decent reserves, which are deemed essential when a human being, say a parent, wife, or sister, is in question. But here a contemptuous reference to Jehovah follows, not upon a careful investigation of the cases of Abraham and of Jephthah, but upon a mere summary citation of them to surrender themselves, so to speak, as culprits; that is to say, a summons to accept at once, on the authority of the Reply, the view which the writer is pleased to take of those cases. It is true that he assures us, in another part of his paper, that he has read the Scriptures with care; and I feel bound to accept this assurance, but at the same time to add that if it had not been given I should, for one, not have made the discovery, but might have supposed that the author had galloped, not through, but about, the sacred Volume, much as a man lightly glances over the pages of an ordinary newspaper or novel.

Although there is no argument as to Abraham or Jephthah expressed upon the surface, we must assume that one is intended, and it seems to be of the following kind: "You are not entitled to reprove the Hindoo mother who cast her child under the wheels of the car of Juggernaut; for you approve of the conduct of Jephthah, who (probably) sacrificed his daughter in fulfilment of a vow* that he would make a burnt offering of whatsoever, on his safe return, he should meet coming forth from the doors of his dwelling." Now the whole force of this rejoinder depends upon our

* .Judg. xi. 31,

supposed obligation as believers to approve the conduct of Jephthah. It is, therefore, a very serious question whether we are or are not so obliged. But this question the Reply does not condescend either to argue, or even to state. It jumps to an extreme conclusion without the decency of any intermediate steps. Are not such methods of proceeding more suited to placards at an election, than to disquisitions on these most solemn subjects?

I am aware of no reason why any believer in Christianity should not be free to canvass, regret, condemn the act of Jephthah. So far as the narration which details it is concerned, there is not a word of sanction given to it more than to the falsehood of Abraham in Egypt, or of Jacob and Rebecca in the matter of the hunting ; * or to the dissembling of St. Peter in the case of the Judaizing converts.† I am aware of no colour of approval given to it elsewhere. But possibly the author of the Reply may have thought he found such an approval in the famous eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, where the apostle, handling his subject with a discernment and care very different from those of the Reply, writes thus :—

“And what shall I say more? For the time would fail me to tell of Gideon, and of Barak, and of Samson, and of Jephthah: of David also, and Samuel, and of the prophets.” ‡

Jephthah, then, is distinctly held up to us by a canonical writer as an object of praise. But of praise on what account? Why should the Reply assume that

* Gen. xx, 1-18, and Gen. xxiii.

† Gal. ii, 11.

‡ Heb. xi, 32.

it is on account of the sacrifice of his child? The writer of the Reply has given us no reason, and no rag of a reason, in support of such a proposition. But this was the very thing he was bound by every consideration to prove, upon making his indictment against the Almighty. In my opinion, he could have one reason only for not giving a reason, and that was that no reason could be found.

The matter, however, is so full of interest, as illustrating both the method of the Reply and that of the Apostolic writer, that I shall enter farther into it, and draw attention to the very remarkable structure of this noble chapter, which is to Faith what the Thirteenth of Cor. I. is to Charity. From the first to the thirty-first verse, it commemorates the achievements of faith in ten persons: Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Sarah, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Moses (in greater detail than any one else), and finally Rahab, in whom, I observe in passing, it will hardly be pretended that she appears in this list on account of the profession she had pursued. Then comes the rapid recital (ver. 31), without any specification of particulars whatever, of these four names: Gideon, Barak, Samson, Jephthah. Next follows a kind of recommencement, indicated by the word *also*; and the glorious acts and sufferings of the prophets are set forth largely, with a singular power and warmth, headed by the names of David and Samuel, the rest of the sacred band being mentioned only in the mass.

Now, it is surely very remarkable that, in the whole of this recital, the apostle, whose "feet were shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace," seems with a tender instinct to avoid anything like stress on the exploits of warriors. Of the twelve persons having a share in

the detailed expositions, David is the only warrior, and his character as a man of war is eclipsed by his greater attributes as a prophet, or declarer of the Divine counsels. It is yet more noteworthy that Joshua, who had so fair a fame, but who was only a warrior, is never named in the Chapter, and we are simply told that "by faith the walls of Jericho fell down, after they had been compassed about seven times." * But the series of four names, which are given without any specification of their title to appear in the list, are all names of distinguished warriors. They had all done great acts of faith and patriotism against the enemies of Israel—Gideon against the Midianites, Barak against the hosts of Syria, Samson against the Philistines, and Jephthah against the children of Ammon. Their title to appear in the list at all is in their acts of war, and the mode of their treatment as men of war is in striking accordance with the analogies of the Chapter. All of them, moreover, had committed errors. Gideon had again and again demanded a sign, and had made a golden ephod, "which thing became a snare unto Gideon and to his house." † Barak had refused to go up against Jabin unless Deborah would join the venture. ‡ Samson had been in dalliance with Delilah. Last came Jephthah, who had, as we assume, sacrificed his daughter in fulfilment of a rash vow. No one supposes that any of the others are honoured by mention in the chapter on account of his sin or error : why should that supposition be made in the case of Jephthah, at the cost of all the rules of orderly interpretation ?

Having now answered the challenge as to Jephthah,

* Heb. xi. 30.

† Judg. viii. 27.

‡ Judg. v. 8.

I proceed to the case of Abraham. It would not be fair to shrink from touching it in its tenderest point. That point is nowhere expressly touched by the commendations bestowed upon Abraham in Scripture. I speak now of the special form, of the words that are employed. He is not commended because, being a father, he made all the preparations antecedent to plunging the knife into his son. He is commended (as I read the text) because, having received a glorious promise, a promise that his wife should be a mother of nations, and that kings should be born of her,* and that by his seed the blessings of redemption should be conveyed to man, and it being plain that the fulfilment of this promise depended solely upon the life of Isaac, he was, nevertheless, willing that the chain of these promises should be broken even if it were to be by the extinction of that life, because his faith assured him that the Almighty would find the way to give effect to His own designs.† The offering of Isaac is mentioned as a completed offering, and the intended blood-shedding, of which I shall speak presently, is not here brought into view.

The facts, however, which we have before us, and which are treated in Scripture with caution, are grave and startling. A father is commanded to sacrifice his son. Before consummation, the sacrifice is interrupted. Yet the intention of obedience had been formed, and certified by a series of acts. It may have been qualified by a reserve of hope that God would interpose before the final act, but of this we have no distinct statement, and it can only stand as an allowable conjecture. It may be conceded that the narrative does not supply us

* Gen. xvii. 6.

† Heb. xi. 17-19.

with a complete statement of particulars. That being so, it behoves us to tread cautiously in approaching the matter. Thus much, however, I think, may further be said by way of preliminary : the command was addressed to Abraham under conditions, essentially different from those which now determine for us the limits of moral obligation.

For the conditions, both socially and otherwise, were indeed very different. The estimate of human life at the time was different. The position of the father in the family was different : its members were regarded as in some sense his property. There is every reason to suppose that, around Abraham in "the land of Moriah," the practice of human sacrifice as an act of religion was in vigour. [We cannot doubt that Abraham shared that general belief in survival beyond death, which evidently prevailed in his time.]* But we may look yet more deeply into the matter. According to the Book of Genesis, Adam and Eve were placed under a law, not of consciously perceived right and wrong, but of simple obedience. The tree, of which alone they were forbidden to eat, was the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Duty lay for them in following the command of the Most High, before and until they, or their descendants, should become capable of appreciating it by an ethical standard. Their condition was greatly analogous to that of the infant, who has just reached the stage at which he can comprehend that he is ordered to do this or that, but not the nature of the thing so ordered. To the external standard of right and wrong, and to the obligation it entails *per se*, the child is introduced by a process, which gradually

* Added 1896.—W. E. G.

unfolds together with the development of his nature, and the opening out of what we term a moral sense. If we pass at once from the epoch of Paradise to the period of the prophets, we perceive the important progress that has been made in the education of the race. The Almighty, in His mediate intercourse with Israel, deigns to appeal to an independently conceived criterion, as to an arbiter between His people and Himself. "Come, now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord." * "Yet ye say, The way of the Lord is not equal. Hear now, O house of Israel; Is not My way equal? are not your ways unequal?" † Between these two epochs how wide a space of moral teaching has been traversed! But Abraham, so far as we may judge from the pages of Scripture, belongs essentially to the Adamic period, far more than to the Prophetic. The notion of righteousness and sin was not indeed hidden from him: transgression itself had opened that chapter, and it was one never to be closed: but as yet they lay wrapped up, so to speak, in Divine command and prohibition. And what God commanded, it was for Abraham to believe that He Himself would adjust to the harmony of His own character.

The faith of Abraham, with respect to this supreme trial, appears to have been centred in the one point, that he would trust God to all extremities, and in despite of all appearances. The command received was obviously inconsistent with the promises which had preceded it. It was also inconsistent with the exact morality acknowledged in later times, and perhaps too definitely reflected in our minds, by an anachronism easy to

* Isa. i. 18.

† Ezek. xviii. 25.

conceive, on the day of Abraham. There can be little doubt, as between these two points of view, that the strain upon his faith was felt mainly, to say the least, in connection with the first mentioned. This faith is not wholly unlike the faith of Job; for Job believed, in despite of what was to the eye of flesh an unrighteous government of the world. If we may still trust the Authorized Version, his cry was, "though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him." * This cry was, however, the expression of one who did not expect to be slain; and it may be that Abraham, when he said, "My son, God will provide Himself a lamb for a burnt offering," not only believed explicitly that God would do what was right, but, moreover, believed implicitly that a way of rescue would be found for his son. I do not say that this case is like the case of Jephthah, where the introduction of difficulty is purely gratuitous. I confine myself to these propositions. Though the law of moral action is the same everywhere and always, it is variously applicable to the human being, as we know from experience, in the various stages of his development; and its first form is that of simple obedience to a superior whom there is every ground to trust. And further, if the few straggling rays of our knowledge in a case of this kind rather exhibit a darkness lying around us than dispel it, we do not even know all that was in the mind of Abraham, and are not in a condition to pronounce upon it, and cannot, without departure from sound reason, abandon that anchorage by which he probably held, that the law of Nature was safe in the hands of the Author of Nature, though the means of the reconciliation

* Job xiii. 15.

between the law and the appearances have not been fully placed within our reach.

But the Reply is not entitled to so wide an answer as that which I have given. In the parallel with the case of the Hindoo widow, it sins against first principles. An established and habitual practice of child-slaughter, in a country of an old and learned civilization, presents to us a case totally different from the issue of a command, which was not designed to be obeyed, and which belongs to a period when the years of manhood were associated in great part with the character that appertains to childhood.

It will already have been seen that the method of this Reply is not to argue seriously from point to point, but to set out in masses, without the labour of proof, crowds of imputations, which may overwhelm an opponent like balls from a *mitrailleuse*. Instead of arguing, it pelts. As the charges, lightly run over in a line or two, require pages for exhibition and confutation, an exhaustive answer to the Reply within the just limits of an article is on this account out of the question; and the only proper course left open seems to be, first to exhibit the vicious method of the writer, and then to make a selection of what appears to be the favourite, or the most formidable and telling, assertions, and to deal with these in the serious way which the grave interests of the theme, not the manner of their presentation, may deserve.

It was an observation of Aristotle that weight attaches to the undemonstrated propositions of those who are able to speak in any given subject matter from experience. The Reply abounds in undemonstrated propositions. They appear, however, to be delivered without

any sense of a necessity that either experience or reasoning are required in order to give them a title to acceptance. Thus, for example, the system of Mr. Darwin is hurled against Christianity as a dart which cannot be but fatal.*

“His discoveries, carried to their legitimate conclusion, destroy the creeds and sacred scripture of mankind.”†

The wide-sweeping proposition is imposed upon us with no exposition of the how or the why; and the whole controversy of belief one might suppose is to be determined, as if from St. Petersburg, by a series of *ukases*. It is only advanced, indeed, to decorate the introduction of Darwin's name in support of the proposition, which I certainly should support and not contest, that error and honesty are compatible.

On what ground, then, and for what reason, is the system of Darwin fatal to Scriptures and to Creeds? I do not enter into the question whether it has passed from the stage of working hypothesis into that of demonstration; but I assume, for the purposes of the argument, all that, in this respect, the Reply can desire.

It is not possible to discover, from the random language of the Reply, whether the scheme of Darwin is to sweep away all theism, or is to be content with extinguishing revealed religion. If the latter is meant, I should reply that the moral history of man, in its principal stream, has been distinctly an evolution from the first until now; and that the succinct though grand

* Page 475.

† See the interesting volume of Mr. Capron on ‘The Antiquity of Man,’ who upholds with great force the account given in Gen. i. in the character of a thorough-going Darwinian.—W. E. G., 1896.

account of the Creation in Genesis is singularly accordant with the same idea, but is wider than Darwinism, since it includes in the grand progression the inanimate world as well as the history of living organisms. But, as this could not be shown without much detail, the Reply reduces me to the necessity of following its own unsatisfactory example in the bald form of an assertion, that there is no colourable ground for assuming evolution and revelation to be at variance with one another.

If, however, the meaning be that theism is swept away by Darwinism, I observe that, as before, we have only an unreasoned dogma or dictum to deal with, and, dealing perforce with the unknown, we are in danger of striking at a will of the wisp. Still, I venture on remarking that the doctrine of Evolution has acquired both praise and dispraise which it does not deserve. It is lauded, in the sceptical camp, because it is supposed to get rid of the shocking idea of what are termed sudden acts of creation; and it is as unjustly dispraised, on the opposing side, because it is thought to bridge over the gap between man and the inferior animals, and to give emphasis to the relationship between them. But long before the day either of Mr. Darwin or his grandfather, Dr. Erasmus Darwin, this relationship had been stated, perhaps even more emphatically by one whom, were it not that I have small title to deal in undemonstrated assertion, I should venture to call the most cautious, the most robust, and the most comprehensive of our philosophers. Suppose, says Bishop Butler,* that it were implied in the natural immortality of brutes, that they must arrive at great attainments,

* 'Analogy,' part i. chap. i. sec. 21.

and become (like us) rational and moral agents; even this would be no difficulty, since we know not what latent powers and capacities they may be endowed with. And if pride causes us to deem it an indignity that our race should have proceeded by propagation from an ascending scale of inferior organisms, why should it be a more repulsive idea to have sprung immediately from something less than man in brain and body, than to have been fashioned according to the expression in Genesis (ii. 7) "out of the dust of the ground"? There are halls and galleries of introduction in a palace, but none in a cottage; and this arrival of the creative work at its climax through an ever-aspiring preparatory series, rather than by transition at a step from the inanimate mould of earth, may tend rather to magnify than to lower the creation of man on his physical side. But if belief has (as commonly) been premature in its alarms, has non-belief been more reflective in its exulting anticipations, and its pæans on the assumed disappearance of what are strangely enough termed sudden acts of creation from the sphere of our study and contemplation?

One striking effect of the Darwinian theory of descent is, so far as I understand, to reduce the breadth of all intermediate distinctions in the scale of animated life. It does not bring all creatures into a single lineage, but all diversities are to be traced back, at some point in the scale and by stages indefinitely minute, to a common ancestry. All is done by steps, nothing by strides, leaps, or bounds; all from protoplasm up to Shakespeare, and again, as we may suppose, all from primal night and chaos up to protoplasm. I do not ask, and am incompetent to judge, whether this is among the things proven, but I take it so for the sake of the argument;

and I ask, first, why, and whereby, does this doctrine eliminate the idea of creation? Does the new philosophy teach that, if the passage from pure reptile to pure bird is achieved by a spring (so to speak) over a chasm, this implies and requires creation; but that if reptile passes into bird, and rudimental into finished bird, by a thousand slight and but just discernible modifications, each one of these is so small that they are not entitled to a name so lofty, and may be set down to any cause or no cause, as we please? I should have supposed it miserably unphilosophical to treat the distinction between creative and non-creative function as a simply quantitative distinction. As respects the subjective effect on the human mind, creation in small, when closely regarded, awakens reason to admiring wonder, not less than creation in great; and as regards that function itself, to me it appears no less than ridiculous to hold that the broadly outlined and large advances of so-called Mosaism are creation, but the refined and stealthy onward steps of Darwinism are only manufacture, and relegate the question of a cause into obscurity, insignificance, or oblivion.

But does not reason really require us to go farther, to turn the tables on the adversary, and to contend that evolution, by how much it binds more closely together the myriad ranks of the living, ay, and of all other orders, by so much the more consolidates, enlarges, and enhances the true argument of design, and the entire theistic position? If orders are not mutually related, it is easier to conceive of them as sent at haphazard into the world. We may, indeed, sufficiently draw an argument of design from each separate structure, but we have no further title to build upon the position which

each of them holds as towards any other. But when the connection between these objects has been established as continuous, and so established that the points of transition are almost as indiscernible as those of the passage from day to night, then, indeed, each preceding stage is a prophecy of the following, each succeeding one is a memorial of the past, and, throughout the immeasurable series, every single member of it is a witness to all the rest. The Reply ought surely to dispose of these, and probably many more arguments in the case, before assuming so absolutely the rights of dictatorship, and laying it down that Darwinism, carried to its legitimate conclusion (and I have nowhere endeavoured to cut short its career), destroys the Creeds and Scriptures of mankind.

That I may be the more definite in my challenge, I would, with all respect, ask the author of the Reply to set about confuting the succinct and clear argument of his countryman, Mr. Fiske, who, in the earlier part of the small work entitled 'Man's Destiny,'* has given what seems to me an admissible and also striking interpretation of the leading Darwinian idea in its bearings on the theistic argument. To this very partial treatment of a great subject I must at present confine myself; and I proceed to another of the notions, as confident as they seem to be crude, which the Reply has drawn into its wide-casting net:

"Why should God demand a sacrifice from man? Why should the Infinite ask anything from the finite? Should the sun beg of the glow-worm, and should the momentary spark excite the envy of the source of light?"†

* Macmillan, London, 1887.

† Page 475.

This is one of the cases in which happy or showy illustration is, in the Reply before me, set to carry with a rush the position which argument would have to approach more laboriously and more slowly. The case of the glow-worm with the sun cannot but move a reader's pity ; it seems so very hard. But let us suppose for a moment that the glow-worm was so constituted, and so related to the sun that an interaction between them was a fundamental condition of its health and life ; that the glow-worm must, by the law of its nature, like the moon, reflect upon the sun, according to its strength and measure, the light which it receives, and that only by a process involving that reflection its own store of vitality could be upheld ? It will be said that this is a very large *petitio* to impart into the glow-worm's case. Yes, but it is the very *petitio* which is absolutely requisite in order to make it parallel to the case of the Christian. The argument which the Reply has to destroy is and must be the Christian argument, and not some figure of straw, fabricated at will. It is needless, perhaps, but it is refreshing, to quote the noble Psalm * in which this assumption of the Reply is rebuked. "All the beasts of the forest are Mine ; and so are the cattle upon a thousand hills. . . . If I be hungry I will not tell thee ; for the whole world is Mine, and all that is therein. . . . Offer unto God thanksgiving ; and pay thy vows unto the Most High, and call upon Me in the time of trouble ; so will I hear thee, and thou shalt praise Me." Let me try my hand at a counter-illustration. If the Infinite is to make no demand upon the finite, by parity of reasoning the great and strong should

* Ps. l. 10, 12, 14, 15.

scarcely make them on the weak and small. Why, then, should the father make demands of love, obedience, and sacrifice from his young child? Is there not some flavour of the sun and glow-worm here? But every man does so make them, if he is a man of sense and feeling; and he makes them for the sake and in the interest of the son himself, whose nature, expanding in the warmth of affection and pious care, requires, by an inward law, to repay as well as to receive. And so God asks of us, in order that what we give to Him may be far more our own than it ever was before the giving, or than it could have been unless first rendered up to Him, to become a part of what the gospel calls our treasure in heaven.

Although the Reply is not careful to supply us with *whys*, it does not hesitate to ask for them:

“Why should an infinitely wise and powerful God destroy the good and preserve the vile? Why should He treat all alike here, and in another world make an infinite difference? Why should your God allow His worshippers, His adorers, to be destroyed by His enemies? Why should He allow the honest, the loving, the noble to perish at the stake?”*

The upholders of belief or of revelation, from Claudian down to Cardinal Newman (see the very remarkable passage of the *Apologia pro vitâ suâ*, pp. 376–378), cannot, and do not, seek to deny that the methods of Divine government, as they are exhibited by experience, present to us many and varied moral problems, insoluble by our understanding. Their existence may not, and should not, be dissembled. But neither should they be exaggerated. Now exaggeration by mere suggestion is the

* Page 479.

fault, the glaring fault, of these queries. One who had no knowledge of mundane affairs beyond the conception they insinuate would assume that, as a rule, evil has the upper hand in the management of the world. Is this the grave philosophical conclusion of a careful observer, or is it a crude, hasty, and careless overstatement, made in headlong eagerness to destroy?

It is not difficult to conceive how, in times of sadness and of storm, when the suffering soul can discern no light at any point of the horizon, place is found for such an idea of life. It is, of course, opposed to the apostolic declaration that godliness hath the promise of the life that now is,* but I am not to expect such a declaration to be accepted as current coin, even of the meanest value, by the author of the Reply. Yet I will offer two observations founded on experience in support of it, one taken from a limited, another from a larger and more open sphere. John Wesley, in the full prime of his mission, warned the converts whom he was making among English labourers of a spiritual danger that lay far ahead. It was that, becoming godly, they would become careful, and, becoming careful, they would become wealthy. It was a just and sober forecast, and it represented with truth the general rule of life, although it be a rule perplexed with exceptions. But, if this be too narrow a sphere of observation, let us take a wider one, the widest of all. It is comprised in the brief statement that Christendom rules the world, and rules it, perhaps it should be added, by the possession of a vast surplus of material as well as moral force. Therefore the assertions carried by implication in the

* 1 Tim. iv. 8.

queries of the Reply, which are general, are because general untrue, although they might have been true within those prudent limitations, which the method of this Reply appears especially to eschew.

Taking, then, these challenges as they ought to have been given, I admit that great believers, who have been also great masters of wisdom and knowledge, are not always able to explain the inequalities of adjustment between human beings and the conditions in which they have been set down to work out their destiny. The climax of these inequalities is perhaps to be found in the fact that, whereas rational belief, viewed at large, founds the Providential government of the world upon the hypothesis of free agency, there are so many cases in which the overbearing mastery of circumstance appears to reduce that agency to extinction or paralysis. Now, in one sense, without doubt, these difficulties are matter for our legitimate and necessary cognizance. It is a duty incumbent upon us respectively, according to our means and opportunities, to decide for ourselves, by the use of the faculty of reason given us, the great questions of natural and revealed religion. They are to be decided according to the evidence ; and, if we cannot trim the evidence into a consistent whole, then according to the balance of the evidence. We are not entitled, either for or against belief, to set up in this province any rule of investigation, except such as common-sense teaches us to use in the ordinary conduct of life. As in ordinary conduct, so in considering the basis of belief, we are bound to look at the evidence as a whole. We have no right to demand demonstrative proofs, or the removal of all conflicting elements, either in the one sphere or in the other. What guides us sufficiently in

matters of common practice has the very same authority to guide us in matters of speculation ; which is more properly, perhaps, to be called the practice of the soul. If the evidence in the aggregate shows the being of a moral Governor of the world, with the same force as would suffice to establish an obligation to act in a matter of common conduct, we are bound in duty to accept it, and have no right to demand as a condition previous that all occasions of doubt or question be removed out of the way. Our demands for evidence must be limited by the general reason of the case. Does that general reason of the case make it probable that a finite being, with a finite place in a comprehensive scheme, devised and administered by a Being who is infinite, would be able either to embrace within his view, or rightly to appreciate, all the motives and the aims that may have been in the mind of the Divine Disposer? On the contrary, a demand so unreasonable deserves to be met with the scornful challenge of Dante :

“ Or tu chi se', che vuoi sedere a scranna
Per giudicar da lungi mille miglia
Colla veduta corta d'una spanna? ” *

Undoubtedly a great deal depends here upon the question whether, and in what degree, our knowledge is limited. And here the Reply seems to be by no means in accord with Newton and with Butler. By its contempt for authority, the Reply seems to cut off from us all knowledge that it is not at first hand ; but then also it seems to assume an original and first hand knowledge of all possible kinds of things. I will take an

* ‘Paradise,’ xix. 79.

instance, all the easier to deal with because it is outside the immediate sphere of controversy. In one of those pieces of fine writing with which the Reply abounds, it is determined *obiter* * by a backhanded stroke that Shakespeare is "by far the greatest of the human race." I do not feel entitled to assert that he is not ; but how vast and complex a question is here determined for us in this airy manner ! Has the writer of the Reply really weighed the force and measured the sweep of his own words ? Whether Shakespeare has or has not the primacy of genius over a very few other names which might be placed in competition with his, is a question which has not yet been determined by the general or deliberate judgment of lettered mankind. But behind it lies another question, inexpressibly difficult, except for the author of the Reply, to solve. That question is, what is the relation of human genius to human greatness. Is genius the sole constitutive element of greatness, or with what other elements, and in what relations to them, is it combined ? Is every man great in proportion to his genius ? Was Goldsmith, or was Sheridan, or was Burns, or was Byron, or was Goethe, or was Napoleon, or was Alcibiades, no smaller, and was Johnson, or was Howard, or was Washington, or was Phocion or Leonidas no greater, than in proportion to his genius properly so called ? How are we to find a common measure, again, for different kinds of greatness ; how weigh, for example, Dante against Julius Cæsar ? And I am speaking of greatness properly so called, not of goodness properly so called. We might seem to be dealing with a writer, whose contempt for authority in

* *N. A. R.* p. 491.

general is fully balanced, perhaps outweighed, by his respect for at least one authority in particular.

The religions of the world, again, have in many cases given to many men material for life-long study. The study of the Christian Scriptures, to say nothing of Christian life and institutions, has been to many and justly famous men a study "never ending, still beginning"; not, like the world of Alexander, too limited for the powerful faculty that ranged over it; but, on the contrary, opening height on height, and with deep answering to deep, and with increase of fruit ever prescribing increase of effort. But the Reply has sounded all these depths, has found them very shallow, and is quite able to point out* the way in which the Saviour of the world might have been a much greater teacher than He actually was; had He said anything, for instance, of the family relation, had He spoken against slavery and tyranny, had He issued a sort of *code Napoleon* embracing education, progress, scientific truth, and international law. This observation on the family relation seems to me beyond even the usual measure of extravagance, when we bear in mind that, according to the Christian scheme, the Lord of heaven and earth "was subject"† to a human mother and a reputed human father, and that He taught (according to the widest and, I believe, the best opinion) the absolute indissolubility of marriage. I might cite many other instances in reply. But the broader and the true answer to the objection is, that the gospel was promulgated to teach principles and not a code; that it included the foundation of a society in which those

* Page 490.

† Luke ii. 51.

principles were to be conserved, developed, and applied ; and that down to this day there is not a moral question of all those which the Reply does or does not enumerate, nor is there a question of duty arising in the course of life for any of us, that is not determinable in all its essentials by applying to it as a touchstone the principles declared in the Gospel. Is not, then, the *hiatus*, which the Reply has discovered in the teaching of our Lord, an imaginary *hiatus*? Nay, are the suggested improvements of that teaching really gross deteriorations? Where would have been the wisdom of delivering to an uninstructed population of a particular age a codified religion, which was to serve for all nations, all ages, all states of civilization? Why was not room to be left for the career of human thought in finding out, and in working out, the adaptation of Christianity to the ever-varying movement of the world? And how is it that they who will not admit that a revelation is in place when it has in view the great and necessary work of conflict against sin, are so free in recommending enlargements of that Revelation for purposes, as to which no such necessity can be pleaded?

I have known a person who, after studying the old classical or Olympian religion for the third part of a century, at length began to hope that he had some partial comprehension of it, some inkling of what it meant. Woe is him that he was not conversant either with the faculties or with the methods of the Reply, which apparently can dispose in half an hour of any problem, dogmatic, historical, or moral ; and which accordingly takes occasion to assure us that Buddha was "in many respects the greatest religious teacher this world has ever known, the broadest, the most

intellectual of them all." * On this I shall only say that an attempt to bring Buddha and Buddhism in line together is far beyond my reach, but that every Christian, knowing in some degree what Christ is, and what He has done for the world, can only be the more thankful if Buddha, or Confucius, or any other teacher has in any point, and in any measure, come near to the outskirts of His ineffable greatness and glory.

It is my fault, or my misfortune, to observe, in this Reply, an inaccuracy of reference, which would of itself suffice to render it remarkable. Christ, we are told,† denounced the chosen people of God as "a generation of vipers." This phrase is applied by the Baptist to the crowd who came to seek baptism from him; but it is only applied by our Lord to Scribes or Pharisees,‡ who are so commonly placed by Him in contrast with the people. The error is repeated in the mention of whited sepulchres. Take again the version of the story of Ananias and Sapphira. We are told § that the apostles conceived the idea "of having all things in common." In the narrative there is no statement, no suggestion of the kind; it is a pure interpolation.¶ Motives of a reasonable prudence are stated as matter of fact to have influenced the offending couple—another pure interpolation. After the catastrophe of Ananias "the apostles sent for his wife"—a third interpolation. I refer only to these points as exhibitions of an habitual and dangerous inaccuracy, and without any attempt at present to discuss the case, in which the judgments of

* Page 491.

† Pages 492, 500.

‡ Luke iii. 7; Matt. xxiii. 33, and xii. 34.

§ Page 494.

¶ Acts iv. 32-37.

God are exhibited on their severer side, and in which I cannot, like the Reply, undertake summarily to determine for what causes the Almighty should or should not take life, or delegate the power to take it.

Again, we have * these words given as a quotation from the Bible :

“They who believe and are baptized shall be saved, and they who believe not shall be damned; and these shall go away into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels.”

The second clause thus reads as if applicable to the persons mentioned in the first; that is to say, to those who reject the tidings of the gospel. But instead of its being a continuous passage, the latter section is brought out of another Gospel, St. Matthew's, and another connection; and it is really written, not of those who do not believe, but of those who refuse to perform offices of charity to their neighbour in his need. It would be wrong to call this intentional misrepresentation; but can it be called less than somewhat reckless negligence?

It is a more special misfortune to find a writer arguing on the same side with his critic, and yet for the critic not to be able to agree with him. But so it is with reference to the great subject of immortality, as treated in the Reply.

“The idea of immortality, that, like a sea, has ebbed and flowed in the human heart, with its countless waves of hope and fear beating against the shores and rocks of time and fate, was not born of any book, nor of any creed, nor of any religion. It was born of human affection; and it will continue to ebb and flow beneath the mist and clouds of doubt and darkness, as long as love kisses the lips of death.” †

* Page 486.

† Page 483.

Here we have a very interesting chapter of the history of human opinion disposed of in the usual summary way, by a statement which, as it appears to me, is developed, not out of history, but out of the writer's inner consciousness. If the belief in immortality is not connected with any revelation or religion, but is simply the expression of a subjective want, then plainly we may expect the expression of it to be strong and clear in proportion to the various degrees in which faculty is developed among the various races of mankind. But how does the matter stand historically? The Egyptians were not a people of very high intellectual development, and yet their religious system was strictly associated with, I might rather say founded on, the belief in immortality. The ancient Greeks, on the other hand, were a race of astonishing, perhaps unrivalled, intellectual capacity. But not only did they, in prehistoric ages, derive their scheme of a future world from Egypt; we find also that, with the lapse of time and the advance of the Hellenic civilization, the constructive ideas of the system lost all life and definite outline, and the most powerful mind of the Greek philosophy, that of Aristotle, had no clear conception whatever of a personal existence in a future state.

The favourite doctrine of the Reply is immunity of all error in belief from moral responsibility. In the first page* this is stated with reserve as the "innocence of *honest* error." But why such a limitation? The Reply warms with its subject; it shows us that no error can be otherwise than honest, inasmuch as nothing which involves honesty, or its reverse, can, from the

* Page 473.

constitution of our nature, enter into the formation of opinion. Here is the full-blown exposition :

“The brain thinks without asking our consent. We believe, or we disbelieve, without an effort of the will. Belief is a result. It is the effect of evidence upon the mind. The scales turn in spite of him who watches. *There is no opportunity of being honest, or dishonest, in the formation of an opinion.* The conclusion is entirely independent of desire.” *

The reasoning faculty is, therefore, wholly extrinsic to our moral nature, and no influence is or can be received or imparted between them. I know not whether the meaning is that all the faculties of our nature are like so many separate departments in one of the modern shops that supply all human wants ; that will, memory, imagination, affection, passion, each has its own separate domain and that they meet only for a comparison of results, just to tell one another what they have severally been doing. It is difficult to conceive, if this be so, wherein consists the personality, or individuality, or organic unity of man. It is not difficult to see that while the Reply aims at uplifting human nature, it in reality plunges us † into the abyss of degradation by the destruction of moral freedom, responsibility, and unity. For we are justly told that “reason is the supreme and final test.” Action may be merely instinctive and habitual, or it may be consciously founded on formulated thought ; but, in the cases where it is instinctive and habitual, it passes over, so soon as it is challenged, into the other category, and finds a basis for itself in some form of opinion. But, says the Reply, we have no responsibility for our

* Page 476.

† Page 475.

opinions: we cannot help forming them according to the evidence as it presents itself to us. Observe, the doctrine embraces every kind of opinion, and embraces all alike, opinion on subjects where we like or dislike, as well as upon subjects where we merely affirm or deny in some medium absolutely colourless. For, if a distinction be taken between the colourless and the coloured medium, between conclusions to which passion or propensity or imagination inclines us, and conclusions to which these have nothing to say, then the whole ground will be cut away from under the feet of this author, and he will have to build again *ab initio*. Let us try this by a test case. A father who has believed his son to have been through life upright, suddenly finds that charges are made from various quarters against his integrity. Or a friend, greatly dependent for the work of his life on the co-operation of another friend, is told that that comrade is counterworking and betraying him. I make no assumption now as to the evidence or the result; but I ask which of them could approach the investigation without feeling a desire to be able to acquit? And what shall we say of the desire to condemn? Would Elizabeth have had no leaning towards finding Mary Stuart implicated in a conspiracy? Did English judges and juries approach with an unbiassed mind the trials for the Popish plot? Were the opinions formed by the English Parliament on the Treaty of Limerick formed without the intervention of the will? Did Napoleon judge according to the evidence when he acquitted himself in the matter of the Duc d'Enghien? Does the intellect sit in a solitary chamber, like Galileo in the palace of the Vatican, and pursue celestial observation all untouched, while the turmoil of earthly

business is raging everywhere around? According to the Reply, it must be a mistake to suppose that there is anywhere in the world such a thing as bias, or prejudice, or prepossession: they are words without meaning in regard to our judgments, for, even if they could raise a clamour from without, the intellect sits within, in an atmosphere of serenity, and, like Justice, is deaf and blind, as well as calm.

In addition to all other faults, I hold that this philosophy, or phantasm of philosophy, is eminently retrogressive. Human nature, in its compound of flesh and spirit, becomes more complex with the progress of civilization; with the steady multiplication of wants, and of means for their supply. With complication, introspection has largely extended, and I believe that, as observation extends its field, so far from isolating the intelligence and making it autocratic it tends more and more to enhance and multiply the infinitely subtle, as well as the broader and more palpable modes, in which the interaction of the human faculties is carried on. Who among us has not had occasion to observe, in the course of his experience, how largely the intellectual power of a man is affected by the demands of life on his moral powers, and how they open and grow, or dry up and dwindle, according to the manner in which those demands are met.

Genius itself, however purely a conception of the intellect, is not exempt from the strong influences of joy and suffering, love and hatred, hope and fear, in the development of its powers. It may be that Homer, Shakespeare, Goethe, basking upon the whole in the sunshine of life, drew little supplementary force from its trials and agitations. But the history of one not

less wonderful than any of these, the career of Dante, tells a different tale; and one of the latest and most searching investigators of his history * tells, and shows us, how the experience of his life co-operated with his extraordinary natural gifts and capabilities to make him what he was. Under the three great heads of love, belief, and patriotism, his life was a continued course of ecstatic or agonizing trials. The strain of these trials was discipline: discipline was experience; and experience was elevation and expansion. No reader of his greatest work will, I believe, hold with the Reply that his thoughts, conclusions, judgments were simple results of an automatic process, in which the will and affections had no share, that reasoning operations are like the whirl of a clock running down, and we can no more arrest the process or alter the conclusion than the wheels can stop the movement or the noise.†

The doctrine taught in the Reply, that belief is, as a general, nay, universal, law, independent of the will, surely proves, when examined, to be a plausibility of the shallowest kind. Even in arithmetic, if a boy, through

* Scartazzini, Dante Alighieri, 'Seine zeit, sein leben, und seine werke,' bk. ii. ch. v. p. 119; also pp. 438, 439. Biel, 1869.

† I possess the confession of an illiterate criminal, made, I think, in 1834, under the following circumstances: The new poor law Act had just been passed in England, and it required persons needing relief to go into the workhouse as a condition of receiving it. In some parts of the country, this provision produced a profound popular panic. The man in question was destitute at the time. He was (I think) an old widower with four very young sons. He rose in the night and strangled them all, one after another, with a blue handkerchief, not from want of fatherly affection, but to keep them out of the workhouse. The confession of this peasant, simple in phrase, but intensely impassioned, strongly reminds me of the Ugolino of Dante, and appears to make some approach to its sublimity. Such, in given circumstances, is the effect of moral agony on mental power.

dislike of his employment, and consequent lack of attention, brings out a wrong result for his sum, it can hardly be said that his conclusion is absolutely and in all respects independent of his will. Moving onward, point by point, toward the centre of the argument, I will next take an illustration from mathematics. It has (I apprehend) been demonstrated that the relation of the diameter to the circumference of a circle is not susceptible of full numerical expression. Yet, from time to time, treatises are published which boldly announce that they set forth the quadrature of the circle. I do not deny that this may be purely intellectual error; but would it not, on the other hand, be hazardous to assert that no grain of egotism or ambition has ever entered into the composition of any one of such treatises? I have selected these instances as, perhaps, the most favourable that can be found to the doctrine of the Reply. But the truth is that, if we set aside matters of trivial import, the enormous majority of human judgments are those into which the biassing power of likes and dislikes more or less largely enters. I admit, indeed, that the illative faculty works under rules upon which choice and inclination ought to exercise no influence whatever. But even if it were granted that in fact the faculty of discourse is exempted from all such influence within its own province, yet we come no nearer to the mark, because that faculty has to work upon materials supplied to it by other faculties; it draws conclusions according to premises, and the question has to be determined whether our conceptions set forth in those premises are or are not influenced by moral causes. For, if they be so influenced, then in vain will be the proof that the understanding has dealt loyally

and exactly with the materials it had to work upon ; inasmuch as, although the intellectual process be normal in itself, the operation may have been tainted *ab initio* by colouring and distorting influences which have falsified the initial conceptions.

Let me now take an illustration from the extreme opposite quarter to that which I first drew upon. The system called Thuggism, represented in the practice of the Thugs, taught that the act, which we describe as murder, was innocent. Was this an honest error? Was it due, in its authors as well as in those who blindly followed them, to an automatic process of thought, in which the will was not consulted, and which accordingly could entail no responsibility? If it was, then it is plain that the whole foundations, not of belief, but of social morality, are broken up. If it was not, then the sweeping doctrine of the present writer on the necessary blamelessness of erroneous conclusions tumbles to the ground like a house of cards under the breath of the child who built it.

In truth, the pages of the Reply, and the letter which has more recently followed it,* themselves demonstrate that what the writer has asserted wholesale he overthrows and denies in detail. "You will admit," says the Reply, "that he who now persecutes for opinion's sake is infamous."† But why? Suppose he thinks that by persecution he can bring a man from soul-destroying falsehood to soul-saving truth, and thus from misery to felicity, this opinion may reflect on his intellectual debility : but that is his misfortune, not his fault. His

* *North American Review* for January, 1888, "Another letter to Dr. Field."

† Page 477.

brain has thought without asking his consent ; he has believed or disbelieved without an effort of the will.* Yet the very writer, who has thus established his title to think, is the first to hurl at him an anathema for thinking. And again, in the Letter to Dr. Field,† “the dogma of eternal pain” is described as “that infamy of infamies.” I am not about to discuss the subject of future retribution. If I were, it would be my first duty to show that this writer has not adequately considered either the scope of his own arguments (which in no way solve the difficulties he presents) or the meaning of his own words ; and my second would be to recommend his perusal of what Bishop Butler has suggested on this head. But I am at present on ground altogether different. I am trying another issue. This author says we believe or disbelieve without the action of the will, and, consequently, belief or disbelief is not the proper subject of praise or blame. And yet, according to the very same authority, the dogma of eternal pain is what ?—not “an error of errors,” but an “infamy of infamies ;” and though to hold a negative may not be a subject of moral reproach, yet to hold the affirmative may. Truly it may be asked, is not this a fountain which sends forth at once sweet waters and bitter ?

Once more. I will pass away from tender ground, and will endeavour to lodge a broader appeal to the enlightened judgment of the author. Says Odysseus in the ‘Iliad,’ ‡ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη : and a large part of the world, stretching this sentiment beyond its original

* Page 476.

† N. A. R., vol. 146, p. 33.

‡ Bk. ii. 204.

meaning, have held that the root of civil power is not in the community, but in its head. In opposition to this doctrine, the American written Constitution, and the entire American tradition, teach the right of a nation to self-government. And these propositions, which have divided and still divide the world, open out respectively into vast systems of irreconcilable ideas and laws, practices and habits of mind. Will any rational man, above all will any American, contend that these conflicting systems have been adopted, upheld, and enforced on one side and the other, in the daylight of pure reasoning only, and that moral, or immoral, causes have had nothing to do with their adoption? That the intellect has worked impartially, like a steam-engine, and that selfishness, love of fame, love of money, love of power, envy, wrath, and malice, or again bias in its least noxious forms, have never had anything to do with generating the opposing movements, or the frightful collisions in which they have resulted? If we say that they have not, we contradict the universal judgment of mankind. If we say they have, then mental processes are not automatic, but may be influenced by the will and by the passions, affections, habits, fancies, that sway or solicit the will; and this writer will not have advanced a step toward proving the universal innocence of error, until he has shown that propositions of religion are essentially unlike almost all other propositions, and that no man has ever been, or from the nature of the case can be, affected in their acceptance or rejection by moral causes.

To sum up. There are many passages in these noteworthy papers which, taken by themselves, are calculated to command warm sympathy. Towards the close

of his final, or latest letter, the writer expresses himself as follows :

“Neither in the interest of truth, nor for the benefit of man, is it necessary to assert what we do not know. No cause is great enough to demand a sacrifice of candour. The mysteries of life and death, of good and evil, have never yet been solved.”*

How good, how wise are these words ! But coming at the close of the controversy, have they not some of the ineffectual features of a death-bed repentance ? They can hardly be said to represent in all points the rules under which the pages preceding them have been composed ; or he, who so justly says that we ought not to assert what we do not know, could hardly have laid down the law as we find it a few pages earlier,† when it is pronounced that “an infinite God has no excuse for leaving His children in doubt and darkness.” Candour and upright intention are indeed everywhere manifest amidst the flashing coruscations which really compose the staple of the article. Candour and upright intention also impose upon a commentator the duty of formulating his animadversions. I sum them up under two heads. Whereas we are placed in an atmosphere of mystery, relieved only by a little sphere of light round each of us, like a clearing in an American forest (which this writer has so well described), and rarely can see farther than is necessary for the direction of our own conduct from day to day, we find here, assumed by a particular person, the character of an universal judge without appeal. And whereas the highest self-restraint

* *N. A. R.*, vol. 146, p. 46.

† *Ibid.* p. 40.

is necessary in these dark but, therefore, all the more exciting inquiries, in order to keep steady the ever-quivering balance of our faculty of judgment, this writer chooses to ride an unbroken horse, and to throw the reins upon his neck. I have endeavoured to give a sample of the results.

V.

THE ELIZABETHAN SETTLEMENT OF
RELIGION.*

1888.

IN the great movement of the sixteenth century, England stands contrasted with other great European countries in this vital respect, that the instinct of national unity was throughout more powerful than the disintegrating tendencies of religious controversy. Hence there went abroad a notion, highly injurious to the nation, that it was ready to accept whatever religion the sovereign might think proper to give it. I recollect a slight but curious illustration of this fact as recently as near the beginning of the present auspicious reign. In the year 1838, travelling through Calabria, I fell into conversation with an intelligent Italian of the middle class, interested in the religion of his country. He expressed to me his fervent desire that the Queen might become Roman Catholic; for in that case it would follow as a matter of course that the English nation would also return to the obedience of the Pope! It is plain that, both in England and in Scotland, purely secular interests played a very great and important

* Reprinted from the *Nineteenth Century*.

part. In the reign of Mary, the Latin service was soon and easily re-established : but the reaction did not dare to lay a finger on the alienated estates of the dissolved monasteries. There was a strong Roman, and a strong Puritan, sentiment of religion. But what afterwards came to be known as Anglicanism, the product of a composition of heterogeneous forces, had neither a visible nor, except perhaps in individual cases, a conscious existence. There was not, as there was in Scotland and in Ireland, a single dominant religious tendency, Protestant in the one, Roman Catholic (much more decisively) in the other. And it was the comparatively near balance of the various forces, which made it possible to have in England, not merely one, but three or four religious revolutions ; revolutions which, by the action of the same causes, were softened as well as multiplied.

The consequence has been that the historic presentation of the subject ever since to general readers has been secular, and not religious, or even ecclesiastical. It has been largely overlooked that what the sixteenth century lacked, the seventeenth supplied. The consciences of the country then came to a settlement of their accounts with one another. The Anglican idea of religion, very traceable in the mind and action of Elizabeth, of Parker, and of Cecil, had received scientific form through the works of Hooker. The Roman antagonist had been reduced, by the accommodations of the Prayer Book and the law, to civil impotence ; and he only counted, in the grand struggle under Charles the First, as a minor auxiliary on the royal side. The Church, as its organisation was worked under Laud, had become a vast and definite force, but it was fatally

compromised by its close alliance with despotism and with cruel severities, and in retribution for its sins it shared the ruin of arbitrary power. In consequence of this association and its result, for nearly twenty years the Puritan element was supreme, and the Anglican almost suppressed. But when the monarchical instinct of the nation brought about the restoration of Charles the Second, and the comparative strength of the religious parties came to be ascertained, what had been taken for a minority asserted itself in overwhelming force, and the ecclesiastical settlement of that epoch, whatever may have been in other respects its merits or defects, expressed the prevailing sentiment of probably nine-tenths of the community, and is now running through its third century of stable duration.

Down to that time, the question which cast of belief and opinion should prevail, as between Anglican and Puritan, had been fought within the precinct of the National Church. It was now determined by the summary method of excluding the weaker party. In its negative or prohibitory part, the settlement accomplished at the Restoration was either wholly new, or it formulated a tendency, that had become paramount, into a fact. But in its positive bases it was, as to all main interests and purposes, an acceptance and revival of the Elizabethan settlement. On this, therefore, in giving an account of herself, the Church of England must fall back.

And such an account it is obvious she must, now and henceforward, be prepared to give. It is no longer with her as it was in the eighteenth century—and God forbid it should ever be so again—when her clergy were the companions of the peers and the gentry, as magistrates

on the bench of justice, and as sportsmen in the hunting-field ; when she found no immediate occasion to look into her title-deeds, for she rested on possession and on quietude. In that less tranquil but nobler form of existence, which she is now called to sustain, she has to extricate her own religious history from the civil broils, from the economical and literary devastations, from the great national to-and-fro of the sixteenth century ; and to show the world whether, along with an external, material, and legal framework that is unquestioned, she has derived herself as a religious society in historical continuity from the ancient Church of the country, or whether, as her opponents may charge, she is a construction of lath and plaster set up, in mean and futile imitation, by the side of the solid and majestic structure of the middle age.

And here I must ask pardon for a momentary digression. In recurring to the year 1662, it is impossible wholly to avoid the deeply interesting question, What became of the partner ejected from the firm ? The old English Puritanism has largely passed, on a widened scale, and with features mitigated but developed and magnified, into the modern English Nonconformity. I do not mean that it has been by a direct or uniform, but by a real if mostly a moral succession. In 1662 it expressed, as I believe, the sense of a small numerical minority of the country, but with more than a proportionate share both of its distinguished theologians and of its religious life. The spiritual side of its position has been set forth, within not very many years, in a masterly tract by Dr. Allon. After the ejectionment from the national establishment of religion, it travelled through a period of declension. But it has since developed, throughout

the British Empire, in the United States, and in heathen lands, into a vast and diversified organisation of what may be roughly termed an Evangelical Protestantism, which, viewed at large, is inclusive of the Presbyterian Churches in Scotland and elsewhere ; which has received a large collateral accession from the movement of Wesley ; and which exceeds, if not in aggregate numbers, yet apparently in the average of religious energies, the old Lutheran and Reformed communities on the Continent. It may be estimated moderately at one-tenth of the entire numerical strength of Christendom ; it depends almost entirely on the voluntary tributes of Christian affection ; and it has become a solid inexorable fact of religious history, which no rational inquirer, into either its present or its future, can venture to overlook in any estimate of Christendom at large. But my purpose at this moment is confined within a circle both narrower and far more sharply defined.

The Christian Church, as it stood before the Reformation, was throughout its whole extent an organism governed by fixed laws ; and it possessed a machinery, in which from the very first a lay, and later on a civil or temporal, element found place, and which was applicable both to legislative and to administrative purposes. In the East, the different portions of this vast body were not united by any bond of such a nature as to involve the interference of a central power by the exercise of jurisdiction in the ordinary affairs of the local Church. But in the West there had gradually grown up usages, which became a complex juridical system, and which assigned to the Roman See large, and not everywhere defined, prerogatives of interposition in the affairs of each national Church. In most of the countries of the

Reformation, the framework, through which this juridical system took effect, was destroyed in those ruling parts, which formed the chief channel of connection with the former organisation. In England they were retained; and *prima facie* the effect of the legislative changes, begun under Henry the Eighth and consummated under Elizabeth, was to place the local or national Church, relatively to the rest of Christendom taken at large, in a position mainly analogous to that occupied by the Churches of the East.

Being, however, a society which claims in her present state continuity with what she was in a former state, she is liable to a challenge and to the denial of her claim on any one at least of the four following grounds:—

1. By changes of doctrine, she altered the one perpetual Christian faith, and became heretical.

2. By changes of rite, she failed to fulfil the sacramental communion of the Church, and her ordinances, or vital portions of them, became ineffectual or invalid.

3. By changes of law, she destroyed the jurisdiction of the Roman See in England, which, as being divine, it was beyond her power lawfully to touch, and she thus became schismatical.

4. In the three foregoing propositions, exception is taken only to the nature of the changes made, and not to the nature of the authority which made them. But they were not made, as is alleged, by the Church at all. They were made without or against her by the action of the Civil Power, which as such was incompetent to act in the matter, and the changes were therefore null for want of sanction.

Of these four great counts of indictment, the three first are properly theological, and being beyond my

reach are wholly excluded from the purview of the present paper.

But the fourth is as properly historical, and my object in these pages is, without prejudice to any other portion of the subject, to establish the negative of this proposition, and to show that, in the last and determining resort, the changes in question were not acts of the State forced upon the Church, but acts of the Church herself, which supply the key to her juridical position held ever since down to the present day.

A cloud of vague misrepresentation has down to a recent period overlaid the facts. The passions of Henry, the shiftings of Cranmer, the cruel executions of Fisher and More, the contrast of characters between the preceding and the succeeding queens, the general prevalence of violence and license, all these are topics which, carelessly blended or confused, have resulted in an ill-defined and unsifted assumption that it is vain to look for legality in the years which followed the fall of Wolsey. Nor has any systematic effort been made to clear the ground even in works so important, because of having been largely drawn from the fountain-heads of information, as those of Burnet and Collier. It will probably be matter of surprise to most readers if they find, not only that a basis of legality, in its determining conditions, for the proceedings of the Reformation was laid during the tumultuous years of Henry the Eighth, but that it was laid before Cranmer and the reforming prelates had mounted into seats of power, and that it claims the authority of Warham, of Tunstal, of Gardiner, and (not to mention many others) even of Fisher.

I. I will now proceed to the proof of these propositions.

And I must begin by reminding the reader that, in order to appreciate with accuracy the position assigned to the Church of England under the laws of the Universal Church by the great Elizabethan settlement, it is necessary to exclude from the arena of the discussion a multitude of topics, which have heretofore greatly encumbered the ground to the exclusion or the prejudice of the matters really relevant.

First, we must disentangle the facts which determine the canonical character of the settlement from the crowd of great transactions, essentially political although with ecclesiastical or moral bearings, which mark the three preceding reigns ; such as the so-called divorce of Henry the Eighth, which was a legal sentence of nullity pronounced on his marriage with Catherine of Arragon, the suppression of the monasteries, the reintroduction of Papal jurisdiction by the secular power, the sanguinary persecutions, and much besides. These have no bearing on the question whether the position of the Church under the settlement of Elizabeth was catholic or schismatical.

Secondly, we must in like manner put aside all the excesses of executive power, such as the appointment of Cromwell to the office of ecclesiastical vicegerent, the proceedings relating to altars under Edward the Sixth, and the exercise by the Privy Council of acts of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which continued in the reign of Mary, and again under Elizabeth during the brief period that preceded the passing of the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity.

Thirdly, we must discard from our consideration of the issue before us the private and personal opinions entertained either on religion generally, or even on the

particular subject-matter, by persons of more or less influence or authority. For example, the mitigatory explanations tendered by Henry the Eighth in 1531 to the clergy respecting the headship are only of importance in so far as they may have affected the conduct of prelates or others in the Convocation, and cannot govern the legal and constitutional meaning of the documents. The same remark will apply to the observations of the clerical reformers * in answer to the suggestions of Cecil which appear to have deterred Elizabeth from prosecuting her design, or desire, to re-establish the first Prayer-book of Edward the Sixth at the period of her accession.

Fourthly, we must bear in mind that the legislation of Henry the Eighth and Edward the Sixth, swept away by Mary, was only restored in a modified form by Elizabeth, and we must carefully observe the modifications of that form.

Lastly and principally, we have to note that there was throughout a double course of legislative or other public action, and to ascertain what is due to the secular and what to the ecclesiastical power. The distinction between the respective offices of the State and the Church is powerfully stated in the famous Preamble to the Statute of Appeals. Acts of the governing body in the Church, done within its lawful competency under Henry the Eighth, and not validly cancelled under Mary, retained their ecclesiastical force, and were as legitimate a foundation for civil action under Elizabeth, as they had been when they were originally passed.

II. In 1530-1, Henry the Eighth by legal chicane

* Strype's 'Annals,' vol. i., Appendix.

entangled the clergy in the penalties of *Præmunire* for having acknowledged the legatine jurisdiction of Wolsey. The commons were included within the scope of his extravagant propositions; but with them the matter was settled by a separate course of proceedings which are irrelevant to the present purpose. From the clergy he demanded (1) a great subsidy and (2) the unconditional and unlimited acknowledgment of his headship over the Church. Not, we have to observe, its enactment, but the acknowledgment of it as a thing already in lawful existence. To this they could not be brought to consent. But they finally agreed to it with a limitation expressed in the following words, which follow a recital of the services of Henry to the Church. “*Ecclesiæ et cleri Anglicani . . . singularem protectorem, unicum et supremum dominum, et, quantum per Christi legem licet, etiam supremum caput ipsius majestatem recognoscimus.*” *

The limiting words, it will be noticed, apply to the term of headship only; and though they are important words they cannot be understood as annulling the whole force of the phrase. They were actually taken, and justly taken, to accept the headship in some substantial sense.

But the sentence branches into three divisions; and its force, as bearing upon the great controversy of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, is by no means confined to the phrases which touch the headship. According to the commencing words, the king is the *singularis protector* of the Church; and they hardly affect the question at issue, as they seem manifestly to refer to action in the exterior

* Wilkins's ‘*Concilia*,’ iii, 742, Feb. 11, 1530-1.

forum. But the case is very different when we take the next limb of the sentence, which declares the sovereign to be the *unicus et supremus dominus* of the Church. These words, which excited no scruple on the part either of the prelates or the clergy, appear to indicate with great precision the idea of the relation between the Church and the sovereign, as it has been conceived in English law. They differ from the declaration of headship, inasmuch as they do not raise the same scruple in religious minds as to invasion of the prerogatives of Him whom the Scripture * proclaims to be the Church's Head ; but they agree with it in being sufficient to cover and even to require the exclusion of the papal, as of all extraneous, jurisdiction. They were in conformity with the doctrines already announced by Tunstal, and subsequently sustained by Gardiner in his book '*De verâ obedientiâ.*'

In the convocation of the province of Canterbury, there was no opposition to the *Concessio* (so it was termed, I presume on account of the subsidy) as thus worded. When the president, Archbishop Warham, stated † that silence was taken for consent, he was answered, "Then we all are silent." ‡ "Unanimi igitur consensu," says the record, "utraque domus articulo huic subscripsit." § In the province of York, Tunstal, who presided, registered || a dissent, not from the words themselves, but from a sense in which he observes that they had been malignantly understood. In this protestation, he limits the headship to temporals, and denies

* Eph. i. 22 ; Col. i. 18.

† Blunt, '*Hist. Church of England,*' i. 208.

‡ Wilkins, iii. 725. § *Ibid.*

|| Lingard, iv. 215 ; Wilkins, iii. 745.

that the king is head next to Christ in spirituals : he submits the whole of the protest to the judgment of the Church (*mater ecclesia*) ; he makes no protestation or reservation whatever on behalf of the Pope. It would appear that either he limited his objection to the affirmative interpretation of the qualifying words (which treated the headship as positively set up by the law of Christ), or else that his opinions underwent some subsequent modification. For, when the headship had been enacted by Parliament in 1534 without substantial qualification, and the bishops were required to swear to it, he both complied himself, and promoted the compliance of others.*

Warham, who appears to have been a principal agent in the accommodation based upon the qualifying words, at a later period (on Feb. 24, 1532) protested before witnesses against all statutes of the subsisting Parliament which were in derogation of the Pontiff or See of Rome, or which were prejudicial to the ecclesiastical power, or to the metropolitan church of Canterbury. But he does not retract or condemn in any particular his own adhesion to the *Concessio* of the clergy which has been cited above. It is strange that this protest, such as it was, should not have been made in Parliament. It is still more remarkable that Fisher appears to have been an assenting party to the course of proceeding adopted in 1531. We are informed that he was one of the nine bishops actually present in the Convocation ; and further that, after the Act of Headship had been passed by Parliament in 1534, and the Oath of Succession was framed by the king so as to include the

* Wilkins, iii. 746.

headship, Fisher took it.* It seems to be true that he had never admitted the so-called divorce; and on his trial he refused to swear to the headship in the terms demanded by Henry: but we have no evidence that he at any time dissented from the more guarded language of the *Concessio* of 1531. The whole body of the bishops with him took the oath. These are interesting matters of illustration. But of course the main argument depends on the corporate action of the Church.

Upon the whole it appears that the Recognition of 1531 was a solemn instrument of the kind known as declaratory; that it was no mere submission to violence, but the result of communications ending in a deliberate arrangement; that it was followed in and after 1534 by the less formal but even wider acknowledgments of the episcopal body at large; and while some allowance must be made for royal pressure, that it was expressive of that aversion to the papal jurisdiction which had spread generally among the English clergy, and which was altogether distinct from the desire for doctrinal reformation. In further proof of the sentiments of the clergy with respect to papal jurisdiction, we may refer to their perfectly voluntary, if suggested, petition in Convocation during the year 1531, for the abolition of Annates, or episcopal first-fruits. The petition † prays that, if the Pope should persist in demanding the payment, then and until he cease from such demand "the obedience of

* Burnet's 'Hist.' i. 206. Also see Sanders, 'De Schism. Anglic.', pp. 106, 107 (ed. 1586); and Brewer, 'Letters and Papers of Henry the Eighth,' v. No. 112, p. 50.

† For this important document see Wilkins, iii. 760, and Blunt's 'Ecclesiastical History,' i. 250-253. [Doubts have been cast upon it, but I believe the statement in the text to be right.—W. E. G., 1896.]

the king and people be withdrawn from the See of Rome," as in like case the French king "withdrew his obedience of him and his subjects" from Pope Benedict XIII. Accordingly it was enacted by 23 Henry VIII. c. 20, that in case the Pope should attempt to enforce such payment by excommunication, interdict, or otherwise, the proceeding should be treated as null, and all divine services carried on in the usual course.

By the 26 Henry VIII. c. 1, passed in November, 1534, this recognition by "the clergy in their convocations" is recited as a recognition of the headship without qualification; and although, according to the opening words of the statute, it exists already, nevertheless, "for corroboration and confirmation and the increase of virtue," it is also enacted. And this act was at once followed by 26 Henry VIII. c. 13, which made it high treason to deprive the king, queen, or heirs apparent "of the dignity, *title*, or name of their royal estates."

The Act declaring the headship gave no power to impose an oath. But such a power had been given by the Act of Succession (1533) for the purposes of the Statute; and Henry, by an act of will, enlarged the oath so as to include the supremacy in the double form of the royal headship and the exclusion of the papal jurisdiction. The bishops were now required to swear to it. Lingard* says that, though with different motives, Sampson and Stokesley, Tunstal and Gardiner exerted themselves to promote this purpose; the prelates seem to have sworn without exception; and the Convocations had already arrived at the conclusion that the Pope "had not any jurisdiction conferred upon him by God

* 'Hist. Engl.' iv. 215.

in this realm of England, [more] than any other foreign bishop." Such was the language of the Canterbury Convocation in March, 1534. That of York passed a declaration in somewhat different words, but apparently with the same meaning.*

III. It is common to represent the antipapal movement under Henry VIII. as having been due simply to the keen desire of the king for the divorce. If any other concurrent causes are taken into view, they are the cupidity of the aristocracy, the indifferent state of the monasteries, which had led Bishop Fox, in founding his college of *Corpus Christi*, to take into view the evident approach of their ruin, and the existence of a latent vein of Lollardism in the country. It is probably true that, but for the divorce, Henry would have continued in that mood of warm attachment to the papacy, which led him so highly to exalt its prerogatives in his controversy with Luther, as to draw down on him the warning expostulation of Sir Thomas More. Consequently it cannot be denied that, in the actual evolution of events, the King's resolution to obtain the divorce was an essential factor, and it may have been with him the governing cause. But it is surely now plain that, among the instruments ready to his hand, there was a widespread aversion of the clergy, in its different ranks, to the working prerogatives of the Roman See, which may be referred in part to impatience of taxation, but which obtained even with some of its highest, purest, and ablest members, and which probably stands in historical continuity with much earlier manifestations

* Collier's 'Hist.' iv. 266.

of the national sentiment both in Church and State, such as the Statute of Provisors, and the Constitutions of Clarendon.

The tyrannical threat of the *Præmunire* in 1530-1 might have had a sufficient motive in the prodigality of the king, which required to be fed by an extravagant subsidy. It is not at first sight so plain why to the grant of the subsidy should have been tacked the acknowledgment of the headship. There was no ostensible plea for the introduction of the subject. There was not a single reforming bishop on the bench. The words of the *Concessio* give emphasis to the theological performances of the king, which had been markedly in an anti-reforming sense. There was not the smallest reference made to the approaching exercise in the superlative degree of the papal power by the denunciation of the divorce from Rome. Had there been even a savour of reference to this subject, the opposition of Fisher would probably have been roused, and he might have been supported by a party. Henry committed a gross error in his first demand for the acknowledgment, which was couched in terms so large as to threaten his plan with total failure. But he retreated from this false position, and, in accepting with crafty forethought a qualified recognition, he contrived, without rousing prematurely the enemies of the divorce, to strengthen his own hands for putting them down at the proper season by making what was to all intents and purposes an effectual provision for the determination of the cause within the realm. Accordingly we find that, as early as in February, 1530-1, Chapuys writes to Charles V. that Anne and her father have principally caused the movement.*

* Brewer's 'Letters and Papers,' 112, 54.

IV. Such was the position of the question between the Church, with the State, on the one side, and the See of Rome on the other, when Mary came to the throne in 1553. In her early measures for the restoration of the Roman worship, she did not touch the supremacy.* At a later period the Parliament proceeded to repeal the Acts which it had passed under Henry the Eighth against the See of Rome, and the Statutes of Appeal, Submission, and Headship. But it is most remarkable that, although the actual bishops and clergy had, through expulsions and burnings, become sufficiently conformable, there was no doctrinal and no legislative action of the Convocations. No attempt was made to disturb the proceedings of 1531 or 1534,† while the list of books proscribed does not contain the works of Tunstal and Gardiner against the papal supremacy. It is possible that these prelates were not disposed to assent to the reversal of the former proceedings, and there may also have been a jealousy at Rome, adverse to the revival of anything resembling a national church government by the practical exercise of power.

Postponing the general recital of the changes made on the accession of Elizabeth, I will only here notice that the Queen found in full force, as ecclesiastical declarations and enactments, the synodical acts of the reign of her father. All that was wanting to give them legal effect was the action of Parliament in the removal of impediments. This was supplied by the very first

* Lingard, vol. v. p. 33.

† As in the reign of Elizabeth, the Lower House outstripped the Upper, and petitioned the Bishops for many things, among them the restoration of the liberties of the Church as they were in 1 Henry the Eighth. This was in 1554. Wilkins, iv. 96.

statute of the reign, 1 Eliz. c. 1. By this statute the regal supremacy was restored. The ideas dominant in it are the renunciation of a "usurped foreign power;"* and the annexation of all such ecclesiastical and spiritual jurisdiction as "hath heretofore been or may lawfully be used" to "the imperial crown of this realm." Or as it appears in the preamble or first section, it is the "restoring and reuniting" to the crown the "ancient jurisdictions" "to the same of right belonging and appertaining;" and the title of the Act is "An Act to restore to the crown the ancient jurisdiction over the estate ecclesiastical and spiritual, and abolishing all foreign powers repugnant to the same." The Act provides an oath to be administered among others to bishops; and this oath declares the sovereign to be the only supreme governor "as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes, as temporal," and utterly renounces all foreign jurisdiction.

It might have been supposed that the episcopal body and the members of the Lower House of Convocation, having their personal composition as yet unaltered, would either not have been allowed to sit, or if so allowed would have bestirred themselves on behalf of the Marian legislation, or in some shape of the papal power. They met, however, under the authority of a "brief" from the Queen: a fact which of itself raises the presumption, that Elizabeth had by some means assured herself that their action would be kept within due bounds. But it is asserted by Lingard that they presented a petition to the House of Lords declaring among other things belief in the papal supremacy. On

* Secs. i., ii., xvi., xix.

reference to the records we find that the allegation is radically erroneous. The facts were as follows.* On the 25th of February, 1559, the Prolocutor, on the part of the Lower House, did make known to the bishops certain articles which that House had framed "for the exoneration of its conscience and the declaration of its faith." One of these articles declares that the supreme power of governing the Church belonged to the successors of Peter, without however attacking in terms the supremacy of the Crown. Another claims for the clergy the right to discuss and define in matters of faith and discipline. The articles were incorporated in an address to the bishops; and, according to the narrative portion of the official record, they asked for some kind of co-operation in the original words, *ut ipsi episcopi sibi sint duces in hac re*. But the document itself is more explicit; and only asks that, as they have not of themselves access to the Peers, the prelates would make known the articles for them. On a later day they inquired whether this had been done (*an articuli sui propositi præsentati essent superioribus ordinibus*). Bonner, the acting president, replied that he had placed them before the Keeper of the Great Seal, as Speaker of the House of Lords; who appeared to receive them kindly (*gratanter*), but made no reply whatever (*nullum omnino responsum dedit*). The prolocutor and clergy renewed their request, but the Convocation passed on to the business of subsidy; and nothing further happened but that the concurrence of the Universities with the five articles was made known on a subsequent day. Thus it is plain that, while the lower clergy framed a document

* Wilkins's 'Concilia,' iv. 179.

which, if a little ambiguous, was clearly more or less hostile, the bishops took no part. It is not, I think, too much to say that they carefully and steadily avoided taking a part. There were, indeed, but four of them present. In the Convocation of York no steps whatever bearing on religion were adopted. There never was in either province so much as a question of a synodical act to reverse, or even modify, the formal and valid proceedings taken, with general consent, in the time of Henry.

V. Before any steps were commenced by the Queen, eleven out of the twenty-seven bishops of the two provinces were dead. To the other sixteen the oath was legally tendered, which asserted, on behalf of the Crown, less than was contained in the unrepealed and therefore still operative declarations of the Anglican Convocations. One only, Kitchin, Bishop of Llandaff (an indifferent subject), took it. The other fifteen were deprived. It is difficult to conceive a more regular proceeding: they were put out of their sees for refusing to conform themselves to a law of the utmost practical importance, and one which had the sanction alike of the Anglican Church and of the State.

Out of these fifteen, five* died before steps were taken for the appointment of their successors. Of the remaining ten, Palmer† has shown that either eight or nine were liable canonically to expulsion as intruders under the auspices of Mary. If, he says, there was

* Lingard, v. 630, note G.

† 'On the Church,' i. 372; and J. W. Lea on 'Spiritual Jurisdiction at the Epochs of the Reformation and Revolution' (London: Wells Gardner).

irregularity in one or two remaining cases, this cannot impugn the proceedings generally. It appears, however, that, if the foregoing statement be correct, although the circumstances were exceptional there was no juridical irregularity whatever. The sees were legitimately cleared before the new appointments were made. The avoidance was effected in a majority of instances by death, in the remaining minority of cases by expulsion for legal cause, with all the authority which the action of the National Church could give for such a purpose. The episcopal succession through Parker is therefore unassailable up to this point, that it did not displace any legitimate possessors, or claimants, of any of the Sees.

This is of course upon the assumption that, in recognising the supreme governorship of the Crown, and in denying the foreign jurisdiction of the Pope, the Church of England acted within her rights as a distinct national Church. It is not for me to enter upon the question, properly theological, whether the Pope had a jurisdiction which neither the nation nor the Church had power to touch; or whether the consecration of Parker is assailable on this or on any other ground.

I think, however, that it is difficult or impossible to deny that the Anglican bishops and clergy under Henry the Eighth, and before the accession of Cranmer, the divorce, and the re-marriage with Anne Boleyn, believed themselves entitled to deal with what Palmer has well called the ordinary jurisdiction of the Pope. It may be that, under Mary, the conservative party in the Church had narrowed its ground, renounced in a measure the older English tradition, and made a rally round the papal standard. It remains, however, a

curious question why they did not, before Elizabeth had re-purged the Convocations by means of the oath of supremacy, avail themselves of their legal standing by some attempt at synodical action in the Roman sense: and it is a question of still greater interest for what reasons no such action was taken during the Marian period, when the episcopate and priesthood had been effectually purged, and the nation at large had been acquiescent in the restoration of the Roman form of worship.

Such is the subject which I have endeavoured to present under an aspect free from colour, and with the dryness which properly belongs to an argument upon law. I ought perhaps to make two small additions. First, that my account of the proceedings in the first Elizabethan Convocation, although brief, contains all that is material. Secondly, that I have carefully perused an able article in the *Dublin Review* for May, 1840, which is believed to have been written by Dr. Lingard, and bears the title "Did the Anglican Church reform herself?" It covers the ground of the argument advanced in these pages; but supplies no reason, I believe, for altering anything that I have written.

VI.

QUEEN ELIZABETH AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.*

1888.

CONSIDERATIONS of religion were the chief determining elements, at least for England, in the public affairs of the sixteenth century. Parallel or counter to these ran the motives of private rapine, European influence, and other forces, variously distributed in various countries; but religion was the principal factor. And yet not religion conceived as an affair of the private conscience: not the yearning and the search for the "pearl of great price:" not an increased predominance of "other-worldliness:" but the instinct of national freedom, and the determination to have nothing in religion that should impair it. The penetrating insight of Shakespeare taught him, in delineating King John's defiance to the Pope, to base it, not on the monarch's own very indifferent individuality, but on the national sentiment.

"Tell him this tale: and from the mouth of England
Add thus much more; that no Italian priest
Shall tithe or toll in our dominions." †

* Reprinted from the *Nineteenth Century*.

† 'King John,' iil. 1.

In these words is set down probably the most powerful element of the anti-Roman movement in England for the sixteenth century. It was in the seventeenth that the forms of personal religion were, for the bulk of the English people, principally determined.*

Henry the Eighth did not create this hostility, but turned it to account; added to it the force of his own imperious and powerful will; and supplied a new ground of action upon which its energies could be mustered and arrayed, in order to sustain a sound or plausible appeal to Scripture against papal prerogative. Henry was, in truth, one of the most papally minded men in England. Sir Thomas More warned him that he had strained the claims of the see of Rome in his book against Luther. But the atmosphere of his soul, like the bag of Aiolos, was charged with violence and tempest, and the stronger blast prevailed. Nothing, Mr. Brewer seems to believe,† but the extravagance of his passion for Ann Boleyn could have overcome the propensity next in vehemence, which was that of attachment to the Pope. In any case, the King showed a great sagacity in the adaptation of his means to his ends. He never questioned the position of the Pope as the head of the Western Church, but he denied that this headship or primacy invested him with ordinary jurisdiction in this realm of England. And this great practical change, which effectually removed the Pope from the daily view of the English clergy and people, was effected without any shock to the stability of the throne, and even carried with it the

* On this not yet fully explored subject, see Weingarten, 'Revolutions-Kirchenlands.'

† 'Papers of Henry VIII.,' iv., Introd. p. cxli.

general assent of the bishops and their clergy. At no time, says Hume,* was he hated by his subjects, and the judgment of our historians from the date of Mr. Hallam † has been that the abolition of the papal jurisdiction corresponded, on the whole, with the bent of the national mind.

Elizabeth was reported by the Count de Feria, a very competent observer, to have a great admiration for her father's mode of ruling. ‡ Had the course of nature been such as to set her upon the throne at his death, and had she been inclined to pursue a religious policy in some essential points resembling his, she would probably have been more largely supported by the people than were either of the intervening sovereigns in the pursuit of opposite extremes. But the reigns both of Edward and of Mary concurred in this single point—that each of them powerfully tended to develop in the public mind the more unmitigated forms of the two beliefs that were in conflict throughout Europe. The Marian bishops occupied a ground widely apart from that of the prelacy which under Warham accepted, and even enacted, the royal supremacy. The Protestant divines, with whom Elizabeth had to deal on her accession, were for the most part men addicted not to Luther, not even to

* 'Hist.,' ch. xxxiii.

† 'Constit. History,' i. 113 n. Green's 'History,' ii. 178, 219. Mr. Gairdner says ('Papers of Henry VIII.,' vol. viii., Preface, p. 11) that the nation disliked the change. I do not know whether he would speak thus of that portion only of the change which abolished the ordinary jurisdiction of the Pope. The divorce, the modes of proceeding with the monasteries, the cruel executions, and finally the despotic government of the Church, are separable from those measures of the reign which seem to have carried national approval.

‡ Froude's 'Hist.,' vi. 525.

Calvin, but more to Zwingli. An independent orthodox Anglicanism, as Mr. Froude has happily phrased it, which was once a reality, had become almost a dream. At the moment of Mary's death, though large masses of the population were without decided leanings, the active religion of the country was divided between purely Roman and strongly puritan opinions. Even Tunstal had been converted to at least an acquiescence in the papal supremacy. As papist or as Zwinglian, the great Queen would at least have had a strong party at her back. To the one and to the other she was inflexibly opposed. If she was resolved to make bricks after her own fashion, she had to make them without straw. For the purposes of religion, she had no party at her back. But she knew that sovereignty in England was a strong reality, and that the will of every Tudor had counted for much in the determination of national policy. She knew, she could not but know, that in strength of volition she was at least their equal, and that in the endowments of her intellect, as well as through the preparatory discipline of her life, she excelled them all. In no portion of her proceedings did she more clearly exhibit sagacious discernment and relentless energy of purpose than in her cautious but never wearying effort to manipulate the religion of the country in a sense which should be national, but should not be that either of the Zwinglian or Calvinian exiles, or of the Roman court. She told the Spanish ambassador on her accession, says Strype, that she acknowledged the Real Presence, and "did now and then pray to the Virgin Mary." *

* Strype's 'Annals,' vol. i. part 1, p. 3.

Like her sister, she made it her primary object to act upon the form of public worship. And her first effort appears to have assumed the shape of an inquiry whether the Prayer Book of 1549 could be assumed as the basis of the new legislation, or whether she must take that of 1552 for her point of departure. As the Book of 1552 can hardly be supposed to have come into extensive use in the short period of its legal existence before the death of the young King, it is probable that the measure she preferred would, had it been practically available at the moment, have been the safest for the country at large.* Questions were apparently submitted, through Cecil, to the divines that had in charge the preparation of a reformed Common Prayer Book, which proposed for consideration the retention of the ceremonies of 1549, and the virtual resumption of the Book of that year.† The reply of Geste (or Guest), who was among the more moderate of these divines (in the absence of Parker through sickness), was unfavourable on all the points, and even proposed to leave open the posture for reception of the elements.‡ The second Book of Edward the Sixth was accordingly assumed as a basis: with changes, however, which served to indicate the inner sense of the Queen. They were carefully limited in number, but were chosen with extreme skill, in consonance with the ideas of the Queen, the Secretary, and (probably) the Archbishop to be. The old

* On the state of religious opinion in the country, and on the action of the clergy respecting the Elizabethan settlement, see the ingenious argument of Mr. S. F. Smith, S.J., in 'The Alleged Antiquity of Anglicanism,' pp. 61-67.

† Dugdale's 'Life of Bishop Geste,' p. 38; Collier's 'History,' vi. 249; Hook's 'Archbishops of Canterbury,' ix. 175.

‡ 'Annals,' vol. i. part ii. p. 459, *seqq.*

words of delivery in the Holy Communion were prefixed to the new ; and the rubric of 1552, which denied the "real and essential" presence, was omitted. Another rubric was framed for the retention of the priestly vestments such as they had been before the first Book of Edward the Sixth. And, while the Communion Office was to be read at "the Table" in the "accustomed place" of the church or chancel, where the daily prayers were appointed to be read, yet power was given to the ordinary to vary it, and the chancels were to remain as in time past. Now the altars, displaced wholly or partially under Edward, had been replaced under Mary. And thus they were to continue, but with a discretion which, if ambiguously expressed, was meant without doubt to meet the diversified exigencies of the time. And the clause in the Litany, which prayed for "deliverance from the Bishop of Rome and from all his detestable * enormities" was cancelled.

Singular as it may seem, there is every presumption that the important stroke of policy involved in these changes was due, not to clerical, but to royal and individual influences. The answers of Guest, to which I have referred, indicate no leaning to any of them, but recommend a further development of the second Prayer Book of Edward in the direction of Puritanism, by a legalised option to stand at the Holy Communion in the act of reception. Had the divines had their way, there might at once have been a conflict with the whole Roman Catholic party, a crisis in the foreign policy of the country, possibly a war both civil and foreign. Apart from any ritualistic and theological leanings of

* In the reign of Henry the epithet was "abominable."

the Queen, she did what the national safety and unity evidently required. The spirit of nationalism, generally dominant under Henry the Eighth, had given way first in one direction under Edward the Sixth, apparently without reserves, then in the other direction with some reserves, to polemical interests and passions. In her it found a restorer and a champion. Elizabeth admitted the Protestant claim in the gross, but admitted it with serious discounts. Yet those discounts were adjusted with extraordinary skill.

Every one of the new changes was an important concession to the Roman Catholic party ; and such on this side was the effect, that the mass of them conformed, and only a sprinkling of individuals or families kept up in secrecy, and with no ostentation, if with more or less of connivance from the Government, the Roman rite.

On the other side of the account, there was to be reckoned, first, that the Book, except in a score of lines, was the Book of 1552. Nor was every concession to the Roman party a blow to the Puritans. No one could seriously contend for the irreverent and scurrilous petition dropped out of the reformed Litany. The restored words of delivery in the Communion Office did not operate as a test ; for it was only by implication that they clashed with the Zwinglian theory. The only change which was as gall and wormwood to the Puritans was the introduction of what is now known as the Ornaments Rubric. This was indeed a daring measure in the face of the reforming divines, who had witnessed only six years before the legislative prohibition of alb, vestment, and cope in the prefatory rubric to the Order for daily prayer. It was probably meant for the rural districts, where there is every reason to suppose it would at the

time be popular. I am not aware of any evidence to show that it ever was enforced against unwilling clergymen, or that it supplied a prominent topic for the controversies of the day. In the matter of clerical habits, these disputes turned mainly on the use of the surplice. It was as much as the Queen and Government could do to hold this narrower ground with success, against the determined opposition of the Puritans in mass, and the leanings of a large proportion of the bishops. But they did hold it: and the experience of the Cromwellian and Restoration periods shows that they rightly gauged the ultimate and fundamental tendencies of the nation, which did not favour a naked Protestantism. They suffered the Ornaments Rubric to lie partially dormant, but they kept it in force, and they sternly resisted all attempts to alter the Prayer Book in the sense of the Swiss Reformation. Even before the Deposing Bull and the consequent breach with the Roman party, these attempts became serious; and in 1566 a bill "to temper the whole to the Puritan gust" had been read a third time in the House of Commons, when Elizabeth ordered it to be sent to her, and the order was obeyed. She further commanded that no such bill should thereafter be brought in till it had been examined and approved by the clergy.* In this injunction there was no small astuteness. For the clergy in convocation could not examine or approve without the license of the Queen previously had.

The resistance to the surplice was not, however, wholly without effect on the proceedings of authority. By the Advertisements of 1566, it was declared to be

* Collier, vi. 514.

sufficient, and the more elaborate vestments were thus far set aside. But the Queen could not be induced to give her sanction, and with it the force of law, to these Advertisements,* which went too far for her, and not far enough for the party of the Puritans either in her council or in the country. She merely connived at them; and according to Strype† they produced at the time no conspicuous effect. They did not conciliate the Puritans; but they probably accelerated the disuse of the Ornaments Rubric as a whole.

In the preparation of the Elizabethan Prayer Book, more scanty regard appears to have been paid to ecclesiastical authority than in the original introduction of the Book under Edward the Sixth. The small Committee of Divines, made small no doubt in order that it might not be formidable, but appointed in order to observe a kind of decency, was invested with no public authority, and (almost of necessity) had not the presence or the countenance of a single bishop. It seems impossible to doubt that, without autocratic dealing in this affair, the Queen would have been unable to secure the concessions to Catholic sentiment which she knew to be necessary, and which she rightly judged that the Protestant leaders among the clergy would not at the time have adopted. That she was not governed by a disposition to withhold from the spirituality its fair share of influence and power, we shall presently see.

In this portion of her work the Queen obtained a substantial though not a complete success. She gave tolerable satisfaction at the time, as is evident, to that large number of her subjects who saw that the

* Strype's 'Parker,' i. 317. † Strype's 'Annals,' I. ii. 130.

independence of the nation was safe in her hands, and who were not given to religious extremes. She adjourned her quarrel with the two organised parties which were actively polemical, until an epoch when her position was consolidated and she had strength sufficient to encounter each of them in turn. It was beyond her power to bring about a reconciliation between them, or even to prevent the struggle of the opposing elements within the Church itself from eventually arriving at a crisis, two generations later in our history. But the conclusive issue of that crisis in 1661 clearly showed that, so far as public worship was concerned, and altogether apart from any religious question on the merits, she estimated more correctly than either of the dissatisfied sections the sense and tendencies of the nation.

In relation to that exterior, but practically most important, department of a national establishment of religion, the Elizabethan policy was summed up in the sagacious choice of a position, and a determined conservatism in defending it against the mutually inimical but co-operating hosts by which it was attacked.

We have presently to turn from the popular side of the Church system and to consider it in another aspect. But before passing to the conduct of the Queen with respect to its constitutional and juridical side, it may be right to observe that, although she followed former practice in the provisional suppression of preaching by the civil authority, her regard for law was decorous in comparison with that of her sister Mary, who not only punished bishops and clergymen by deprivation under her commission for marriages which were authorised by statute and which had never been invalidated, but actually committed to prison Sir James Hales, a judge of the

land, who had distinguished himself by his loyalty, for informing the people in a charge from the bench that it was their duty to conform to the statutes enacted by Henry the Eighth and Edward the Sixth, and still in force.*

In one point of view, indeed, Elizabeth was but a stepmother to the National Church. It was thirteen months after her accession before there was in England a single prelate, except Kitchin only, prepared to conform to the law of the Church respecting the supremacy, such as it had been unanimously declared by the Convocation of 1531, and such as it still remained under that declaration. For nearly six of these months she had no power by statute to proceed against the actual occupants of the sees. When that power had been secured, the deprivations were speedily effected. Many sees had been previously vacated by death, and during the remainder of the time the Crown enjoyed the revenues of them all. A system of exchanges of property was now set in motion, by which they were heavily impoverished; and Collier is reproved by Burnet for saying that, while Mary made martyrs in the Church, Elizabeth made beggars.† Mary had actually remitted a tax, due but not levied, on her accession; and had procured the importation of no less than four hundred thousand pounds in cash, to sweeten, some say by direct bribery, the advent of her husband Philip. She had also done what little in her lay to repair by voluntary foundations the ruin of the ancient monasteries. I now return to the main question.

* Collier, vi. 35.

† Burnet, part iii., pref. p. 3; Collier, ix. 438.

On the legal, political, and exoteric side of ecclesiastical policy, the transactions of the Queen's reign were a series of efforts at reconstruction both positive and negative. Negative, in her resistance to revolutionary change; and positive, in providing against a recurrence of the system of governing the Church by the direct agency of the State, which under Henry the Eighth had been largely established through the vicariate of Cromwell, and which had been developed under Edward the Sixth, through the council of State, to such a degree, that the Church of the country either was or would soon have become simply a department of the Executive. The country at large did not wish to see the Bishops, as Cranmer largely helped to make them, reduced to being the holders of a merely deputed and revocable power; and still less could it observe with satisfaction that the chairs of religious learning were occupied by foreign divines, as though England laboured under the incapacities of a spiritual minority.

The Bill to re-establish the Royal Supremacy was introduced when Elizabeth had been only for four months on the throne; and in the framing of this Bill all the foundation-stones were firmly laid for the legal re-establishment of the National Church, under conditions which secured the just control of the State, but which likewise restored to it, in its own sphere, a reasonable liberty of action. Elizabeth probably gave effect in this matter to her religious convictions; but can it be doubted that she also perceived how a policy like that of her brother's reign would have made the Church not indeed tolerant, but yet contemptible, and even incapable of contributing as a great factor in the body politic to the strength of the State, the loyalty of

the people, and the Imperial independence of the Crown?

In one of the important changes made in this Act, she was enabled to play into the hands of both parties at once. The title of Supreme Head of the Church, enacted by Parliament in 1534 without the qualifying clause of 1531, and borne by Mary until the time of her second Parliament, was dropped from the new Bill. Mr. Froude has shown, from the correspondence with the Spanish Government, how offensive was this title on the Roman side. But all those Protestants who had any worthier conception of the Church than as a mere emanation from the Crown, viewed it as an encroachment on the prerogatives of the Saviour, whose "alone Headship" has been so manfully asserted in Scotland. It ceased to be a legal title. And yet the ghost of it did not cease to haunt the secular mind; so that a Parliament of Anne, in the preamble to an Act, idly and untruly recited that the Queen was the head of the Church of England.* Elizabeth went even farther than the renouncement of this title. In the language of the unanimous Convocation of 1531, the monarch was also the *unicus ac supremus dominus*, the only and supreme lord of the Church. And while scruple arose upon the *supremum caput*, about these words there was no controversy at all. The only title adopted by Elizabeth is that embodied in her oath of supremacy, which declared her to be the "only supreme governor of this realm . . . as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal." †

* I understand that the same legend (for it is no better) appeared on one of the Great Seals of the reign of George the Third.

† 1 Eliz. c. 22, sec. vii.

While extravagant claims were thus abated, and the more modest phrases put in legal use, the necessary substance of power was retained. The general words for the annexation of jurisdiction to the Crown, in section vi. of the Act, are substantially the same as in the Act of 1534. But a different turn is given to it by the oath, which touches only judicial proceedings, and by the title of the Act, which, as well as the Preamble, stamps upon it a conservative character. It is "an Act to restore the ancient jurisdiction" and to abolish "all foreign power repugnant to the same;" and the Preamble expounds the title exclusively in one sense, that of its relieving the subject from a foreign oppression.

In order to bring fully into view the nature of this change, it is needful to remind the reader that the regal headship had in truth two main aspects: in one, it was a defence against the papal jurisdiction; in the other, it was an assertion of absolute power over the National Church. In the first of these senses it had been accepted and enacted by the clergy in 1531; and Tunstal was the only one among the bishops, who appears to have been at that time seriously disquieted by the apprehension that it might become the instrument of a spiritual usurpation. Yet he had already taken the field as an independent champion of the National Church in his work against the jurisdiction of the Pope. It was when Henry's absolutism began to be developed, mainly through the agency of Cromwell, that it was seen how the royal headship was available for purposes of oppression, as it was confined and limited by none of the known lines of law. Warham was the next to indicate, by his protestation on behalf of the Pope, his apprehension on this score; and Fisher, three years

after, witnessed to it with his blood. At a later period, it drove Tunstal and Gardiner, with others, apparently to recede from the ground they had previously taken on behalf of the Crown. Elizabeth therefore declared by her legislation that she desired to govern within the limits of legal precedent, although in the beginning of her reign she had at least on one occasion claimed an absolute sovereignty alike in the civil and in the ecclesiastical spheres.

There were other manifestations of this legal intention in the Act of Supremacy. But, in order to apprehend them clearly, it is requisite to go back to an important statute of the reign of Henry the Eighth.

The Act of 1532-3 * for the Restraint of Appeals is introduced by a Preamble which, though it does not make the law, declares the sense of the legislator and forms a great historic landmark. The leading points of this Preamble are as follows :

1. The realm of England is an Empire, governed by "one supreme head and King."
2. To this King "a body politic," divided in terms and by names of spirituality and temporality, is bound to bear "a natural and humble obedience."
3. This King is duly furnished by God to render final justice to "all manner of folk" within his realm, without appeal to any foreign prince or potentate.
4. The spirituality, or English Church, "always hath been reputed" and also found "sufficient and meet of itself," without any "intermeddling from abroad," "to declare, interpret, and show" "any cause of the law divine."

* 24 Hen. VIII. c. 12.

5. The laws temporal have in like manner been administered by the temporality.

6. And both these authorities and jurisdictions co-operate together.

In this Preamble, if anywhere, we may be said to have a specimen of scientific politics. It closes a multitude of questions. The kingdom is independent. The king is unlimited in all causes which arise. He works through counsellors. The counsellors are ecclesiastical for Church purposes, and temporal for civil purposes. There are two jurisdictions, separate but co-operative. And the old controversy of appeals to Rome, which had raged from before the time of Stephen, is finally decided in the sense of the independence of the realm.

This Preamble strikes a death-blow, not at the office of the Pope as primate or patriarch in the corporate action of the Church universal, but at what Palmer terms his ordinary jurisdiction. It seems as if it had been framed to reassure those who, like Tunstal, were alarmed for the autonomy, under the king, of the local Church. It was framed in the year following that prelate's remarkable protest in the Convocation of York, and appears as if it were intended to meet the claims of that protest. It seems not too much to assume that this Preamble secured the adhesion of the prelates and clergy to the organic change effected by the extinction of the foreign jurisdiction, and even obtained their acquiescence in some measures which did not correspond with the spirit of the great Preamble itself. For these measures they had not long to wait. In 1533 * was enacted an appeal to the King "in the Court of

* 25 Hen. VIII. c. 19.

Chancery," and each cause was to be decided by a commission issued *ad hoc*; a derogation from the important principle that divine causes and temporal affairs were to be governed by distinct organs, though it may be allowed that the provision for a separate commission appointed for judicial purposes, was in the spirit of the Preamble. But in executive matters no fit provision was made for applying it, and down to the year 1553 the Preamble passed more and more into practical oblivion.

Under the Elizabethan Act of Uniformity, the two statutes to which reference has just been made were revived,* and the Preamble accordingly resumed its proper place as part of the law of the land. The foreign jurisdiction was abolished, and the jurisdiction ecclesiastical and spiritual, but only such as had heretofore been or might lawfully be used, was re-annexed to the Crown.† But the Act proceeds by the next section to provide, in exact conformity with the great Preamble, that the Queen may appoint such person or persons, being natural-born subjects, as she shall think fit to exercise the whole of the spiritual and ecclesiastical jurisdiction on her behalf. This is a proceeding analogous to the creation of a court of civil judicature for civil purposes; and thus arose the Court of High Commission.‡ The proceedings of this court were marked by the spirit of absolutism and of harshness, which belonged to the time: it centralised in the metropolis a portion of the business that should have been locally

* 1 Eliz. 1, secs. iv., vi.

† *Ibid.*, secs. xvi., xvii.

‡ See on this Court, Stephen's 'Notes Eccl. Statutes,' i. 357; and Gibson's 'Codex,' i. 44-50. There is a different numbering of the sections in the 'Statutes at Large.'

disposed of, and it trespassed in all directions on competing jurisdictions. It was not therefore an engine of tolerance; nor were any of the measures of this reign steps in the direction of civil or religious freedom for individuals. The sore places of the body politic were at the time not civil but ecclesiastical, and with these sore places the court had to deal. It fell therefore into odium, and was justly abolished by 16 Car. I. c. 11. But it was very remarkable as a conservative attempt made by the Queen to save the religious concerns of the country from becoming the prey, as they had formerly been, of its Cromwells, its Somersets, and its Northumberlands. It was judicial, not executive; and, so far as the Act went, it provided for the exercise of the Supremacy only in the judicial sphere. It was an attempt, made apparently in good faith, to place these affairs under the control of qualified persons, in conformity with the declarations of the great Preamble; and in this sense it appears to be praiseworthy, and to have been successful. A main cause of the failure of the Act, according to the language of the repealing Act, was its assumption of the temporal powers of fine and imprisonment.

In the enactment, under which this Court was appointed, there seems to have been a view to dealing with the Marian bishops, as to whom it must, by the month of April (1559), have become certain that they would not consent to abolish the foreign jurisdiction. Queen Mary appears to have appointed a commission for deposing the Edwardian prelates by virtue only of the royal supremacy. But Elizabeth proceeded in the whole of this matter with a strict regard to legality. The full authority of the State was obtained to tender the oath, and to deprive (sec. xx.) for refusal: while

the oath itself was founded on, and lay within, the terms of the Act of Convocation in 1531, which had never been annulled.

The ecclesiastical moderation of the Queen seems further to have been shown in the precautions taken by the Act against the erection of new forms of heresy, a danger more than usually formidable from the vehemence of religious controversy at the time, and from the strong temptation to imitate with a *tu quoque* the proceedings of the papal see. By a remarkable provision of the Act (sec. xxxv.), no matter could be adjudged by any commission under the Act to be heresy, unless either—

1. It had been so adjudged already by Scripture, or any of the four first general councils, or by some other such council in the words of Scripture ; or—

2. It should be so adjudged by Parliament, the clergy in Convocation assenting.

Since the power to appoint these commissions now no longer exists, the enactment touching heresy is without legal force, but it is remarkable as a feature of the Elizabethan system ; and the condition which it established for securing the joint assent of Parliament and Convocation before private liberty could be restrained by any new sentence of heresy was in force, and was probably of great and beneficial effect, for more than eighty years.

Queen Elizabeth also restored the action of the spirituality, subject to regal control, in the important matter of episcopal elections. By 31 Hen. VIII. c. 9, and 1 Edw. VI. c. 2, bishops might be appointed by letters patent. Under Mary (1. & 2 P. and M. c. viii.) the old law of election was restored. This Act was repealed in 1 Eliz. c. 1, but with reservations ; and, by

the seventh section, the prior statute of 25 Hen. VIII. c. 20 was revived, and still remains the law of the land.* In the event of failure to elect the person named, the King may present to the Metropolitan without election, and the body of persons in default incur a *premunire*. But election even under these restraints has proved to be of value. For, first, it is a relic and symbol of the popular as well as clerical powers embodied in the ancient constitution of the Church with regard to episcopal elections.† And, secondly, experience has shown that in England, during times of laxity, the prerogative of the Crown has been exercised with greater moderation and discernment than in the sister kingdom of Ireland, where the bishops were appointed by letters patent.

It is scarcely necessary to add that, after the accession of Elizabeth, no more was heard of the issue of the commissions subsisting during pleasure, under which the bishops had been content to act during the later years of Henry the Eighth and the reign of his son Edward. There was, however, much negative action, embraced by the policy of Elizabeth, which was not less important than the positive.

In the reign of Henry the Eighth there had grown up an apprehension sufficiently reasonable lest some of the canons, "provincial or synodal" (so they were described), might clash with the statutes of the realm, and might be "much prejudiced to the King's prerogative royal" and onerous both to him and to his

* I may add that, within my own recollection, the House of Commons has refused to adopt a Bill which re-established the nomination of Bishops where election has hitherto prevailed.

† Phillimore, 'Eccl. Law,' i. 38.

subjects.* Accordingly, the clergy had petitioned for the appointment of thirty-two persons—one half to be of their own body, and the other moiety members of one or the other House of Parliament—to examine the said canons, and to present for the King's assent such of them as should be deemed meet to stand. An Act was passed accordingly; but with a strict proviso that none of the approved canons should be contrariant to prerogative, custom, or statute. This law was confirmed by subsequent Acts in 1535 and 1542-3. The appointments were made, and the work was ready, so that when the King died letters patent had been prepared for giving it effect. Another Act was passed in 1549 for the prosecution of the enterprise.

There is some confusion in the account of the proceedings at this stage, and there are differences of opinion among the authorities. What appears probable is that a commission of thirty-two was reconstituted under the Act of Edward for purposes of form, but that the work was delegated in the first place to eight among them, under the name of a preliminary work of preparation; and then that, as Dr. Cardwell states, there was a further delegation to two—namely, Archbishop Cranmer and, *proh pudor*, Peter Martyr.† By these two the work was remodelled or corrected. England must indeed have been poor, when such a share in such a work was accorded to a foreign divine.

For it must be observed that, like most other projects of the period, this particular project had now completely

* 25 Hen. VIII. c. xix. sec. 1.

† See Cardwell's 'Reformatio Leg. Eccles.', pp. viii., xxv., xxvi., 325 (Oxford, 1850); Stephen's 'Eccles. Statutes,' l.

changed its face. It was now no longer the reasonable plan for reforming our synodal and provincial canons, and placing them under due restraint of law. We cannot be altogether surprised to find that the original definition of the aim had been found too narrow ; for, besides native canons, much foreign matter relating to the Church had by use hardened into British law, and required without doubt the application of the pruning hand. But much more was now intended than a corrective work. The title of the Edwardian Act * was "An Act that the King's majesty may nominate and appoint two and thirty persons *to peruse and make Ecclesiastical Laws.*" A material change of plan had been at least theoretically made in 1543, when the title and purpose of the Act were further enlarged by the addition of the words "and to establish all such laws ecclesiastical as shall be thought by the King and them convenient to be used in all Spiritual Courts." When to these extensions of project was added the change of agents, as it stood in 1552, we see plainly that not only had the liberty of the subject been seriously imperilled by foregoing the sanction of Parliament, but the ground had been laid for cutting off this country from all community with Christendom in its laws of religion. It was no longer a plan for a correcting or amending statute, however extensive : the aim, as we find it in the *Reformatio Legum*, was to establish by a complete scheme, newly hatched, a new point of departure. This mode of action was utterly alien to the conservative spirit of British legislation. The ecclesiastical law of the country was, like its temporal law, a gradual growth. There

* 3 & 4 Ed. VI., c. xi.

was a common law of the Church, as well as a common law of the State. The new method of procedure seemed to cut away every bond of union with the past, and to establish a kind of legislation absolutely unknown to the national traditions. Accordingly the Preface, which has the merit of being written in admirable Latin, by Cheke or Haddon, decries the old laws in the mass, and describes the provisions of the work as absolutely new : *quarum materia ab optimis undique legibus petita videtur ; non solum ecclesiasticis, sed civilibus etiam, veterumque Romanarum præcipuâ antiquitate.*

This spirit of novelty commended, naturally enough, the *Reformatio Legum* to the extreme party, which had become so powerful in the Convocation of Elizabeth that it had nearly accomplished what might have proved to be a new religious revolution. In 1562, an obscure statement of Bishop Gibson appears to intimate that the Convocation, or its Lower House, moved in favour of the scheme, but without any practical result. In 1571, the Bull of Pope Pius the Fifth against the Queen had brought about a crisis, and attempts were made, both in the House of Commons and in Convocation, to procure the adoption of the work. Gibson states that this movement was promoted by Archbishop Parker.* It is, however, quite impossible that this statement can apply to the text of the volume as we have it now, and as in the main it left the hands of Cranmer or of Martyr. For it was in this very Convocation that Parker procured the adoption, by the whole body of his comprovincial bishops, of a canon, by which preachers were enjoined to teach nothing to their people except what was agreeable to Scripture and

* Gibson's 'Codex,' p. 952.

had been collected therefrom by "the Catholic Fathers and ancient bishops." * Whereas the *Reformatio* virtually sweeps away the whole doctrine of the Church and the ministry, and both expounds the sacraments in a manner wholly incompatible with the Prayer Book and the Articles, and recognises no interpretative office in the Church Universal. Hook says † that the measure failed through the joint opposition of the Archbishop and the Queen. Cardwell says, ‡ "So little does the Queen appear either to have approved of the book or to have been in favour of the general measure, that no attempt apparently was made during her reign to revive the Act of 1549, and it seems probable, from the jealousy with which the Queen all along viewed the action of the reforming preachers, that she may have suggested as well as approved the remarkable canon of 1571 which was intended to guarantee their orthodoxy."

On the one hand, the Queen may have regarded this code as importing, by the precision of its terms, an abridgment of her ecclesiastical jurisdiction; on the other, there were strong reasons for desiring the enactment of a book of discipline which might raise the standard of practice in the Church. But we cannot suppose the Queen to have overlooked what is obviously the main point in the whole question, namely this: A new code, intended not to consolidate the existing law, but to uproot and replace it, meant a new Church. The Elizabethan policy was to maintain both the personal succession in the Church and the continuity of its law, subject to control from the civil power and to all

* Wilkins, 'Concilla,' iii. 267.

† Hook's 'Parker,' p. 362.

‡ 'Cardwell,' pref. p. xii.; Stephen's 'Ecclesiastical Statutes,' i. 331 n.

necessary amendments. What she seems to have desired was, that the amending laws in the Church should hold the same place for the Church, as great reforming and reconstructing statutes for the State: they maintain the ancient constitution, while they alter and improve it.

I have dwelt at some length on what may be called the shelving of the *Reformatio*, because it was not an omission, but a renunciation, and because its extreme importance as a determining condition in the history of the actual Church of England has not, I think, been sufficiently exhibited by our historians in general.

Among the minor inconveniences of such a code, it may be remarked that it would have required, first, a new tradition of interpretation, and, secondly, continual amendment. When we reject wholesale the aid which the labour of preceding generations has provided, we expose our own work to the severest treatment from the generations that are to follow. The legislator, as such, is compelled by his office to judge on their behalf as to particular points. But if he chooses to judge for them on all points, that is his own fault and folly. Men so acting are apt to tumble into pitfalls. Thus, to take a minute instance, the *Reformatio* orders that where the Old Testament is found obscure it shall be cleared* from the Hebrew text; its compilers doubtless being unaware of the fact that the youngest Hebrew MS., from which the LXX worked, was by many centuries older than the oldest of those upon which the present Hebrew text is based; and perhaps also that the Septuagint is cited as freely as the Hebrew in the Books of the New Testament. Such objections,

* 'Tit.' I. c. 12.

however, are only accessory to those which lie against the principle or initial conception of the scheme.

It still remains to examine the Elizabethan policy in its relation to the creed of the Church. And here again we have to notice both a negative and an affirmative side of this policy. Negatively, the Queen not only withstood all overtures for further change in the Prayer Book, but, during the first twelve years of her reign, she would not suffer the Thirty-nine Articles to be imposed by law even on the clergy. Evidently she regarded them as an instrument which had been required and justified by the circumstances of the time, but one which ought to be kept in hand in a ductile condition, and might be dealt with according as any change in those circumstances might thereafter require. But, when the Pope had launched his Bull of Deposition, she met it by falling back all the more frankly upon her people, and took a step acceptable to the reforming party by allowing the Articles to find a place upon the statute book.* Even then the obligation was confined to persons under the degree of a bishop and to the Articles which concern the "true Christian faith" and the sacraments.

But she had included in her proceedings as to the Articles perhaps the boldest of all her strokes of ecclesiastical policy, and had acted in excess of law with a far-sighted view to the recognition and consolidation of other law which rested on a deeper and more secure foundation.

The twentieth of the Articles of the Church of England begins in these words: "The Church hath power to decree rites or ceremonies, and authority in controversies of faith."

* 13 Eliz. c. 12.

These words were not in the original draft of the Articles of 1562; and the reference in the statute is not to that original, but to a printed book and to its title, which is not yet perhaps fully identified. It was only as we approached the middle of the present century that Dr. Lamb, Master of Corpus Christi College in Cambridge, published his 'Historical Account of the Thirty-nine Articles' from 1553 to 1571,* and for the first time placed beyond dispute the question how this most important clause first found its way into the body of the book: that is to say, through the simple method of insertion by the Queen herself.

Dr. Lamb observes† that the clause appears in the first printed copy of the Articles, which was issued under the Queen's authority in 1563. It was inserted there after the Articles had passed the Convocation, and before they could be published with authority. In order to have authority under the Act of Submission, they required the Great Seal to be attached to them, and thus came into the hands of the Queen. That she was personally the author of this clause becomes almost a certainty from circumstantial evidence. In the first place, she kept the book in her hands for a twelvemonth. In the second place, when it came forth, she appended to the book a statement that she had assented to it "after diligent reading and scrutiny by herself:" *quibus omnibus . . . per seipsam diligenter prius lectis et examinatis, regium suum assensum præbuit.*

* Cambridge; Deightons, 1829.

† 'Historical Account,' p. 33. Hardwick in 1851 followed Lamb (1829). He examines the subject more at large (pp. 129-52). Various points still remain open to discussion. My attempt is to deal with any of them only so far as they regard the Queen.

Nor was this the only point in which the Queen laboured for the cause of religious reaction and reconstruction through the Articles. She obtained for the time the exclusion from the Book of the Twenty-ninth Article (on non-reception by the wicked), which of the whole number was perhaps the most characteristically Protestant. Cecil, who may be regarded as practically one with the Queen in religious position and belief, as well as by general conformity of mind, laboured to bring Archbishop Parker to the excision of this Article. He failed; but the Article was struck out of the Book, and only reappeared in 1571 when, after the Deposing Bull of the Pope, the reforming party had become too strong for the Queen, and she was compelled partially to beat a retreat.

I have said partially, because, when she could no longer prevent the Parliament from intermeddling in the matter, she endeavoured by a side movement in some considerable degree to neutralise their action.

The Commons had passed in 1566 a Bill for Subscription;* but the Queen stopped its progress in the Lords. In 1571 the Parliament again met. It was on April 2; and on the 7th a similar Bill was introduced, together with other Bills into the House of Commons. Two of them—the Bill for Subscription being one—appeared on May 3 in the House of Lords. This was in defiance of the Queen, who on May 1† had given them to understand that she “liked very well of the Articles” and would publish them, but “not to have the same dealt in by Parliament.” She gave her assent to the Bill on May 29. But in the mean time it had been

* Dr. Lamb, p. 24.

† *Ibid.* p. 27.

adopted (in a form not identical with that of 1562*) and subscribed in Convocation on the 11th, with an order for circulation in all the dioceses, and it was published with a royal Ratification,† which makes no reference to the Act, and therefore, I make no doubt, preceded it. In this Book ‡ the Twenty-ninth Article reappears, while the disputed clause in the Twentieth remains excluded. Assent to this was probably the price which Elizabeth had to pay for having the Articles settled, issued, and circulated (as Convocation had ordered) throughout the country without any notice of the action of the Lords and Commons.

But prudence did not permit the Queen any longer to baulk her Parliament, and the Bill became an Act. There remains the question, What book or copy of the Articles was that which passed through the Houses? Plainly not that used by the Convocation: for they acted and signed while the House of Lords had in its custody the Book referred to by the Act. In the Book, as Dr. Lamb thinks it was passed by Parliament,§ the disputed clause does not appear; but neither does the Twenty-ninth Article. It appeared, however, in one or more editions published in that year.|| Until the rule of Laud, it was sometimes included and sometimes omitted. It was then *de facto* fastened into the body of the Articles. It finally obtained ecclesiastical as well as civil authority in the great settlement of 1662 ¶ which finally sealed the effort of Queen Elizabeth. The

* Dr. Lamb, p. 28.

† *Ibid.* p. 29.

‡ Nos. v. and vi. of the copies printed by Dr. Lamb.

§ No. iii. of the forms printed by him.

|| Lamb, p. 37. Hardwick, 'Hist. of the Articles,' pp. 140-5.

¶ 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 4, sec. xvii.

Act declares the Articles to be the same as those named in the statute of 1571.

Besides the case of the Articles, there is another instance in which Elizabeth seems clearly to have gone beyond the legal and constitutional limits of her executive power.

Edmund Grindal, successor of Parker, became Archbishop of Canterbury in 1576. His primacy was a very short one. As a man of earnest piety, he was sensible of the grievous defect of preaching power in the clergy, and he appears while Archbishop of York to have encouraged the use of a remedy by what were called the exercises or prophesyings, conferences of the clergy on portions of Scripture, begun and concluded with prayer. His promotion to Canterbury was by some ascribed to the desire of the Queen to have him more under her control.

There was much to say for the exercises: which, however, in his first year he had to place under the control of most rigid rules.* But this did not avail, and in his second year the Queen prohibited them by proclamation as not warranted by the laws.† This was in May, 1577. In June he was sequestered, on account of non-compliance, for six months, and confined to his house. He appointed vicars-general for his diocese, and was occasionally called upon to act. He remained a nominal primate, without influence or power, until 1583, when he died just as the arrangements for his resigning his see were approaching completion.‡ The reigns of Henry the Eighth and Edward the Sixth

* Wilkins, 'Concilia,' iv. 287.

† *Ibid.* p. 289.

‡ Strype's 'Life of Grindal,' chs. v., xiv.

can exhibit no more remarkable exercise of arbitrary power on the one side, and absolute submission on the other, than we find in the case of Grindal. In 1580, sixteen bishops of his province petitioned for his restoration, but in vain.* The singular feature of the Queen's conduct is this, that she used arbitrary power in opposition to the sense of her prelates, in order to maintain the strict law and discipline of the Church. She had not disposed of the Marian bishops by prerogative, but by law. So far as I know, this case, and that of her operations on the Articles, are the only instances in ecclesiastical matters of her going beyond the law; and in both cases it was clearly with a view not to weakening, but to securing the Church against what she thought more dangerous illegality. It is right that her motive should be observed, without asking how far it affords justification or excuse.

Let us now review, in a summary manner, and according to the best evidence in our possession, the chief acts and attempts of this extraordinary woman, done or attempted with a view to determining the character and position of the Reformed Church of England.

1. She began by a tentative effort to use the Book of 1549 as the basis of reformed worship, but desisted for lack of support; for she had a quick discernment of the practicable.

2. Falling back on the Book of 1552, she made legal provision for continuity as to what met the eye in public worship, by the enactment of the Ornaments Rubric.

3. She provided against a most palpable breach in the

* Wilkins, 'Concilia,' iv. 293.

audible and moral continuity of the service of the Church, by the re-insertion of the ancient words of delivery in the ministration of the Holy Sacrament, and by the abandonment of the Zwinglian rubric at the close of the service.

4. She conciliated those of Romeward leanings without offending any man of sense by striking out from the Litany the clause which denounced the Pope.

5. She resisted successfully the attempts of the House of Commons to innovate upon the Prayer Book ; and she resisted also the endeavours to enforce the Articles, until the violent hostility of the Pope compelled her to strengthen herself in the quarters opposed to him.

6. She dropped the claim to the headship of the Church, and gave thereby satisfaction to the Puritans, as well as to the friends of the unreformed religion.

7. She limited the supremacy, by defining it to be such as had lawfully belonged from old time to the Sovereigns of England.

8. She provided against the absorption of the spiritual estate in the executive by constituting a separate organ for the disposal in the temporal sphere of ecclesiastical causes, and by confining it to judicial functions.

9. She placed a barrier in the way of dogmatic narrowness by enacting that nothing should be declared anew to be heresy except with the assent both of the spirituality and the temporality.

10. She established as her ordinary method of action in Church matters that of communications from herself or her council to the Primate or the bishops, as the actual chief magistrates of the Church, sometimes in the tone of request, sometimes of injunction.

11. Instead of renewing the Act of Edward the Sixth for the appointment of bishops by letters patent, she restored the method of a *congé d'élire* for their election.

12. She put an end to the system of commissions during pleasure, under which the prelates of Henry the Eighth and Edward the Sixth had acted.

13. She renounced the policy and plan of a new code of laws for the Church which had been actively prosecuted under both those Sovereigns.

14. When driven by the urgency of affairs to allow the Thirty-nine Articles to take their place on the statute book as a test, she contrived for their issue to the country on her own authority and that of the clergy, without any notice either of the Act or of its limitations.

15. In her jealousy lest the substance of the Eucharistic doctrine should be impaired, she fought hard for the exclusion of the Twenty-ninth Article, which asserts non-reception by the wicked.

16. She introduced into the Twentieth Article the declaration not only of the power to decree rites and ceremonies, but that "the Church hath authority in controversies of faith."

17. She used every effort to obtain the aid of some of the bishops in possession for filling the vacant sees, and issued her mandate for the election of Parker only on the day * when she had secured the official adherence of one at least among them.

18. In clearing the sees by the expulsion of the Marian bishops she acted strictly, as has recently been

* Lamb, p. 11.

shown in this Review,* according to law both of the State as declared by the first Act of her own reign, and of the Church as established by Convocation in 1531, and never thereafter cancelled.

I might refer to the retention of the law of Mary on the marriage of the clergy, to the controversy on images, and to other matters, but the heads here enumerated will probably suffice.

It is singular, and somewhat disheartening for the student of human action, to note the manner in which this great scheme of effort, so boldly and so persistently undertaken by Queen Elizabeth, has been estimated by some writers on the history of England and the Church of England.

Mr. Hallam, a wise and moderate writer, has noticed the personal leanings of Elizabeth, and thinks she may also have been guided by high motives of equity and prudence, yet inclines towards censuring her for not meeting the demands of the Puritans.† Carwithen commends her for firm resistance on the right hand and the left.‡ But neither of these authors appears to perceive or to allow how much there was in her policy of real initiative, of creative or reconstructive energy. Hume accuses the Queen of having by the Act of Supremacy assumed absolute power, among other things, to establish or repeal all canons; § of which in the Act there is not a word. More strangely still, Dr. Lamb, to whose investigations of facts and documents we are so much indebted, treats || her insertion in the Twentieth Article of the power of the Church to establish rites,

* July, 1888. † Hallam, 'Const. Hist.,' vol. i. c. iv. p. 191, 4to.
 ‡ Vol. ii. c. xv. § Hume, V. xlvi. || Dr. Lamb, p. 33.

and of her authority in controversies of faith, as equivalent to declaring herself to be not only the protector but the sole director of her subjects' faith; and again he speaks of her asserting her "prerogative as supreme Head of the Church," * which even Hume perceived that she had renounced. Collier censures her for having made beggars in the Church without allowance for service in any other direction.† Bishop Short appreciates her greatness, gives her credit for personal piety, and blames her love of power.‡ None of these writers, I think, have awarded to her exactly that which is her due.

And her due is not the praise of an amiable character, or of a friend or promoter of individual freedom as distinguished from national independence. A Tudor from top to toe, her own disposition led her to strong exercises of power, and the real necessities of the case inclined her in the same direction. To modify the Articles of her own motion by insertion and exclusion, to sequester and virtually depose at her will an Archbishop of Canterbury, were lawless acts. But how can we impute general lawlessness to a Princess who made so many laws in restraint of her own power over the Church; or how charge her with despotism in the Church, when even those acts which most savoured of it were, whether in themselves wise or unwise, yet certainly addressed in good faith to the establishment and maintenance of a legal constitution and of an effective authority apart from her own?

I think it cannot be denied that the acts and

* Dr. Lamb, p. 24.

† Collier, ix. 438.

‡ 'Hist. of Church of England,' pp. 468-69.

abstentions which have here been put together were by no means isolated or impulsive, but were parts of a scheme or system. The essence of this scheme or system, undertaken in concurrence with an arbitrary civil government, and as it may be in a larger or smaller degree for the sake of it, was to build up the Church, beneath the shadow of the prerogative, which had been used so largely under Henry and Edward to depress and dishonour it as to threaten depriving it of all capacity to command respect, to train character, or to exercise beneficial influence. Other princes, however, Charlemagne for example, have conceived and pursued a constructive policy in the Church. The point in which Elizabeth stands alone, as far as I know, is this, that she pursued her work from first to last mainly in opposition to the Church's rulers and without a party to support her; that is to say, without a hold in religion on either party, except that they liked her better than they liked the idea of a change which might increase the power of their antagonists. Thus it may truly be said that she rode upon the storm and that she had hardly more than one great, faithful, able servant to help to steady her in her seat.

It is true, indeed, that Elizabeth made no direct contribution by her religious policy to another essential requisite of the national character, that, namely, which was represented and fostered by Puritanism; and to which we owe it that the doctrine of non-resistance, the birth-sin of the English Reformation and the plague-spot of the Church of England, did not undermine and absorb the political liberties of the nation. The only excuse that can be offered is that if the policy of the Queen was the only one which in those days could have secured

the independence of the kingdom, then she took a certain, though, it must be admitted, a circuitous road towards the establishment of religious freedom.

Nothing can be further from the ideal than the English Church has been in its practical development. Perhaps even in its ideal it is assailable enough. Yet it has been a solid and not trifling piece of human history, and has had a large share in moulding the character, and determining the fortunes, of a great nation. This paper, this brief study, if it may so be called, is not a panegyric either upon an institution or a human being; it simply aims at the exhibition, by the enumeration of facts in one among many aspects, of a mind persistent in its work, and singularly powerful while clad in female form. That this nation is what it is, and this Church is what it is, may without praise or blame, but only in acknowledgment of the fact, be owned due to Queen Elizabeth as much as to any human being, that has ever in this island enjoyed or suffered the stern and bracing experience of life.

I have stated in this paper that Elizabeth in her operations upon the Church of England had to make her bricks without straw, and had no party to support her. Those operations exhibit an example of the effects which may be produced by strong will combined with consummate skill, such as is rare in history. She took an exact measure of her own strength, and used it accordingly.

Her father had carried with him, in his proceedings against the Pope, the entire body of the bishops. An interval of years separates the downfall of Fisher from the proceedings of the Convocation which renounced the papal jurisdiction. The accession of Edward VI. did

not bring about a religious crisis. Nor did the earliest of his measures in the direction of reform. But their result, as a whole, was the deprivation of a number of bishops, and the formation of a Roman party in the episcopal body. It was a natural consequence that men such as Tunstal and Heath should become committed to the proceedings of the Marian period, and should consequently decline to associate themselves with Elizabeth in her work, much as she appears to have desired it. It is to be observed that both these distinguished prelates, who had tolerated the Headship under Henry VIII., refused the milder form of the Supremacy which she introduced, and did not wait to take their objection on the ground of any doctrinal change.*

* It is interesting to glance at an event, which had taken place in Scotland. The Scottish Church published, in 1552, what is known as the Catechism of Archbishop Hamilton. Its apparent aim was to set forth the established teaching of the pre-reformation Church, but, in doing this, from its first to its last page it contained no recognition, not even a notice, of the Pope or Church of Rome. It may be inferred that the Scottish bishops and clergy were generally of the same mind, as the English bishops and clergy under Henry VIII. They probably contemplated a National Church, and a free passage through the critical period without violent changes, and without a rupture of internal unity. It seems therefore possible that the changes effected under Edward VI., especially in his later years, may have caused the Scotch bishops to abandon, after publishing the Catechism, hopes which had been alive at the period of its compilation, and may thus have rendered religious revolution certain, to the north as well as to the south of the Border. This important document has recently been reprinted at the Clarendon Press.—W. E. G., 1896.

VII.

THE CHURCH UNDER HENRY VIII.*

1889.

THE sixteenth century was highly remarkable in our annals for the production of great facts and strong men. The principle and the basis of its main proceedings in religion have been imperfectly traced by many of our writers under the double influence of insufficient access to information and of exuberant partisanship. The facts, complex in themselves and but partially known, have been inaccurately handled even within the limits of that partial knowledge. But a new day has dawned, with the enlarged access to the sources which has been opened by the publication on a large scale of authentic records ; while this has occurred simultaneously with that great extension of historical studies and historical appetite among us, which may almost be called the rise of a new historical school. Such are the impressions I have been led to form by my own doubtless insufficient inquiries. If they are in any degree well-founded there is still a great work to be done in portions of this field. Something may be attempted gradually even by piecemeal contributions, such as those which I have taken upon myself to offer.

* Reprinted from the *Nineteenth Century*.

In this Review for July, 1888, under the title of "The Elizabethan Settlement of Religion," I undertook the proof of certain propositions, which may be substantially restated as follows :—

1. A basis of ecclesiastical legality for the proceedings of the English Reformation, in their determining conditions, was laid in the reign of King Henry the Eighth.

2. This basis was not laid by the persons who are popularly known as Reformers, such as Cranmer and his coadjutors, but was anterior to the rupture with Rome brought about by the (so-called) divorce, and had the sanction of the collective national episcopate, including such great names as those of Warham, Tunstal, Gardiner, and Fisher, as well as of the clergy of the second order, all represented in Convocation.

3. This being so, the doctrinal assertions and the ritual and other changes of the period have to be tried upon their merits, or upon the competency of a National Church to enact or adopt them, but cannot be dismissed without trial as having been forced upon the Church by the civil authority, which was, I admit, essentially incompetent to constitute an order of bishops, or legitimately to establish various other changes such as were actually made.

To these I will now add a fourth proposition, for the purpose of setting aside, as irrelevant to the present issue, questions which may be raised with reference to some portions of the subject, and especially to the ecclesiastical sanction due to the Book of Common Prayer as it stood during the reign of Elizabeth. For us of the present day it seems enough to say, fourthly, that, on the Restoration of Charles the Second, this sanction was

supplied in a manner thoroughly regular and formal; and that the scheme thus appointed by the concurrence of the temporalty and the spirituality of the land has subsisted for more than two centuries and a quarter. I may, perhaps, subjoin that there is no apparent sign of its having come near to the close of its existence.

These are propositions turning altogether upon matters of historical fact; but they tend towards establishing the continuity of the British episcopate from the period before the Reformation downwards; and, though I have avoided impugning any other scheme or system, they have drawn forth criticism both from Nonconforming * and especially from Roman Catholic quarters.

I shall now endeavour to deal with all the principal allegations which have been urged against me, and first with one serious charge of inaccuracy brought by Mr. Morris, S.J.† It relates to Fisher, and the oath exacted under the Succession Act; and my statement (in p. 8) has led Mr. Morris to assert that Fisher never took any such oath, and that in support of the contrary allegation there is not a corroborating word in Sander's Book on the Schism. While I admit that my allegation is wrong in one point of chronology, I shall endeavour to support its substance; and, to proceed in order, I will first quote the important passage from Sander to which I referred. The passage ‡ is as follows:—

* *The British Weekly*, Nov. 23, 1888.

† *Dublin Review*, Oct., 1888, p. 252.

‡ Sander, '*De Origine ac Progressu schismatis Anglicani*,' ed. Rome, 1586, pp. 106, 107. I find a corresponding passage in the Cologne edition of 1610, and in the French translation, Paris, 1683. Upon examining, however, an English translation, published in 1877 by Mr. David Lewis, I find that no less than twelve consecutive pages of the original, as it stands in the editions I have cited, do not appear in it.

“His inquam aliisque multis rationibus inductus ac deceptus Roffensis (de quo postea sæpissimè gravissimèque doluit), necessitati præsentì cedendum ratus, persuasit reliquis, qui firmiores adhuc erant in Christo (nam plerique jam Archiepiscopis Cranmero et Leio, huic Eboracensi, illi Cantuariensi, qui ambo Regis negotium promovebant, adhæserant), ut saltem cum exceptione illâ prædictâ (quantum per Dei verbum liceret) obedientiam Regi in causis ecclesiasticis ac spiritualibus jurarent. Cujus facti Roffensem postea usque adeò pœnituit, ut publicè se ineusans diceret, suas, id est Episcopi, partes fuisse, non cum exceptione dubiâ, sed apertè et disertis verbis cæteros potius docuisse quid verbum Dei permetteret, quidve prohiberet, quò minus alii in fraudem incurrerent: nec unquam sibi deinceps peccatum hoc expiasse videbatur, quousque proprio sanguine hanc maculam eluisset.”

No one will, I think, deny that this is a passage of great importance, although it has escaped the notice of Mr. Bridgett, S.J., in his able biography of Fisher.*

Mr. Morris† quotes the second Act of attainder against Fisher, and Burnet's account of his behaviour on his trial, to show what requires no showing—namely, that at a certain date in 1534, and in 1535, Fisher refused to take the oath of succession. But these facts do not dispose of the statement of Sander, which is express to this extent, that Fisher recommended those of the chief prelates who were most adverse to the King's

This passage, with the narrative to which it belongs, forms part of them. Some explanation appears to be required. Sander died before the publication of the work by Rishton. The introduction and notes by Mr. Lewis evince great research. Not only, however, does he ascribe the ‘De Antiquitate’ to Parker, which though not the truth is not far from it, but he states that the Clergy of 1531 in their terror withdrew the limiting clause, “per legem Christi,” and thus the Recognition passed without it (note, p. 92). This seems to be rather a gross instance of what I have said in the text as to historical inaccuracies.

* ‘Life of Blessed John Fisher.’ Burns & Oates, 1888.

† *Dublin Review*, p. 252.

proceedings to take an oath promising obedience to him even in spiritual causes, and that afterwards he bitterly repented of this conduct and considered that it required expiation by his blood. The questions, which arise upon the passage, seem to be these three :—

1. What was the oath to which it refers?
2. What was the time to which it refers?
3. Did Fisher himself take the oath, or did he only persuade others to take it?

As to the first question, we know of no novel or special oath of the period anterior to the oath of succession. No Act of Parliament had been passed earlier than the Act of Succession, at the beginning of 1534, which in any manner required the taking of an oath. The concessions of the clergy, in 1531 (the Recognition), and in 1532 (the Submission), had not become the law of the land. The Royal Headship was not enacted until the end of 1534, but it was logically involved in the Act of Succession; for that Act defined the oath to be one for maintaining “the whole effects and contents” of the Act. These contents included the dissolution of the marriage with Catherine, and the confirmation of the marriage with Anne. Such determinations depended entirely upon domestic as opposed to foreign authority; and this domestic authority, again, depended upon the royal headship. I conclude it, therefore, to be beyond reasonable doubt that the oath treated of by Sander is the oath of succession.

As respects the time when Fisher exercised his power of persuasion so effectually, Sander himself supplies us with sufficient means of judgment. He places it in the year 1533 (according to the old method of computation),

and before the definitive sentence of the Pope,* which is also assigned to that year; but after the Act of Succession had passed,† and in direct connection with an account of a personal pressure brought to bear upon Fisher by the King, who pointed out to this prelate that his obedience was limited by the condition “so far as the Word of God allowed.” Further, the passage shows that Cranmer was already archbishop, so that Sander cannot refer to anything before the 30th of March, 1533, the day of his consecration. Now Fisher’s refusal to take the oath of succession is defined by his Act of attainder ‡ for refusal to have been on or after the 1st of May, 1534. But many weeks had then elapsed since the passing of the Act; and Henry, who had obtained the statutory authority on the 23rd of March, named his Commissioners to enforce it on the 30th.§ The only admissible conclusion, upon these facts, as to the question of date seems to be that the King’s urgency, and Fisher’s compliance, belong to the beginning of the period between the passing of the Act in the month of March, and the arrival of the news of the Pope’s sentence on the 12th of April.

At first sight it may appear strange that a man of Fisher’s firmness, character, and standing should in so short a time have exhibited so radical a change in his own conduct; but there had been, within the compass of that short period, a change in the circumstances most likely to affect Fisher’s action, which may go far to explain it. The bolt, suspended for months and years in the sky over England, had fallen. Passing at length

* Sander, p. 111. The sentence was dated the 23rd of March.

† Sander, p. 104.

‡ Bridgett, p. 283.

§ *Ibid.* p. 206.

from the questions of competency and jurisdiction to the merits of the case of divorce, the Pope had, on the 23rd of March, definitively ratified the old marriage of Henry, and annulled the new. To conform to the Act of Succession would, from this time forward, not only have been in conflict with Fisher's personal opinion on the divorce, which many of his brother bishops did not share; it would have pledged him to a headship which was no longer abstract, but which had now been placed in direct contradiction to the official judgment of the Pope on a matter of spiritual concern. At the first of the two periods, the Church of England had not pronounced upon the marriage, and the Pope had not taken the question out of its jurisdiction. At the latter period, both these positions were reversed. Moreover, the parliamentary enactment went beyond the terms of the convocational declaration.

3. Did Fisher himself take the oath, or did he only persuade those among the bishops to take it who were most reluctant? I cannot doubt that he took it. No other conclusion gives effect to the words of Sander, who says (*necessitati præsenti cedendum ratus*) not that he complied in part, but that he complied *simpliciter*. In truth, to persuade others was a greater compliance than to swear himself. To take such a course advisedly would have been a piece of baseness, that cannot be imputed to such a man as Fisher. We should therefore follow the statement of Burnet,* who says (with some want of distinct specification as to dates, but yet in a manner such as to leave no room for doubt) "the bishops did all swear their alliance to the King, and swore also

* Vol. i. p. 330 (ed. Oxf. 1816).

to maintain his supremacy." If all the bishops swore, Fisher is, of course, included.*

The main argument now before us has reference to collective and constitutional authority, and does not depend on the action of individuals; but it is material to trace the acts of a prelate who, from the combined force of character, learning, and seniority, seems to have possessed a weight of moral influence beyond that accorded to any other contemporary personage in England.

Mr. Bridgett† well observes that even deep students of the history of that period in some cases know of this remarkable man no more than a few facts of his life, and perhaps the details of his death. I still venture to doubt whether, even by the work of Mr. Bridgett himself, his character has been completely elucidated. In truth, I find in that work, and in the works of other Roman Catholic writers, the omission of a material element of the case before us; namely, a regard to the National Church in itself, as distinct from the royal influence and power on the one side, and the Papal chair on the other. If I judge aright, this element counts for a great deal in the history of the period. A learned divine, and a man of austere life, Fisher appears to have been totally exempt from the influences of personal selfishness and ambition. He would not leave his poor church of Rochester for a richer one; and even at the last he valued not, as he said, the Cardinal's hat unwisely bestowed on him. But he seems to have been wanting in breadth of mind, and in the faculty for

* Even if Fisher was excused from attendance in Parliament, he may have seen the King, and the words of Sander on this part of the case (p. 106) seem to imply that they met personally.

† Preface, p. vii.

discerning the signs of the times. He did not see the necessity of reforms which was obvious to Wolsey, to Warham, to Gardiner, and to Tunstal; the last of whom, at any rate, if greatly junior to Fisher, emulated him in his Christian graces. So far as political inclination went, Fisher was one of those who would have counted among the *Μαρθωρόμαχοι* of Aristophanes, or, in our own day, among a Parliamentary residue, the forlorn hope of Protection, who passed, in the House of Commons, by the name of "cannon balls;" from their impassibility, it would appear, not from their efficacy. In the year 1529-30, Bills were introduced into Parliament, which touched neither the faith nor the discipline of the Church, nor yet the Papal power, but sought to deal, as Burnet* says, with "some of the most exorbitant abuses of the clergy," touching probates, mortuaries, pluralities and non-residence, and the farming of lands by spiritual persons. Fisher† offered a vehement opposition to these Bills, which he seems to have regarded as indicating "lack of faith only," and showing that the mind of the Commons was "nothing but down with the Church."

Bearing this fact in mind, let us weigh some incidents of his subsequent course. No doubt remains that he concurred in the Recognition of the royal headship in 1531. In 1532 came the large concession with regard to Canons, which is termed the Submission of the clergy. Fisher was absent, probably ill at the time. Mr. Bridgett says he cannot be shown to have had any share in this surrender. But he was formally

* Burnet, i. 159; Froude's 'Hist.' i. 248-51; Bridgett, pp. 181-5.

† Bridgett, pp. 201, 202.

consulted * (on the 6th of May, 1532) by deputies from the two Houses of Convocation, which were adjourned for three days in order to receive his advice. There is no record of what it was. Had he objected, he must have made his objection known, probably by formal protest. He must surely be taken, then, as having given here also a reluctant, perhaps, but honest assent. And the upshot of the matter thus far is that this eminently dauntless man, who had proved in 1529 his ability to confront and denounce a prevailing power, and who maintained an uniform and unflinching resistance to the divorce, yet concurred, even if with reluctance, in the Convocational Act of 1531, and made no opposition to the submission which followed in 1532. The story told by Chapuys,† that he complied in 1531 because he was threatened with being pitched into the river if he did not comply, is totally at variance with the resolute character of the man, and is evidently the mere gossip of the day. The rational conclusion is that he acted throughout for the best, and according to his conscience. Reluctance of this kind does not take away the effect of responsible concurrence, nor the authority due to it. But, further, I am aware of nothing to show that this reluctance was grounded upon regard for the Papal prerogatives. To this point I shall presently recur. And I pass now to the main issue, which plainly turns upon the nature and effect of the Recognition of 1531 as matter of law, both constitutional and ecclesiastical.

I will first, however, say a word upon a portion of the Recognition which has not attracted much notice

* Collier, ii. 68.

† 'Letters and Papers of Henry the Eighth,' vol. v. No. 112.

in the discussions upon it; I mean the phrase which declares the King to be "*unicus et supremus dominus*" of the Church. Mr. Morris* considers these words to be simply descriptive of the relation held to the Church by its feudal lord. It is at first sight a plausible contention; but the balance of argument seems to be very strongly against it. For the King was not feudal lord of the Church at all; but only of particular fiefs held by certain of its members. And, again, the letter of Henry the Eighth to Tunstal and the Northern Convocation, which cites these words, may seem to give them a wider meaning. The King says that they are open to cavil, like the words touching the headship, on the ground that Christ alone is "*unicus Dominus et supremus*, as we confess him in the church daily."† There is a similar piece of evidence against this limitation of sense in Tunstal's own protest, namely, that he did not so understand the words; for, in his protestation, he treats these words as *in pari materiâ* with the rest and says, "*Et similiter declarandum et exprimendum puto verba illa, scil. unicum et supremum dominum, in temporalibus post Christum accipi.*"‡ Had these words referred to the feudal lordship Tunstal would have urged no such argument, for the feudal lordship obviously required no such limitation.§

* *Dublin Review*, p. 248.

† Wilkins, 'Concilia,' iii. 763.

‡ *Ibid.* iii. 747.

§ I desire to recede from the statement (article, p. 8) that the remarkable petition against annates proceeded from the clergy, in which I simply followed Strype, Wilkins, and Blunt ('*Ecclesiastical History*,' i. 250-253). Mr. Gairdner considers it to be a petition from Parliament ('*Letters and Papers*,' vol. v. Nos. 722, 725). [Upon another reconsideration, I must withdraw a concession which was made mainly in deference to the high authority of Mr. Gairdner.—W. E. G., 1896.]

It must always be borne in mind that the Recognition in 1531 does not stand alone. In 1534, Lee had become Archbishop of York; Cranmer and Gardiner had been added to the episcopate of the southern province. Except for these successions, made in the usual form, the personal composition of the Convocations continued as it had been in 1531. Mr. Morris* erroneously states that the proceeding in Convocation at this later epoch was "nothing but an answer by the Lower House" to a question concerning the Pope. On the contrary, the proceeding seems to have been complete in itself; and it was beyond doubt a proceeding in both the Convocations.

It was propounded to them, and to the Universities that the Bishop of Rome by the sacred Scriptures has no greater jurisdiction in the realm of England than any other foreign bishop. To this proposition, on the 2nd of June, 1534, the Convocation of York unanimously agreed. The unanimity is strongly marked by the words used—"unanimiter et concorditer, nemine eorum discrepante."† Even from this document alone the previous and concordant action of the province of Canterbury might almost be taken for granted. And, in this purely anti-Papal transaction, there is not a whisper of coercion or of reluctance.

But, on the preceding 31st of March, the vote of the Lower House of Canterbury on the same proposition had been repeated in that Convocation.‡ Thirty-four asserted it, while one doubted and four denied. The document given by Wilkins is not an ordinary journal of a day's proceedings, but a summary, and probably a contracted, account of the proceedings of many days.

* *Dublin Review*, p. 257. † Wilkins, iii. 782. ‡ *Ibid.* iii. 769.

Collier, however, cites the formal record "of the sense of the prelates and clergy" of Canterbury from the Journal of Convocation.* He also cites from Wharton a testimony, according to which it would appear that this renunciation of all Papal jurisdiction by Divine right—this being the nature of the power which was in question—was more formal and general throughout the land, than any other ecclesiastical proceeding of the period.

The learned men of the Roman communion enjoy a deserved credit for accurate and careful training, and I must own to some surprise at what seems to me a want of precision in some reasonings of those who have offered replies to my article.

The Rev. Mr. Morris† quotes the words of Bishop Stubbs, which are very weighty words, to the effect that neither Fisher, Warham, nor More would have accepted the words of 1531, if they had implied a rejection of "Papal authority;" and, later in the article, my antagonist finds that I am under a "prepossession" that "the English clergy were really averse to the Pope and to his authority."‡ His proof of this prepossession is that I speak of "that aversion to the Papal jurisdiction which had spread generally among the English clergy." Can he require to be reminded that jurisdiction is one thing and authority another? "Jurisdiction" is a technical word; "authority" is not, and is of far wider scope. The oath of succession, as found in Burnet, speaks of both, but the two things are distinct though related. For example, no one, I presume, will refuse to admit that the Patriarch of Constantinople enjoys a certain

* Collier, 'Hist.' ii. 94.

† *Dublin Review*, p. 250.

‡ Wilkins, p. 254.

authority in Greece; but in Greece he has no jurisdiction whatever. It has always seemed to me that the term jurisdiction in its proper sense, drawn legitimately from its basis in the word *jus*, is stamped *ab initio* with the idea of defined civil force and effect; and cannot be separated from this idea even in such a phrase as spiritual jurisdiction, though of course the word is capable, like other words, of being widened into a second intention, and a merely popular use.

This distinction was observed by the Church of England, even in the sixteenth century. In 1534, the question put to the clergy was whether the Pope had by Scripture any jurisdiction in England beyond any other foreign bishop; and when the proposition that he had none was affirmed by the Convocations, the answers in both cases (as in that of the University of Oxford) * adhered strictly to the word *jurisdictio*. In 1562 Art. xxxvii. only avers that "the Bishop of Rome hath no jurisdiction in this realm of England." It might be difficult to show that the English Church in any one of its formal Acts has ever touched the question what attributes might appertain, or be allowed, to the Bishop of Rome in virtue of his Western patriarchate, or even of his Primacy as first among the Patriarchs.† The negation of 1533-4, although it went beyond the Act of 1531, was doubly conditioned; it applied only to *jurisdictio*, and to *jurisdictio* available in virtue of powers conferred in Holy Scripture. The probable intention of the King at and after this time was to make terms with

* Collier, ii. 94; Burnet, 'Records,' vol. iii. Nos. 26, 27; Palmer, 'On the Church,' pt. ii. ch. ii.

† It would be a further question what powers the Pope might have by allowance or consent.—W. E. G., 1896.

the Pope. The Act of 1532 respecting firstfruits, passed after the Recognition, stood upon this footing.* It involved the contingency of a total renunciation; but, in the meantime, it conditionally recognised his intervention even in the appointment of English bishops; it provided a moderate payment in respect of the forms to be observed; and Cranmer in 1533 was consecrated under Bulls from Rome. Nor was it wonderful that this moderation should be observed, when we consider what such a man as Melancthon thought he believed; that, if other controversies could be composed, the Papal primacy, rationally handled, need not form an obstacle to the restoration of Christian unity.

And the fact remains unshaken that these declarations, made by the representative body of the English Church, never were repealed. The allegations of Mr. Morris are two. First,† that there was a proceeding in the first year of Mary against the Statute of 1534. But that proceeding falls utterly short of the exigencies of Mr. Morris's argument. It was not the Act of Convocation, but only of the Lower House. It was a Lower House personally remodelled under civil authority. And, finally, it touched neither the acknowledgment of 1531 nor the negation of 1534, but only the Statute of that year. I am not aware of any Convocational action at any date, which has aimed at undoing the legislative proceedings of the Church during the reign of Henry the Eighth.

Mr. Morris, indeed, also dwells upon the national Synod, which in November 1555 (when nearly half the reign had already passed away) Pole obtained authority

* 23 Henry VIII. c. 20, secs. ii., iii.

† *Dublin Review*, p. 256.

to call, as a Synod having for its mission to reform the Church of England, "which by the calamity of the late schism was greatly deformed in doctrine and morals." But these words are not the words of the Synod; * they are simply the words of Cardinal Pole. And the proceedings of the Synod, which seem to have been speedily arrested, but which are on record,† involve no condemnation, and no repeal, of anything done ecclesiastically in the preceding reign.

Without doubt, there must have been very strong reasons of policy which caused so remarkable an abstention: an abstention continued, as I have shown, I believe with perfect accuracy, into the reign of Elizabeth by the collective body of Convocation in the province of Canterbury, and by both the Houses in the province of York. Perhaps it was that Gardiner and the other prelates, who had shared in proceedings under Henry, were not willing that their own solemn acts should be directly annulled. Perhaps it was that, as statesmen, they knew that it would be dangerous to stir the public feeling by direct assertions on the part of the Church against the regal and on behalf of the Papal power. Perhaps the Marian councillors speculated a little on the age of the Queen. She was not very far advanced in life. Her reign might well have proved to be of considerable duration. It may have been thought wise to postpone the final stage of ecclesiastical reaction until the heads of the reforming party should have been forgotten, and the realm thoroughly habituated to the restoration of the Latin forms of worship. Be this as it may, the fact remains. By circuitous means the dominant party cut off all that

* Wilkins, iv. 151.† *Ibid.* iv. 131.

was for the moment operative in the prior Acts, but they left the Acts themselves. Thus they left it free to Queen Elizabeth, on her accession, by simply repealing the Parliamentary settlement of Mary, to place herself face to face with the unrepealed proceedings of the Church under Henry the Eighth. She then, by a substantive enactment declaring her governorship of the Church, which manifestly lay within and not beyond the declarations of 1531 and 1534, placed herself in a condition to execute the Church law, as well as the State law, against all who might, if challenged, refuse to accept that governorship.

I now come to the consideration of reasons alleged by those who, aware that there has been no repeal of the Convocational Acts, think that they can account for the fact, and can deprive them of their presumptive significance. These pleas appear to be as follows:—

Firstly, that the Recognition of 1531 was obtained by terrorism, which amounts to coercion; and it is therefore void.

Secondly, that the proceedings of the Marian Convocation, though they did not involve the repeal of the Recognition, yet were equivalent to a repeal.

Thirdly, that the Recognition was so insignificant, that it did not require repeal, or notice of any kind.

As to the first contention, I must observe that in the whole field of political argumentation there is no more perilous, I had almost written more pestilent, doctrine than that which exempts persons in authority from obligation to their acts and words on the plea of coercion. I know of no worse fault in the kingship of the past, than its disposition to avail itself of this plea, and thus to obtain release from its covenants.

Even darker is the case, if darker may be, when the doctrine is applied to bodies, which are obviously less liable, than individuals, to the extremes of compulsory pressure. And most of all in the case of bodies entrusted with functions purporting to be divine.

Of course it remains true that there is gross injustice in the fact of terrorism, and loss of moral authority on one side or on both. But there is no proof of what can justly be called terrorism in the case before us, though there is evidence of pertinacity on the part of the King, who doubtless was looking forward to ulterior developments. Let us examine the facts of the procedure, about which, so far as I know, there is now no material dispute. I take the account from Collier.*

In the first form of the demand the King was to be "protector et supremum caput." This the clergy would not accept. After three days, the King proposed to add to the foregoing the words "post Deum." This again met with no acceptance. Then came in the limitation "quantum per Christi legem licet." The declaration was accepted unanimously, with this limitation; and it also met the wishes of the King. It has always been supposed that the limiting words were proposed by Warham. Mr. Bridgett † prefers, on authority which seems to me highly apocryphal, to ascribe them to Fisher himself, into whose mouth Hall, his biographer, puts a speech with the air of a modern report. In this speech, he advises them to make the recognition, in its qualified form, as a choice of evils. Now the notion of terrorism is really incompatible both with the previous refusals, and with the strictly graduated and deliberative

* Vol. ii. pp. 62, 63. † 'Life of Blessed John Fisher,' pp. 201, 202.

process, by which an agreement was arrived at. That Fisher was the adviser is highly improbable, for he was a man of aye and no, not of compromises and expedients. That his assent was reluctant we have no evidence warranting assertion or denial. That his reluctance was shared by the clergy we have no contemporary evidence except that of Chapuys, the envoy of the emperor.* But we must remember that it is his incessant endeavour to encourage Charles to vigorous and even military action on Mary's behalf, by representing that opinion is everywhere against the King. No doubt it became widely adverse, when Henry proceeded to the repudiation of Catherine after twenty-five years of married life, and even anticipated it by disgusting exhibitions of himself in company with Ann Boleyn. But there is no proof whatever of an adverse public opinion either at the period, or on the subject, of the Recognition.

The speech attributed to Fisher, which refers to coercion and disinclination, makes no reference to the Pope. Neither does it explain what it was that the clergy feared. This is, however, probably explained by the protest of Tunstal, and by the explanatory argument of Henry in reply.† In neither of these is there a word either respecting danger to the prerogatives of the Pope, or tending to save those prerogatives. They make it plain that the object put forward as requiring care and defence was the prerogative not of the Pope, but of Christ. This indeed would be sufficiently shown by the fact, even if it stood alone, that Tunstal himself had already published his work against the power of the

* 'Letters and Papers of Henry the Eighth,' vol. v. Nos. 105, 120, 124.

† Wilkins, iii. 745.

Pope in England. The action of 1531, then, has all the appearance of a serious deliberative proceeding ; and, if there be any semblance of fear or of reluctance, it has no regard to the maintenance of the Papal power, but only to the just independence, within her own proper sphere, of the National Church. Of this we have a further and conspicuous proof in 1534. In 1531, when there is no direct reference to the Pope, and the immediate question is of the National local Church, there is a degree of hesitation and reluctance. In 1534, when the Papal jurisdiction is directly assailed and denied, and no word is used which could be prejudicial to the Church, we hear nothing of coercion, and nothing of unwillingness on the part of even a single bishop (Fisher being in prison). Can there be a more conclusive indication that the men who thus cheerfully complied in 1534, only the Pope being concerned, when they stickled in 1531 for special forms of limitation did it on behalf of the Church, of which the liberties were directly in question ?

As to the second of the three contentions, my reply is that there may be repeal in direct words, or through overriding and contradicting a previous judgment by a later one ; but that, short of such alteration or contradiction by an authority equivalent to that of the original Act, there can be no such thing as an equivalent of repeal. The performance or allowance, in the face of the original instrument, of administrative proceedings apparently or even really inconsistent with it cannot destroy its authority. The legislative power is essentially the highest power, and its Acts cannot be invalidated except by its own authority. It is, of course, to be borne in mind that there was not an

absolute opposition between the declarations of 1531 and 1534, and the exercise of Papal power in England. Under that of 1534, it might have been exercised as a power of ecclesiastical though not of Scriptural appointment. Under that of 1531, it might have been exercised by allowance of the realm through its constituted authorities ; by option, in short, and arrangement, but not by compulsion or command. There was therefore an opportunity, so far as the Church under Mary was concerned, of playing with the subject. It is sometimes thought politic to wink at disobedience to an Act without or before proceeding to repeal it, but those who deem it proper and wise to play such a game must take their chance of themselves disappearing from the scene, and leaving the Act in full force for their successors to deal with.

But, according to Mr. Mivart,* who holds so high a place in the world of natural science, the Act of Convocation was one which might naturally and properly be let alone by both of the parties whom it concerned ; by the friends of the Papal system, because it was *ultra vires*, and therefore *ipso facto* null and void ; by the friends of royal power, because in their view it was "superfluous" and "an idle act." As to the first plea, I admit that, according to the doctrine now recently established, the Convocation would have been incompetent to determine anything of any kind against the Pope. But (1) we have no reason to believe that a single bishop under Henry held that doctrine, while we know positively that many, including Gardiner and Tunstal, did not ; (2) this act cannot be fully measured,

* *Tablet* newspaper, Dec. 15, 1888.

for the purpose of the present argument, without taking into view the responses of 1534. Both were perfectly canonical in form. Both unquestionably formed part of the ecclesiastical law of England. As part of the local law, they had a local force, which could not be in the least degree abated by any proceedings not having a legislative character, and there was no proceeding, either of Convocation or of Synod, having such a character, in the reign of Mary. Mr. Mivart finds it necessary to say of my argument that it "is surely as strange a perversion of ingenuity as was ever invented by an unscrupulous lawyer to defend a position utterly incapable of any straightforward defence." Declarations such as this would perhaps, in the political world, be called bluster; but I should be sorry to apply such a term to a writer so distinguished in his proper line. Convocation might, as he says, be "impotent to restore that which never had been abolished," but it was not impotent to cancel errors in its own record.

The other horn of his dilemma is even less formidable, as we have the clearest historical proof that the regal or political party did the very things which Mr. Mivart says they might safely, and did, forbear from doing. It is an elementary fact of our history that high importance was attached to the action of the Convocations. The King thought it important, for he pressed for it with eagerness and tenacity, and he personally took up the argument with Tunstal, as he had done with Luther. The clergy thought it important, for they resolutely refused certain forms (even while under the threat of *præmunire*), and agreed only when their scruples had been met. Finally the Legislature* thought it impor-

* 24 Hen. VIII. c. 12, 1832.

tant, for the Statute of Appeals was framed in complete accordance with it, and the Statute of Headship* recited it in its preamble. I do not deny for a moment that Henry, in his later proceedings, rode roughshod over the constitution of the Church, both as an historic institution and as a Christian society; but irregularities of government are one thing, formal legislation is another. The legislative proceedings of the reign of Mary were confined to the civil sphere; and, if we view its administration as a whole, nothing in the entire picture is more curious than its highly Erastian character.

There is indeed an argument not yet noticed, which respect for its author forbids me wholly to pass by. Mr. Morris† holds that a statement *parenthetically made* cannot be a legal enactment, and that if it were found in the sentence of a judge it would only be an *obiter dictum*. There seems here to be much confusion. An *obiter dictum*, as I understand it, is an opinion beside the purpose of the instrument in which the opinion is given, and is more commonly found in a speech than in a formal sentence. The question whether this or that were an *obiter dictum* would not be in the smallest degree affected by its being inside or outside of brackets. What a parenthesis contains is grammatically capable of severance from the sentence in which it is found, but its contents have as full force in regard to their substance as if there were no use of parenthetical signs at all. To say that the assertion is beside the purpose of the instrument is to beg the question what was the purpose; whether the purpose was the single one of

* 26 Hen. VIII. c. 1, 1534.

† *Dublin Review*, p. 248.

granting the subsidy, or the double one of accepting the supremacy together with the grant of the subsidy. The form of expression is "recognoscimus." It declares, but it does not create, for the province of Canterbury could not create an attribute for the King of the realm, nor could it put forward in the character of a novelty what it meant to recognise as having existed from immemorial time.

In opposition to the argument of unimportance, which seems to me the strangest of all contentions ever imported into this part of our constitutional history, I will in conclusion give some proofs that the Convocational proceeding now directly in question was one of great weight and significance.

First, the Recognition of 1531 was an Act of unusual importance and solemnity, because it was not the mere establishment of a certain legal doctrine which might be affirmed to-day and denied to-morrow, and which was without authority both before the affirmation and after the denial; but it was the assertion and the recognition of a prerogative descended from immemorial time, in lawful existence before as well as after the enactment. In order to get rid of the judicial effect of such an enactment as this, its repeal was necessary; but further, its mere repeal would have been insufficient.

We have an analogous case of great interest in the civil legislation of the eighteenth century, which explains my meaning and, I think, irrefragably confirms my position.

In the year 1719 a declaratory Act was passed in England, which asserted the right of Parliament to make laws for the government of Ireland. In 1782 this Act was repealed. But the repeal did not satisfy

the vigilance of Irish patriotism. Flood argued, that the withdrawal of this particular assertion of the right did not destroy the right itself, nor preclude its reassertion. His argument prevailed; and in the year 1783 another Act was passed to assert the contradictory of the proposition contained in the Act of 1719. This fresh Act declared that the sole right of making laws for Ireland resided in the King, Lords, and Commons of Ireland.

So also it ought to have been in the sixteenth century, in order to make good the argument of my assailants. There ought to have been both a repeal of the express assertion made by the Convocation of 1531 for the present existence of a certain right, and a contradiction of the far more important implied assertion that it had always existed. There was neither the one nor the other.

Secondly, the Act of 1531 derived a special importance from the authority and weight of the men who concurred in passing it. Warham has received the glowing eulogium of Erasmus. Tunstal, "a spirit without spot," was a person of eminent learning and ability, and one of the best men of the sixteenth century. High praise was bestowed upon him in the sermon preached at his funeral after the Elizabethan settlement; and his protestation on behalf, not of the Pope but of the Church in the Northern Convocation, shows the courage as well as the deliberation with which he acted. The Recognition had the subsequent adhesion of Gardiner, who became a bishop in December, 1531. He was one of the great statesmen of England, and to him we owe it that foreign influences did not much more largely predominate in the council of Mary. As to Fisher, I

will only further say that already in the year 1530 he had been imprisoned for his conduct in defence of the Church,* and he had declared himself ready to die rather than assent to the divorce. This declaration of his (writes the secretary who served Campeggio †) has created a great stir, for he is in such repute that his opposition would be fatal to the dissolution of the marriage.

It may be said that Warham before his death in 1532 made a notarial protestation on behalf of the Church of Canterbury, the Church of England, and the See of Rome. But this protestation, which did not *nominatim* point to anything that had been done, was expressly confined to statutes of the realm. ‡ It did not include Convocational Acts; and, as we know from the case of Tunstal that there was a power of protesting in such cases, we are obliged to infer that Warham to the last saw nothing in the recognition of 1531 which he desired to retract or qualify.

Thirdly, this act of Convocation is of special authority, because it and it alone among the critical proceedings of the sixteenth century emanates from a Convocation which had not been tampered with. The Convocations of Edward the Sixth, of Mary, and of Elizabeth had been altered in their composition by the imprisonment or deprivation of obnoxious persons before they were put into motion. They differ from the Convocation of 1531, as the Long Parliament after the application of Pride's purge differs from the Long Parliament before

* Bridgett's 'Life of Blessed John Fisher,' pp. 183, 190.

† 'Monumenta Vaticana' (Lämmer), pp. 33, 34.

‡ Wilkins, iii. 746.

it. They were, in fact, packed Convocations ; while the Convocation of 1531 consisted entirely of persons, who had attained their respective places in regular course, and without reference to the controversies of the day, or the exigencies of political convenience.

VIII.

PROFESSOR HUXLEY AND THE SWINE- MIRACLE.*

1891.

THE controversy, in which this paper has to take its place, arose out of a statement, indeed a boast, as I understood it, by Professor Huxley,† that the adepts in natural science were assailing the churches with weapons of precision, and that their opponents had only antiquated and worthless implements to employ in the business of defence. I took upon me to impeach at certain points the precision of the Professor's own weapons.‡ Upon one of those points, the miracle of the swine at Gadara, as recorded in the Gospels, he had given us assumption instead of proof upon what he thinks the vital question, whether the keeping of the swine was an innocent and lawful occupation. He has now offered an elaborate attempt at proof that such was its character. The smallest indication of such an attempt in the original article would have sufficed entirely to alter

* Reprinted from the *Nineteenth Century*.

† *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1890, p. 22.

‡ 'Impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture,' p. 260.

the form of my observation, which would then have been what it will now be; not that he offers no argument, but that his argument is unsound from the beginning to the end.

Of that considerable portion of his article which is devoted to sneers, imputations, and lectures for my profit, I shall take no notice whatever. The question of my guilt or innocence is too insignificant, and even the question whether Mr. Huxley does or does not always use weapons of precision might hardly warrant a prolongation of the warfare. But the personal action of our Lord appertains to the basis of the Christian revelation, and to impugn it successfully in any point is to pierce the innermost heart of every Christian. No inquiry, therefore, can be too painstaking which helps to carry such a question to a conclusive issue.

I must, however, in passing, make the confession that I did not state with accuracy, as I ought to have done, the precise form of the accusation. I treated it as an imputation on the action of our Lord: Mr. Huxley replies that it is only an imputation on the narrative of three Evangelists respecting Him. The difference from his point of view is probably material, and I therefore regret that I overlooked it. From the standing ground of those who receive the Scriptures, it is not so considerable. That Christ, who is not only the object of imitation, love, and worship, but the very food and life of Christians, is the Christ of the Gospels. In a sense relative yet not untrue, they may almost be called "the brightness of His glory and the express image of His person."* If the Gospels are put on their trial as

* Heb. i. 3.

literary documents, and if a legitimate though mordent criticism can successfully impugn any portion of them, we cannot complain, and must take our chance. But when their contents are summarily condemned and rejected on a charge of intrinsic unworthiness and immorality, upon no higher authority than that of the private judgment of this or that individual, then, and so long as we are dealing with a portion of the attested portraiture, an arraignment of them becomes, at least in my view, more hard to distinguish from an arraignment of Him whom they pourtray. Told, and told in detail, by all the three Synoptics, the miracle of the demoniac and the swine does not well bear severance from the staple of the biography. Nor, indeed, is it so severed by Mr. Huxley,* who frankly treats it as involving at large the authority of the Synoptic Gospels. In itself, it is undoubtedly of the utmost significance, on account of the questions which it raises. One of these is the large subject of demoniacal possession, on which I do not presume to enter. Another is whether our Saviour in answering the prayer of the evil spirits by "saying unto them, Go," became a co-operator in the destruction of the swine. This has been contested, but I pass by the contest, and for argument's sake at least admit the affirmative. Then there remains the further question; whether the beneficent ministry of our Lord on earth included in this instance the infliction of heavy injury upon certain individuals, the owners, or keepers and owners, of the swine, by the destruction of their property lawfully and innocently held?

Mr. Huxley observes that the Evangelists do not

* *Nineteenth Century*, December, 1890, p. 968.

betray any consciousness of the moral and legal difficulties involved in the question. But if the Evangelists believed that our Lord was dealing in this case with Hebrews, or with persons bound by the law of Moses, then for them, believers in the Messiah, there was no legal or moral difficulties at all.

There are, indeed, those who have been content to rest the case on the absolute right of the Deity to deal at will with the property of the creatures whom He has made. "Of thine own have we given Thee!" Commentators are far from uniform.* But, as it appears to me, the question does not come before us quite in this shape. Apart from any such contention, it is no trivial inquiry whether we have to record in this case the existence of an exception to the general character of our Lord's ministry, which was both beneficent and law-abiding. So far as regards the taking of animal life, the matter need not be discussed. It was life destined to be taken, taken by violence and probably with greater pain. It may have been, undoubtedly, the highest practical assertion of power, which is recorded by the Evangelists. But there is a remaining question, namely, whether this assertion of power was such as to involve serious injury to the proprietary rights of innocent persons. This is the character which Professor Huxley stamps upon the narrative; justly, as he thinks, but, as I hold, in defiance of historical authority, and of the laws of rational and probable interpretation. I cannot, however, but agree with him on two points which appear to be important: namely, first, that the excision

* Consult Cornelius à Lapide, and his references to others, on Matt. viii. 28-34. Thomas Scott's commentary is worthy of notice.

on moral grounds of this narrative from the Synoptic Gospels affects their credit as a whole, and, secondly, that it is material to know whether the act recorded involved the infliction of a heavy penalty upon conduct in itself innocent.

The first question that arises in approaching this inquiry is, where did the miracle take place? And I do not well understand how Mr. Huxley, or his authorities, have so readily arrived at the conclusion that the very existence of any place named Gergesa is very questionable.* Origen was a learned man, of critical mind, and he resided for a large part of his life in Palestine, and travelled there only two centuries after the time of our Lord.† He tells us expressly these three things:—

1. That there was an ancient city named Gergesa on the Lake of Tiberias.

2. That, bordering on the water, there was a precipitous descent, which it appears, or is proved (*δείκνυται*), that the swine descended.

3. That Gadara is indeed a city of Judæa, with very famous baths, but has no precipitous ground in the vicinity of water.‡

This statement from such a source, at such a date, appears to require a treatment much more careful than the dictum that the existence of Gergesa is “very questionable.” I admit, however, my obligation under the circumstances to inquire also, and fully, into the case of Gadara.

Let me now summarily point out what I conceive to

* *Nineteenth Century*, December, 1890, p. 972.

† See also McClellan's ‘New Testament,’ on Matt. viii. 28, for the testimony of St. Jerome.

‡ Orig. ‘Comment. in Joann.’ p. 145.

be the main sources of error, which, taken together, vitiate the entire argument of Professor Huxley.

1. Throughout the paper he confounds together what I had distinguished, namely, the city of Gadara and the vicinage attached to it, not as a mere *pomœrium*, but as a rural district.

2. He more fatally confounds the local civil government and its following, including, perhaps, the whole wealthy class and those attached to it, with the ethnical character of the general population.

3. His one item of direct evidence as to the Gentile character of the city refers only to the former and not to the latter.

4. He fatally confounds the question of political party with those of nationality and of religion, and assumes that those who took the side of Rome in the factions that prevailed could not be subject to the Mosaic law.

5. His examination of the text of Josephus is alike one-sided, inadequate, and erroneous.

6. Finally, he sets aside, on grounds not critical or historical, but purely subjective, the primary historical testimony on the subject, namely that of the three Synoptic Evangelists, who write as contemporaries, and deal directly with the subject, neither of which is done by any other authority.

7. And he treats the entire question, in the narrowed form in which it arises upon secular testimony, as if it were capable of a solution so clear and summary as to warrant the use of the extremest weapons of controversy against those who presume to differ from him.

Our main question, then, is the lawfulness and innocence of the employment of the swineherds. The ethnical character of Gadara and of its district derives

its interest from its relation to that main question. In my opinion, not formed without an attempt at full examination, there is no historical warrant for doubting that the swineherds were persons bound by the Mosaic law. In the opinion of Mr. Huxley,* "the proof that Gadara was, to all intents and purposes, a Gentile and not a Jewish city, is complete." And, again,† Gadara was, "for Josephus, just as much a Gentile city as Ptolemais." Utterly contesting these two propositions, I make two admissions: first, that one or more of the many and sparse references of Josephus may easily mislead a prepossessed and incomplete inquirer; and secondly, that in the territory of Gadara, and in various other parts of Palestine, it would be a mistake to look for a perfectly homogeneous population either Hebrew or Gentile.

Outside the text of Josephus, Professor Huxley adduces but a single fact in support of his allegations concerning Gadara—the fact, namely, that its coinage was Gentile. But coinage is essentially, and is most of all in a conquered country, the work of the governors, wholly apart from the governed. To say that the Gadarenes "adopted the Pompeian era on their coinage,"‡ out of gratitude, must almost be a jest. If Pompey re-annexed Gadara to the Syrian province,§ it is most improbable that he should have altered its laws respecting religion. Mr. Huxley supposes this change was popular as a restoration of Roman authority. But, had he consulted the text of Josephus, he would have seen it was approved, because the cities were restored

* *Nineteenth Century*, p. 973. † *Ibid.* p. 974.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 973. § Josephus, 'de Bell. Jud.' i. 7, 7.

by him to the "Home Rule" of their own proper inhabitants.

I. THE REVOLTED JEWS.

Mr. Huxley comes nearer to the point when he touches the text of Josephus,* on which, indeed, apart from the Synoptic Evangelists, we have chiefly to depend. He deals with the passages found in the 18th chapter of Book II. of the "Judaic War." Now, these passages are most dangerous and seductive to those of his opinion, because, if severed from other passages, they would prove his point: on one condition, however, namely this, that we admit what is, indeed, his master fallacy, to be sound in logic and in fact.

He says† that the revolted Jews are stated by Josephus to have laid waste the villages of the Syrians, "and their neighbouring cities, and after them Gadara and Hippos." He then cites from Section 5 the passage which states that Scythopolis, Askelon, Ptolemais, and Tyre slew or put in prison great numbers of Jews. "Those of Hippos and those of Gadara did the like; as did the remaining cities of Syria." And hereupon Professor Huxley assumes that his case is proved: *causa finita est*.

And so, perhaps, it might be were we to adopt what I have termed his master fallacy. That master fallacy is his assumption as to the cleavage of the Palestinian communities. According to him, all that was anti-Roman was Jewish or Hebrew, and all that acted on the other side was Gentile. Where, as in Tyre or Ptolemais,

* *Nineteenth Century*, p. 974.

† *Ibid.* on 'Bell Jud.' ii. 18, 1.

the population generally is known to have been Gentile, this assumption would, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be a fair one. Such, in Mr. Huxley's view, was the case of Gadara, where the Jews were only local immigrants, like the inhabitants of a Ghetto.* But this is just what he ought to prove; and it is not proved by showing either that those Jews who were in revolt attacked a part of the Gadarite population, or that the Gadarite population afterwards did the like to some Jews among themselves. For the whole text of Josephus testifies that the Jews, as often happens in a case where foreign domination exists over a people of high nationalism, were sharply divided among themselves on the point of resistance. There were among them Roman and anti-Roman factions; ardent spirits always disposed to rise, and spirits more sluggish and pacific, who were either indifferent or indisposed to run the risk. Further, the strife between these sometimes went to blood, and not unfrequently placed the same community on different sides at different times. This, undoubtedly, I have to prove. I will first illustrate it by various cases including even Jerusalem itself, and will afterwards show that, if we wish to make sense and not nonsense out of Josephus, we must apply the same ideas to Gadara, which besides, in all likelihood, had some mixture of population, and classes possessed of wealth and influence, which were sure to take the Roman or anti-national side.

I must first, however, observe that Mr. Huxley has quoted the text of Josephus inaccurately. As he has cited it, the revolted Jews proceeded at Gadara and

* *Nineteenth Century*, p. 974.

Hippos as they had done in the cities of Syria that he had previously mentioned. But what Josephus says * is that they devastated (wholesale as it were) these Syrian cities, and that then, proceeding against Gadara and Hippos (which meant territories and not mere cities), they burned some places, and reduced to submission (not the rest but) others ; thus pointing to those differences of local faction, class, or race, in the different neighbourhoods, which Mr. Huxley overlooks.

Sepphoris, the chief city of Galilee, and the strongest, exhibits those anomalies of political position which belonged to a conquered, disturbed, and variously divided country. It was one of the five great Hebrew centres, which Gabinius chose to be the seats of Sanhedrims.† After the death of Herod, it was taken and destroyed by the Romans, and the population reduced to slavery. Subsequently it was re-peopled. When Vespasian invaded Palestine, it asked and obtained from him a Roman garrison,‡ as it had also received Cestius Gallus with acclamations not long before.§ Yet, nearly at the same period, and probably between these two occasions, when Josephus was engaged in preparing Galilee for defence, by fortifying at the proper points, he left Sepphoris to raise its own walls,|| because while it was rich it was also so zealous for the war. Later on, Sepphoris was required to give hostages to the Romans¶ at the very time when it was exposed to the jealousy and hostility of the Jews. Thus the same city, according to local fluctuations, was the partisan to-day of one side, to-morrow of the other. A

* 'Bell. Jud.' ii. 18, 5. † 'Antiq.' xiv. 5, 4; 'Bell. Jud.' i. 8, 5.

‡ *Ibid.* § *Ibid.* ii. 18, 11. || *Ibid.* ii. 20, 6. ¶ 'Vita,' c. 8.

clear comprehension of this shifting character in the local facts is vitally necessary for a sound judgment on the case before us.

Again, Gamala,* on the Sea of Tiberias, adhered at this time to Rome; a little later we find it one of the last and most obstinate strongholds of Judaism against Vespasian.† Further, Gabara, as I shall presently show, exhibited similar variations.

In truth, as Milman says,‡ “every city was torn to pieces by little animosities; wherever the insurgents had time to breathe from the assaults of the Romans, they turned their swords against each other.” It was in Jerusalem most of all that these bloody factions raged; they were exasperated by the arrival of strangers; the peace parties shed the blood of the warlike, and the war parties of the peaceful.§ In truth, such had long been the condition of that city, that Vespasian advisedly postponed the commencement of his operations for fear lest he should extinguish the local feuds, which, as he saw, were wasting the strength of the rebels, and should compel them to unite together.||

It is, then, quite conceivable that when Josephus says the revolted Jews burned some places and subjugated or kept down others in Gadaris, he means to speak of places where the peace party, which might be Jewish or not Jewish, predominated; and when he says the Hippenes and the Gadarenes acted against the Jews, he probably means that the Jews of the war party were put down by antagonists averse to war, though of their own race, as much as, and even possibly more than, by

* ‘Vita,’ c. 11. † Milman, ‘Hist. Jews,’ ii. 280–284. ‡ *Ibid.* ii. 290.
§ *Ibid.* ii. 315 *seqq.* || *Ibid.* ii. 305.

Gentile portions of the population. This, I have said, is a conceivable opinion. But, in order to justify what I have said of the argument of Professor Huxley, I must show that it is an opinion not only conceivable, but warranted, and even required, by a consideration of the whole evidence on the record. That is the best conclusion, which best meets all the points of the case. The conclusion reached by Professor Huxley leaves Josephus in hopeless contradiction to himself.

For I shall now proceed to show that Gadara or Gadaris, first, was an important centre of Jewish population, by which I mean population subject to the Mosaic law; secondly, was a recognised seat of Jewish military strength; and thirdly, according to Josephus himself, acknowledged the law of Moses as its local public law, and was bound to obey it.

II. THE ORDINANCE OF GABINIUS.

Mr. Huxley places great reliance on the "classical" work of Dr. Schürer,* which treats of the history of the Jewish people in the time of our Lord. And certainly a high tribute to it is due from him, as it seems to have supplied nearly all his material for the history and character of Gadara; except, indeed, the exaggeration of the terms in which he describes them. It may, perhaps, be questioned whether a work, of which one half bears dates so recent as 1889 and 1890, can yet have fully earned the title of a classical work. I do not, however, presume to question its ability and research.

* 'Geschichte des jüdischen Volks im Zeitalter Jesu Christi,' Leipzig, 1886-90.

On the other hand, without detracting from its general character, I cannot assume it to be precise and conclusive upon every one of those complicated local histories of Palestinian towns, among which Gadara has to be reckoned. Nor can I help embracing the opinion that he is (in the case before us) over-fond of giving the go-by to a difficulty by altering the text of his authority, so as to make it conform to the view he has adopted. No less than five times,* upon this very limited subject, does he accept or propose this method of proceeding. At the same time, he altogether passes by phrases, and even passages, of Josephus, which are of real, and, in one or more cases, even of capital importance.

Let the reader test what I have said, in the first place, by reference to the weighty statement of the Jewish historian as to the Sanhedrims of Gabinius.

Soon after the conquest by Pompey, who had himself given proof of his moderation and regard for the religion of a conquered people, Gabinius became administrator of the Roman power ; and he divided Palestine into five regions, for the purpose of administering the Jewish law in each of them, through an assembly of elders termed Sanhedrim ; possibly also with a view to the easier and more effective collection of the Roman tribute.

Of these regions, according to the text as it stands, one had Gadara for its centre ; the others being Jerusalem, Sepphoris, Jericho, and Amathus. The measure, and the name of Gadara, are mentioned in two separate passages. Here we have to all appearance a pretty flat contradiction to the theory that Gadara was

* 'Antiq.' xiii. 13, 5 (Schürer, ii. 91); *ibid.* xiv. 5, 4; 'Bell. Jud.' i. 8, 5; *ibid.* iii. 7, 1; 'Vita,' c. 15.

a Greek or a Gentile city. Accordingly, says Mr. Huxley,* Schürer has "pointed out" that what Gabinius really did was to lodge one of these (the Sanhedrims) in Gazara, "far away on the other side of the Jordan." Under this facile phrase of "pointing out" is signified the deliberate alteration of the text, which inconveniently asserts not only in two separate passages, but in two separate works,† that the place selected was not Gazara, but Gadara. Without doubt any theory can be established with ease, if we are free thus to bend the original text into conformity with its demands. In this instance that text contains, as we shall see, a specific statement, which, as Mr. Huxley must have found if he had referred to Josephus, made it manifestly impossible that he could have written Gazara in these two places.

I confess that Dr. Schürer appears to me to have seriously misapprehended in some degree the spirit of this measure as well as the facts, when he says‡ that it involved the abolition of whatever residue of political independence had thus long remained to Palestine, because Hyrcanus was now deprived of his temporal and confined to his priestly power. If we examine the matter according to the reason of the case, it was probably a great gain to the population to have the Mosaic law administered at its own doors by its own local leaders rather than by a priest-king sitting at a distance in Jerusalem. If we test it by the general spirit of the policy of this proconsul, we are led to suppose it friendly, because with it there was combined the rebuilding of some cities which had been overthrown.

* *Nineteenth Century*, p. 973.

† 'Antiq.' xiv. 5, 4; 'Bell. Jud.' i. 8, 5.

‡ 'Gesch.' i. 276.

If we follow the authority of Josephus, we are bound to take it as a measure altogether favourable to Jewish liberties ; for, he says,* “ thus the Jews were liberated from dynastic rule, and remained under the government of their local heads ” (ἐν ἀριστοκρατείᾳ διήγον).

Since the text, as it stands, entirely overthrows the doctrine that Gadara was a Gentile city, the propounders of that theory can only meet their difficulty by altering it, although they must surely feel that to mutilate the text of two independent works is a remedy not daring only, but rather desperate.

But, independently of the confirmatory witness of a double text, Josephus cannot have written Gazara, for, if he had done so, he would have committed the absurd error of contradicting himself in the very sentence in which he wrote it.

Gazara is not only “ far on the other side of Jordan.” We are dealing with the north-east of the country, and Gazara is in the extreme south-west. Josephus says expressly that Gabinius divided the country into five *equal* districts. Now the old kingdom of Judæa may be taken roughly as one-third of Palestine. Samaria was probably excluded : even if it were not, the case is not greatly altered. For the emendation thus “ pointed out ” entirely overthrows the equality of the districts. It gives to Judæa three out of the five Sanhedrims, and, leaving Amathus for the country beyond Jordan, assigns to Sepphoris alone the Galilees and Decapolis, or a territory about as large as that given to the three southern centres conjointly.

It can hardly be necessary to observe that, besides

* ‘ Antiq.’ xiv. 5, 4.

this fatal objection, Gazara seems to be disqualified by its geographical remoteness near the south-western border, and perhaps also by comparative historical insignificance.

The emendation, then, has to be committed *emendaturis ignibus*, for contradicting not only the authentic record, but also itself; and the twice-repeated testimony of Josephus stands intact, showing that, shortly after the time of Pompey, Gadara was chosen for a purpose which obviously required, and which therefore establishes its being, a great centre of Hebrew or Mosaic population.

III. MILITARY IMPORTANCE.

Having shown that Gadara was important as a centre of population which was either Jewish in blood or governed by the Jewish law, I will next show that Gadara was also formidable as a seat of Jewish military power. The time came when Vespasian had to contemplate operations against Jerusalem. And now, says Josephus,* "it was necessary for him to subdue what remained unsubdued, and to leave nothing behind him which might prevent his prosecution of the siege."

Accordingly, he marched to the point of danger. This was Gadara, the strong metropolis of Peræa, which had once, against Jannæus, stood a siege of ten months. The rich, who were numerous there, escaping the notice of their opponents, had invited him. On the approach of Vespasian, the party disposed to war found itself (and no wonder) in a minority, and fled; but not till

* 'Bell. Jud.' iv. 7, 3.

they had massacred Dolesus, the author of the invitation to the Roman general. In their absence, the people received Vespasian with acclamations. But they pulled down the walls of their own accord: and he then left with them a garrison of horse and foot to defend them against the return of the expelled party. Why were the walls pulled down, except to prevent the population from holding the city against the Romans? Why, although the wealthy and the local governing power was friendly, yet was a Roman garrison left behind, but because the dominant force in the city, apart from foreign intervention, was a Hebrew or anti-Roman, and not a Gentile, force? And does not this passage, even if it stood alone, abundantly suffice to show that, whatever the division of parties may have been, Gadara was not, "to all intents and purposes, a Gentile city"? It was a city from which Vespasian apprehended an attack in his rear; and to prevent this he makes it an open city, and leaves a force in it in order that his partisans might continue to have the upper hand.

But let us not suppose that these partisans were necessarily Gentiles. I must again press the proposition that the Jews of that era, or the populations observing the Mosaic law, were largely divided into peace party and war party, and that we may find a peace party acting with the Gentiles against their fellow-countrymen, in order to avoid the alternative of war. I will now refer to a passage which shows this in a manner quite conclusive. Gischala* appears to have been a city of the extreme war party, though it, too, had partisans of peace. However, it broke away, and was

* Josephus, 'Vita,' c. x.

in consequence assailed and destroyed by a composite force of Tyrians, Sogarenes, Gadarenes, and Gabarenes. It seems quite natural that the Tyrians, a Gentile people, should actively maintain the Roman domination. And the Gabarenes on this occasion acted with them. Shall this prove Gabara to be a Gentile city? Certainly not: for Gabara was a Galilæan, and, as Mr. Huxley himself sees, a thoroughly Jewish city, and yet it shared in the overthrow of Gischala. There cannot be a clearer proof that, in certain cases, it was not the question of religion or race that determined the balance of opinion and the action of the community, but the question of war or peace. I rely, then, on the strategical movement of Vespasian to show that Gadara, an important centre of Jewish population, was also in the main an important seat of Jewish military strength; most of all, perhaps, as being the centre at which the rural population of Gadaris would muster for war in case of emergency.

IV. THE JEWISH LAW IN GADARIS.

Although, in inquiries of this kind, we may speak of Jewish or Hebrew populations, as Dean Milman does, to describe generally those who were adverse to the Roman power, the expressions are not quite satisfactory, because, in themselves, they involve a condition of race; whereas, to say nothing of those descendants of the ancient Canaanites who had conformed to Judaism, we find that the Mosaic law was imposed at the time of which we treat, as a consequence of conquest, if not on Gentile yet on what were in some sense mixed populations. And the real question in respect to the

Gadarene territory is not exclusively whether the population were of Hebrew extraction, but also, and indeed mainly, whether they were Jewish as being bound by the Jewish law: or, as I should like to call it, whether they were a Mosaic population. To this question let us now further look.

According to Origen,* Gadara was simply a city of Judæa. According to Josephus in one passage, it was a Grecian city, as were Hippos and Gaza.† But in another place he includes it in a great group of cities which were Syrian, Idumæan, or Phœnician,‡ and he then places it in the Syrian subdivision of that group. We are guided by the nature of the case to the meaning of these two last-named designations. There was no properly Hellenic element reckoned in the population of the country,§ though there must have been a sprinkling of Greeks concerned in the administration of the kingdoms founded by Alexander's generals. As there were Phœnicians in the earliest Hellas, so now there were important Hellenic settlers in Asia, and, without doubt, a larger number of Hellenised Asiatics. In connection with the name of Gadaris, Strabo|| enumerates a few Greek individuals of some distinction. The case has been sufficiently explained by Grote,¶ who allows as the characteristics of what was, he thinks improperly, called Hellenism, in the kingdoms after Alexander, the common use of Greek speech, a certain proportion of Greeks, both as inhabitants and as officers, and a partial streak of Hellenic culture. This flavour of Hellenism would

* 'In Joann.' p. 141.

† 'Antiq.' xiii. 15, 4.

|| *Ibid.* xvi. 2, 29.

† 'Bell. Jud.' ii. 6, 3.

§ Strabo, xvi. 2.

¶ 'Hist. of Greece,' xii. 362-7.

be found rather at central spots than in the country at large. At Gadara it might be sustained by the baths, which probably made it a place of fashionable resort. But in this qualified or diluted sense, the name of Grecian was applied both to the Syrian and the Egyptian powers,* and the Rescript of Augustus respecting religion accordingly describes Judæa as having suffered grievously from Greek cruelty. Politically, Gadara with Hippos and Gaza † were given to Herod, and after his death, on the division of his dominions, they were re-annexed to Syria. But these were administrative changes, made without any effect, so far as appears, on the laws and religion of the country. Very different was the change which ensued when, from having been a Syrian city, ‡ it was acquired by Alexander Jannæus for Judæa. § My opponent has overlooked the capital fact, that what Judæa acquired or recovered by conquest was thereupon placed under the Mosaic law. In Samaria, we may safely assume that it was there already when Jannæus conquered it. When Idumæa was subdued by his father Hyrcanus, || that law was established, and the people were at once circumcised. In the case now before us the statement, though indirect, is equally conclusive. When Josephus enumerates ¶ the cities conquered by Jannæus, Pella closes the list. But Pella,

* 'Antiq.' xvi. 6, 2.

† 'Bell. Jud.' ii. 5, 3; 'Antiq.' xvii. 11, 4.

‡ Mr. Huxley says, "It is said to have been destroyed by its captors." It is not so stated by Josephus in his account of the conquest. But it seems to have undergone some reverse before the time of Pompey (B.C. 65), by whose favour it was restored.

§ 'Antiq.' xiii. 15, 4.

|| Milman, 'Hist. Jews,' ii. 28; 'Bell. Jud.' xix. 9, 1.

¶ 'Antiq.' xiii. 15, 4.

he adds, they destroyed, because the inhabitants would not submit to the Mosaic law (τὰ πάτρια τῶν Ἰουδαίων εἶθι). It is plain therefore that the other cities, of which Gadara was one, remained intact, because they allowed the law of Moses to become the law of the land.

Alexander Jannæus died in B.C. 79. But there is not, so far as I know, the smallest evidence that the law was altered here, any more than in Galilee or Judæa, before the time of our Saviour. Mr. Huxley indeed again and again assumes the contrary,* but without citing a single authority, or even taking notice of the testimony from Josephus which I have here given; and it is in the light of this passage that we have to consider the establishment of the Sanhedrim by Gabinius. He says, indeed (without any reference), that the only laws of Gadara were the Gentile laws sanctioned by the Roman suzerain.† Now we know something of the proceedings of the Roman suzerain in the time of Augustus, with regard to the Jews, not of Judæa merely, but of Asia at large and of Cyrenais, who appealed to Cæsar against what they termed Greek oppression.‡ The answer commends the fidelity of the Jews; it especially lauds Hyrcanus, the actual high priest; and then grants to the Jews without limit the full enjoyment of their own peculiar laws, after the manner of their fathers, as they were enjoying them under Hyrcanus, the high priest. This charter of continuance for the Mosaic law where it prevailed is issued during the lifetime of Herod the Great, and before the re-annexation of Gadara to the Syrian province. I can hardly suppose, however, that any one would assign

* *Nineteenth Century*, pp. 977-8.

† *Ibid.* p. 977.

‡ Josephus, 'Antiq.' xvi. 6, 1, 2.

to that merely administrative change the effect of altering the religious law of the country, a matter in which the general rule of Roman policy was that of resolute non-interference.

I conceive, then, that the conquest of Jannæus, together with the measures of Gabinius, leave no reasonable ground for doubting that the law established in Gadara at that period was the Mosaic law; and also that the Rescript of Augustus confirms this proposition. But confirmation is not required. If the religious system of the Jews was established there in the time of Gabinius, we must assume its continuance until we find it changed. Of such a change there is not, I believe, any sign before the time of our Lord.

V. STRABO.

Were it only on account of his general authority, we must not omit to notice the particulars which Strabo has supplied with respect to Gadaris. He has indeed fallen into undeniable confusion as to geographical arrangement, yet not so as to hide the real effect of some important statements.

In proceeding southwards along the Syrian coast, Strabo* places Gadaris next to Joppa; then comes Azotus, Ascalon, and Gaza. From Gadara proceeded five persons with Grecian names, of whom he gives a list. Now this Gadara has points of contact with the Gadara of the north, first because he speaks of it as Gadaris, a territory and not only a town; secondly, because the Greeks whom he names are known to have

* Strabo, xvi. 2, p. 759.

sprung from Gadara of Peræa.* Let us now try to clear up this matter.

Proceeding from Gaza towards Pelusium, he introduces the Sirbonian Lake or morass; † but, in describing by characteristic details the nature of its waters, he gives them properties which, copied from Diodorus, render it an accurate account of the Dead Sea; except that he assigns to it only 200 stadia in length, and makes it stretch along the sea coast, which agrees with the Sirbonian Lake, while the length of the Dead Sea nearly reaches forty miles. ‡ He was in fact almost wholly ignorant of the interior; and, as he confounded the Dead Sea with the Sirbonian Lake, he probably also confounded the Lake of Tiberias with the Dead Sea, both being on the line of the Jordan; and thus was led to bring Gadaris into geographical relation with it and with the coast.

The chief importance, however, of his account is to be found in a third point of contact with the true Gadaris which it presents. He describes the appropriation of this territory by a remarkable phrase. The Jews, he says, ἐξιδιάσαντο, made it conform to their own model; thus supporting emphatically the account drawn above from Josephus respecting the introduction of the Jewish law into the district.

It seems possible that Strabo may have been in part misled by the name of Gazara, which was in this part of Palestine, and which had likewise been Judaised upon a military conquest.

* Schürer, ii. 91.

† Strabo, p. 763.

‡ Williams in Smith's 'Dict.'

VI. GADARA AND GABARA.

Vespasian, in commencing his campaign of A.D. 67, came from Antioch to Ptolemais to unite his force with that of Titus. He was there met by a party sent out of Sepphoris,* who obtained from him a Roman garrison. From this centre, all Galilee was laid waste with fire and sword, there being no safety except in the cities fortified by Josephus.† Vespasian then carried his army of overwhelming force across the Galilæan frontier, and encamped there to try the moral effect upon the enemy. It was so powerful that Josephus,‡ who commanded the Jews, withdrew his force to Tiberias, at the extremity of the province.

Hereupon, says our historian,§ Vespasian attacked the city of the Gadarenes, took it at the first assault, as it was not provided with a fighting force, and on his entry slaughtered the inhabitants of military age, for two reasons—one of which was hatred to their race. As the text stands, it proves at least a wide prevalence of Jewish nationality in the city and region of Gadaris.

It is proposed, however, to alter Gadara into Gabara, and the alteration, first suggested by Reland (1714), but not adopted by Hudson (1720) or Cardwell (1837), has received the approval of Schürer, of Milman,|| and of Robinson.¶ I speak of it with respect, out of deference to such authorities. They do not seem to have stated conclusive or even detailed reasons, beyond the remark that, while Gabara may be within fifteen

* 'Bell. Jud.' ii. 2, 4.

† *Ibid.* 6, 2, 3.

|| ii. 243.

† *Ibid.* 4, 1.

§ *Ibid.* 7, 1.

¶ 'Biblical Researches,' iv. 37.

miles of Ptolemais, Gadara is out of Galilee, and more than twice the distance. Professor Huxley has gone much further, and has set forth strategical reasons which he thinks demonstrate that Vespasian's case would have been one truly of demoniacal possession could he have passed by Gabara and marched on to Gadara. For the Roman line of march would have been between Gabara, to the north, and Jotopata, a fortified city in strong position on the south. According to Robinson,* I may observe the distance between the two is only from six to eight Roman miles. Vespasian "could not afford to leave these strongholds in the possession of the enemy,"† and from Gabara "his communications with his base could easily be threatened."

Now this statement is contradicted right and left by the facts. For first, if Gabara be the right reading, it was (and so Milman has stated it) ungarrisoned. Secondly, it was not a stronghold at all; for Josephus tells us that all Galilee was now cruelly devastated with fire and sword by the Romans, and there was nowhere any refuge, except in the cities he had fortified; of which Gabara was not one. Thirdly, in the narrow region between Gabara and Jotopata lay Sepphoris, which was held by the Romans, and was the stronghold from which all Galilee was laid waste. Fourthly, Vespasian, in defiance of his modern instructor, did leave behind him all the twelve or fourteen strong places that Josephus had fortified except one. Fifthly, he did, indeed, march against Jotopata, but for this he had a very strong reason, quite apart from fears about his base, which would under the circumstances have been

* iv. 87 (1852).

† *Nineteenth Century*, p. 976.

chimerical: namely, that the Roman commander, Placidus, had just before failed in an attack upon it, and had been defeated and put to flight under its walls. We may now, I think, bid adieu to the strategy of Professor Huxley.

Many a good cause, however, suffers from the use of bad arguments in its favour. It remains for me to offer, with due submission, some reasons, which appear to me serious, in support of the text as it stands.

1. Josephus says Vespasian attacked "the city of the Gadarenes." So far as I know, he uses this form of expression only when the city is the centre of a district (Gadaris)* named after it. Such was the case of Gadara, but not of Gabara. He does not call Sepphoris the city of the Sepphorites, or Gamala the city of the Gamalenes.

2. He says the place was taken at the first assault; appropriately enough for a fortified place shorn of its garrison, but not appropriate for an open town.

3. Gamala, as part of the open country of Galilee, was already in full subjection to the Romans.

4. If, as we see, Vespasian began his operations by securing Sepphoris, the capital of Galilee, and thereby secured the province, so that the Jewish force fled to Tiberias, was it strange or unnatural that he should as his next operation secure the capital of Peræa to dominate the territory beyond Jordan?

5. The text, as it stands, agrees with Book iv. 7, 3, in testifying to the military importance of Gadara: but the emendation makes Vespasian prefer to Jotopata a place which apparently counted for nothing in military movements.

* 'Bell. Jud.' iii. 3, 1.

VII. TESTIMONY OF THE EVANGELISTS.

Bidding farewell now to the text of Josephus, I do not know that we have much more assistance to expect from secular literature as to Gadara and its district. But a very important light is cast upon it by the Synoptical Gospels, and by the facts of the Old Testament history in their relation to the geographical precinct, which was also in general the ethnical limit, of our Lord's ministry upon earth.

It was, apparently, a part of the providential calling of the race of Abraham that they were to have in the first instance for themselves a distinct and separate offer of the new "glad tidings." Christ was not sent, accordingly, "but to the lost sheep of the House of Israel." It is most interesting to observe how and in what localities this offer took effect.

We naturally look in the first instance to Jerusalem and the country belonging to it. Our Lord was born, as we know, in Judæa; and the scene of the Gospel of St. John, which is in the main confined to Jerusalem and its neighbourhood, and also in the main to a few continuous narratives, is principally laid there. The territory of Samaria was immediately contiguous to that of Judæa, but "the Jews had no dealings"* with the mixed race inhabiting that country, and our Saviour seems never to have exercised there more than what may be termed an accidental ministry. But the Baptism and temptation were in Galilee.† It was there that He commenced His course of miracles.‡ When

* John iv. 9.

† Matt. iii. 1, 13; iv. 1.

‡ John ii. 11.

the wakeful jealousy of the Pharisees made it needful for Him to quit Judæa and repair to Galilee,* “He must needs go through Samaria.” Then came the (so to speak) casual meeting and discourse with the woman of Samaria, to whom He declared that salvation was of the Jews.† Out of the report which she carried away from Him, there grew an invitation of the Samaritans to the Saviour, praying Him to come among them:‡ but He abode with them only two days, and passed on into Galilee. It is wonderful to observe how large a proportion of His ministry was exercised in the north. Nor was it in the neighbourhood of His own city of Nazareth, nor equally diffused over the Galilæan provinces from east to west, but was almost confined, or most largely given, to the eastern district and the close neighbourhood of the Galilæan sea. Here and hereabouts we have the principal specific narratives of the calling of the Apostles,§ to the number, apparently, of six. Here lay the chief scene of our Lord’s active ministry: here was delivered the Sermon on the Mount. It was not only from the eastern or Galilæan side of this sea, but from Decapolis also He was followed by great multitudes;|| and of Decapolis Gadara and its district were an important, and were also the nearest, part. And the fact that our Saviour selected Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum for the denunciation of the woes,¶ on account of the privileges that they had enjoyed, at once denotes the scenes of His habitual preaching, and bears appalling testimony to its rejection.

* John i. 43; ii. 1–11.

† *Ibid.* v. 22.

‡ *Ibid.* v. 40.

§ Matt. iv. 18–22, and John i. 40–51.

|| Matt. iv. 25.

¶ *Ibid.* xi. 21–24; Luke x. 13–15.

Dr. Edersheim places a group of the miracles to the east of the sea of Galilee in "a semi-heathen population,"* lying much beyond Gadara. But he includes the eastern shores of the lake in the country which he describes as the principal seat of Jewish nationalism.† This perhaps was "Galilee of the Gentiles."‡ Nor did our Lord wholly avoid the coasts of Tyre and Sidon,§ where there were Jews in considerable numbers: but the contrast between these towns and those before named proves the comparative rarity of His visits. If they were also rare in Decapolis, "through the midst of the coasts of which"|| He came, we must recollect that this district, constituted under Greek authority, included Damascus and other Gentile cities. We know very well that Hebraic settlement and influence were not in our Lord's time confined to the western side of the Lake of Tiberias; for the town of Gamala¶ on its eastern side (see Robinson's map) was sternly Jewish in the final struggle, which was also sustained by multitudes, so says Josephus, from Peræa as well as other parts of Palestine; Peræa being regularly reckoned as part of Palestine by the Rabbis.**

We need not doubt that there was a variable Syrian infusion in the population of this country. But we have to bear in mind that Gadaris and all its neighbourhood formed part of the old promised land, and that, accordingly, the law of Moses had been in force there from a date running back for a thousand or fifteen hundred years; unless, perhaps, at the comparatively recent

* 'Life and Times of Jesus,' ch. xxxiv.

† *Ibid.* ch. x. vol. i. p. 238.

§ Matt. xv. 21; Mark vii. 24.

¶ Milman, 'Hist. Jews,' ii. 280-6.

‡ Matt. iv. 15; Isa. ix. 1.

|| Mark vii. 31.

** Edersheim, i. 398.

period at which it had been reckoned for a time as a Syrian city. The right general assumption, therefore, is that the large majority, especially of the rural and labouring population, was either of genuinely Hebrew origin, or was drawn from one of those nations of Canaan who were in prior occupation. As to these, the reader of the Sacred Volume must be struck by the contrast between the pre-exilic and the post-exilic times. In the earlier history of Palestine, we are only too much reminded of their presence by the fatal fascinations of their worship. At the later period, when Judaism had set itself firmly against idolatry, they seem to be effaced; and we are left to infer that unless in Samaria, on which they imprinted a hybrid character, they had either quitted the country or had been drawn gradually within the compass of the more substantive religion, and had come to be reckoned in the number of the dominant and more persistent race. Over and above these considerations, and that re-establishment of the Jewish law in the recovered cities, of which notice has already been taken, it is known that, after the two captivities, there was a powerful reflux or reaction of the Hebrew element or race in Northern Palestine, which, perhaps, was the means of establishing the broad distinction between it and Samaria. Dean Milman notices this infusion.* Samaria remained, he observes, in comparative insignificance. But the north became gradually populous, whether from the multiplication of those who had escaped deportation, or from those who returned, with the aid, perhaps, of families belonging to the southern tribes of Judah and Benjamin. We might

* Edersheim, i. 441, 2.

have expected this current of Hebraism partially to repair to the neighbouring district of Samaria, and to the temple on Mount Gerizim; but, on the contrary, the inhabitants worshipped in Jerusalem, followed the fortunes of its ruling power, and fought desperately at the close for the national cause. He speaks in particular of the two Galilees, but the resistance, as Dr. Ederheim has stated, extended beyond them, and it is plain that in a portion, at least, and evidently the nearer portion, of Decapolis, strong nationalism prevailed. And here we may admire the wisdom of Gabinius in providing at Gadara and Sepphoris for the local administration of the law, and thus relieving this great population from much of the inconvenience of dependence on a distant centre at Jerusalem.

Quite apart from the conclusive testimony of Josephus, Mr. Huxley has evidently seen that the Synoptical Gospels, in the narrative of the swine, and in other parts, presuppose the predominance of a Hebrew nationality in the population of Gadaris. He is wise, therefore, in not only rejecting the story, but availing himself of the occasion in order to challenge the general authority of the Gospels. Conversely, all we who acknowledge their historical credit, must feel how improbable it is that our Lord should have carried His ministry into a really Greek or Gentile district on the only one occasion when He thought fit to run counter to the public sentiment, and to give to His action the character of a serious interference with the rights of property. How could He have ventured thus to associate Himself with the destruction of a great herd of swine, if the country was Gentile, and if those swine belonged to persons not bound by the prohibition of the Mosaic law? Might

they not, and would they not, have resorted to the use of force against this unarmed, as well as unauthorised intruder? But what happens is that the swineherds fly; according to all the three Evangelists, they fly; to the city, according to St. Matthew and St. Mark,* which was the seat of authority; and they tell what had happened. Why, then, if this was a land of Gentile rule, and if the swineherds were Gentiles, why was not our Saviour, since His agency was recognised, either assailed by popular violence, or called regularly to account by the law of the land; by that "Hellenic Gadarene law," † with the supposed dominion of which Mr. Huxley pastures his imagination? Instead of this, without the slightest idea of an accusation against our Lord, the population, streaming forth, simply consult for their own temporal interests, and beseech Him to depart out of their coasts.‡

The supply of swine testifies indeed to the existence of a demand. It may probably testify also to the existence of a Gentile class or element in the country. The question, indeed, which relates to the use of pork as an article of diet has by no means that uniformity of colour, outside the Mosaic law, which Professor Huxley assigns to it. But it would be tedious by entering upon it to lengthen a paper already too long, for we may safely allow that among the Syrian Gentiles this diet may have been known, and may not have entailed any legal penalty.

Mr. Huxley concludes the argumentative portion of

* Matt. viii. 34; Mark v. 13.

† *Nineteenth Century*, p. 976.

‡ Matt. viii. 34; Mark v. 17; Luke viii. 37.

his article by insisting that the "party of Galilæans" * were foreigners in the Decapolis, and could have no title, as private individuals, even to vindicate the law. I will not argue the point, which is wholly immaterial to my purpose; and it may not be easy to draw with exactness the line up to which the private person may go of his own motion in supporting established law. I confine myself to the following propositions:—

1. Both from antecedent likelihoods, and from history, there is the strongest reason to believe that the Mosaic law was the public law of Gadaris.

2. Even if it had been relaxed as public law (which it plainly had not), yet those traditionally bound to it would not have been released from the moral obligation of obedience, and all the particulars go to show that the keepers of the swine were thus bound.

3. In the enforcement of a law which bound the conscience, our Lord would have had an authority such as does not belong to the private individual.

4. That the Gadarenes should have deprecated any recurrence of this interference with unlawful gains, is no more wonderful than that the population of the maritime counties of Great Britain should, in the days of our protective tariff, have been favourable to smuggling, and should even have resented, as they did, the interference of conscientious clergymen whose duty it was to denounce the practice.

5. That they should have done no more than ask for our Saviour's departure, affords of itself the strongest presumption that the action in which He co operated, and which was certainly detrimental, was not illegal.

* *Nineteenth Century*, p. 978.

I submit these observations upon an historical subject, complicated by several difficulties, with all respect to those who differ from me. I do not deny that the population of Decapolis was in some sense a mixed population, partially resembling that of Samaria.* But to suppose the swineherds to have been punished by Christ for pursuing a calling which to them was an innocent one, is to run counter to every law of reasonable historic interpretation. I will not assume that I have even now exhausted the subject, though I have not knowingly omitted anything material. But Professor Huxley is so well pleased with his own contentions, that he thinks the occasion one suitable for pointing out the intellectual superiority to which he has been led up by scientific training. I believe that I have overthrown every one of these contentions : but I do not think the achievement such as would warrant my concluding by paying myself a compliment.

* 'Bell. Jud.' iii. 3, 2.

IX.

THE PLACE OF HERESY AND SCHISM IN THE MODERN CHRISTIAN CHURCH.*

1894.

IF Christ our Lord founded the Church as a visible and organised society, by a commission from Himself ; if He did this in the most definite and pointed way by a charge, not to the mass of believers promiscuously, but to the Apostles, whom He had chosen, and whom in many significant ways He designated as His successors in carrying forward the great work of the Incarnation ; and, again, if this charge, far from being limited to the brief term of their personal careers upon earth, was expressly extended by a promise of His superintending presence with them (which could only mean with them and their successors) until the end of the world ; if, finally, this Church was to be the great standing witness in the world for Him and for the recovery of lost mankind ; it follows that a most serious question arose hereupon, which may be described in such terms as these. It relates to the condition of any who, acknowledging His authority, yet should rebel against the jurisdiction then solemnly constituted, should sever themselves, in

* Reprinted from the *Nineteenth Century*.

doctrine or in communion, from His servants, and should presume in this way to impair their witness and to frustrate thereby His work, so far as in them lay.

This question did not escape the forethought of our Saviour, and it was dealt with by Him in the simplest and most decisive manner. "If he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican."* With this stringent law the language of the Apostles coincides, and, most markedly perhaps among them all, the language of St. John, who was especially the Apostle of love. The work of heretics and schismatics was a work of the flesh, and, like other works of the flesh, it excluded from salvation. Thus, in the face of all hostile powers, and under the pressure of its hostility, the unity of the Church was maintained, and she patiently pursued her office through the gloom of this world to the glory of the next.

This I think is a fair account of heresy and schism, according to the view of our Lord and the Apostles. But now there have passed away well nigh two thousand years, and enormous changes have been brought about.

The Church, whose light in Apostolic days was still, so far as regarded the world at large, hidden under a bushel, by degrees became mistress of the social and moral forces which determined the course of human society, and assumed a conspicuous and triumphant position. That cruel overweening world, of which Scripture speaks, waned by degrees and dwindled in her presence, and finally throughout Christendom became absorbed in the mass of baptised believers. But the internal change, though it was great, was not co-extensive

* St. Matt. xviii. 17.

with that on the exterior face. All the elements of evil, which at first had carried on an open warfare with the Church, now wrought against her true life and spirit more subtly from within. The tone of her life was immensely lowered, and her witness for God before the world, which was formerly only compromised by heresy and schism, was now darkened and enfeebled by latent corruption in a thousand forms. She was still, however, the heir of the promises: the obligations of her mission were unchanged. Was she still entitled as before to wield against those who broke away from her creed or her communion, the thunderbolts of the Most High? Without doubt it was still her duty to pray, as she now prays, to be delivered from the evils of heresy and schism; but when her warnings had been slighted, and these evils had come into an existence, not only active but inveterate, was she still bound, was she now even permitted, to act upon the rules and to hold the language of the New Testament against the persons chargeable?

I should be inclined to reply that during such periods as the fourth century, when the wide sway of the Arian opinion often made it matter of doubt where the true Church of Christ, in one place or another, was to be found; or in other words with which of two contending bishops it was a duty to hold communion, this darkening of the evidence modified the moral character of the offence. But on the whole the credentials of the Church did not lose their original clearness, and so long as this was the case, her duties with respect to heresy and schism remained without substantial change, and she was bound not to compromise the safety of her spiritual children by any use of ambiguous language.

Now it has happened in certain cases, and it seems to have come about very gradually since the Advent, that the laws of religion have been modified by circumstance. Nothing can be more broad and sweeping than the denunciations of the Old Testament, against all attempts to embody in images the forms of living creatures. The crime of idolatry ranks in all its pages with the very highest crimes. But it has been urged that, from the time when the Son of God was pleased to assume human form, this law naturally, if insensibly, underwent an essential modification. By far the largest portion of the Christian Church, gives a sanction to the use for religious purposes either of images or of pictures. This use is not wholly excluded from the Churches of the Reformation, as may be seen in Lutheran countries, and especially in Scandinavia. Not that the dangers which beset the employment of images in religion have been wholly removed; but rather that they are now in the class of dangers fit to be guarded against otherwise than by absolute prohibition. It is not now with us as it was at the period when Moses was in Horeb. The world was then generally given to the practice of representing God in images; and in many cases this practice, especially in the East, was associated with purposes unspeakably degrading. The mission of the Hebrew race absolutely required that the Divine idea should be held in sharp severance from every material form. The religion of the God-man has now deprived abuse of every palliation. A new method of procedure has to be adopted, and the mere making of the image or picture, apart from the cult paid to it, no longer involves the guilt of idolatry.

We might perhaps quote, as another instance of the

mutability in certain cases of great religious laws, the case of the law of usury, which was prohibited as between the members of the chosen race. This prohibition appears to have been incorporated in the Mosaic system, as a conservative expedient for the repression of all those economic changes, which seemed to threaten the fixity of the Jewish system. Hence the taking of usury is everywhere denounced with vehemence as a moral offence. Yet our Saviour himself, in the parable of the talents, appears to recognise interest upon money as an established, perhaps as a legitimate, practice. The phrase itself has been essentially changed in signification ; and the whole prohibitory system against it, in whatever sense, may be said to have disappeared from the face of Christian Statute-Books.

Let us see whether the application of true and just principles to the mixed and fluctuating conditions of life has undergone, or ought to undergo, in the case of heresy and schism, any mitigation offering in some respects an analogy with what has happened as to the law of idolatry and the law of usury.

Now the guilt of any offence whatever, varies inversely with the strength and clearness of the evidence which establishes its criminality. And surely it is not to be denied that the evidence which condemns heresy and schism has been greatly darkened, and therefore greatly weakened, since the days of the Apostles.

The Church was then fresh from the hands of her Divine Founder. The principles of life within her were so powerful as to preclude any allowed manifestation of the spirit of heresy or of schism, or to render its suppression easy. She was governed by those who had personally known the Lord : whose authority was

attested by the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit ; by men, some of whose brethren had already sealed, and who might themselves at any moment be summoned personally to seal, their testimony with their blood. The unity of the Church was a fact as patent to those who came into contact with it, as the unity of the sun in heaven, and to deny the one was like denying the other.

But before three centuries had passed, the Church was at variance for considerable periods with itself, both in communion and in doctrine, and these periods were gradually elongated into something like a continuous chain. During the agonising struggles of the fourth century with Arianism, the intensity of which it is difficult for modern Christendom to conceive, where was the light of the city on the hill ? or what could be the responsibility of the individual Christian, for threading his way through the mazes of theological controversy to the truth ? On minor cases it is needless to dwell ; almost needless to point out that in cases such as that of Montanism, the party adjudged to be heretical might well seem, to the inexperienced eye, as the stoutest attestors of the antagonism between Church and world, which all knew to be a fundamental truth of the Gospel. The force of Athanasian faith proved eventually sufficient to bring the Arian heresy to its downfall, and the accompanying schisms to a close. But who does not feel that these facts of history remaining on its page cast some haze upon the clear light of the Apostolic doctrine of schism, and abate the sharpness of its edge ? Still, as facts, they passed away, and unity was admitted in principle as the universal law.

But experience had yet to produce larger crops of

evidence all working in the same direction. The eleventh century established the rupture between the Greek and the Latin Churches which has never yet been closed ; but which on the contrary has, it is to be feared, been seriously widened by the proceedings of the Vatican Council in 1870 ; proceedings which appear to have so greatly sharpened the edges of Papal infallibility. But the division established between East and West did not end there. There grew up in the fourteenth century a division between West and West, between Rome and Avignon, under which the English Christian found himself excommunicated in Scotland, and the Scotch in England. Into this labyrinth we need not further enter. The quarrel reached its close ; but not in full until the fifteenth century had well advanced. Even then there remained the formidable question to be settled, which party had been in true corporate union with the Chair of St. Peter. Any answer to this question which may be attempted, appears to involve consequences beset with the most formidable difficulties. If either party be excluded, then the light of half Western Christendom had been extinct for half a century. If on the other hand it be attempted to include them all by the doctrine of an upright intention, that doctrine, when once admitted with respect to Church communion, may be found to render all sharp application of the argument against schismatics (nor is the case of heretics in my opinion materially different), in truth against all non-Roman Christians, nearly impracticable. Meantime the East had all along its divisions also, and Churches tainted with heresy (under the decrees, for example, against Nestorius) still subsisted, and have continued to subsist down to the present day. Moreover, they

appear to enjoy equally with the Orthodox Church the prerogative of perpetuity.

After this it seems almost needless to refer to the further and great aggravations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But to find a way of escape from their significance, surely implies a marvellous faculty of shutting the eyes to facts. The Continental Reformation is now nearly four hundred years old. It underwent in the sixteenth century much vicissitude. But, on the whole, sects and parties have settled down. The boundaries of sect now undergo no great changes. Protestantism unable to make good its footing south of the Alps, and numerically feeble in France, yet remains upon the whole, after this long experience, a hard, inexpugnable, intractable, indigestible fact. In some countries, as in Scandinavia, it enjoys even exclusive possession. Who can fail to be struck with the fact, that the distinctions between the fugitive and the permanent seem to be in a measure broken down? It was not so of old. The Gnostic, the Arian, the Donatist, the Monophysite, where are they? When we compare their meteoric passage over the scene, with the massive and by no means merely controversial Protestantism of Northern Europe, are we not led to the conclusion that there must be some profound and subtle difference in the causes which have issued in such a signal contrariety of results? It does not seem altogether like the case of the wicked man, flourishing for a moment like the green bay tree, but presently sought for and nowhere to be found.

And if this be true as to the Protestantism of Continental Europe, is it not even more vividly true of the singularly active and progressive Protestantism (other

than Anglican) of Great Britain? I speak of that Protestantism—Presbyterian, Methodist, Independent, and the rest—which has not only built itself steadily upward, without aid, speaking generally, from any other than internal and voluntary resources, but has reproduced itself in America, endowed there also with much of this same reproductive energy, and has dotted nearly all barbarous countries with the light of its Christian Missions.

I have not here spoken of the Church of England, which holds a remarkable, and, in some degree, a peculiar, position of its own in Christendom. But I must admit that, at periods not wholly beyond my memory, and in appreciably large portions of the country, it has appeared as if the hands principally charged with the training of souls for God, were the hands mainly or only of Nonconformists. If in the abstract it be difficult to find justification for English Nonconformity, yet when we view it as a fact, it must surely command our respect and sympathy. If so we cannot dare to curse what God seems in many ways to have blessed and honoured, in electing it to perform duties neglected by others, and in emboldening it to take a forward part, not limited to our narrow shores, on behalf of the broadest interests of Christianity. Here, indeed, I may speak as one who in some degree at least knows that whereof he is talking. I have seen and known and but too easily could quote the cases, in which the Christian side of political controversies has been largely made over by the members of the English Church to the championship of Nonconformists. I take it, for example, to be beyond all question that, had the matter depended wholly on the sentiment and action of

the National Church, the Act for the extinction of negro slavery would not have been passed so soon as in the year 1833.

There are civil cases when, though we may not be able to say the rebel is in the right, yet we can clearly see that the possessor of power who drove him to be a rebel, is far more profoundly in the wrong. It may perhaps be that something of a similar situation has been brought about in the Christian Church, and that antichristian ambitions, working under some thin Christian garb, have in a certain sense sapped and mined foundations, in such manner that, through long addiction to and tyrannical enforcement of unreasonable claims, it has eventually become impracticable to procure the allowance of any just weight to claims which are reasonable.

If there be anything of force or justice in the foregoing remarks, they lead us directly and undeniably to an important consequence.

Nothing can be more plausible, or at first sight stranger, than the case which can be made for itself by the spirit of proselytism ; although our Saviour made a reference to it which cannot be encouraging to its more reckless votaries. Let us see what that case really comes to. Truth, it will be truly said, is the possession most precious to the soul of man. If I am so happy as to possess the truth, as the question supposes it, am I to stand by inactive, and see my neighbour perish for the lack of the sustenance which it supplies ? The case, without doubt, is susceptible of startling presentation. But let us look into it a little more closely. Who assures me that this truth of yours, on which you so naturally rely, is certified by any other witness, than

the witness of your own private spirit? You will hardly pretend that it has come to you with the stamp and seal of a Divine revelation, or that you are entitled to proclaim, like one of the ancient prophets, "Thus saith the Lord." Holy Scripture provides us with instances of the danger of substituting the witness of another person's private spirit for our own.* Your supposed certainty is but your sincere persuasion; a great warranty without doubt for yourself, but none whatever for me your neighbour. Unless, indeed, you can show me that you have received from on high, a commission to instruct mankind in that which you have learned yourself; but such a commission, which, if it is to rule me, must be exhibited in a manner which I can understand, you do not attempt to show. And thus, or in some way like this, it is that the hot proselytiser ought to learn to pay some of that respect to the convictions of his neighbours, which he pays so largely to his own.

Let us show a little more particularly why and wherefore such respect ought to be paid.

When the proselytiser † begins his operations, his first act is to plant his battering-ram, stronger or weaker as the case may be, against the fabric of a formed belief. It may be a belief well formed or ill; but it is all which the person attacked has to depend upon, and where it is sincere and warm, even if unenlightened, the proselytiser, properly so called, seems to have a special zest in the attack. His purpose is to batter it down, to cart

* 1 Kings xiii.

† Some sensible remarks on this subject will be found in the correspondence of Cowper, where possibly they would not be looked for.

away the ruins, and then to set about building up something else, which he has inwardly projected, in its stead. His purpose is constructive: but his activity is bent in the first instance to destroy. He little knows how easy is the last-named operation, how difficult the first. When he has broken to pieces the creed or system at which his great guns are aimed, what right or power has he to dig new foundations for a mind which is in no way bound to his allegiance? He has led his victim out into the desert, to choose for himself amidst a thousand paths. It is with a just, though not an exclusive, regard to these principles, as I conceive, that the wisest men have proceeded.

It was my lot to visit Munich in the autumn of the year 1845 for a purpose purely domestic. This purpose required me to call upon Dr. Döllinger, then (I may almost say) the favourite theologian of the Latin Church in succession to Möhler, and undeniably a person of essentially large, historic, and philosophic mind. He gave me his time and thoughts with a liberality that excited my astonishment, and I derived from him much that was valuable in explanation and instruction, nor did he scorn my young and immature friendship. For the Church of England, and for its members, among whom I counted, the period was one of disaster and dismay; it was the hour of Newman's secession; the field of controversy was dark with a host of fugitives. But in that trying hour, Dr. Döllinger, while he patiently laboured to build me up in Christian belief, never spoke to me a single word that smacked of proselytism. He would not (so I suppose) destroy the half truth, as the first step to the introduction of (what he would think) the whole. I should define

the spirit of proselytism as a morbid appetite for effecting conversions, founded too often upon an overweening self-confidence and self-love.

The antidote to this spirit, is to be found in a careful regard to the whole circumstances of the case and position of the person concerned. The first requisite is to distinguish markedly between the ringleader in a heresy or schism, and his followers; and the next to distinguish, still more markedly, between the first generation of the followers, and their descendants.

The great, I might say the enormous, difference which subsists between the founder of a heresy and those who inherit it from the founder, may be illustrated by examining the nature of the term.

The word heresy does not in itself imply poisonous or mischievous opinion. It means self-chosen and self-formed opinion. The Gospel is not chosen or formed by us: but fashioned by God and tendered for our acceptance. Here lies the responsibility of the arch-heretic or heretic proper: God offers him something, he puts it aside, and substitutes for it another thing.

But in the case of his heirs and successors, there is no supposition. Not through their own act, but through the act of the heretic proper, the Divine offer has been hid from their view. If and so far as the heresy involves in itself perversion of the Christian dogma, they are the sufferers. But here we are dealing with error, not heresy. With the speciality of heresy, namely, self-appointed choice in lieu of acceptance from the hand of God, they have nothing to do. The heretics of the Apostolic times were founders, self-choosers, and thus heretics proper. The ostensible heretics of our times are consequential and passive, and do not fall

within the proper compass of the term, unless, and then only in so far as, they make themselves party to the original rejection of a Divine tender.

A petty and most unwarrantable schism was engendered in the Episcopal Church of Scotland, some thirty or forty years ago: but within that obscure and abstractedly unblessed fold, there grew up, as I had occasion to know, some young persons of a singular holiness. And what we ought to bear in mind is this; the young Protestant, Nonconformist, Quaker, or other (supposed) imperfect believer, has been reared, like the young Roman Catholic or Eastern, in a home. He has been taught about God, to believe in Him, to love Him, to obey Him, in the lap of a mother. He holds his religion (though he may not know it), as the mass of Continental Christians do, by tradition. In these first convictions his mind and soul have been trained; and they are entitled to respect, and to the most considerate and tender treatment, upon the very same principles as those which, within the fold of the hierarchical Churches, fence round with sacredness the pious aspirations of the young. *Maxima debetur puero reverentia.* But what is true of the child also adheres to the adult; and, if the tenor of this paper be a sound one, we must beware of all that looks coldly or proudly upon beliefs, proved by experience to be capable of promoting, in their several degrees, conformity to the Divine will, and personal union with the Saviour of the world.

Let us now proceed to consider various objections which may be taken in perfect good faith, to the strain of argument and remark, which have been followed in the present paper.

It may in the first place be said that I am playing with edge-tools ; that the record of Scripture is plain and strong, written on the sacred page as in characters of fire. Do not, it will be said, attenuate, do not explain away, a teaching which is Divine. You are tempting your fellow-creatures to walk in slippery paths, and if they should fall you will have incurred no small responsibility.

My reply is as follows. In the cases of idolatry and of usury, I have sought to follow the guidance of Scripture itself ; and, it should be remembered that Scripture is not a stereotype projected into the world at a given time and place, but is a record of comprehensive and progressive teaching, applicable to a nature set under providential discipline, observant of its wants which must vary with its growth, and adapting thereto in the most careful manner, its provisions.

What I have attempted, is to distinguish between the facts of heresy and schism, as they stood in the Apostolic age, and the corresponding facts as they present themselves to us, at a period when the ark of God has weathered eighteen hundred years of changeful sea and sky.

I think it was in the year 1838 that the Rev. Sir William Palmer published his book upon 'The Church,' which I suppose to be, perhaps, the most powerful, and least assailable defence of the position of the Anglican Church from the sixteenth century, especially from the reign of Henry the Eighth onwards. The book was after a few years submerged in the general discredit and discomfiture, which followed upon the temporary collapse of the Oxford movement, consequent upon the secession to the Latin Church of the most powerful

genius among its founders. Father Perrone, the official theologian of the Roman See, said of its author, if my memory serve me right, that he was *theologorum Oxoniensium facile princeps*, and gracefully added, *talis cum sit, utinam noster esset*. But he applied in all their vigour to Presbyterians, Puritans, and others, the language of the New Testament concerning heresy and schism, and he seemed ruthlessly to cast them and their communions out of the Church of Christ. I remember feeling at the time the incongruity of such language. In or about the year 1874, the distinguished author published an anonymous work under the pseudonym of *Umbra Oxoniensis*: as to which Dr. Döllinger said to me, "This writer knows what he is about." He presented in truth an essential alteration of his rigid and icy views upon modern heresy and schism. Of the work itself Dr. Döllinger said that its republication, with such enlargement or modification of the text as the lapse of half a century had rendered needful, would be "an event for Christendom" (*ein Ereigniss für die Christenheit*).

But I turn to the higher authority of Holy Writ, and the historic dealings of God with His chosen people. I ask the impartial reader to compare the treatment awarded to Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, and to their followers, with the providential method pursued, after the great schism of Jeroboam, with the Ten Tribes or Northern Kingdom. Not that the act of this heresiarch was lightly viewed: who, in the teeth of all the tokens continually displayed in Hebrew history, "made Israel to sin." So stood the founder; but how stood the followers? Were they cast out from the elder covenant and its provisions for Divine guidance? The account given us of the priesthood of the Northern Kingdom,

with its broken succession, might not of itself supply an answer. But parallel with, not antagonistic to, the sacerdotal orders ran the historic race of prophets. The two great functions might be united in the same person. They were in themselves alike sacred, and perfectly distinct. The schismatic body constituted the majority ; but this could have no determining effect, for "thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil." On grounds, as we may rest assured, quite distinct from those of mere numerical preponderance, the Northern Kingdom was still systematically made the object of rebuke, encouragement, or warning. To it was addressed the great representative ministry of Elijah, the person selected to typify the prophets in the grand vision of the transfiguration : and his character was, so to speak, reproduced in that of the Baptist. Their ruinous dispersion was treated much like that of the Jews. Samaritans, after the Advent, continued to be the objects of the tender regards of our Lord ; and the recently recovered Pentateuch of the Samaritan use, has served to show that the people of this motley nation, now so hard to trace amidst the floods of ethnical change, still remained, either collectively or individually, within the fence of the vineyard once planted "on a very fruitful hill."

I ask no more than that we should apply to the questions of heresy and schism, now that they have been permitted, all over Christendom, to harden into facts seemingly permanent, and to bear not thorns and thistles only, but also grapes and figs, the principles which Holy Scripture has set forth in the history of the two Hebrew kingdoms, and which a just and temperate use of the method of analogy may extract from the record.

I now turn to another objection which may be advanced against me from the Catholic churchman's point of view. And by the Catholic churchman I mean simply one who adheres with firmness to the ancient or Catholic Creeds of the Church. These are the Apostolic Creed and the (as commonly called) Nicene Creed ; the Athanasian Creed, however important as a document of history and theology, occupying a different place.

It will have been noticed that the argument of these pages points to an alteration in the ancient modes of dealing with those who decline to accept these venerable documents. I have shown that the finger-posts which marked the way to them have, in the course of time, been blurred by human infirmity, and I may be asked whether I propose to resign or abandon those portions of the old Creeds which do not now command, as they did four centuries ago, an universal acceptance? For instance, "I believe in one Baptism for the remission of sins." For a section of Christendom, not inconsiderable in numbers, and as I conceive growing in magnitude relatively to the whole, these words, I fear, convey no very definite meaning, and are in no sense an article of faith. I mean the non-Episcopal Protestants, especially those of the English tongue. We are not, it seems, to condemn them as they would have been condemned of old for contumacy in the non-acceptance of this article ; but we are, in the rather hollow phraseology of the day, to dwell much on the matters in which we agree, little on those in which we differ ; a sentiment capable of either wise or unwise application, but sometimes put forward in a thoroughly onesided spirit, and intended to convey as its true sense that we are to make light of our differences with the Reformed Churches of the sixteenth

century, but as much as we please of any points in controversy with the great Latin and Eastern communions ; as if the sixteenth century of our era had been favoured with a new, and even with a more authoritative, republication of the Gospel.

Is it the effect, it may be asked, the drift of these explanations, to land us in the substitution for our ancient and historical Christianity, of what is known as undenominational religion ?

This is no trivial question, especially in Great Britain and North America. For in them subsist great numbers of religionists organised in bodies which really present few or no salient points of difference. The Sacrament of Baptism might have appeared to raise such a point, when Baptism was conceived to convey with Divine authority an inward and spiritual grace. But in proportion as the minds of men are staggered at such a doctrine, and as Baptism consequently resolves itself into a becoming and convenient form, the bodies known as Independents and Baptists, counted by millions respectively, may seem to find their warrant for severance from one another somewhat obscured. And as in parts of Great Britain, and in most parts of North America, these non-Episcopal Protestants constitute the bulk of professing Christians, we cannot wonder, and should not complain, if they are more and more laid hold of by the idea, that the contentions of Anglicans, and even of Roman Catholics or Easterns, may properly be overridden with regard to their sectional peculiarities and may be justly required to submit to laws which impose, in schools for the education of the young or otherwise, something that is called undenominational religion. Are not belief in Christ, and union with

Christ, the main, the all-important matters, and why should we not together put forward the assertions in which we agree, and leave to the separate care of those who hold them and think them material all adventitious provisions which are supplementary to this grand and central purpose of the Gospel? A purpose which still blazes, as it were, in the heavens without obscuration before our eyes, while we ourselves confess that the tokens necessary to make good the claims of this or that communion to our allegiance, have been in the course of time obscured.

A few words then are necessary on the nature of undenominational religion.

The idea conveyed in this phrase with awkwardness characteristically modern, has in my opinion two aspects absolutely distinct. One of them is in the highest degree cheering and precious. The other aspect disguises a pitfall, into which whosoever is precipitated will probably find that the substance of the Gospel has escaped, or is fast escaping, from his grasp. With the former of them I first proceed to deal, and very briefly.

I do not know on earth a more blessed subject of contemplation than that which I should describe as follows. There are, it may be, upon earth four hundred and fifty millions of professing Christians. There is no longer one fold under one visible shepherd: and the majority of Christians (such I take it now to be, though the minority is a large one,) is content with its one shepherd in heaven, and with the other provisions He has made on earth. His flock is broken up into scores, it may be hundreds, of sections. These sections are not at peace but at war. Nowhere are they too loving to one another; for the most part love is hardly visible among

them. Each makes it a point to understand his neighbours not in the best sense, but in the worst : and the thunder of anathema is in the air. But they all profess the Gospel. And what is the Gospel? In the old-fashioned mind and language of the Church, it is expressed as to its central truths in very few and brief words ; it lies in those doctrines of the Trinity, and the Incarnation of Christ, which it cost the Christian flock in their four first centuries such tears, such prayers, such questionings, such struggles, to establish. Since those early centuries men have multiplied upon the earth. Disintegration within the Church, which was an accident or an exception, has become a rule : a final, solid, and inexorable fact, sustained by opinion, law, tendency, and the usage of many generations. But with all this segregation, and not only division but conflict of minds and interests, the answer given by the four hundred and fifty millions, or by those who were best entitled to speak for them, to the question what is the Gospel, is still the same. With exceptions so slight, that we may justly set them out of the reckoning, the reply is still the same as it was in the Apostolic age, the central truth of the Gospel lies in the Trinity and the Incarnation, in the God that made us, and the Saviour that redeemed us. When I consider what human nature and human history have been, and how feeble is the spirit in its warfare with the flesh, I bow my head in amazement before this mighty moral miracle, this marvellous concurrence evolved from the very heart of discord.

Such, as I apprehend, is the undenominational religion of heaven, of the blissful state. It represents perfected union with Christ, and conformity to the will of God,

the overthrowing of the great rebellion, and the restoration of the perpetual Eden, now enriched with all the trophies of redemption, with all the testing and ripening experiences through which the Almighty Father has conducted so many sons to glory. It is the fair fabric now exhibited in its perfection, which could afford to drop, and has dropped, all the scaffolding supplied by the Divine Architect in His wisdom for the rearing of the structure. The whole process, from first to last, is a normal process, and has been wrought out exclusively by the use of the means provided for it in the spiritual order. Whatever may have been the diversity of means, God the Holy Ghost has been the worker ; and the world, which Christ lived and died to redeem, has been the scene. In some cases the auxiliary apparatus was elaborate and rich, in others it was elementary and simple, but in all it was employed, and made effectual for its aim, by the hand of the Almighty and Allwise Designer.

Here is the genuine undenominationalism ; now let us turn to the spurious.

From every page of the Gospel we find that the great message to be conveyed to the world, in order to its recovery from sin, was to be transmitted through a special organisation. I do not enter on any of the questions controverted among believers as to the nature of this organisation, whether it was the Popedom, or the Episcopate, or the Presbyterate, or the Christian flock at large consecrated and severed from the world by Baptism. The point on which alone I now dwell is that there was a society, that this society was spiritual, that it lay outside the natural and the civil order. These had their own places, purposes, and instruments ; they were

qualified to earn a blessing in the legitimate use of those instruments within their own sphere, or might degrade and destroy them, by ambitiously and profanely employing them for purposes for which they were not intended by the Most High.

Nowhere, so far as my knowledge goes, is this essential difference between the temporal and the spiritual kingdoms laid down with a bolder and firmer hand, than in the confessional documents of the Scottish Presbyterian system. It may be due to that Christian courage, that Scottish Presbyterianism has been found strong enough to exhibit in this nineteenth century of ours, examples of self-sacrifice and faith, which have drawn forth tributes of admiration from the Christian world at large. Conversely, of all the counterfeits of religion there is in my view none so base as that which passes current under the name of Erastianism, and of which it has been my privilege to witness, during the course of the present century, the gradual decline and almost extinction, especially among the luminaries of the political world. This is not a question between a clergy and a laity ; but between the Church and the world. Divine revelation has a sphere, no less than a savour of its own. It dwelt of old with the prophets, the priests, and the congregation ; it now dwells with the Christian people, rulers and ruled ; and this strictly in their character as Christian people, as subjects of God the Holy Ghost engaged with them in the holy warfare, which began with the entrance of sin into the world, and which can never end but with its expulsion. Foul fall the day, when the persons of this world shall, on whatever pretext, take into their uncommissioned hands the manipulation of the religion of our Lord and Saviour. The

State, labouring in its own domain, is a great, nay a venerable, object ; so is the family. These are the organic units, constitutive of human societies. Let the family transgress and usurp the functions of the State ; its aberrations will be short, and a power it cannot resist will soon reduce its action within proper limits. But the State is, in this world, the master of all coercive means ; and its usurpations, should they occur, cannot be checked by any specific instruments included among standing social provisions. If the State should think proper to frame new creeds by cutting the old ones into pieces and throwing them into the caldron to be re-boiled, we have no remedy, except such as may lie hidden among the resources of the providence of God. It is fair to add that the State is in this matter beset by severe temptations ; the vehicle through which these temptations work will probably, in this country at least, be supplied by popular education.

The Church, disabled and discredited by her divisions, has found it impracticable to assert herself as the universal guide. Among the fragments of the body, a certain number have special affinities, and in particular regions or conjunctures of circumstances it would be very easy to frame an undenominational religion much to their liking, divested of many salient points needful in the view of historic Christendom for a complete Christianity. Such a scheme the State might be tempted to authorise by law in public elementary teaching, nay, to arm it with exclusive and prohibitory powers as against other and more developed methods which the human conscience, sole legitimate arbiter in these matters, together with the Spirit of God, may have devised for itself in the more or less successful effort to

obtain this guidance. It is in this direction that we have recently been moving, and the motion is towards a point where a danger signal is already lifted. Such an undenominational religion as this could have no promise of permanence. None from authority, for the assumed right to give it is the negation of all authority. None from piety, for it involves at the very outset the surrender of the work of the Divine kingdom into the hands of the civil ruler. None from policy; because any and every change that may take place in the sense of the constituent bodies, or any among them, will supply for each successive change precisely the same warrant as was the groundwork of the original proceeding. Whatever happens, let Christianity keep its own acts to its own agents, and not make them over to hands which would justly be deemed profane and sacrilegious when they came to trespass on the province of the sanctuary.

Let us now turn to another aspect of this interesting examination.

Thus far it may be said we have been constantly extenuating the responsibilities which attach to heresy and schism, and tampering with the securities for the maintenance of the true Apostolic doctrine. If it may be said the claims of rival communions to demand adhesion with authority are now thus confused or balanced, it follows that Christianity has been deprived of some portion at least of the favouring evidences on which it had to rely when ushered into the world; and thus a diminution has been effected in the aggressive force, by means of which the Gospel had to convert the kingdoms of the world, into the kingdoms of our God and of His Christ. And such without doubt is the first result of the argument as it has been set out. But let us see,

if this be an evil, whether it is not one for which in another portion of the field that has been opened, we have an ample compensation ; and whether the spirit of faction which prevails so lamentably in religious divisions, has not been made to minister to the very purpose over which it had seemed to exercise so fatal an agency.

When two powers or parties are very sharply divided in controversy, and when the force of the old Adam seems to enthrone this hostility as the ruling motive of their conduct, it is apt to follow that great additional emphasis and efficacy is given to their testimony on the points where it is accordant. Take, for example, the case of the lately discovered Samaritan Pentateuch. The enmity which subsisted between Samaritans and Jews was an overpowering enmity, which reached the point of social excommunication ; for the Jews had "no dealings with the Samaritans." Under these circumstances, if either party could have detected the other, as implicated in the offence of altering or corrupting the great traditional treasure of the Torah, it is quite certain that the accusation would have been made, and would have been turned to the best possible account. When the capacity and the disposition to expose negligence or fraud existed on each side and in the highest degree, the absence of any charge, and the absolute concurrence as to the great document, afford us the highest possible assurance of the integrity of the record.

The same argument is applicable as between Jews and Christians, and within its proper limits to the integrity of the Hebrew Scriptures.

Now let us ask whether and how far a similar argument applies to the case of the Christian Church rent by schisms, and the Christian faith disturbed and defaced by

heresies. We have before us a very Babel of claimants for the honours of orthodoxy and catholicity. Setting out from Western Christendom, we naturally go back to the great convulsion of the sixteenth century ; we perceive the still huge framework of the Latin Church, with the Popedom at its head, standing erect upon a wide field of battle, in the midst of other separated masses, each of them greatly smaller when reckoned one by one, but in the aggregate forming a total very large, even if we confine our views to Europe. The three principal of these severed masses are the Lutheran, the Calvinistic, and the Anglican, which at the present time may reach sixty or eighty millions in this quarter of the globe. Conjoined with them are a number of Christian bodies, which derive force and significance partly from magnitude, and partly from the historic incidents of their formation ; or from moral, spiritual, or theological particularities, whether in government, discipline, creed, or in the spirit of their policy and proceedings. Almost all of them are very strongly anti-Roman, and there are probably still many religionists among them, who regard the Roman scheme, incorporated in the person of the Pope, as the man of sin, the anti-Christ, sitting in the temple of God, and boasting or showing himself that he is God. It is impossible to conceive a livelier scene of diversity and antagonism.

When we pass beyond the ocean we find large additions to all these Western Communions, especially to those which bear the name of Protestant. So that Presbyterians, Methodists, and Independents or Congregationalists, are able to boast of an aggregate following, which amounts apparently in each case to a respectable number of millions, while the smaller

segments of the body continue to be almost everywhere represented.

But Western religion has had this among its other particularities, that it maintains a wonderful unconsciousness of the existence of an East. But there is an Eastern Christianity, and this too is divided among no small number of communions, of which by far the most numerous are aggregated round the ancient See of New Rome, or Constantinople. And here again we find a knot of Churches, which are termed heretical on account of difficulties growing out of the older controversies of the Church. It seems fair, however, to remark that these Churches have not exhibited the changeable and short-lived character which is supposed to be among the most marked notes of heresy. They have subsisted through some fifteen hundred years with a signal persistency, I believe, in doctrine, government, and usage. The Eastern Christians do not probably fall short of ninety or a hundred million persons all told; and although to the Western eye they present so many exterior resemblances to the Roman Church, they are in practice divided from it not less sharply than the Protestants, by differences partly of doctrine (where their position seems very strong), but still more of organisation and of spirit.

That all these Churches and communions, Latin, Eastern, or Reformed, bear a conflicting witness concerning Christianity on a multitude of points, is a fact too plain to require exposition or discussion. Is there, however, anything also on which they generally agree? And what is the relation between that on which they agree, and those things on which they differ? At this point, it is manifest that we touch upon matters of

great interest and importance ; which, however, it will suffice to mention very briefly. The tenets upon which these dissonant and conflicting bodies are agreed, are the great central tenets of the Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of our Lord. But these constitute the very kernel of the whole Gospel. Everything besides, that clusters round them, including the doctrines respecting the Church, the Ministry, the Sacraments, the Communion of Saints, and the great facts of eschatology, is only developments which have been embodied in the historic Christianity of the past, as auxiliary to the great central purpose of Redemption ; that original promise which was vouchsafed to sinful man at the outset of his sad experience, and which was duly accomplished when the fulness of time had come.

If, then, the Christian Church has sustained heavy loss through its divisions in the weight of its testimonials, and in its aggressive powers as against the world, I would still ask whether she may not, in the good providence of God, have received a suitable, perhaps a preponderating, compensation, in the accordant witness of all Christendom, to the truths that our religion is the religion of the God-Man, and that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh ?

It will have appeared, I hope, sufficiently from the foregoing pages, that what they contemplate and seek to recommend is a readjustment of ideas, and not a surrender, in any quarter, of considered and conscientious convictions, or of established laws and practices.

The Christian Church, no longer entitled to speak with an undivided and universal authority, and thus to take her place among the paramount facts of life, is not thereby invaded in her inner citadel. That citadel is,

and ever was, the private conscience within this sacred precinct, that matured the forces which by a long incubation grew to such a volume of strength, as legitimately to obtain the mastery of the world. It would be a fatal error to allow the voice of that conscience to be put down by another voice, which proceeds, not from within, but from without, the sanctuary. The private conscience is indeed for man, as Cardinal Newman has well said, the vicegerent of God.

It is part of the office with which the private conscience is charged, to measure carefully its powers of harmonious co-operation with Christians of all sorts. This duty should be performed in the manner, and on the basis, so admirably described by Dante :—

“Le frondi, onde s' infronda tutto l' orto
Dell' Ortolano eterno, am' io cotanto
Quanto da lui a lor di bene è porto.” *

It will be governed by large regard to the principle of Love, and by a supreme regard to the prerogatives of Truth, and the very same feelings which will lead a sound mind to welcome a solid union, will also lead it to eschew an immature and hollow one.

And why, it will be further asked, is this readjustment of ideas to be the work of the present juncture? In answer, I request that we should study to discern the signs of the times. Is creation groaning and travailing together for a great recovery, or is it not? Are the persons adverse to that recovery, banded together with an enhanced and overweening confidence? They loudly boast of their improved means of action: and are fond especially of relying on the increase of knowledge.

* ‘Paradiso,’ Canto xxvi. 64.

Knowledge, forsooth ! God prosper it. But knowledge is like liberty ; great offences are committed in her name, and great errors covered with her mantle. The increase of knowledge can only lead us to an increased acquaintance with Him Who is its source and spring. Let the champions of religion now know and understand, that it is more than ever their duty to equip themselves with knowledge, and to use it as an effective weapon, such as it has proved, and is proving itself to be, in regard to the ancient history of our planet and of man. The obstinacy of the attack is probably due in the main to the increased power of worldliness under the conditions of the present time ; and this, in its turn, naturally springs from the extension of wealth, the multiplication of luxuries, the increase of wants following therefrom : of wants, every one of which is as one of the threads which would, separately, break, but which in their aggregate, bound Gulliver to the earth. This is the subtle process which more and more, from day to day, is weighting the scale charged with the things seen, as against the scale whose ethereal burden lies in the things unseen. And while the adverse host is thus continually in receipt of new reinforcements, it is time for those who believe to bestir themselves : and to prepare for all eventual issues by well examining their common interests, and by keeping firm hold upon that chain which we are permitted to grasp at its earthward extremity, while at its other end it lies "about the feet of God."

POSTSCRIPT.

To the Editor of the *Nineteenth Century*.

Hawarden Castle, Chester :
September 19, 1894.

SIR,—I should be glad if you will kindly allow me to supply an omission in my recent paper on the position of Heresy and Schism in the modern Christian Church.

I have there laid stress on the great evidential as well as moral value which I attach to the concurrence of an overwhelming majority of Christians in the acceptance of certain doctrines, which they regard as vital and central. But I had no intention of thereby conveying any precipitate or harsh assumption with regard to the section unable to accept them. I am not about to enter on this large subject, but I own with pleasure that results (as we think them) of true doctrine are often exhibited on a scale far exceeding that of its profession.

I have the honour to remain, sir,

Your most faithful servant,

W. E. GLADSTONE.

X.

TRUE AND FALSE CONCEPTIONS OF THE ATONEMENT.*

1894,†

PREFATORY.

THIS volume presents to us an object of considerable interest. It inspires sympathy with the writer, not only as a person highly gifted, but as a seeker after truth, although it is to be regretted that at a particular point of the narrative the discussion borders on the loathsome. Indeed, it becomes hard to conceive by what mental process Mrs. Besant can have convinced herself, that it was part of her mission as a woman to open such a subject as that of the Ninth Chapter, in the face of the world, and in a book meant for popular perusal. Instruction will be derived from the work at large ; but probably not exactly the instruction intended by the authoress. Her readers will find that they are expected to feel a lively interest in her personality : and, in order that this interest may not be disappointed, they will find her presented to their view in no less

* Reprinted from the *Nineteenth Century*.

† 'Annie Besant: an Autobiography' (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1894).

than three portraitures, at different portions of the volume. They will also find, that the book is a spiritual itinerary, and that it shows with how much at least of intellectual ease, and what unquestioning assumptions of being right, vast spaces of mental travelling may be performed. The stages are, indeed, glaringly in contrast with one another; yet their violent contrarieties do not seem at any period to suggest to the writer so much as a doubt whether the mind, which so continually changes in attitude and colour, can after all be very trustworthy in each and all its movements. This uncomfortable suggestion is never permitted to intrude; and the absolute self-complacency of the authoress bears her on through tracts of air buoyant and copious enough to carry the Dircæan swan. Mrs. Besant passes from her earliest to her latest stage of thought as lightly, as the swallow skims the surface of the lawn, and with just as little effort to ascertain what lies beneath it. An ordinary mind would suppose that modesty was the one lesson which she could not have failed to learn from her extraordinary permutations; but the chemist, who shall analyse by percentages the contents of these pages, will not, I apprehend, be in a condition to report that of such an element he can find even the infinitesimal quantity usually and conveniently denominated a "trace." Her several schemes of belief, or non-belief, appear to have been entertained one after another, with the same undoubting confidence, until the junctures successively arrived for their not regretful, but rather contemptuous, rejection. They are nowhere based upon reasoning, but they rest upon one and the same authority—the authority of Mrs. Besant. In the general absence of argument to explain the causes of her movements, she apparently

thinks it sufficient to supply us with her three portraits, as carrying with them sufficient attestation. If we ask upon which of her religions, or substitutes for religion, we are to place reliance, the reply would undoubtedly be, upon the last. Yes ; but who is to assure us that it will be the last ? It remains open to us to hope, for her own sake, that she may yet describe the complete circle, and end somewhere near the point where she began.

Religion had a large share in the interests of Mrs. Besant's early childhood ; and at eight years † old she received a strongly Evangelical bent. She is sensible of having been much governed by vanity at this period of her life, while she does not inform us whether this quality spontaneously disappeared, or what had become of it in the later stages. It can hardly be made matter of reproach to Mrs. Besant that such early years did not supply her with her final standing-ground ; or that, like most of the other highly gifted pupils in the school popularly known as Evangelical, she felt herself irresistibly impelled to an onward movement. She came to rejoice, as so many more have done, in the great conception of a Catholic Church lasting through the centuries ; † "the hidden life grew stronger," and the practice of weekly communion, nay, even that of self-chastisement, was adopted. In retrospect, she perceives that the keynote of her life has been a "longing for sacrifice to something felt as greater than the self." † When she married, at the age of twenty, she "had no more idea of the marriage relation than if she had been four years old." The supremacy of the new form given to her religious ideas is not very well defined, nor is there any

* Page 45.

† Page 56.

‡ Page 57.

intelligible account of the process through which it was summarily put upon its trial. She informs us, indeed, that she went up to the sources, and made herself acquainted with the Fathers of the Christian Church. It would be interesting to know what were her opportunities, or what was the extent of the girl's patristic reading.* Suffice it to say that it has not left the smallest trace upon the matter or spirit of this volume. And, indeed, that a reader of the early Fathers should present to us, as agreeable to the teaching "of the Churches," that utterly modern caricature of the doctrine of the Atonement which will presently be cited, is a solecism which, along with a multitude of other solecisms, we must leave it to her readers to examine. As for Mrs. Besant she is frankly astonished at the amount of her own religiosity, and she accepts with apparent acquiescence the remark of her dying father,† that "darling Annie's only fault was being too religious." In all her different phases of thought, that place in the mind where the sense of sin should be, appears to have remained, all through the shifting scenes of her mental history, an absolute blank. Without this sense, it is obvious that her Evangelicalism and her High Churchism were alike built upon the sand, and that in strictness she never quitted what she had never in its integrity possessed. Speaking generally, it may be held that she has followed at all times her own impulses with an entire sincerity; but that those impulses have been wofully dislocated in origin, spirit, and direction, by an amount of egregious self-confidence which is in itself a guarantee of failure in mental investigations.

* Page 56.

† Page 24.

After a physical crisis, brought about by the sufferings of a child in illness, her religion received a shock which it had not strength to survive. She resolved carefully and thoroughly to examine its dogmas one by one;* and she addressed herself, by a process which she does not describe, to four propositions, which, as she states, are assailed by "the steadily advancing waves of historical and scientific criticism." The propositions are : †

1. The eternity of punishment after death.
2. The meaning of goodness and love, as applied to a God who had made this world with all its sin and misery.
3. *The nature of the Atonement of Christ, and the justice of God in accepting a vicarious suffering from Christ, and a vicarious righteousness from the sinner.*
4. The meaning of inspiration as applied to the Bible, and the reconciliation of the perfections of the Author with the blunders and immoralities of the work.

These propositions were rejected by the young lady not long out of her teens. But lest we should resent her reticence as to the method in which she fulfilled her plan of systematic examination, she gives us this assurance : "Looking back I cannot but see how orderly was the progression of thought, how steady the growth, after that first terrible earthquake." ‡

Still, beyond this authoritative notice, we have not the smallest tittle of evidence to show either, first, that any of the propositions were ever subjected to any serious examination at all, or even, secondly, that any pains were taken to verify them as propositions really incorporated in that teaching of "the Churches" with which she was resolved to deal. It is hardly needful to observe that, to allege such incorporation, with respect

* Page 99.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Ibid.*

to an essential part of the third proposition, is to exhibit what, in a case where insincerity is not for a moment to be imputed, can only be described as rash and blameworthy ignorance.

It is not necessary to follow the authoress into her further experiences as (in her own language) an atheist and a theosophist. The point at which she parts company from Christianity is the point for taking up her challenge. Accordingly, the purpose of these pages is to test at least one of her four propositions, that which relates to the doctrine of Atonement. But as I am conscious of no title to set off an *ipse dixit* against the *ipsa dixit* of Mrs. Besant, the task set before me can only be performed by a patient examination of language, and of reasoning, which supply the sole means ordinarily vouchsafed to man as his aids in the search for truth. In speaking thus, I waive no tittle of the authority which belongs to the established doctrine of the Atonement; but only abstain from modes of speech and argument, which could find no possible access to the minds of such as follow the methods adopted by the writer of this autobiography.

THE ATONEMENT OF CHRIST.

This inquirer, or rather, this objector, asks * what is the "justice" of God in "accepting a vicarious suffering from Christ, and a vicarious righteousness from the sinner"?

The acceptance of a vicarious righteousness from the sinner may be put aside for the present; inasmuch as, if the first part of the case can be met, the second, which is an ulterior, and perhaps in various ways a

* Mrs. Besant, 'Autobiography,' p. 99.

questionable, development, at least as it is often put, never will arise.

It is well to get rid of verbal controversies. In human affairs, when an intermediate person comes between a creditor and his debtor, and guarantees or advances the money, the creditor may be said to accept a vicarious liquidation of the debt. And yet that intermediate person may have the fullest intention of requiring the debtor to take the obligation upon himself, and the fullest knowledge that this will be done. Accordingly, let this topic stand aside, for it is virtually included in the larger question.

It is, then, obviously intended to suggest that God accepts from Christ the suffering which, but for Christ, would have been justly due to the sinner, and justly inflicted upon him; and that, Christ being absolutely innocent, injustice towards Him is here involved.

At the outset, I have to say that statements are sometimes made by unwise or uninstructed persons—indeed, I have myself heard such statements from the pulpit—which give, or appear to give, countenance to this charge. A preacher, whom I am reluctant to name, declared in my hearing that, when pardon has been obtained under the Gospel, a debt is paid off, and God gives “a receipt in full.” The thing necessary is, that there should be a payment. What does it matter to the creditor by whom the debt is paid? Shylock, more astute than other creditors, though even he was incompletely astute, yet provided effectually against this contingency. The debt of Antonio was to be paid with a part of his own body, and admitted of no substitution. An act of sin is, from this point of view, what is called an I O U; and it is nothing more. The receipt in full

having been given, the transaction, or course of transactions, is at an end. This incautious preacher stated a part, and that not the most inward or ethical part, as if it had been the whole ; and, according to his exposition, the Almighty, who was the creditor, had no more to do with the affair ; while the character of the required penalty, which fell upon the Saviour, is so stated as if good had been undeservedly obtained for the sinner, by the infliction of evil undeservedly upon the righteous.

It is, of course, no answer to this to say that the obligation to discharge the debt was willingly accepted by our Lord. For, firstly, we must, I think, understand from the Agony in the Garden that His willingness was a conditioned willingness. He would not ask for the twelve legions of angels ;* but He prayed that the cup might pass from Him if His drinking, draining, it could be dispensed with ; He accepted it because there was something deep down in the counsels, and in the very nature of the Divine Being, which made it indispensable. Secondly, if it was unjust that He should pay by suffering, His willingness in no way clears the character of the Almighty as the universal Governor of the world. Injustice is not the less injustice because there may be a willing submission to it.

But, in fact, our objector seems to agree with our disowned defender in this ; that both look at the forensic or reputed, and neither at the ethical, which is of necessity the essential, aspect of the case. Let it be granted to them both—

1. That the “sinner,” that is to say, man, taken generally, is liable to penalty, for sin ingrained and sin committed.

* Matt. xxvi. 39, 42, 53.

2. That the Son of God, liable to no penalty, submits Himself to a destiny of suffering and shame.

3. That by His life and death of suffering and shame men are relievable, and have, upon acceptance of the Gospel and continuance therein, been actually relieved, from the penalties to which they were liable.

4. That as sin entails suffering, and as Another has enabled the sinner to put all penal suffering away, and, in effecting this, and for the purpose of effecting it, has Himself suffered, this surely is in the full sense of the term a vicarious suffering, an atonement, at-one-ment, vicariously brought about by the intervention of an innocent person.

This dispensation of Atonement is part and parcel of the Incarnation; and the Incarnation, undertaken in order to suffer, by the Man of Sorrows acquainted with grief, is mystery but is not injustice; does not involve the idea of injustice, and is not liable to the charge. Such is the contention which it will now be endeavoured to make good.

Be it remembered that pain, though it is not lawfully to be inflicted except for wrong done, is not in itself essentially evil. It has been freely borne, again and again, by good men for the sake of bad men; and they have borne it sometimes with benefit to the bad men, always with benefit to themselves. Pain indicates, it may be, a relation to evil; but is so far from being absolutely an evil, that it may be relatively and conditionally a good, as being the instrumental cause of good.

If we are told in reply that Christ, being God and therefore perfect, could receive no good from pain, the answer is that by the Incarnation Christ took upon

Him a nature not strictly perfect but perfectible, for He "grew in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man." *

I have here gone through some propositions which may be termed forensic. It may be convenient, before proceeding farther, to advert to the meaning of this term, which was brought, I apprehend, into familiar use, about half a century ago, by the remarkable writings of Mr. Alexander Knox. It properly refers to proceedings of condemnation or acquittal, such as take place in earthly courts of justice, and accordingly express not certain truth, but only our imperfect effort to arrive at it. They are therefore necessarily disjoined from ethical conditions, in so far that they have no fixed relation to them.

With so much of explanation, let us now turn to those considerations which are properly ethical. And I would strongly contend that there is in Scripture, in Christianity, nothing forensic, which is not also ethical ; that these are two distinct but not clashing forms of expressing the one and the same thing ; one of them, it may be said, expressing it as law, the other as command ; one as justice, the other as will. I would indeed submit that, if we believe in God at all, it becomes impossible for us to sever these two ideas from one another.

The following propositions as they stand of course cannot pretend to the smallest authority ; but they are meant to be, and I hope may be, conformable to the established doctrine of Scripture and the Church at large :

1. We are born into the world in a condition in which our nature has been depressed or distorted or impaired

* Luke ii. 52.

by sin ; and we partake by inheritance this ingrained fault of our race. This fault is in Scripture referred to a person and a period, which gives definiteness to the conception ; but we are not here specially concerned with the form in which the doctrine has been declared.

2. This fault of nature has not abolished freedom of the will, but it has caused a bias towards the wrong.

3. The laws of our nature make its excellence recoverable by Divine discipline and self-denial, if the will be duly directed to the proper use of these instruments of recovery.

4. A Redeemer, whose coming was prophesied simultaneously with the fall, being a person no less than the Eternal Son of God, comes into the world, and at the cost of great suffering establishes in His own person a type, a matrix so to speak, for humanity raised to its absolute perfection.

5. He also promulgates a creed or scheme of highly influential truths, and founds therewith a system of institutions and means of grace, whereby men may be recast, as it were, in that matrix or mould which He has provided, and united one by one with His own perfect humanity. Under the exercising forces of life, their destiny is to grow more and more into His likeness. He works in us and by us ; not figuratively, but literally. Christ, if we answer to His grace, is, as St. Paul said, formed in us. By a discipline of life based on the constitutive principles of our being, He brings us nearer to Himself ; that which we have first learned as lesson distils itself into habit and character ; it becomes part of our composition, and gradually, through Christ, ever neutralising and reversing our evil bias, renews our nature in His own image.

6. We have here laid down for us, as it would seem, the essentials of a moral redemption ; of relief from evil as well as pain. Man is brought back from sin to righteousness by a holy training ; that training is supplied by incorporation into the Christ who is God and man ; and that Christ has been constituted, trained, and appointed to His office in this incorporation, through suffering. His suffering, without any merit of ours, and in spite of our guilt, is thus the means of our recovery and sanctification. And His suffering is truly vicarious ; for if He had not thus suffered on our behalf, we must have suffered in our own helpless guilt.

7. This appears to be a system purely and absolutely ethical in its basis ; such vicarious suffering, thus viewed, implies no disparagement, even in the smallest particulars, to the justice and righteousness of God.

8. It is not by any innovation, so to speak, in His scheme of government, that the Almighty brings about this great and glorious result. What is here enacted on a gigantic scale in the kingdom of grace, only repeats a phenomenon with which we are perfectly familiar in the natural and social order of the world, where the good, at the expense of pain endured by them, procure benefits for the unworthy. It may indeed be said, and with truth, that the good men of whom we speak are but partially good, whereas the Lord Christ is absolutely good. True ; yet the analogy is just, and it holds, even if we state no more than that the better suffer for the worse. The Christian Atonement is, indeed, transcendent in character, and cannot receive from ordinary sources any entirely adequate illustration, but yet the essence and root of this matter lies in the idea of good vicariously conveyed. And this is an operation appertaining to the

whole order of human things, so that, besides being agreeable to justice and to love, it is also sustained by analogies lying outside the Christian system, and indeed the whole order of revelation.

9. The pretexts for impugning the Divine character in connection with the redemption of man are artificially constructed by detaching the vicarious efficacy of the sufferings of our Lord from moral consequences, wrought out in those who obtain the application of His redeeming power by incorporation into His Church or Body. Take away this unnatural severance, and the objections fall to the ground.

10. And now we come to the place of what is termed pardon in the Christian system. The word justification, which in itself means making righteous, has been employed in Scripture to signify the state of acceptance into which we are introduced by the pardon of our sins. And it is strongly held by St. Paul that we are justified by faith,* not by works. Were we justified, admitted to pardon, by our works, we should be our own redeemers, not the redeemed of Christ. But there are further and unwarranted developments of these ideas, which bring us into the neighbourhood of danger.

11. I have said that, when the vicarious sufferings of Christ are so regarded that we can appropriate their virtue, while disjoining them even for a moment from moral consequences in ourselves, we open the door to imputations on the righteousness of God. But the epoch of pardon for our sins marks the point at which that appropriation is effected; and if pardon be, even for a moment, severed from a moral process of renovation,

* Rom. iii. 28, v. 1.

if these two are not made to stand in organic and vital connection with one another, that door is opened through which mischief will rush in. And thus pardon may be made to hold an illegitimate place in the Christian system; as when it is said that the condition and means of pardon are simply to believe that we are pardoned; the doctrine charged with extraordinary pertinacity and vigour by Bossuet upon Luther. But in Holy Scripture there is no opening of such a door; no possibility of entrance for such an error.

12. Pardon, on the other hand, has both a legitimate and a most important place in the Christian scheme. What is that place? and what is pardon itself? Is it arbitrary, and disconnected from the renewing process? or is it, on the other hand, based upon a thorough accord with the ethical and the practical ideas which form the heart of the scheme? Is it like an amnesty proclaimed by some human, probably some revolutionary government without any guarantee or condition as to the motives it will set in action; or is it the positive entry of the strong man into the house which he is to cleanse and to set in order, while he accompanies his entry with a proclamation of peace and joy founded upon the work which he is to achieve therein?

I suppose we do not travel far from the line of accuracy if we allege that pardon is what in the Pauline sense would be initial justification. Both of them are terms belonging to the forensic system. That epithet has great conveniences from the simplicity and force of the antithesis it signifies. I have pointed out that it is defective in point of precise accuracy, and it does not express the whole truth of the case. When a man is declared guilty in a court of justice, from which sphere

the phrase is borrowed, the meaning is definite enough in this, that the man was to suffer a penalty definite in its nature, but implying nothing certain upon the question whether he has actually committed the fault to which it is annexed. If, conversely, he is declared to be not guilty, again the meaning is not that he is certainly known not to have committed the fault, but that he is not certainly known to have committed it, and that upon the assumption of his innocence he is to go scot free. It is to be observed that this forensic phraseology, and the responsibility of the comparison which some preachers have so vulgarised by treating the transaction as one across the counter, does not appear to belong to Holy Scripture. But as Holy Scripture speaks of pardon, and of that state of condemnation in which our sin abideth, and from which we are delivered by pardon, there is here a real resemblance to the "guilty and not guilty" of the court of justice in respect of punishment impending or not impending. But there is none of the uncertainty as to true guilt or innocence which marks our imperfect efforts to establish criminal retribution ; for all things are naked to the eyes of Him with whom we have to do.

There is thus a limited or partial accommodation to the forensic idea, when use is made in theology of the word pardon, and of a justification which primarily signifies not righteousness but acquittal. Let us attempt to illustrate this accommodating use, by contrasting it with the case of physical disease under remedial treatment. Here the physician and the patient alike have to look only to the ailment and the remedy, operating upon one another. There is no such thing as an imputed cure. What the remedy gains, the

malady loses ; and *vice versâ*. There is no cure except an actual cure : no assurance of health of any kind until, and just in so far as, actual health is recovered.

The case is, however, different when we consider man as labouring under moral ailment, and as receiving the care of the Great Physician. Here, when the centre of his being is effectually reached, and the inmost spring of action, which had wrought for evil, now turns to goodness and to God as its source, the taint of former sin, the force of evil bias, is not at once, nor perhaps for a long and weary time, effectually removed. The man remains sinful except in his intention for the future. What is this intention required to be in order to bring it within the saving grace of the Gospel? Not merely a weak, not merely even a strong, remorse. Not a mere velleity of good, however that velleity be free from the taint of conscious insincerity at the moment. No, it must be the sovereign faculty of will truly (but whether permanently or not is a question only collateral to the present inquiry) turned to God, and actually and supremely operative upon the workings of the whole man ; for if there be a reserve, if the heart will not part with some treasured corruption, if like the young man in the Gospel it will not separate from all that separates from Christ, the remedial process is intercepted, the avenging record is not blotted out, there is no pardon, no justification, no capable subject upon which the blessing can descend.

But if, on the other hand, the heart is right with God in that sense which so many pages of the Scripture establish and define for us by living instances, then there is pardon ; there is that living seed of actual righteousness, which has only to grow, under the laws

appointed for our nature, in order to complete the work. Pardon is properly a thing imputed. But, besides what is imputed, something is imparted to the sinner: but, in the first place, what? and, in the second place, why?

There is imparted to him relief from the penal inflictions due to sin. But what do we mean, in the employment of these words? We do not mean that he is relieved from all the consequences of sin. Many of those consequences arrive from without, and an operation takes place in the way of cause and effect, just as independently of repentance, as if one has received a wound in a guilty foray, where sorrow for the occurrence does nothing to cure the hurt. Neither do we even mean that he is relieved from all the consequences of sin, except such as are external. For it may be too sadly true that the soul, like the souls of Guinevere and Lancelot, will have presented to it in the future the seductive influences of many a sweet temptation. Let us advance one step further. It is not meant that the penitent sinner will be relieved from all the painful consequences of sin. None of our actions end with the doing of them. Their consequences will ordinarily come back upon the doer in a multitude of forms. The evil habits will assert themselves, which the converted will and heart will at all hazards and to all extremities, resist; and here it seems obvious that the amount of pain and bitterness growing up out of the old transgressions will be greater and more intense in proportion to the earnestness, courage, and simplicity of aim with which the soul's battle of life and death is carried on. What, then, is that vast residue of the consequences of sin from which the pardoned sinner is exempted by receiving his pardon?

The answer is, I suppose, to be found in the distinction justly drawn between corrective and vindictive justice, between the remedial and the simply penal consequences of sin. Those results of sin which have been enumerated above—the pain and shame of recollection, the struggle with the enemy—are in the nature of corrective or remedial results. They are not opposed to pardon, they are not restraints upon it. They are co-operators with pardon; auxiliaries which supply their contribution towards the accomplishment of the proper work of pardon. The one and the other are alike directed to and qualified for the abatement of spiritual disease. All these consequences of sin, and all the struggles with them, if bitter in their first inception, have an after-sweetness which effectually soothes and reconciles, and engenders not only a contentment due to resignation and submission, but a kind of actual joy in salutary pain; supremely described by the genius, which has presented to us the ‘*Dream of Gerontius*.’

Far different are the pains, strictly penal as to the offender, morally exemplary for others, which attach themselves to sin when it has been deliberately and obstinately cherished. These are the pains due to, and seemingly inseparable from, that Divine constitution of the universe under which guilt and misery are bound one to another, in its permanent arrangements, by a chain of iron.

We have seen, then, that the Atonement of Christ, so far from involving deviation from the established laws of Divine justice, has its foundations deeply laid in the moral order of the world, and is an all-powerful instrument for the promotion of righteousness. It may indeed be alleged that it is a provision obviously

exceptional, and that according to ordinary laws every individual stands or falls in the main by his own well or ill doing, and not by that of another. Nor can this be denied ; it being indeed evident, that the entire case of the human inhabitants of this planet has been made, in most important respects, exceptional, through the introduction of sin into the world. And hence it may be associated with the discipline or condition of worlds other than our own. We are ordained to be a spectacle for men and angels.* If Apostles, then perhaps others, according to their degree, may, in high matters of our redemption, says St. Peter, see things which “ the angels desire to look into.”† “ The general assembly and church of the firstborn ” ‡ is named apart from “ the spirits of just men made perfect,” and probably includes more. “ Which things,” says St. Peter—namely, the spiritual things of the terrene dispensation, “ the angels desire to look into.” And in truth the whole ministry of angels, whereof the notices are so richly spread through the Scriptures, seems to imply the concern of the sinless and free creatures of God in the condition of those immediately touched by the great overshadowing fact of the Incarnation. For, on the one hand, it would, but for this, be hard to see why the sympathies of angels should not dwell on those whose condition essentially corresponds with theirs ; and, on the other, it is difficult to conceive how such a fact as the Incarnation can be without interest, nay, probably even (we may add) without consequences, for worlds other than our own. In other words, it would seem that this world does not

* 1 Cor. iv. 9.

† 1 Pet. i. 12.

‡ Heb. xii. 23.

exist for itself alone, but is, in some manner which we cannot yet unless most vaguely conceive, to serve a most important purpose of example, warning, or otherwise, on behalf of other portions of God's intelligent creation. But the exceptionality, so to call it, of the Christian dispensation is not an argument against its being true. On the contrary, it is a substantive argument in favour of the Gospel, if it be manifest that the remedy is one adapted to, and so far accounted for by, the disease : that it tends to repair the rent which has been made by disobedience in the fair order of the world, to restore that harmony of original creation which, as we are told, made the sons of God shout for joy.

In truth, it seems difficult to account for the blindness which fails to perceive the profundity of wisdom which underlies the simplicity of the Gospel. The philosophy of the Incarnation is, indeed, a great and indestructible philosophy. It was said that Socrates plucked wisdom down from Heaven. The Incarnation brought righteousness out of the region of cold abstractions, clothed it in flesh and blood, opened for it the shortest and the broadest way to all our sympathies, gave it the firmest command over the springs of human action, by incorporating it in a person, and making it, as has been beautifully said, liable to love.

Included in this great scheme, the doctrine of free pardon is not a passport for sin, nor a derogation from the moral order which carefully adapts reward and retribution to desert, but stands in the closest harmony with the component laws of our moral nature.

According to St. Matthew,* our Saviour made use of

* Matt. ix. 5.

these words: "Whether is it easier to say, 'Thy sins be forgiven thee,' or to say, 'Arise and walk;'" and then, in order that His auditory might perceive that He was invested with power to forgive sins, "He said to the sick of the palsy, 'Arise and walk;'" and the impotent creature, thus endowed with strength, arose and walked accordingly. An absolute change was effected, as if by magic, in the physical power of the man. And we understand that when his sins were thus forgiven him, a corresponding moral change was operated in his soul. Was there here an *opus operatum*, which by means independent of his free will made the man thereafter morally a different man from what he had been before? Or did not the absolving act of our Lord imply and correspond with a movement belonging to and residing in the interior of the man himself?

There are modes of presenting the doctrine of pardon according to which it effects an absolution, such that, when it has been obtained, we have only to enjoy it, and suffer it to work out its results, every other requisite of spiritual progress following spontaneously. But if this be a right conception of it, the task of harmonising such a theory with the ordinary laws which govern our moral nature becomes far from an easy one.

Pardon, as between man and man, implies a change of intimate relations, but not necessarily a change of inward disposition; for the dispensers of human pardons have no certain insight into the heart, and cannot tell whether the receiver of the absolution is worthy or unworthy to receive it. If, however, he be worthy, then the grant of a pardon is truly operative in producing a change of disposition. The child, sorry for its offence, and receiving pardon from the parent, is sensible at

once that he is relieved of a weight which oppressed and retarded him. He becomes conscious that there has been removed out of his way an obstacle, which made it harder for him to do right and avoid doing wrong. There was a clog tied about his neck, which impaired his power to move. Confidence now replaces misgiving, and cheerfulness despondency. The effect of pardon in the Christian system affords a beautiful illustration of the expression of the Psalmist,* who assures us that his feet are made "like hart's feet," to run in the way of righteousness. And the graver the fault may have been, the greater is the relief enjoyed. So that, as between God and man, pardon is a real power, helpful to the great end of sanctification. In one point of view, it is an anticipation of that freedom from the effect of past sin on the habit of the mind which may only be fully attained in the future. But it is, at the same time, a seal or stamp, verifying the renunciation of sin, and imparting vigour to the motives by which it is prospectively to be resisted. Without doubt, it is vital to bear in mind that pardon is in its essence a recognition of a change which has already taken place, as well as an instrument for producing further change. Even Divine pardon is in this sense essentially declaratory. Unless the will have been rectified, there can be no effective pardon. "David said unto Nathan, 'I have sinned against the Lord.' And Nathan said unto David, 'The Lord also hath put away thy sin; thou shalt not die.'"† But if pardon were disjoined from the condition of a converted will, then, indeed, it would be a license for transgression, instead of a powerful means for its avoidance.

* Ps. xviii. 33.

† 2 Sam. xii. 13.

In conclusion.

It is not difficult to perceive that works and proceedings such as those of Mrs. Besant may be useful to religion, not by virtue of what they intend, but by virtue of the controlling Providence which shapes their direction and effect, in total independence of the aims of their authors. Of the four propositions of Mrs. Besant, one, standing second in order, deals with the problem presented to us by the existence of evil in the world created and ruled by an all-powerful as well as all-holy God. This problem appertains to theism at large, and not to the special dispensation of the Gospel. The other three, touching upon the eternity of future punishment, the inspiration of Holy Scripture, and the atonement of Christ, lead us upon ground properly Christian. I suppose it cannot be denied that upon each and all of these doctrines rash things have been said, with the intention of defending them, but with a great lack of wisdom in the choice of means for making that defence effectual. The enemy, prowling round the fortress, may be of the highest utility in awakening the care and vigilance of those to whom its safety is entrusted. In making use, however, of this illustration, we have to recollect that this care and vigilance are to be employed not only against the foe outside the walls, but against ourselves. The heat of controversy, the intermittent negligence of the human understanding in the performance of its work, and the aptitude of selfish passions to clothe themselves in the garb of zeal for religion, are among the causes which may require the exercise of careful and constant criticism over the forms of language in which Christian doctrine has to be inculcated, and the application of a corrective and pruning process to

retrench excesses unwittingly committed by believers ; as well as to supply those voids in the assertion of doctrine which result from the wasting, sapping, and gnawing operation of actual heresy. The promise of perpetuity and immortality to the Church, against which the gates of hell are not to prevail, is a promise to the Church at large, and not to its individual members, or even to its particular sections. It will surely not be denied by any person of candid mind that these possibilities of excess through the narrowness and temerity of unbalanced zeal are more than merely abstract possibilities. They have been painfully illustrated in practice. We have been told at times of the indiscriminating grace of God, which saves or consigns to damnation according to mere choice or pleasure, and irrespectively of anything in the persons whose destinies are to be so controlled ; so that of two persons, exactly alike in point of service or offence, one is to be rescued and the other lost. The meaning of this would be that the sovereign pleasure of God did not move upon lines parallel to those of the moral law. Let those, who are so inclined, be responsible for the consequences of such a doctrine. That the apprehension of it is not unreal, may be readily perceived by those who will refer to the Lambeth Articles of 1595, passed by Whitgift and certain of the Elizabethan Bishops, but never incorporated in the authoritative documents of the English Church. As against them and all such utterances we rear the standard of Scripture : "Are not my ways equal? are not your ways unequal?"* And we welcome aid, from Mrs. Besant or any one else, which recalls us from rashness to

* Ezek. xviii. 25.

vigilance and care. Again, and in closer proximity to the present subject, we have seen that even now representations are sometimes made which seem to treat the Atonement of Christ not as a guarantee, but rather as a substitute for holiness. For if sin, which is undoubtedly a debt, be nothing but a debt, if it be so detached from the person of the debtor that when it is paid it matters not by whom, that then the debtor can no more be challenged, and remains as he was before in all things except that a burden has been discharged from his shoulders, then again the moral laws are in danger. For those laws will not for a moment tolerate that grace and favour be disjoined from reformation, justification from repentance and conversion of the heart.

Such are the openings for error, which are due to the shortcomings of individuals, or of factions in the Church. It is needless to write upon the deeper question, whether the Christian Church at large is wholly exempt from the possibility of going astray in matters not vital to the Christian faith; whether the promise of perpetual life is equivalent to a promise of perpetual and perfect health. It can hardly be said that this question is disposed of by the terms of the promise itself, for life does not of itself exclude languor and disease. Another parallel may be drawn, which is perhaps not wholly fanciful. The Christian Church has the promise and the note of sanctity, no less than of truth. And yet this promise of an indestructible holiness and striving after the image of God does not exclude vast masses of sin from her precincts. Why should imperfections in belief be less compatible with the human conditions of the Christian dispensation than imperfections in practice, provided they are subject to the same limiting provision—this

namely, that they do not touch the central seat of life ; do not destroy, though they may impair, the action of the Church in the fulfilment of its office ? We know that the tares are mingled with the wheat ; and how can we be certain that those tares may not signify perverted thought as well as corrupted action ? But I desist from this strain of observation, and bring these remarks to a close with the suggestion that, according to the established doctrine of Holy Scripture and of the Christian Church, the great Sacrifice of Calvary does not undermine or enfeeble, but illuminates and sustains, the moral law ; and that the third proposition of Mrs. Besant, with which alone we are here concerned, is naught.

XI.

THE LORD'S DAY.*

1895.

THE citadel of Christianity is in these days besieged all round its circuit. There is one point, however, in that circumference, where the defence presents to us certain particularities. That point is the article of Sabbath, or more properly of Lord's Day, observance. And the particularities are two, widely separated from one another. The first is that, among the forces employed in defence, there are important auxiliaries, who put wholly out of view the revealed sanction and the properly Christian motive ; who are not and do not profess to be available for the work of active defence of other points of the precinct. The other peculiarity is this : that very many of those defenders, whose motive and profession are not secular, but distinctly religious, are singularly ill-equipped with consistent or perspicuous ideas of the subject, and, what is more, that in their ordinary practice they systematically and very largely make over large portions of the day, if not to secular occupations and amusements, yet to secular thought and conversation. This is done without deliberate or conscious insincerity ; yet we must all feel that when the margin between profession and practice has become, and is

* Reprinted from *The Church Monthly*

allowed to remain, enormous, real insincerity lies perilously near.

As to the first head, we have a class, or more than a class, who view the subject entirely from the natural or secular side, but who still believe, with a greater or less vivid clearness of conviction, that a periodical day of rest, which they reasonably associate with the one day in seven now become so venerable from its associations as well as its origin, is a necessity of health, as well for the brain of man as for the general fabric of his body : but at any rate, and in the highest degree, for corporeal health and vigour, as commonly understood. I assume, and also very strongly believe, this to be generally true, although I am not aware that the opinion has ever been made the subject of sanitary statistics. It would, however, be interesting, if it were found practicable, to test the question through the case of that limited proportion of the British community, who do not in one way or another enjoy at the least some considerable amount of relief from labour, bodily and mental, on the consecrated day, by a definite exhibition of results on health, through a comparison of their experiences with those of the community at large.

This extremely important belief seems to be largely held among the masses of the people, apart from, as well as in connection with, the ideas of religious duty and of spiritual health. Even the most devout may thus think and feel without any inconsistency. It is probably both knowledge of, and participation in, this conception which has greatly helped the continuance of Sabbath legislation, nay, the increase of its stringency in the particular of public-houses, and the notable caution and self-restraint of the House of Commons as to

administrative changes recommended on the ground of mental recreation and improvement for the people. There can be no reason, why the firmest believers in the Christian character and obligation of the day should not thankfully avail themselves of the aid derived from alliance with this secondary but salutary sentiment.

When we approach the second head, it becomes needful to separate between ideas and practice. As to ideas, it can hardly be said that in our own country, of which alone I speak, the general mind is possessed with any conception, at once accurate and clear, of the religious ground, on which we are to observe the Sunday. There is a hazy, but still practical, and by no means superficial, impression that in some way or other it has to do with the original command delivered through Moses, so often recited in our churches, and backed there by the definite petition that God will incline our hearts "to keep this law." We do not in due proportion weigh or measure two facts which at this point bear materially on the case.

Two changes have indeed been imported into this law; one of them into its form, the other into its spirit. The first has been altered by translation of the commandment from the seventh day of the week to the first: the second, by imparting to it a positive and affirmative, in addition to its originally negative and prohibitory sense. I am not aware that the sabbatical signification has been relaxed; and it has certainly been kept in very full view by the Church, and by the State, of England. But the ascent that the Fourth Commandment of the Decalogue has made, and the development and expansion that it has received, under the Christian dispensation, have not been so prominently put forward. Hence perhaps it is that we have but imperfectly grasped

what is implied in what we familiarly call the observance of Sunday. Possibly there may have been a concurring cause for this defect in the indisposition of many minds, after the crisis of the Reformation, to recognise any action of the Church apart from actual Scripture. It is difficult, on a tranquil survey of the whole case, to exclude from it some admission of such action. But, so far as this action has existed, it has been in obvious furtherance of the mind of the Bible, and it may equitably be considered not as raising any question as between clergy and laity, but as expressing the harmonious co-operation of the entire Christian community.

The auxiliary evidence, which the Old Testament supplies to support the Fourth Commandment, is ample. And it was fortified by secondary institutions, such as the "preparation of the Sabbath," and the limitation of the Sabbath day's journey. It was not relaxed by our Lord; who lived obediently under the conditions of the older covenant, and whom we are evidently to understand, on some marked occasions, not as impairing the commandment, but as protesting against and cancelling an artificial and extravagant stiffness in its interpretation. Cruden (*in loc.*) observes that the word "Sabbaths" included the great festivals of the Jews. But the obligatory force of the Fourth Commandment as touching the seventh day is destroyed by the declaration of St. Paul (Col. ii. 16) that we are liable to be judged or coerced by none in respect of Sabbath days. This command was addressed, as is obvious, especially to Jews who had become Christians; so that it applies with an even enhanced force to us, who have never been under the obligations of the Mosaic law.

The opinion, which required a great sabbatarian

strictness, has in all likelihood been largely consequent upon the Reformation ; and, without much critical investigation of the case, has rested practically upon the Fourth Commandment of the Decalogue as it stands. It did not, however, arise at once out of the great movement, even in Scotland, where it eventually attained to a pitch of rigour, and exhibited a tenacity of life, probably greater than in any other Christian country. If we measure things not as they were Divinely intended, nor as they are in themselves, but as they are subjectively entertained, it might be a question whether the Scottish Sabbath was not for two hundred years a greater Christian Sacrament, a larger, more vital, and more influential fact in the Christianity of the country than the annual or sometimes semi-annual celebration of the Lord's Supper, or the initiatory rite of Baptism, or both together. I remember that when, half a century ago, ships were dispatched from Scottish ports to South Australia, then in its infancy, laden with well-organised companies of emigrants, I read in the published account of one of them that perfect religious toleration was established as the general rule on board ; but that, with regard to a fundamental article of religion like the Sabbath, every one was of course required to observe it. Many anecdotes might be given which illustrate the same idea : an idea open to criticism, but one with which the Presbyterian Church cannot well afford to part, without some risk to the public power and general influence of religion.

The seventh day of the week has been deposed from its title to obligatory religious observance, and its prerogative has been carried over to the first ; under no direct precept of Scripture, but yet with a Biblical

record of facts, all supplied by St. John, which go very far indeed towards showing that among the Apostles themselves, and therefore from Apostolic times, the practice of Divine worship on the Lord's Day has been continuously and firmly established. The Christian community took upon itself to alter the form of the Jewish ordinance; but this was with a view to giving larger effect to its spiritual purpose.

The seventh day had been ordained as the most appropriate, according to the Decalogue, for commemorating the old creation. The Advent of our Lord introduced us to a chain of events, by which alone the benefits of the old creation were secured to us, together with the yet higher benefits of the new. The series of these events culminated in the Resurrection. With the Resurrection began, for the Saviour Himself, a rest from all that was painful in the process of redemption, as on the seventh day there had begun a rest from the constructive labours that had brought the visible world into existence and maturity.

The seventh day was, then, the festival of the old life, accompanied with an exemption from its divinely appointed burdens. The first day was the festival of the new life, and was crowned with its constant and joyous exercise. The ordinances of joint worship exhibit one particular form of that exercise. The act of the Church or Christian community in altering the day was founded on this broad and solid analogy; and was also, as has been said, warranted by the evidence of Apostolic practice.

On the day of Resurrection itself, in the evening, the disciples were solemnly assembled, with the doors shut "for fear of the Jews,"* and the Lord, in His risen

* John xx. 19.

body, appeared among them, to confer on them their great mission.* Again, on the eighth day, or, as we should term it, seven days after the great day of the Resurrection, we have a similar assembly, and a like appearance, which records the confirmation of the faith of St. Thomas.† The same Apostle, who had linked together thus markedly these three occasions, introduces the Apocalypse to us, with a Proem that shows his deep sense of its dignity and importance; and next proceeds to localise it, first in place, by describing the isle of Patmos as the scene, and then in time, by specifying that he was “in the spirit on the Lord’s Day.”‡ We may after all this admit that the aggregate of evidence for the obligation of meeting together for worship on the Christian Sabbath, or Lord’s Day, has not literally a demonstrative character; but we must assert and insist, that its several parts are in keeping one with another, and that its combined force is morally conclusive. No Christian can entertain a reasonable doubt as to the solidity of the foundations on which the established tradition and practice rest.

But it remains to consider a portion of the subject, on which the prevailing conceptions are the most lame and incomplete.

We may now dismiss the question of the authority for the Lord’s Day. There remains the further question, What is the nature and amount of the religious observance due to it? Is it, apart from works of charity and necessity, which I set aside and cover by a general assumption all along, the setting aside of worldly business, either in part or altogether? Is it an attendance

* John xx. 21-23.† *Ibid.* 26-28.

‡ Rev. i. 9, 10.

on public worship, in quantity penuriously admitted, frugally and jealously doled out? Is the demand of duty, is the religious appetite satisfied, by the resort (be it more punctual, or less) to a single service, by thus becoming what an old friend of mine wittily calls "a oncer"; or can our bounty stand the drain on attention, and on our available hours, of two regular services of the Church? Are we to deal with the question how much of the Lord's Day shall be given to service associated with its name in the spirit, in which the commander of a capitulating fortress deals with the incoming force, when he works for a maximum of indulgence, a minimum of concession in return, and tempers his thrift only by a prudent care to avoid a rupture? Or, if the question be not too audacious, is all this haggling and huxtering upon quantities and portions beside the purpose, and is there not open to us, for the determination of the entire controversy, and for marking out the lines of duty, "a more excellent way"; a way, not to be ascertained by embarking on any voyage of fanciful investigation, but simply by examining the first and fundamental elements of the case?

May it not be that the Apostles, and the community which they guided, saw that they had to deal with the Fourth Commandment, and that the course dictated to them by the essential bearings of the case was, not to abrogate, nor to contract, nor in any manner to disparage it, but (so to speak) to transform it from within outwards; to stand upon the analogy which it suggested, and to supply the obvious application to the enlarged and altered position? The change from the seventh day to the first was one which could not be arbitrarily made. So it appears, as we were justly told at the

recent parliament of Religions in America, by the representative of one leading strain of Jewish thought, M. Pereira Mendez ; who, on behalf of the strict Mosaists, declared that they could not accept a first day "Sabbath." * We can ; and the authority, which is on our side, has also reason at its back. The old Sabbath was the festival of rest from labour with the hand : a festival of the body, or the natural life : a festival negative in its character, for its fundamental conception was simply a conception of what man was *not* to do. The Redeemer, like the Creator, had His work, and had His rest from His work ; this was on the Resurrection day, and the Apostles and the Church instituted the festival of the new life, as the Creator had (and surely from the beginning) appointed the festival of the old.

The festival of the new life. Not merely of the act of our Lord's rising, which had for its counterpart the act of the Creator's resting ; but of the life, and the employments of the life, which in His Resurrection-body He then ushered into the world. Here comes into view a point not only of difference, but of contrast. The Fourth Commandment enjoined not a life but a death, and all that may now be thought to require a living observance of the day, is not read in, but (as the lawyers say) read into it. But the celebration of the Lord's Day is the unsealing of a fountain head, a removal of the graveclothes from the man found to be alive, the opening of a life spontaneous and continuous. It reminds me of the arm of a Highland river, which the owner of the estate dammed up with a sluice on all ordinary days : but on special days he removed the

* *Indian Church Quarterly Review*, October, 1894, p. 388.

barrier, and the waters flowed. And flowed how long? Until the barrier was replaced. Not for a measured half hour or hour, but as long as they were free to flow ; and not by propulsion from without, but by native impulse from within. And in like manner the question for the Christian is, not how much of the Lord's Day shall we give to service directly Divine. If there be any analogous question it is rather, how much of it can we withhold? A suggestion to which the answer obviously is, as much, and as much only, as is required by necessity. With this come charity and mercy ; but these are not exceptions ; for they are in themselves exercises of the new life. These are undoubtedly terms of a certain elasticity ; but they are quite capable of sufficient interpretation by honest intention and an enlightened conscience. If it be said that religious services are not suited for extension over the whole day, and could only lead to exhaustion and reaction into lethargy, I would reply that the business of religion is to raise up our entire nature into the image of God, and that this, properly considered, is a large employment ; so large, that it might even be termed as having no bounds. But the limit will be best determined by maintaining a true breadth of distinction between the idea of the new life and the work of the old. All that admits the direct application of the new spirit, all that most vividly brings home to us the presence of God, all that savours most of emancipation from this earth and its *biscentum catenæ*, is matter truly proper to the Lord's Day. What it is in each case, the rectified mind and spirit of the Christian must determine. What is essential is that to the new life should belong the flower and vigour of the day. We are born, on each Lord's Day.

morning, into a new climate, a new atmosphere : and in that new atmosphere (so to speak), by the law of a renovated nature, the lungs and heart of the Christian life should spontaneously and continuously drink in the vital air.

It may perhaps be said, that this view of the subject disparages the Christian life of the other six days of the week. A fatal objection, if only the fact were so. But I believe that, if we search the matter to the bottom, it is found difficult or impossible to reach any other firm foundation for the observance of the Lord's Day. The counter idea is to give a certain portion of the day to work associated with the new life, and to withhold the rest. On what authority, what groundwork of principle, does such an idea rely for its warrant? There is no allocation of a portion, of a *quantum* of time weekly for such a purpose commanded in the Old Testament ; none in the New ; none in the known practice and tradition of the Church. Would it not seem that this is the plan that savours of will-worship, rather than the other? The observance of the Lord's Day by continuing spiritual service rests, in its inner soul and meaning, not on a mere injunction, but on a principle.

Does then that principle import any dishonour to the general law of love, obedience, and conformity to the Divine commands, which embraces all days alike without preference or distinction of degree? It does nothing of the kind. The service of God in this world is an unceasing service, without interval or suspense. But, under the conditions of our physical, intellectual, and social life, a very large portion of that service is necessarily performed within the area which is occupied by this world and its concerns, yet within which every

Christian grace finds perpetual room for its exercise. But for its exercise under circumstances not allowing the ordinary man, unless in the rarest cases, that nearness of access to the things of God, that directness of assimilation to the Divine life, which belongs to a day consecrated to spiritual opportunity. So the grace and compassion of our Lord have rescued from the open ground of worldly life a portion of that area, and have made upon it a vineyard seated on a very fruitful hill, and have fenced it in with this privilege, that, whereas for our six day work the general rule of direct contact must for the mass of men be with secular affairs, within this happy precinct there is provided, even for that same mass of men, a chartered emancipation; and the general rule is reversed, in favour of a direct contact with spiritual things.

I do not enter upon the question how far the considerations here stated bear upon the case of Festivals other than the Lord's Day. They do not all of them seem to fall into the same category, one with another, by reason of the great difference between the determining epochs of the Incarnate life of our Lord, and some minor commemorations. None of them are in precise correspondence with the case of the Lord's Day, though by analogy they are carried very near its substance, and fully correspond with its occasion, so that we are at once reminded of that similar case in the Hebrew records, where the great annual festivals of the Israelites are held to be sometimes comprised under the description of Sabbaths.

Neither do I advert, as I write for our own insular case, to diversities of idea and practice prevailing in branches of the Christian Church other than our own.

Finally, the very last idea that I should desire to convey is that the idea of the Lord's Day, which has here been suggested, is novel or original. The case is rather thus: it is an idea which, through the want of precision in the habitual thoughts of men, has fallen into the shade, and given place to other ideas presented in a shape more sharply defined. I cannot here do better than take refuge under the authority of one of the very greatest Doctors of the Church, I mean St. Augustine. In many places he touches upon the Sabbath. Our Sabbath, he says, is in the heart; in the peace of Christian hope. It is the work of God, not our own.* Our "Sabbatism" is an entry upon that life "which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath the heart of man conceived"; it is the bliss of immortality.† Its fundamental idea is "rest"; rest inhabited by sanctification. *Ibi Sanctificatio, quia ibi Spiritus Dei.*‡ The soul can have rest only in God, and the love of God is perfect sanctification, the Sabbath of Sabbaths.§ "Even now my Father works," says our Lord. Yes, but not in carnal work, and here is the removal of the veil.|| This is the rest promised to the faithful in doing good works,¶ and walking in newness of life, even as God works while He rests. What chiefly brings the people together on the Day of Rest, is hunger for the Word of God.** The fulness of Divine

* St. Augustine, *Enarr.* in Psalm xci.

† *Ibid.*, Sermon. 259, on the Octave of Easter.

‡ Sermon. 8, on the Ten Plagues.

§ Sermon. 33, on Psalm cxliii.

|| *De Genesi*, Book i.

¶ *De Genesi, ad litt.*, Book iv.

** Sermon. 128, on John v.

benediction and sanctification is the highest Sabbath.* The Lord's Day anticipates the time when we shall rest and see, see and love, love and praise, in the end that has no end.† It is undeniable that throughout St. Augustine treats the day as a whole, that he postulates an entire withdrawal from worldly occupation, and that he regards this as the basis of a rest and of an activity, which prefigure both of those in Heaven. In more than one place, too, censuring a contemporaneous Jewish laxity, he declares that useful labour on the Day of Rest would be preferable to the frivolities of recreation. And now having brought St. Augustine before the reader to explain the basis of Lord's Day observance, I feel that there can be no more appropriate moment for withdrawing myself from his attention.

* 'De Civ. Dei,' xxii. 4.

† *Ibid.* 5.

XII.

ON THE ANCIENT BELIEFS IN A FUTURE STATE.

1891.

It is a circumstance of real literary interest that there should be published in Calcutta a periodical devoted to the promotion of Christian learning, under the auspices of the Oxford Mission to India, and depending upon the contributions of Native as well as of British writers ; and further, that it should attract the support of so distinguished a Hebraist and Biblical scholar as Professor Cheyne. An article by this Professor * furnishes the point of departure for the following remarks upon a subject of interest alike in itself and in its relation to other and yet wider subjects.

It is the opinion of Professor Cheyne that there is a doctrine of immortality in the Old Testament. He finds it in Psalms xvi., xvii., xxxvi., xlix., lxiii., lxxiii. He thinks he has proved that these Psalms were composed "during the latter part of the Persian rule over Palestine." In the Review, however, he does not enter upon the date of these Psalms : but states a principle which serves as

* *Indian Church Quarterly Review*, April, 1891, No. 2, p. 127. (Calcutta: Oxford Mission Press; London: Masters, 78, New Bond Street.)

a convenient text for a discussion of the subject touched by it. The principle is this* :—

“It involves a much greater strain upon faith to hold that the wonderful intuition of immortality was granted so early as the times of David and Solomon, than to bring the Psalms in question down to the late Persian age.”

The general doctrine which appears to be here conveyed is to something like the following effect : that the human race advances through experience, heredity, and tradition, from infancy towards maturity ; that the mind, subjected to these educative agencies, undergoes a process of expansion, and becomes capable in a later age of accepting intelligently what in an earlier age it could not have been fit to receive. In my opinion such a doctrine requires an important qualification ; because moral elements, as well as those which are intellectual, go to form our capability of profitable reception, and because it depends upon the due proportion and combination of the two whether an advance in the understanding shall or shall not bring us nearer to the truth. But, for the sake of argument, let the doctrine stand. If it stands, it sustains a presumption that knowledge with respect to a future life, after once being imparted, improved in the early stages of human history with the lapse of time. But, as yet, the doctrine rests only on the footing of an argument *a priori*. From this there actually lies an appeal to the argument derivable from positive testimony. Does our information with regard to the religions of the ancients lead us to believe that the sense of a future world advanced, or that it receded,

* *Indian Church Quarterly Review*, April, 1891, No. 2, p. 128.

as "the years rolled into the centuries," and as civilisation assumed more positive and consolidated forms? Be it remembered all along that the question before us is not whether the knowledge of a future state was evolved by man subjectively from his own thoughts, or was divinely imparted. The present question is only whether, when once received, this particular article of religious knowledge progressively advanced along with the general growth of intelligence, or whether, on the contrary, it declined.

I am not willing, however, to quit altogether this question of presumption *a priori* without drawing an inference in parallel subject matter, which appears to me relevant, and rather strong.

If the advance of civilisation imported the growth of intelligence, and if the advance of intelligence quickened the mental eye for the perception of things beyond the material range, this quickening, it is obvious, would be available, not for the future only, but for the unseen world at large, both as to a standing consciousness of its existence, and as to a readiness to acknowledge and accept the presence on earth, and in human affairs, of any beings by whom it is supposed to be peopled.

It is intelligible, indeed, that a distinction may be drawn between a belief in Providence, and a belief in Theophany, or in the marvellous under any of its many forms. Let us accept this distinction. It will still, I apprehend, remain undeniable that the onward movement of ancient civilisation did not in practice enliven, but rather, on the contrary, tended to weaken or efface the belief in the doctrine of Providence; in an unseen but constant superintendence and direction of human affairs by the Divine power. I take Homer and

Herodotos as two men who, while separated in time by a number of centuries even greater than the four which the historian allows, were both of them, according to the lights and opportunities of their day, pious men. But how far stronger, more familiar, and more vivid, is the sense of a Providence truly divine, of the *theos* and *theoi* quite apart from polytheistic limitations, in Homer than in Herodotos ! Take another step, say of half a century, from Herodotos to Thucydides ; and you encounter a work of history generally as perfect in its manipulation as the highest productions of Phidias ; but a work, also, the author of which had lost all touch of the religious idea, and could hardly be said to see, what even Agnosticism thinks it sees, the fact of a mighty or an almighty power working behind an impenetrable curtain. Well : during the interval of time between Homer and Thucydides the progress of Greece in civilisation had been immense ; but she had lost her grasp of the doctrine of Providence, of the nearness of deity to man, of its living care for human affairs and interests. And whatever may be said of the speculations of Plato, an intellect more muscular, more comprehensive, and more entirely Greek—the intellect of Aristotle—places the element of deity at a distance from human life as wide as that of the Lucretian heaven. This was not, evidently, because of a decline in intellectual capacity. But the aggregate of the influences operative upon human perception had enfeebled the sense of the unseen *present*. The presumption, though (thus far) no more than a presumption, herewith arises that it would also enfeeble the sense of the unknown future.

Now let us pass on to the direct evidence available upon the subject before us : and I will recite at once

the conclusions which the facts, as far as we know them, seem to me to recommend. They are as follows:—

1. That the movement of ideas between the time of civilisation in its cradle, and the time of civilisation in its full-grown stature, on the subject of future retribution, if not of a future existence generally, was a retrograde, and not a forward, movement.

2. That there is reason, outside the Psalter, to think that the Old Testament implies the belief in a future state, as a belief accepted among the Hebrews; although it in no way formed an element of the Mosaic usages, and cannot be said to be prominent even in the Psalms.

3. That the conservation of the truth concerning a future state does not appear to have constituted a specific element in the Divine commission intrusted to the Hebrew race, and that it is open to consideration, whether more was done for the maintenance of this truth in certain of the Gentile religions.

I.

As regards the first of these propositions, which is one of fact only, we seem to labour under this great difficulty, that the Greek or Olympian religion is the only religion of antiquity which we can trace at all minutely in its different phases through the literature and records of the country; whereas it is by no means a religion which distinctively enshrines the doctrine of a future state. In the case of Assyria, while we might hope for testimony extending over a lengthened period, the destiny of mankind after death did not, according to Canon Rawlinson, occupy a prominent place in the beliefs of the people.* And if we turn to the Egyptian,

* 'Ancient Religions,' p. 77.

and the Iranian or Persian religions, the means of comparing their earlier with their later states seem to be very incomplete though not wholly insignificant. The Persian religion in its earlier condition was one of a dualism of abstract conceptions, and it progressively developed them into rival personalities. In the course of time, the country came under the influence of Magianism. To the early Zoroastrianism, there had been attached a strong belief in a future state of a retributive character. But when Herodotos * wrote his account of the Persian religion he described the Magian system and its elemental worship, and seems to have known little or nothing of the older Persian scheme, unless on the negative side, where it rejected temples, images, and altars. The older form had now apparently come to be the religion of the Court, rather than of the people.† The religion of abstract ideas had lost ground ; that which was sacerdotal and pantheistic had gained it. I see thus far no sign of progress in the doctrine of a future state. The inference rather is that it was passing into the shade.

The historical relations, however, between Greece and the Persian empire were so important that, probably on this account, a large number of the Greek writers, Aristotle himself included, gave attention to the religion of the great antagonist whom Alexander finally overthrew. It was, most probably, the later condition of that religion, to which their accounts relate. The most important of them, from Herodotos to Plutarch, are textually cited or described in Dr. Haug's Essays on

* 'Herod.' i. 131, 138 ; iii. 16.

† Rawlinson's essay, in his 'Herod.' i. 426-431.

the Parsees.* No one of them, except that ascribed to Theopompos,† makes any reference to the future state. We shall see presently what a place this doctrine occupied in the earlier times of Zoroastrianism.

The political relations of Greece with the Egyptian empire appear to have been important in the prehistoric period; but the notices of them are few and undetermined. In the great literary age, they were of secondary concern. It has become well known, from the monuments, how powerfully the doctrine of the future life was developed in the archaic religion of Egypt. It was not to be expected that the classical period should here supply us with information such as it has furnished with respect to the religion of Persia. But Herodotos was led, partly by the peculiarities of the case of Egypt generally, and partly from his acknowledging a certain early connection between its religion and that of Greece, to devote more than forty sections of his second Book to his account of it.‡ Yet that principal account does not contain one word of reference to future retribution, or of belief in the existence of the soul after death; although in another portion of his work we shall see that he mentions the primitive Egyptian teaching.

The fifteenth Satire of Juvenal censures in the strongest terms the Egyptian religion of his own day, at once debased and fanatical. He then closes the satire in an ethical strain of remarkable loftiness; and it might be thought that, had future retribution been a living and prominent portion of the Egyptian religion of his day, he

* 'Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsees,' by Dr. Martin Haug. Edited and enlarged by Dr. West (London, 1890), Essay I. pp. 3-16.

† Page 9.

‡ Vol. ii. 35-76.

could hardly have avoided making some reference to it, especially as he appears to have been himself a believer in the unseen world.* But in the 'Isis et Osiris' of Plutarch, I find a passage which, if I understand it rightly, signifies that the Egyptian priests of his time had become somewhat ashamed of the old definite, circumstantial teaching of their religion concerning Osiris,† as the judge of each dead man and lord of the Underworld, in that it savoured too much of matter, or was in some way behind the age. Again, Iamblichus, writing in the age of Constantine, and discussing the Egyptian religion, assigns to it a high rank, but does not seem to include the idea of a future state among its motive powers.‡ Thus, then, the doctrine of the future state, if viewed as a working portion of religion, lost force and did not gain it with the lapse of time under the Egyptian system, which had been so famous for its early inculcation.

Undoubtedly this seems to have been the case also with the Greeks. The genius of that extraordinary people does not appear at any time to have qualified or inclined them to adopt with anything like earnestness or force that belief, which is so marked in the religions of Egypt and of Persia at an early date. Homer is here our principal authority: and what we gather from the 'Odyssey' is that the Underworld of the Poet is evidently an exotic and imported conception, made up of elements which were chiefly supplied from the religions of Egypt and Assyria. We may also observe that the place he

* Sat. ii. 149, sqq.

† Plut. 'De Is. et Os.' 382. 37. Τοῦτο, ὅπερ οἱ νῦν ἱερεῖς ἀφοσιούμενοι καὶ παρακαλυπτόμενοι μετ' εὐλαβείας ὑποδηλοῦσιν.

‡ Iamblichus, 'De Mysteriis,' 159. (Lugduni, 1577.)

finds for it lies in the outer zone of his geography, beyond the great encircling River Okeanos. In the 'Iliad,' the great national and patriotic poem of Homer, the doctrine of the future life appears only in the case of Patroklos, and there only as a vague, remote, and shadowy image. The Egyptian name for the kingdom of the dead was Amenti, which seems to reappear in the Greek Rhadamanthos. There is a singular circumstance associated with one of the discoveries of Schliemann at Mycenæ. In a tomb fifteen feet six inches in length, and only five feet six inches in breadth, the bodies of full-grown men are laid not along but across the space, being thus squeezed in the strangest manner. But they were in this way made to lie east and west, and towards the west: and such we learn was the position in which the Egyptians laid their dead.* Minos is also introduced to us as a personage in the Underworld of the 'Odyssey,' and he is engaged in administering justice. So far we follow the Egyptian idea. But the Greek spirit took the heart and life out of the realm of Osiris. Minos sits, so to speak, not as a criminal but as a civil judge: he does not punish the guilty for their misdeeds on earth, but simply meets the wants of a community for an arbitrator of determining authority in their affairs.† No one, whom we can certainly call a compatriot of Homer's, appears in the Underworld as under penal suffering: not, for instance, Aigisthos, or Klutaimnestra, who might have been fit subjects for it. In the ethical code of Homer, there is no clear recognition of penalty for sin; except it be for perjury upon the breach of great

* Schliemann's 'Mycenæ,' xxxii. iii. and 295.

† 'Odyssey,' xi. 568-571.

public pacts; and this penalty is made applicable to gods and men alike. The only case, in which he associates the existence after death with happiness, is that of Menelaos. Menelaos is among the purest characters of the Poems: but the reason given for his fortunate lot is, that he was the husband of Helen, and son-in-law of Zeus.* It is, however, plain that there must have been a general belief in a future state among his contemporaries, or we should not find it as we now find it embodied and developed in a poem essentially popular.

It was, then, an article of the national belief in the heroic age. What became of it in the classical period? It faded out of notice. There grew up instead of it that remarkable idea of the self-sufficiency of life, which became a basis for Greek existence. Apart from particular exceptions, and from the mysteries, which remained always only mysteries for the people, things temporal and things seen affixed all round a limit to human interests. The Underworld could not have been treated as it is treated by Aristophanes, in any country except one where for the mind of the people at large it had ceased to have a really religious existence. The disputed existence which it obtained in some of the philosophical schools is itself a witness to the fact that for man as such, in the wear and tear of centuries, the idea had not, upon the whole, gained ground, but lost it, among the most intellectual people ever known.

Have we not then to wait for the evidence which is to show that the doctrine of immortality would have been too great a strain for the Hebrews at the reputed

* 'Odyssey,' iv. 569.

era of the composition of the Psalms under David and Solomon, and that it was mercifully withheld from primitive man who could only feed on milk, to be administered as strong meat to a later and more mature generation?

Even were such evidence to be forthcoming on behalf of the general proposition, we should still have to ask how it is known, or why it is to be believed, that the idea of immortality was made known to the Hebrews from Persian sources? The Captivity was not a Persian, but a Babylonian captivity. The advent of Persian power brought it to a close. It was Magianism, rather than Zoroastrianism, that the political influence of Persia at the time would have been likely to impart. But what proof is there, during the period which followed the return, and preceded the Greek supremacy, of this kind of Persian influence over the Hebrew people? The adoption of Persian words in the popular language was a general fruit of Persian power, and is said not to have included subjects of religion.* But I pass on to the second of the three heads which have been proposed.

II.

The six Psalms, indicated by Professor Cheyne as those in which the hope of immortality may perhaps be traced, all lie within the first, that is, speaking generally, the older portion of the Psalter. For those who suppose them to have belonged to the worship of Solomon's temple, and who are glad to follow Professor Cheyne when he proves that they embody the hope of a future

* Haug, p. 5.

life, it would be somewhat anomalous to believe that, while the public service taught this doctrine, no mark of it had been left, outside the Temple walls, upon the historical books of the Old Testament, or in the sense of the people. True, the doctrine of a future existence is not prominent upon the face of the older Scriptures. Neither, it might perhaps be said, is it very conspicuous in the speech and actions of the Pharisees in the Gospels, who notwithstanding are known to have held it. But yet we should expect to find some traces of it: and our Lord has actually taught us that it is conveyed in the declaration that God was the God of Abraham and of Isaac and Jacob; a saying of which the force can hardly be escaped by the plea that He was interpreting ancient lore in conformity with the current opinion of the people.

In the Authorised, and also in the Revised, Version of Gen. v. 24, we read the words,

“And Enoch walked with God: and he was not; for God took him.”

The rendering of the Septuagint is that he pleased God, and that he was not found, for God transposed or transplanted him. The natural sense of the words taken from the Hebrew is the necessary sense of the Greek: and it appears that it is adopted by the various Targums.* Is it possible rationally to put any interpretation on this verse, except one which conveys the idea just as the Septuagint has put it, and shows that life in the unseen world was a conception accepted both by the author of the verse, and by those for whom it was written? Such is the sense given to it in Ecclesiasticus

* Bishop Browne, in the ‘Speaker’s Commentary,’ *in loc.*

xliv. 16 and in Heb. xi. 5. Such is the sense given by Bishop Browne in the Speaker's Bible, by Fuller in the Student's Bible, by Bishop Patrick adopted into Mant's Bible, by Grotius, Fagius, and others* in the 'Critici Sacri.' But I will not pursue further this enumeration in a case which does not seem to leave room for doubt. I will only add that the legend of Ganymede, according to the beautiful form which it bears in the 'Iliad,'† with just so much of descent from the loftiness of the old Hebrew tradition as we might have expected, seems to owe its origin to the translation of Enoch.

There seems to subsist a vague, but widespread, impression that the Hebrews of ancient times were not made aware of the existence after death. In the direction of this untrue notion, two concessions I believe, and two only, can be made. The first is, that the future state is nowhere proclaimed by Moses. The second, that a national and public dispensation of rewards and punishments, purely temporal, may have had a certain tendency to throw into the shade in the individual mind the doctrine of our surviving corporal dissolution. And, for us of this day, it is possible that the argument of Warburton in the 'Divine Legation' may have been made instrumental to consequences for which its author is not really responsible. What he argued was, that Moses never would have promulgated his system, devoid as it was of sanctions from the doctrine of a future state, unless he had been divinely commissioned and inspired. But around this fair and probable argument there has gathered a varied group of errors, with this

* *In loco* by each of these respectively.

† 'Iliad,' xx. 232-235.

main one at the head, that the religion taught by Moses was the entire religion of the patriarchs and of the ancient Hebrew nation ; or that at the least it was, as a religion, an advance upon the patriarchal religion, a kind of halfway house between it and Christianity, so that to look beyond it for any truths of Hebrew belief, which it does not contain, is to recede from the light into the darkness.

There are, indeed, delivered by Moses certain broad enunciations of principle, which appertain to the habitual religion of the individual and may truly be called spiritual commandments. In part, the injunctions of the Decalogue have this character ; but they do not seem to mark the point of loftiest elevation reached by the declarations of Moses. The principle of love is not expressly contained (unless as to parents only) in the ten precepts ; although room, so to speak, is made for it to occupy, by the exclusion of false gods, by the re-injunction of the sabbatical rest—for it may, after the Assyrian discoveries,* with increased confidence be described as a revival—and by the negatives so rigorously put upon crime and appetite. But may it not be said that those negative forms, and that revival of the sabbath, of themselves point to something higher ? The acme of the declarations of Moses appears to be reached first in Leviticus (xix. 18), where it is proclaimed that a man is to love his neighbour as he loves himself ; and further, in Deuteronomy (vi. 5), that he is to love the Lord *his* God with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his strength. These injunctions fill the space left open by the Decalogue. Is there any reason

* Smith, ' Assyrian Discoveries,' p. 12.

for regarding them as novelties, first taught from or after Sinai? It is easy indeed to comprehend the appropriate wisdom of their solemn republication after the children of Israel had so long dwelt in the midst of a corrupt idolatry, and so far as we know without the advantage either of a fixed code or of positive institutions,* to cherish and keep alive the truths which their fathers had possessed. True, these great principles of religion are nowhere taught in the Book of Genesis as precepts; but neither is belief in God, or any other part of the religion of the patriarchs, set out in a creed or a code. We only see it live and work: and are not these great principles of love to God and man the very same principles, which made Enoch too good to remain under the conditions of an earthly life, and which fashioned the faultless character of Joseph?

The Mosaic law was neither the full enunciation of a personal religion for individuals, nor an instrument for educating a nation into counsels of perfection. In truth, it dealt with the nation rather than with its component members, and laid down precepts for each of these only in so far as it was necessary to maintain them as a community separated from the rest, to testify against idolatry by the worship of one God, to exhibit through its ritual and sacrificial system the character of sin, to cherish the expectation of a coming deliverance, and in the meantime, and until the fulness of time should come, to gird about an encircled space, "a vineyard in a very

* It is at any rate remarkable that the reason given for the release of the children of Israel from Egypt is (Exod. vii. 16; viii. 20) that they may serve God in the wilderness; and again it appears, from Exod. viii. 20-23, that they could not perform the proper sacrifices to God in Egypt, but must go into the wilderness for the purpose.

fruitful hill ; " * within which a spiritual worship, and the lives befitting it, might have full and unhindered growth upon the basis traditionally known to the fathers of the race.

But it may without difficulty be shown that, while the Mosaic law was a law of temporal sanctions only, the people did not fall so low, in the scale either of nature or of grace, as to suppose that the life of man is at an end when his remains are laid in the ground : that they did not sink so far beneath the other nations of remote antiquity, none of which appear to have entertained that dishonouring and dangerous belief, though they varied from others in the prominence which their systems assigned to the positive doctrine on the subject. It might perhaps be sufficient to cite the care taken and cost incurred by them in the sepulture of the dead, as 'proofs that when burial was accomplished they did not think all was over. But more pointed proofs are not deficient. Let us take, for instance, the case of the prophet Elijah. In his lifetime, he must have been a character as conspicuous as the sovereigns of the country ; while, after his death, it appears that a living tradition of his greatness made him the special type of the prophetic office, both in the mouth of Malachi, and when four more centuries had elapsed at the Transfiguration of our Saviour.† It will not, I suppose, be disputed, that the Hebrews received as true the history of his being corporally transported into heaven : an occurrence, which we are specially informed that fifty men of the sons of the prophets stood to witness from a distance, while Elijah and Elisha passed over

* Isa. v. 1.

† Mal. iv. 2 ; Mark ix. 4.

Jordan together.*. Is it possible that a people, who believed this prophet had thus been carried up from earth, believed also that with that miraculous transportation his existence came to an end?

Still more remarkable, upon the point now before us, is the proof of the popular belief afforded by the practice of necromancy among the people. The whole basis of such a practice lies in an established popular conviction that the spirits of the departed not only existed, but existed in a state of susceptible faculty, and might be moved, by influences exercised in this world, to make apparition before the eyes of the living. It appears, indeed, that this practice was viewed by the governing powers with jealousy, for the woman, who had "the familiar spirit," urged, when application was made to her, that it was dangerous for her to comply, because Saul had "cut off those that have familiar spirits, and the wizard out of the land."† Under such circumstances, as the prohibitions of the Mosaic law were no dead letter, the profession of the witch could only be kept alive by strong inducements; and what strong inducement could there be, except a curiosity of the people for direct information about the dead, which involved the certainty of their continuing existence?

King Saul finds himself placed in desperate straits by the attack of the Philistine army, at the time when David was serving in its ranks. Samuel, the mainstay of the State, had recently died, and had been solemnly mourned for by the people. Saul was driven, in order to obtain the benefit of indispensable counsel, to seek the aid of those whom he had attempted to extirpate.

* 2 Kings ii. 7.

† 1 Sam. xxviii. 4, 9.

Failing to obtain light upon the emergency by any of the ordinary means, he requires his servants to find for him a woman with a familiar spirit. He is referred to such a person, who lives at Endor. He repairs to her in disguise, evidently believing that, though she would of course regard the king as her enemy, yet, if he could pass for one of the people, she would meet his desire, and evoke the spirit of the dead in the regular way of business. She recognises the king, and he has to give her a promise of indemnity. Samuel is then brought up; and a scene is reported to have taken place, in which his spirit addresses King Saul, and, in the exercise of the gift of prophecy, announces that his kingdom was to depart from him. Such is the narrative, which would appear to imply the reality of the apparition. Both the rabbinical commentators, however, and the Christian writers, are divided upon this question down to the present day.* But this is a matter wholly apart from the present argument, which simply rests upon the fact that there was a general belief in such apparitions, a belief extending even to the king upon the throne. The measures taken by Saul for the suppression of necromancy and all witchcraft, may have been adopted in obedience to the stringent and repeated prohibitions contained in the law.† Those prohibitions do not expressly name intercourse with the dead, but this, I apprehend, cannot be excluded from the general scope of the profession; and, if so, the number and nature of the prohibitions is a

* See Grotius, Munterus, and others, in the *Critici Sacri*; and, of recent commentators, Adam Clarke, the Speaker's Bible, the Student's Bible, Mant, and Thomas Scott. Modern English commentators for the most part affirm the reality.

† Exod. xxii. 18; Lev. xix. 21; xxx. 6; Deut. xviii. 10.

fresh testimony to the popular belief in the existence of the soul after death, and seems to indicate its continuity among the Israelites from the time of Moses onwards.

It is not now the question how far this belief was developed, or how far it was operative on conduct. We have no proof from Scripture that it implied the punishment of bad men in the other world, though the cases of Enoch and Elijah may fairly stand as indicating the rewards of those who were pre-eminently good. Neither, again, in the Psalms is the penal part of the doctrine of a future life as plainly discernible, as the portion which concerns the rest and peace of saints. As we see from Homer, the ideas of future retribution and of future existence have not a necessary, though they have an appropriate, connection. My proposition amounts simply to this: that, as in the time of our Lord, so in the pre-exilic periods, the Hebrew race in general did not believe in the extinction of the soul at death: and that, as to the completeness and moral power of this belief, we do not seem to have evidence requiring or entitling us to draw any very broad distinction in favour of one period as against another. Thus much I have admitted: that, as the theocratic system of Moses, aided by the order of prophets, worked in the earlier time in a manner more legible, so to speak, by the people, than after the exile, and as this may have tended somewhat to confine or weaken the habit of mind which resorts to future sanctions, so the post-exilic period, or that large part of it which was passed in a condition of political dependence, may to some extent have been favourable to a more active sense of the future life. But nowhere does a necessity seem to arise for supposing that the

Jews received any large infusion of positive doctrine on the subject of a future state from the circumstances of the Babylonish captivity, or from Persian influences after its close.

III.

If, then, it is admitted, even by those who favour the argument followed in these pages, that the doctrine of a future state nowhere entered into the prescriptions of the Mosaic law, and is not directly declared and inculcated in the earliest Scriptures, it probably subsisted among the Hebrews rather as a private opinion, than as an obligatory belief. And it obviously follows that it did not form a part of those truths, or of that system, which the Jewish people were appointed to maintain and to transmit. It was not divinely intrusted to them, as part and parcel of their special work. Was there, then, any other, even if it were an indeterminate, provision among the nations for the conservation of this belief?

Undoubtedly, in this wayward world of ours, truth commonly has error on its borders, and in the neighbourhood of religious beliefs, in themselves just and weighty, there may lie all round a set of opinions, more or less openly avowed, which, if associated with them at all in the order of thought, are no better than their spurious offspring. Thus, from the Christian point of view, it was a great fact of religion that, long before the Advent, and indeed from the outset of human history, God had selected a portion or portions of the human race for high and special purposes to which He perceived their adaptation. From the call of Abraham onwards, we perceive that great and wonderful selection

of his posterity, which proclaims itself to the world down to this very day. But upon such a positive truth men have allowed themselves to graft the negative assertion, that the rest of mankind were outcasts, without any sign of the Divine favour, or of possessing a share in the designs of the Almighty for the education of mankind.

It is likely that this misconception may have been extended and strengthened by the great movement of the sixteenth century. That movement threw the mind of the reformed communities upon Scripture, as a bulwark of defence against the ruling authorities of the Latin Church; and this not upon the New Testament only, which records the final breaking down of the wall of severance, but upon Scripture as a whole; so that, especially within the energetic sweep of Scottish Presbyterianism, and of Puritanism in England, the Old Testament was lifted more nearly to a level with the New. In details the Old Testament itself testifies, by hundreds of passages, to the active providential relation with persons and races outside the confines of the Abrahamic race and the Mosaic dispensation. The dealing with Melchisedec, the marriage of Joseph to the daughter of the priest of On,* and of Moses to the daughter of the priest of Midian,† the assignment of portions of country in the promised land to Canaanites, the remarkable history of Balaam, the beautiful episode of Ruth the Moabitess, the explicit language of the Psalms, and of the prophets, among whom Jonah had no other mission than to Nineveh—all these circumstances, which might be stated with very wide development, ought to

* Gen. xiv. 18; xlii. 50.

† Exod. ii. 21.

have made the enlarged knowledge of Scripture a guarantee against narrow conceptions. But the resort to the sacred volume was of necessity in a great degree polemical; and the polemical frame of mind, however effective for its immediate purposes, however inevitable in the case before us, is too commonly fatal to enlargement and impartiality of view. The notion of a race preferred over other races, and employed in a particular case to administer punishment for depravity, was magnified into an absolutely exclusive love, and a not less sweeping condemnation or neglect.

It was a breaking of new ground when, in 1815, there was published an essay of Bishop Horsley's which treats of Messianic prophecy and of various portions of truth preserved among the heathen. Among these were included the immortality of the soul; and the Bishop, in anticipation of researches to come, makes reference to the sacred books of Persia.*

It has been, indeed, the belief of the Christian Church and community, that the history not only of the chosen people but of the world throughout a very wide circle was, before the coming of our Lord, a grand *præparatio evangelica*. In some respects, the forms of this preliminary discipline were obvious enough. The conquests of Alexander secured for that marvellous instrument of thought, the Greek language, such a currency as, when backed by the influence which in the West had been acquired by its literary monuments, dispensed as it were with the day of Pentecost in the general action of the

* 'A Dissertation on the Prophecies of the Messiah dispersed among the Heathen,' pp. 16, 115. The essay, which was posthumous, is wider than its title.

Christian Church, and supplied a channel of communication and a vehicle of worship available in most parts of the civilised world. What the genius of Greece was to secure in the region of thought, the vast extension of the Roman empire effected in the world of outward fact. It prepared the way of the Lord, and made the rough places plain. Immediately before and after the advent, it levelled the barriers between separate and hostile communities, and for the first time established the idea of police in its highest form, and made peaceable and safe intercourse everywhere possible among men. Everywhere it was, as with us in Britain: "when the Roman left us," then it was that again "the ways were filled with rapine." *

Another stage on the way to the comprehension of a truth of the widest reach and highest value was attained, when the world began to be sensible of its debt to ancient Greece. It may well be, to us of this day, a marvel to conceive how it could have been that, down to a time when poetry and the arts had already achieved the most splendid progress, the Christian world remained insensible to the superlative dignity and value of the ancient Greek literature and art. In Italy at least, the compositions of the Greeks must all along have survived in numerous manuscripts. But the Greeks had not merely produced a certain number, not after all a very large one, of great works of mind and hand: they had established habits of mind and of performance, alike in art, in letters, and in philosophy, such that they furnished the norm for civilised man in the ages to come. Hellenism became a capital fact for the race. Greece

* Tennyson's 'Guinevere.'

supplied the intellectual factor under the new dispensation of Christianity, as truly as the Hebrew race supplied us with the spiritual force which was to regenerate the heart and will of man. And this was done for millions, who knew little but the name either of Greeks or Jews. And if this transcendent function was assigned to the Hellenic race, outside the bounds of any continuing revelation, the question surely arises whether other races may, through their forms of religion or otherwise, have made their special contributions to the fulfilment of the grand design for establishing the religion of the Cross, and for giving it an ascendancy which is already beyond dispute, and which may be destined even to become, in the course of time, universal over the surface of the earth.

The last, and in a much higher degree the present, centuries have opened the door to a knowledge wholly without precedent of these ancient religions, which took and long held their place in conjunction with advanced civilisation and commanding political power. I suppose that Sir William Jones and Anquetil du Perron will be for ever famous among the pioneers in this great undertaking, the one for his services with regard to the Vedic, and the other to the Zoroastrian religion. Besides the vast subsequent progress in the spheres of knowledge there opened, the interpretation of the Egyptian and the Assyrian monuments has effected nothing less than a revolution with regard to the archaic religions of the earliest great empires of the world. It is of the deepest interest to examine whether in any and what particulars, now recognised by Christians as undoubted portions of revealed truth, those religions were more advanced or more enlarged than the religion of the favoured race.

The question is hardly one entangled with controversy. No doubt, if it be found that these extraneous and independent religions taught in any point more fully than the Hebrews what Christians now acknowledge, this will be for Christians a new and striking proof that in the infancy of the race of Adam, and before its distribution over the earth, the Almighty imparted to it precious knowledge, which it could hardly have discovered, and was but indifferently able to retain. But those, who view religions as simply the formations gradually effected by our own unaided powers, from fetichism upwards, will have their solution ready also : the diversities of the onward movement, as between one race and another, will for them only show variety in tastes and in capacity for progress. Let me proceed to an example.

It is a favourite observation with the negative writers on religion, that the narrative of the temptation in the Garden of Eden lends no support to the doctrine of the existence of Satan or of devils, inasmuch as the seduction of Eve from obedience is ascribed simply to the serpent. The personal action of the evil spirit is mentioned in several places of the Old Testament. But there is no identification of him with the serpent of Paradise ; and further, there is no distinct intimation that he came to be what he was through a rebellion against God, followed by a fall from heaven. The magnificent description by Isaiah * of the fall of Lucifer from above, though it may well serve for a description of such a rebellion, is primarily referable to the king of Babylon. It is only passages of the New Testament,

* Isa. xiv. 4-19.

and these not systematically combined in its text, which inform us that he was a fallen spirit, once in conflict with the servants of the Most High. We hear nothing, in fact, from the Old Testament of the War in heaven. But while this awful tradition was waiting for its sanction from the pens of Apostles, and was apparently unknown to the Hebrews, there was sufficient recollection of it in the heathen religions. We are told of it as late as by Horace.* Homer gives it us in various forms—of the Titans punished in Tartaros,† of the Giants,‡ and perhaps also in the attempt of Otos and Ephialtes to scale the heavens.§ Still, we had not until recently had easy means of carrying the tradition further back into remote antiquity. But the Assyrian monuments, though as yet but partially unveiled, furnish a tablet,|| thought by Mr. Smith to be one of those about which Berosus states that they were buried before the Deluge, and disinterred after it had subsided. This tablet contains the story of the seven wicked gods or spirits, who conspired together to make war against Hea. And Hea sends his son Merodach to put them down, even as Horace in his fine ode assigns to Apollo a capital share in quelling the attack of the Giants.¶ Probably much more evidence could be collected to the same effect. But what has been said is sufficient as an instance in support of my general proposition, namely, there may be cases where the independent religions of antiquity have enshrined in very pointed forms traditions justly to be

* Hor. 'Od.' b. iii. 1; v. 49.

† Hom. 'Od.' vii. 59, 206.

‡ G. Smith's 'Assyrian Discoveries,' pp. 398-402.

¶ Hor. 'Od.' iii. iv. 60-64.

† 'Il.' x. 429.

§ *Ibid.* xi. 307.

called primeval, which have obtained no clear notice in the Old Testament, but which subsequently appear as authorised portions of the New. If this be true, then it is surely also true that these religions were employed *pro tanto* in the counsels of Divine Providence, for purposes reaching beyond and above the consciousness of those who proclaimed and practised them.

Let us now proceed to take a somewhat higher flight. It will be admitted on all hands that the doctrine of a life beyond the grave is an article essential, to speak moderately, for the completeness of religion. Locke, in his famous Essay, excluded from toleration those who did not believe in a future state, because without such belief, as he held, they could give no sufficient guarantee for their conduct as good citizens. No one perhaps would act upon such an opinion now. There is a law written in our nature itself, apart both from temporal sanctions and from the prolongation of existence after death, which of itself imposes upon sound minds a real obligation to good conduct. But there are several things which may be fairly urged. First, all men have not sound minds; and secondly, that the doctrine of a future life not only harmonises with, but very greatly strengthens that obligation. And moreover, that any power, which society now possesses to dispense with this powerful sanction, and yet enjoy comparative impunity, is largely due to an elevation in the social standard of right and wrong, both public and private, due to the long reign of Christianity in the manners, policy, and belief of civilised man.

We have seen that the doctrine of a future life was not among the sanctions of the Mosaic law. It is not

necessary for my purpose to endeavour to track it through all the non-Mosaic religions of antiquity. It will be enough to dwell upon two of them, in which it appears to have attained, at a very early date, a remarkable development. And it is noteworthy that, while the recipients of special religious light in pre-historic times were Semites, neither of these cases is found among members of that family: the one being Aryan or Japhetic, and the other what is commonly called Turanian. They are respectively the cases of Iranians or Persians, and of Egypt. And there is a certain amount of resemblance between the two forms of development, which tends to favour the presumption of a common origin.

The "strain to faith," which Professor Cheyne regards as unsuited to an early stage in the existence of the race, seems to have been put upon the Egyptians and the Iranians at a very early stage indeed. Perhaps the case of Egypt carries us nearer to the fountainhead of historic time by its certified antiquity. But the date of Zarathustra, or, according to the Latin corruption of the name, Zoroaster, is thrown back by many beyond the reputed age even of the Egyptian remains. The modern Parsees bring him down to about 550 B.C.; but Drs. Haug and West point out that the movement, which he led, is noticed in the earlier Vedas, and conceive it not unreasonable to place him as a contemporary of Moses.

The great work of Sir J. Gardner Wilkinson, published in 1837-41, made us familiar with the belief of the Egyptians, not only in a future life, but in a life of future retribution. Their funerals seem to have been celebrated with the utmost pomp of religious

rites.* It is a well-known and at least plausible opinion, that the skilled preservation of the mummy was intended to conserve the remains in a condition fit for renewed occupation by their former owner. On the Monuments, a procession of boats cross, from Thebes, the Lake of the Dead, and at the necropolis the body is set up in the ancestral sepulchre. The final judgment is held before Osiris, no sinecurist like Aïdoneus in Homer, but the real working sovereign of the Underworld and its inhabitants; who governs as well as rules. Before him justice was administered, without the law's delay; administered there and then. The actions of the dead man were weighed in the scales of Truth, and recorded by Thoth.† Horos then conducted him into the presence of Osiris, Anubis also taking a share, and the four Genii of Amenti waiting to do their part. It was not dread of disgrace, says Wilkinson,‡ which the Egyptians were taught to look upon as the principal inducement to virtue, but the fear of that final judgment, which awaited them in a future state, and which was to deal with their omissions as well as with their crimes. The all-scrutinising eye of the Deity penetrated into the secrets of the heart; and, as the rewards of the good were beyond conception, so were the punishments of the bad, who were doomed to a transmigration into the forms of the most detested animals. The evidence of their belief is to be found amply recorded upon the oldest among their monuments.§ In later times, the features of ritual and presentation were perhaps less strongly impressed upon the masses, but the

* 'Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians,' by Sir J. Gardner Wilkinson, Second Series, vol. iii. plates 83-88.

† Wilkinson, iii. ix.-xi.

‡ *Ibid.* ii. 438.

§ *Ibid.* i. 211.

tenet continued to be acknowledged by the Egyptians, and it seems sufficiently clear that from them the doctrine of immortality was learned by Pythagoras and Plato.*

Let us now turn to the testimony, perhaps less remarkable, of the Zoroastrian religion. In the person of its great teacher, it was mainly based, says Haug, on Monotheism,† although the *motor*, or evil principle, was present with that of good in Ahuramasda, or Ormuzd, himself.‡ He taught a future life which was to succeed the present one: nor did he hold survival only, but retribution, and likewise the resurrection of the body.§ On the third night after death, the soul of the dead man approaches the bridge of Chinvat (or assembling), and is contended for by Deities on one side, and Devas on the other, while he is examined by Ormuzd himself as to his conduct in the flesh. The pure soul passes the bridge, with a company of its fellows, and an escort of the blessed ones, into heaven.

“But the souls, which come to the bridge full of terror and sick, find no friend there: the evil spirits, Vizaresha by name, lead them bound down into the place of the dead; into the darkness, the dwelling of the Druj.”||

Thus the Persian religion had a developed doctrine of immortality, like that of Egypt; though they were shut out by their rejection, in the early stages, of imagery and ritual from using those means of stamping it on the general mind, which were so freely employed by the Egyptians on their monuments. Nor can we

* Wilkinson in Rawlinson's 'Herodotos,' at ii. 123.

† Haug, p. 301.

‡ Page 303.

§ Pages 217, 311-313.

|| Duncker, 'History of Antiquity,' b. ii. ch. vii.: from the Vendidad.

doubt that the belief in immortality continued to hold its place in the authoritative standards of the religion, for we understand that it is cherished by the Parsees at the present day as a practical tenet. Whether it had not lapsed long ago from its position of influence may be doubtful. At any rate, a passage which we find in Herodotos seems to suggest a change of that character under the Achæmenid sovereigns of Persia. Cambyses, absent from his capital, had put to death his brother Smerdis. The murdered man was personated by an impostor, who proclaimed himself king, and sent a herald to make the proclamation in the camp. Cambyses at once challenged on the subject the person whom he had sent to commit the murder. This was Prexaspes, who replied by saying, "If the dead rise again, then indeed you may expect also to meet Astyages the Mede; but if things continue as they have been, you need have no anticipation of trouble from that quarter."*

Prexaspes spoke with the object of removing alarm from the mind of the king. This speech indicates a decline; and deterioration had also been manifested in other great articles of the religion of Zoroaster. First, it had been developed into an absolute dualism.† Each of the two contending powers was surrounded with a council of six members, over which he simply presided, like a moderator in a presbytery. Under the sacerdotal and ritualistic system of the Magi, as Duncker ‡

* Herod. iii. 62, misquoted, as I conceive, by Duncker (vol. v. p. 181, Abbott's translation). The text runs: *Εἰ μὲν νῦν οἱ τεθνεώτες ἀνεστéασι . . . εἰ δ' ἔστι ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ, κ.τ.λ.* I note the tone and spirit, as well as the words.

† Haug, p. 305.

‡ Book vii. ch. vii. Abbott's translation, p. 161 of vol. v.

assures us, Ormuzd himself was represented as offering sacrifices to Mithra and others; actual images of the deities were fashioned under the first Artaxerxes;* and Artaxerxes II., falsifying the account of Herodotos,† erected a temple, as well as statues, to Anakita at Ecbatana.‡

To conclude. Both the conservation of the belief through so many centuries, and the immense force with which it seems to have acted on the public mind at the earliest epochs, stand in singular contrast, as to this great article, with the Mosaic system: nor do I see how we can refuse to recognise a sublime agency for the preservation of truth in the one case, as well as in the other. The God of revelation is the God of nature. The means employed may be different, but the aim is the same. And when the Redeemer, standing in Judæa, brings life and immortality fully into light, He propounds a doctrine already not without venerable witness in the conscience and tradition of mankind.

* Duncker, 'History of Antiquity,' b. vii. ch. vii. p. 176.

† *Ibid.* p. 177.

‡ Herod. i. 131.

XIII.

SOLILOQUIUM AND POSTSCRIPT.

I.—SOLILOQUIUM.

May, 1896.

[The following paper, by MR. GLADSTONE, was communicated by HIS GRACE THE ARCHBISHOP OF YORK to the London newspapers, with a request for its publication.]

THE question of the validity of Anglican Orders might seem to be of limited interest if it were only to be treated by the amount of any immediate, practical, and external consequences likely to follow upon any discussion or decision that might now be taken in respect to it. For the clergy of the Anglican communions, numbering between 30,000 and 40,000, and for their flocks, the whole subject is one of settled solidity. In the Oriental Churches there prevails a sentiment of increased and increasing friendliness towards the Anglican Church, but no question of actual intercommunion is likely at present to arise, while, happily, no system of proselytism exists to set a blister on our mutual relations. In the Latin Church, which from its magnitude and the close tissue of its organization overshadows all Western Christendom, these Orders, so far as they have been noticed, have been commonly disputed, or denied, or

treated as if they were null. A positive condemnation of them, if viewed dryly in its letter, would do no more than harden the existing usage of reordination in the case—which at most periods has been a rare one—of Anglican clergy who might seek admission to the clerical order in the Roman Church.

But very different indeed would be the moral aspect and effect of a formal, authorized investigation of the question at Rome, to whichever side the result might incline. It is to the last degree improbable that a ruler of known wisdom would at this time put in motion the machinery of the Curia for the purpose of widening the breach which severs the Roman Catholic Church from a communion which, though small in comparison, yet is extended through the large and fast-increasing range of the English-speaking races, and which represents, in the religious sphere, one of the most powerful nations of European Christendom. According to my reading of history, that breach is indeed already a wide one, but the existing schism has not been put into stereotype by any anathema, or any express renunciation of communion, on either side. As an acknowledgment of Anglican Orders would not create intercommunion, so a condemnation of them would not absolutely excommunicate; but it would be a step, and even morally a stride, towards excommunication, and it would stand as a practical affirmation of the principle that it is wise to make religious differences between the Churches of Christendom more conspicuous to the world, and also to bring them into a state of the highest fixity, so as to enhance the difficulty of approaching them at any future time in the spirit of reconciliation. From such a point of view, an inquiry resulting in a

proscription of Anglican orders would be no less important than deplorable.

But the information which I have been allowed, through the kindness of Lord Halifax, to share, altogether dispels from my mind every apprehension of this kind, and convinces me that if the investigations of the Curia did not lead to a favourable result wisdom and charity would in any case arrest them at such a point as to prevent their becoming an occasion and a means of embittering religious controversy.

I turn, therefore, to the other alternative, and assume, for the sake of argument, that the judgment of the examining tribunal would be found either to allow upon all points the preponderance of the contentions on behalf of validity, or at the least to place beyond controversy a portion of the matters which enter into the essence of the discussion. I will for the present take it for granted that these fall under three heads:—

- (1) The external competency of the Consecrators.
- (2) The external sufficiency of the Commission they have conferred.
- (3) That sufficiency of intention which the eleventh Canon of the Council of Trent appears to require.

Under the first head, the examination would, of course, include, in addition to the consecration of Parker, and the competency of his consecrators, the several cases in which consecrators outside the English line have participated in the consecrations of Anglican bishops, and have in this manner furnished independent grounds for the assertion of validity. Even the dismissal from the controversy of any one of these three heads would be in the nature of an advance towards

concord, and would be so far a reward for the labours of his Holiness, Pope Leo XIII., in furtherance of truth and peace. But I may be permitted to contemplate for a moment, as possible or likely, even the full acknowledgment that, without reference to any other real or supposed points of controversy, the simple abstract validity of Anglican consecrations is not subject to reasonable doubt.

And now I must take upon me to speak in the only capacity in which it can be warrantable for me to intervene in a discussion properly belonging to persons of competent authority. That is, the capacity of an absolutely private person, born and baptized in the Anglican Church, accepting his lot there, as is the duty of all who do not find that she has forfeited her original and inherent privilege and place. I may add that my case is that of one who has been led by the circumstances both of his private and of his public career, to a life-long and rather close observation of her character, her fortunes, and the part she has to play in the grand history of Redemption. Thus it is that her public interests are also his personal interests, and that they require or justify what is no more than his individual thought upon them.

He is not one of those who look for an early restitution of such a Christian unity as that which marked the earlier history of the Church. Yet he even cherishes the belief that work may be done in that direction, which, if not majestic or imposing, may nevertheless be legitimate and solid, and this by the least as well as by the greatest.

It is the Pope who, as the first Bishop of Christendom, has the noblest sphere of action; but the humblest of

the Christian flock has his place of daily duty, and, according as he fills it, helps to make or mar every good and holy work.

In this character the writer has viewed with profound and thankful satisfaction, during the last half century and more, the progressive advance of a great work of restoration in Christian doctrine. It has not been wholly confined within his own country, to the Anglican communion, but it is best that he should speak of that which has been most under his eye. Within these limits, it has not been confined to doctrine, but has extended to Christian life and all its workings. The aggregate result has been that it has brought the Church of England from a state externally of halcyon calm, but inwardly of deep stagnation, to one in which, while buffeted more or less by external storms, subjected to some peculiar and searching forms of trial, and even now by no means exempt from internal dissensions, she sees her clergy transformed (for this is the word which may advisedly be used), her vital energies enlarged and still growing in every direction, and a store of bright hopes accumulated that she may be able to contribute her share, and even possibly no mean share, towards the consummation of the work of the Gospel in the world.

Now, the contemplation of these changes by no means uniformly ministers to our pride. They involve large admissions of collective fault. This is not the place, and I am not the proper organ, for exposition in detail. But I may mention the widespread depression of evangelical doctrine, the insufficient exhibition of the person and work of the Redeemer, the coldness and deadness as well as the infrequency of public worship, the

relegation of the Holy Eucharist to impoverished ideas and to the place of one (though doubtless a solemn one) among its occasional incidents; the gradual effacement of Church observance from personal and daily life. In all these respects there has been a profound alteration, which is still progressive, and which, apart from occasional extravagance or indiscretion, has indicated a real advance in the discipline of souls, and in the work of God on behalf of man. A single-minded allegiance to truth sometimes exacts admissions which may be turned to account for the purpose of inflicting polemical disadvantage. Such an admission I must now record. It is not to be denied that a very large part of these improvements has lain in a direction which has diminished the breadth of separation between ourselves and the authorized teaching of the unreformed Church both in East and West, so that, while on the one hand they were improvements in religious doctrine and life, on the other hand they were testimonials recorded against ourselves and in favour of bodies outside our own precinct—that is to say, they were valuable contributions to the cause of Christian reunion.

With sorrow we noted that, so far as the Western Church was concerned, its only public and corporate movements, especially in 1870, seemed to meet the approximations made among us with something of recession from us. But it is not necessary to open further this portion of the subject; *redeunt Saturnia regna*. Certain publications of learned French priests, unsuspected in their orthodoxy, which went to affirm the validity of Anglican ordinations, naturally excited much interest in this country and elsewhere. But there was nothing in them to ruffle the Roman atmosphere,

or invest the subject, in the circles of the Vatican, with the character of administrative urgency.

When, therefore, it came to be understood that Pope Leo XIII. had given his commands that the validity of Anglican ordinations should form the subject of an historical and theological investigation, it was impossible not to be impressed with the profound interest of the considerations brought into view by such a step, if interpreted in accordance with just reason, as an effort towards the abatement of controversial differences.

There was indeed in my view a subject of thought, anterior to any scrutiny of the question upon its intrinsic merits, which deeply impressed itself upon my mind. Religious controversies do not, like bodily wounds, heal by the genial force of nature. If they do not proceed to gangrene and to mortification, at least they tend to harden into fixed facts, to incorporate themselves with law, character, and tradition, nay, even with language; so that at last they take rank among the *data* and presuppositions of common life, and are thought as inexpugnable as the rocks of an iron-bound coast. A poet of ours describes the sharp and total severance of two early friends:—

“They parted, ne’er to meet again,
But never either found another
To free the hollow heart from paining.
They stood aloof, the scars remaining,
Like cliffs, which had been rent asunder,
A dreary sea now rolls between.”*

Let us remember that we are now far advanced in the fourth century since the Convocation of Canterbury,

* Coleridge’s ‘Christabel.’

under Warham in 1531, passed its canon or resolution on the Royal Governorship of the Church.

How much has happened during those centuries to inflame the strife, how little to abate or quench it! What courage must it require in a Pope, what an elevation above all the levels of stormy partisanship, what genuineness of love for the whole Christian flock, whether separated or annexed, to enable him to approach the huge mass of hostile and still burning recollections in the spirit, and for the purposes, of peace!

And yet, that is what Pope Leo XIII. has done, first in entertaining the question of this inquiry, and secondly, in determining and providing, by the infusion both of capacity and of impartiality into the investigating tribunal, that no instrument should be overlooked, no guarantee omitted for the probable attainment of the truth. He who bears in mind the cup of cold water administered to "one of these little ones" will surely record this effort stamped in its very inception as alike arduous and blessed.

But what of the advantage to be derived from any proceeding which shall end, or shall reduce within narrower bounds, the debate upon Anglican Orders? I will put upon paper, with the utmost deference to authority and better judgment, my own personal and individual, and, as I freely admit, very insignificant reply to the question.

The one controversy which, according to my deep conviction, overshadows, and in the last resort absorbs, all others is the controversy between faith and unbelief. It is easy to understand the reliance which the loyal Roman Catholic places upon the vast organization and imposing belief and action of His Church as his provision

for meeting the emergency. But I presume that even he must feel that the hundreds of millions who profess the name of Christ without owning the authority of His Church must count for something in the case, and that the more he is able to show their affirmative belief to stand in consonance with his, the more he strengthens both the common cause—for surely there is a common cause—and his own particular position.

If, out of every hundred professing Christians, ninety-nine assert amidst all their separate and clashing convictions their belief in the central doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, will not every member of each particular Church or community be forward to declare—will not the candid unbeliever be disposed freely to admit, that this unity amidst diversity is a great confirmation of the faith, and a broad basis on which to build our hopes of the future?

I now descend to a level which, if lower than that of these transcendent doctrines, is still a lofty level.

The historical transmission of the truth by a visible Church with an ordained constitution is a matter of profound importance according to the belief and practice of fully three-fourths of Christendom. In these three-fourths I include the Anglican Churches, which are probably required in order to make them up.

It is surely better for the Roman and also the Oriental Church to find the Churches of the Anglican succession standing side by side with them in the assertion of what they deem an important Christian principle, than to be obliged to regard them as mere pretenders in this behalf, and *pro tanto* to reduce the “cloud of witnesses” willing and desirous to testify on behalf of the principle. These considerations of

advantage must of course be subordinated to historic truth, but for the moment advantage is the point with which I deal.

I attach no such value to these reflections as would warrant my tendering them for the consideration of any responsible person, much less of one laden with the cares and responsibilities of the highest position in the Christian Church.

On the other hand, there is nothing in them which requires that they should shrink from the light. They simply indicate the views of one who has passed a very long life in rather intimate connection with the Church of this country, with its rulers, its members, and its interests. I may add that my political life has brought me much into contact with those independent religious communities which supply an important religious factor in the religious life of Great Britain, and which, speaking generally, while they decline to own the authority either of the Roman or of the National Church, yet still allow to what they know as the established religion no inconsiderable hold upon their sympathies.

In conclusion, it is not for me to say what will be the upshot of the proceedings now in progress at Rome. But, be their issue what it may, there is, in my view, no room for doubt as to the attitude which has been taken by the actual Head of the Roman Catholic Church in regard to them. It seems to me an attitude in the largest sense paternal, and while it will probably stand among the latest recollections of my lifetime, it will ever be cherished with cordial sentiments of reverence, of gratitude, and of high appreciation.

II.—POSTSCRIPT.

THE readers of this foregoing paper will find that its purport is capable of being briefly summed up as follows :

1. The immediate question concerned in the inquiry spontaneously instituted last year by Pope Leo XIII., that is to say, the opinion of the Roman See on the validity of the commission now given to Anglican clergy, is intrinsically of small importance.

2. But by way of significance it is important, both on the negative and on the positive side.

3. On the positive side, after all that has happened during the last (nearly) four centuries, the spontaneous effort of a Pope to deal with a controverted matter in a spirit of approximation and of peace, was a step full of advantage to the cause of religion, and entitled the high person taking it to the warmest and most grateful acknowledgments.

4. And that, negatively, an authoritative condemnation of what every Roman theologian has hitherto been free to support would be a grave evil in hardening and widening religious discord.

5. That on every ground of sense and prudence we might be certain that the Pope had secured himself against such a frustration of his purposes, and therefore was entitled to be regarded as having struck a great stroke in the interest of unity and concord.

The language of my paper seems fairly adapted to such a state of facts. But it is entirely dislocated by the events as they now stand before us. For we now know that the inquiry, supposed to be free, was in reality fettered by the condition that it should not bring into question any prior condemnatory utterance

of the Roman See; that the whole subject had been already decided by such condemnatory utterances; and that, in the opinion of Rome, the commission of the Anglican clergy is wholly valueless and null. It appears, therefore, that no Roman writer may henceforward defend the reverse proposition, on which he has heretofore been entirely free. In the face of this sentence of wrath, which I leave to be dealt with * on its merits by those competent to the task, we have still before us the good intentions of the Pope, which have undergone so sad a miscarriage. For one, I believe in those intentions, as fully as before. With regard to his adaptation of means to ends, that is a different matter. A man of good intentions, desirous to warm a house, may, by happening to make the fire on the floor instead of in the grate, burn it to the ground. What I desire now to do is to part company altogether from the excellent person who at the moment fills the Roman chair, and to consider his Bull, or Brief, *Apostolicæ Curæ*, simply as an historical event, and in its due relation to other historical events. I will not delay even to point out how easy it would have been, if positive good could not on this occasion have been done, to relegate the question to farther and future examination, as Pope Gregory XVI. wisely attempted to do when the ardour of Lamennais, in 1831, sought to force him into an alliance with the famous *Avenir*, which he did not dare to undertake.†

* It has now been dealt with by the Reply of the two archbishops in an exposition which I believe has entirely satisfied the members of the Anglican Church.—W. E. G., March 26, 1897.

† I burden this paper with only one word of personal explanation. My intervention in this matter would have been wholly unwarrantable, had it been gratuitous. The *Soliloquium* was not written until (to my

The century, which is now drawing to its close, has been one famous for the material and political developments which it has exhibited. But it awakens interests yet more profound in connection with the moral and spiritual destinies of man. I write entirely from one defined and immovable point of view. According to my mind, the whole interests of the human race eventually depend upon one question, the question of belief ; as, again, belief is summed up in Christianity, and Christianity in Christ ; He is for us the true Alpha and the true Omega. I am not now inquiring as to the width of the precinct where the traces of His presence and power may be found, but only laying the ground for my contention ; which is, that every measure, and every movement, in matters of religion, without any exception, ought to be ultimately tried by its tendency to bring mankind nearer to Christ, or to remove them farther from Him. But here I must insert a word to obviate misunderstanding. I do not for a moment separate belief from conduct. But belief is, for the race, not the individual, as the rule, not as the exception, the rule and source of conduct. Christian belief is itself a means to an end. It carries in its bosom the only true and enduring type of full moral excellence ; and the life of belief lies in this, that by means of it we are to become assimilated with Him in whom we believe.

great surprise) I had received from Rome the tidings that, in the highest ecclesiastical quarters, a declaration of the kind from me was *vivement désiré*. Further, I wrote to an old friend, holding a distinguished position in the Italian Church, a letter couched in terms not less warm than those of the *Soliloquium* ; and I received through him in return, from the official representative of his Holiness and on his behalf, a most gracious acknowledgment, the terms of which I feel myself authorized to publish should it be demanded.

The age has been what may be rudely termed an Armageddon age; not indeed exhibiting the stages of the great battle between faith and unfaith, but the marshalling on either side of the forces with a view to some decisive encounter. On the one hand, immense additions have been made to secular and scientific knowledge; the whole of which ought, of course, to be claimed as effectually auxiliary to the grand truth of all, the truth of Christ. They are, however, so generally and loudly boasted, by those who deny the authority of religion, as their best allies, that they stand in the minds of multitudes as forming the heaviest artillery which is to clear Christianity off the field. And it must be admitted that not a few among believers have failed to give them that uncompromising and hearty welcome, which would have been the best preservative against so mischievous an error. I may be asked, Where, upon my showing, lie the reasons for alarm on behalf of religion, and of the interest of mankind in it? I answer that they lie partly in imperfect or perverted ideas among religionists themselves as to the proper effects of science and research; secondly, they lie in a less suspected but far more dangerous quarter. The enormous increase in the material comforts and conveniences of common life, and a proportionate multiplication of human desires and appetites, have cast a heavy weight into the scale, in which things seen and temporal are weighed against things unseen and eternal. Thirdly, it must be added that there is a large and palpable decay of what may be called traditional or hereditary religion; a form of character and observance unsatisfactory in itself, but which has for a long time constituted in multitudes of cases a holding-ground in

the individual soul, available for further and more vital advances, but now lost without a substitute.

On the other hand, the century has witnessed a powerful and extensive revival of religious influences, both personal and corporate, if not throughout the whole of the professedly Christian body, yet in very large and important portions of it; for example, in the Latin Church generally, and throughout the English-speaking race, together covering considerably more than a moiety of Christendom, and likewise constituting those portions of it which are in the most direct contact with rebellious elements and most visibly summoned "to the help of the Lord against the mighty." So far, then, it would appear that these portions of the Church are the portions to which the very highest interests of mankind are at the present time, not indeed exclusively, but principally confided, and in whose hands the question of questions mainly lies.

But it is patent to every eye that what I am here rudely describing as a Christian host, engaged with a community of design in the highest of all enterprises, the promotion of the Kingdom of Christ, is in fact bitterly and sharply divided within itself. So much so, indeed, that great numbers of its members seem to be wholly unconscious that there is a community of interest and work pervading the whole body. This weighty fact is by multitudes either forgotten or unknown. Some among them, indeed, both Protestant and Roman, appear to think that their holiest duty and their chief concern lies, not in putting down the spirit of unbelief or the spirit of the world, but in combating and exposing the errors, real or supposed, which they detect in some Christian teaching, and in the work known as that of proselytism.

It would be painful, and it is unnecessary, to point to the sections of Christians among whom this is most observable; but my desire and object are to protest broadly against their methods, which in substance go to deny that there is a common belief among Christians, and that, in the face of the unbelief of the day, the interest of this common belief is the highest of all Christian interests in the world of thought.

Can there, in the first place, be any doubt as to the existence of this common belief? The whole of the unreformed Church, Eastern and Western, continues to recite, in terms which are absolutely identical except as to an expression declared by its interpolators to imply no difference of doctrine, the whole of the Nicene or Constantinopolitan creed. The Anglican Churches do precisely the same. It is only when we come to the mode of the manifestation of the Holy Ghost, or the visibility and historical succession of the Church, and to the relation between Baptism and the forgiveness of sins, that the Reformed Churches which are not Episcopal, are either equivocal in their agreement with, or patently dissent from, the large majority of Christendom. I do not dissemble the importance, or the lamentable character, of the discord thus established. But this can be no good reason for exaggerating its amount, or failing to observe how large a region it leaves untouched.

As Möhler showed in his *Symbolik*, it affects Christianity on its human side. But the doctrine of the Trinity, and of the redemption of the world by an Incarnate Saviour, solidly built up in the earliest and severest struggles of the Church, remain unaffected by it. Although the external and historical provision for

the reunion of individual souls to God be disowned, yet Christian ministry, rites, and discipline are upheld, and are so exercised as to result on a very large scale in the formation of a true life of faith and love. The existence of this system, the largeness of its scale, its resolute activity, and the signs of solidity and durability which it exhibits, have given it a place among those cardinal facts of Christian and world-wide history which must, as one would suppose, strike the eye of the dullest among observers.

We have it, then, as a fixed and undeniable fact that, among Christians unanimity prevails with regard to the great central facts of the Divine Revelation, and that the controversies among them, however important and distressing, lie upon a less exalted plane. In the face, then, of the assailants of religion, there is a broad ground to occupy. But it does not cover the entire field of battle; and as the divisions of the Christian Church are its chief source of weakness in the contest, must we not deem those happy who, without compromising truth, seek to make that ground of union wider still? From whence it must follow that unhappy is the lot of all, however excellent, whose policy and conduct goes to narrow it.

I now turn to a new and interesting line of observation. It is one and not the least salient point of religious history for the nineteenth century, that it has been distinguished, in a degree never before known, by henotic or unifying tendencies, and that these tendencies have manifested themselves among many of the religious bodies whom the convulsions of the sixteenth century left in a state of severance from the Roman obedience and from the larger portion of the West.

Chief among these manifestations, undoubtedly, is that known by the name of the Oxford movement. It has altered in an important manner the whole exterior face of religion in this country. It has reimpresed upon the clerical character a stamp which had been very largely effaced. Even doctrinal truths have been brought back by it into brighter and clearer consciousness. It is legible and palpable, not in Great Britain alone, but in the United States, and in our groups of colonies, from their magnitude almost continental, throughout the world. What is, perhaps, even more singular is that the same pulsations, which have throbbed under the congenial shelter afforded by the ancient Apostolical framework of the Anglican communion, have also been felt among our Presbyterian and Nonconforming brethren in regard both to doctrine and to ritual. These changes have been in part, but by no means wholly, external. They have been wholly in an affirmative direction ; and, so far as they have gone, they have held out, even to Christendom at large, a right hand of peace and friendship. But this, be it observed, all proceeds from the English-speaking race, which is multiplying upon the earth with such rapidity ; and even from some portions of that race which might have been expected to move, not in the direction of unity, but of widened and embittered schism.

Let us halt, then, for a moment, to take the measure of the situation. There is a great battle raging between belief and unbelief, the greatest of all issues for the interest of mankind. Believers, though divided among themselves on points of grave importance, have yet by the loving providence of God been kept at one upon those points which seem the most important, because they lie

nearest the centre. There is thus established a common interest of vital and paramount weight which pervades this whole Christian host. Approximations have been made among very large sections of Western Christendom, towards the older or unreformed communions. Beyond all doubt, these approximations have been met, among the old and truly venerable Oriental Churches, with a generous and sisterly feeling, exhibited in a multitude of secondary though significant forms, of which alone the situation as yet admits. But it is more material to inquire what, in these interesting and surely promising circumstances, the Latin Church has been about. It is with her that, for good or for evil, we are most concerned, as she is the largest, the most active, and (above all) geographically the nearest of them all.

We had a title to expect much from her on these grounds : for, as she claims an universal maternity, it may well be supposed that there must escape from her, from time to time, some tokens of a mother's love.

I begin with a matter comparatively small. In all the bulls, briefs, encyclicals, and other multifarious products of Papal thought during the bygone generation, I have never noticed one kindly syllable of appreciation of these approximations. Glorification of the Roman See and its prerogatives, touching complaints of the blindness and deadness of mankind to its attractions, assurances of the gushing tenderness with which each successive Pontiff yearns for the day when we are to prostrate ourselves at his feet, all these, of course, untainted by the smallest admission of any error or shortcoming on the side of Rome itself, we have had in abundance; but of appreciation, which need not be the less kindly because justly guarded, of this I have seen never a word.

In the absence of such efforts as might have been cheaply made by the Roman Church through the verbal medium, we have the less cause to wonder that no effort has been made, synodically or by the authority of the Court of Rome itself, to soften any of the difficulties raised in our minds by tenets or usages of the papal churches, through those kindly mitigating explanations which, even if they fall short of being effectual, yet have a true value of their own as indications of a pacific spirit. For such indications always have a tendency to beget their like, and may, without offering ripe results, carry in them the seed and harbinger of future good. Not an atom of effort in this direction, so far as I am aware, has the nineteenth century produced.

Barren as have been our results thus far, there seems to remain behind one expectation on which we might rather confidently have relied. We might have argued thus: Ever since the Council of Trent and the Catechism it produced, the Popes, if they have done nothing to narrow the range of our controversies, at least have for a long time done nothing to widen it. If the positive efforts of the Roman See towards Christian unity have been null, if the contributions of Roman Catholic writers to our defence against unbelievers have been meagre, at least they have abstained from all attempts to tamper with the Christian faith, and aggravate existing difficulties by laying down new utterances in controverted matter of a nature largely to exasperate our existing differences, and abate the hopes of every lover of peace.

Amiable and kindly, but accessible almost beyond example to flattery, Pius IX. leaves behind him painful recollections alike in the temporal and in the spiritual sphere. A large contributor to the revolutionary

movement of 1848, he passed the bulk of his long pontificate as a leading reactionist. He offered to the extreme party in the Curia an opportunity it was sure not to neglect. In 1854 a pilot balloon was sent up in the shape of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin. As this did not seem gravely to ruffle the surface, it was followed in 1870 by the portentous Council of the Vatican ; which alienated from the Roman Church many of its most able, learned, and loyal supporters, and stirred the indignation even of such a man as Newman, though he believed in the Papal infallibility. The decree itself was indeed couched in terms which, from different points of view, might be held to render it either innocent or senseless ; for no man alive knows what are the conditions necessary to make an *ex cathedrâ* declaration, or how many and what such declarations exist, or even whether such a curiosity is to be found in the whole range of Church history. But it is not so with the twin declaration of the Council, which lays it down that the Pope is never to be resisted in any matter, by any persons, or under any circumstance ; and thus reduces the whole Latin Church, nearly a moiety of Christendom, to an ignominious servitude.

Such is the principal contribution which, amidst the tempest of unbelief, and with every motive of duty and policy recommending conciliation or abstention, the great Latin Church of our time has offered to the concord and union of Christendom.

The recent declaration of the Patriarch and Church of Constantinople has shown how fearfully the Council of 1870 has widened the rent between Eastern and Western Christendom. As for the Protestants of the Continent, and the great and growing Churches of the

English-speaking race, it is, I fear, obvious that, even had all the old controversies of the sixteenth century been adjusted, the Vatican Council supplies, for us as well as for the East, an insurmountable barrier to the unity of Christendom. It is only with a bleeding heart that such words can be written ; but surely we cannot, in the face of Scripture, history, and reason, give over the determination of our faith to the successor of Liberius, of Vigilius, and of Honorius.

There remained, however, in the minds of some a hope that, with the demise of Pius IX. a new era might begin ; that perhaps modes might be devised for retrieving some of his miscarriages ; that, at the very least, no new one would be added to the list. And now has come this damnatory Bull against English orders, a *telum imbellis sine ictu* as to its effect, but only too clear in its meaning, and breathing in every line the sentiment, " All ye who covet union, look for it anywhere except to Rome." And so by an authentic act the Pontificate of Leo XIII. takes its place with that of Pius in the list of reactionary Pontificates.

Yes, " in every line," including those lines in which the Pope assures us of the unbounded tenderness of his heart, and the intensity of that yearning with which he longs once more to number us among the sheep within his fold. As it is impossible to suspect so good a man of speaking an untruth, we are compelled to believe that he thinks there is some value, some healing efficacy, in these declarations. They tempt us to suppose that, in his loftiness and pride of place, he cherishes a profound contempt for our understandings. We do not consider that deeds of hostility are countervailed by words of beneficence, or a common assault by a compliment. The


barriers he would have us surmount are indeed many. At present it may be enough to say we cannot be content with mutilated sacraments, with an imprisoned Bible,* with Aristotelian metaphysics exalted into definitions of faith, with the transfer to any human tribunal of an allegiance due to God alone. These Papal utterances, their sincerity notwithstanding, are for us (so far as I know) no siren songs; they are charged with an ineffable emptiness, and pass by us like the idle wind.

But let me not conclude in terms of controversy. We are all bound as Christians to desire the well-being of Christendom; and herein not least of the great Latin Church. Little as this review may tend to inspire sanguine expectations, let us heartily desire and pray that she and we alike may fail wherever we are at fault, but that in every good design and effort, she may prosper to her heart's content.


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
March 26, 1897.

* Those who may deem this expression harsh should read the recently published articles by Dr. Wright on the melancholy experience of M. Lasserre in connection with his translation of the New Testament into French.



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